CHAPTER XIII.

TRENCH-WARFARE MATERIAL.

Like many of the other war implements produced by the Ordnance

Department for use in France, the weapons employed in fighting from

the trenches were entirely novel to American industry; and in the

production of them we find the same story of the difficulties in the

adoption of foreign designs, of the development of our own designs, of

the delays encountered and mistakes made in equipping a new industry

from the ground up, but, finally, of the triumphant arrival at quantity

production in a marvelously brief time, considering the obstacles which

had to be overcome.

When the movements of armies in the great war ceased and they were

held in deadlock in the trenches, the fighters at once began devising

weapons with which they could kill each other from below ground. For

this purpose they borrowed from the experience of man running back to

time immemorial. They took a leaf from the book of the Roman fire-ball

throwers and developed the hand grenade beyond the point to which

it had been brought in the European warfare of the last century.

They called upon an industry which had once existed solely for the

amusement of the people, the fireworks industry, for its golden rain

and rainbow-hued stars for signals with which to talk to each other by

night. Other geniuses of the trenches took empty cannon cartridges and,

setting them up as ground mortars, succeeded in throwing bombs from

them across No Man's Land into the enemy ranks. They even for a time

resurrected the catapult of Trojan days, although this device attained

no great success. But from all such activities new weapons of warfare

sprang, crude at first, but later refined as only modern science and

manufacture could perfect them.

America entered the war when this development of ordnance novelties

had reached an advanced state. It became necessary for us, then, to

make a rapid study of what had been done and then go ahead with our own

production either from foreign designs or with inventions of our own.

To this end in April, 1917, a few days after we declared war with

Germany, the Trench Warfare Section was organized within the Ordnance

Department and given charge of the production of these novelties. The

section did not entirely confine itself to trench-warfare materials,

since one of its chief production activities was concerned with the

manufacture of the various sorts of bombs to be dropped from airplanes.

Also, at the start of its existence it had charge of the production of

implements for fighting with poison gas and flame. Although in large

part this phase of its work was taken away from it in the summer of

1917 and was later placed under the jurisdiction of the newly organized

Chemical Warfare Service, the Trench Warfare Section continued to

conduct certain branches of gas-warfare manufacture, in particular

the production of the famous Livens projectors of gas and also the

manufacture of the portable toxic-gas sets for producing gas clouds

from cylinders.

All in all, the Trench Warfare Section was charged with the

responsibility of producing some 47 devices, every one of them new to

American manufacture and some extremely difficult to make. The backbone

of the program consisted of the production of grenades, both of the

hand-thrown and the rifle-fired variety, trench mortars, trench-mortar

ammunition, pyrotechnics of various sorts, and bombs for the airplanes,

with their sighting and release mechanisms.

In the production of these new devices there arose a new form of

cooperation between Government and private manufacturers under the

tutelage of the Trench Warfare Section. The manufacturers engaged in

the production of various classes of these munition novelties joined

in formal associations. There was a Hand Grenade Manufacturers'

Association, under the capable leadership of William Sparks, president

of the Sparks-Withington Co., of Jackson, Mich.; the Drop Bomb

Manufacturers' Association, headed by J. L. Sinyard, president of A.

O. Smith Corporation, Milwaukee; the Six-inch Trench-mortar Shell

Manufacturers' Association, R. W. Millard, president of Foster-Merriam

Co., Meriden, Conn.; the Rifle Grenade Manufacturers' Association,

under the leadership of F. S. Briggs, president of the Briggs &

Stratton Co., Milwaukee, Wis.; and the Livens Projector Manufacturers'

Association. A similar association of manufacturers engaged in army

contracts existed in the production of small-arms ammunition; but in

no other branch of the Ordnance Department was the development of such

cooperation carried on to the extent of that fathered by the Trench

Warfare Section.

The existence of these associations was of inestimable benefit

in securing the rapid development, standardization for quantity

manufacture, and production of these strange devices. Each association

had its president, its other officers, and its regular meetings. These

meetings were attended by the interested officers of the Trench Warfare

Section. In the meetings the experiments of the manufacturers and the

short-cut methods developed in their shops were freely discussed;

and, if modifications of design were suggested, such questions were

thrashed out in these meetings of practical technicians, and all of the

contractors simultaneously received the benefits.

The Trench Warfare Section produced its results under the handicap of

being low in the priority ratings, many other items of ordnance being

considered in Washington of more importance than the trench-fighting

materials and therefore entitled to first call upon raw materials and

transportation. In the priority lists the leader of 47 trench-warfare

articles, the 240-millimeter mortars, stood twenty-second, and the

others trailed after.

GRENADES.

The first of the trench-warfare weapons with which the rookie soldier

became acquainted was the hand grenade, since this, at least in its

practice or dummy form, was supplied to the training camps in this

country. To all intents and purposes the hand grenade was a product

of the war against Germany, although grenades had been more or less

used since explosives existed. All earlier grenades had been crude

devices with only limited employment in warfare, but in the three years

preceding America's participation in the war the grenade had become a

carefully built weapon.

The extent of our production of hand grenades may be seen in the fact

that when the effort was at its height 10,000 workers were engaged

exclusively in its manufacture. The firing mechanism of the explosive

grenades which we built was known as the Bouchon assembly. In the

production of this item 19 of every 20 workers were women. In fact no

other item in the entire ordnance field was produced so exclusively by

women. Incidentally, at no time during the war was there a strike in

any grenade factory.

For a long time in the trenches of France only one type of hand grenade

was used. This was the so-called defensive grenade, built of stout

metal which would fly into fragments when the interior charge exploded.

As might be expected, such a weapon was used only by men actually

within the trenches, the walls of which protected the throwers from the

flying fragments. But, as the war continued, six other distinct kinds

of grenades were developed, America herself contributing one of the

most important of them; and during our war activities we were engaged

in manufacturing all seven.

The defensive, or fragmentation, type grenade was the commonest,

most numerous, and perhaps, the most useful of all of them. Another

important one, however, was that known as the offensive grenade, and

it was America's own contribution to trench warfare. The body of the

offensive grenade was made of paper, so that the deadly effect of it

was produced by the flame and concussion of the explosion itself. It

was quite sure to kill any man within 3 yards of it when it went off,

but it was safe to use in the open offensive movements, since there

were no pieces of metal to fly back and hit the thrower.

A third development was known as the gas grenade. It was built of sheet

metal, and its toxic contents were effective in making enemy trenches

and dugouts uninhabitable. A fourth, a grenade of similar construction,

was filled with phosphorus, instead of gas, and was known as the

phosphorus grenade. This grenade scattered burning phosphorus over

an area 3 to 5 yards in diameter and released a dense cloud of white

smoke. In open attacks upon machine-gun nests phosphorus grenades were

thrown in barrages to build smoke screens for the attacking forces.

As a fifth class there was a combination hand and rifle grenade, a

British device adopted in our program. The sixth class of grenades

was known as the incendiary type. These were paper bombs filled with

burning material and designed for use against structures intended to

be destroyed by fire. Finally, in the seventh class were the thermit

grenades, built of terneplate and filled with a compound containing

thermit, which develops an intense heat while melting. Thermit grenades

were used principally to destroy captured guns. One of them touched off

in the breech of a cannon would fuse the breech-block mechanism and

destroy the usefulness of the weapon.

All of these grenades except the incendiary grenades used the same

firing mechanism, and the incendiary grenade firing mechanism was the

standard one modified in a single particular.

The earliest American requirement in this production was for defensive

grenades, of the fragmentation type. Our first estimate was that we

would need 21,000,000 of these for actual warfare and 2,000,000 of the

unloaded type for practice and training work. But, as the war continued

and the American plans developed in scale, we saw we would require a

much greater quantity than this; and orders were finally placed for a

total of 68,000,000 live grenades and over 3,000,000 of the practice

variety.

By August 20, 1917, the Trench Warfare Section had developed the design

and the drawings for the defensive grenade. The first contract--for

5,000 grenades--was let to the Caskey-Dupree Co. of Marietta, Ohio.

This concern was fairly entitled to such preference, because the

experimentation leading up to the design for this bomb was conducted

almost entirely at its plant in Marietta.

Next came an interesting industrial development by a well-known

American concern which had previously devoted its exclusive energy to

the production of high-grade silverware, but which now, as a patriotic

duty, undertook to build the deadly defensive grenades. This was the

Gorham Manufacturing Co. of Providence, R. I. This firm contracted to

furnish complete, loaded grenades, ready for shipment overseas, and was

the only one to build and operate a manufacturing and loading plant.

Elsewhere contracts were let for parts only, these parts to converge

at the assembling plants later; and such orders were rapidly placed

until by the middle of December, 1917, various industrial concerns were

tooling up for a total production of 21,000,000 of these missiles.

The grenade which these contractors undertook to produce was an

American product in its design, although modeled after grenades already

in use at the front. Its chief difference was in the firing mechanism,

where improvements, or what were then thought to be improvements, had

been installed to make it safer in the hands of the soldier than the

grenades then in use at the front. This firing mechanism with its

pivoted lever was, in fact, a radical departure from European practice.

The body of this grenade was of malleable iron, and the grenade

exploded with a force greater than that of any in use in France.

The remodeling of factories, the building of machines, and the

manufacture of tools for this undertaking, pushed forward with

determined speed, was completed in from 90 to 120 days, and by

April almost all of the companies had reached the stage of quantity

production.

And then, on May 9, 1918, came a cablegram from the American

Expeditionary Forces that brought the entire effort to an abrupt halt.

The officers of the American Expeditionary Forces in no uncertain

terms condemned the American defensive grenade. The trouble was that

in our anxiety to protect the American soldier we had designed a

grenade that was too safe. The firing mechanism was too complicated.

In the operation required to touch off the fuse five movements were

necessary on the part of the soldier, and in this the psychology of

a man in battle had not been taken sufficiently into consideration.

The well-known story of the negro soldier who, in practice, threw his

grenade too soon because he could feel it "swelling" in his hand,

applies to most soldiers in battle. In using the new grenade the

American soldier would not go through the operations required to fire

its fuse. Cases came to light, too, showing that in the excitement of

battle the American soldier forgot to release the safety device, thus

giving the German an opportunity to hurl back the unexploded grenade.

As the result of this discovery all production was stopped in the

United States and the ordnance engineers began redesigning the

weapon. The incident meant that 15,000,000 rough castings of grenade

bodies, 3,500,000 assembled but empty grenades and 1,000,000 loaded

grenades had to be salvaged, and that on July 1, 1918, the production

of live fragmentation grenades in this country was represented by

the figure zero. Some of the machinery used in the production of the

faulty grenades was useless and had to be replaced by new, while the

trained forces which had reached quantity production in April had to

be disbanded or transferred to other work while the design was being

changed.

By August 1 the new design had been developed on paper and much of the

new machinery required had been produced and installed in the plants,

which were ready to go ahead immediately with the production. It is

a tribute to the patriotism of the manufacturers who lost time and

money by this change that little complaint was heard from them by the

Government.

In the production of hand grenades the most difficult element of

manufacture and the item that might have held up the delivery of

completed mechanisms was the Bouchon assembly. There was an abundant

foundry capacity in the United States for the production of gray-iron

castings for grenade bodies, and so this part of the program gave

no anxiety. The Bouchon assembly threatened to be the choke point.

In order to assure the success of defensive-grenade production, the

Precision Castings Co. of Syracuse, N. Y., and the Doehler Die Castings

Co. of Toledo, Ohio, and Brooklyn, N. Y., worked their plants 24 hours

a day until they had built up a reserve of Bouchons and screw plugs and

removed all anxiety from that source. The total production of Bouchons

eventually reached the figure 64,600,000.

The first thought of the Ordnance Department was to produce grenades

by the assembling and quantitative method; that is, by the production

of parts in various plants and the assembling of those parts in other

plants. But, due to delay in railway shipments and difficulties due

to priorities, it was discovered that this method of manufacture,

however adaptable it might be to other items in the ordnance program,

was not a good thing in grenade production; and when the war ended the

tendency was all in the direction of having the assembly contractors

produce their own parts either by purchase from subcontractors or by

manufacture in their own plants.

The orders for the redesigned grenades called for the construction of

44,000,000 of them. So rapidly had the manufacturers been able to reach

quantity production this time that a daily rate of 250,000 to 300,000

was attained by November 11, 1918, and by December 6, less than a month

after the fighting stopped, the factories had turned out 21,054,339

defensive grenades.

It should be remembered that the great effort in ordnance production

in this country was directed toward the American offensive expected on

a tremendous scale in the spring of 1919. Had the war continued the

fragmentation grenade program, in spite of the delays encountered in

its development, would have produced a sufficient quantity of these

weapons.

Special consideration is due the following-named firms for their

efforts in developing the production of defensive grenades:

Caskey-Dupree Co., Marietta, Ohio.

Spacke Machine & Tool Co., Indianapolis, Ind.

Stewart-Warner Speedometer Co., Chicago, Ill.

Miami Cycle & Manufacturing Co., Middletown, Ohio.

American Radiator Co., Buffalo, N. Y.

International Harvester Co., Chicago, Ill.

Doehler Die Castings Co., Brooklyn, N. Y.

Precision Castings Co., Syracuse, N. Y.

The American offensive grenade was largely the production of the Single

Service Package Corporation of New York, both in the development of

its design and in its manufacture. The body of this grenade was built

of laminated paper spirally wound and waterproofed by being dipped

in paraffine. The top of this body was a die casting, into which the

firing mechanism was screwed. Practically no changes were made in the

design of this weapon from the time it was first produced, and the

production record is an excellent one.

Our earliest thought was that we would need some 7,000,000 of these

grenades and orders for that quantity of bodies were placed in January

and March, 1918, with the Single Service Package Corporation. Then it

became necessary to discover factories which could produce the metal

caps. The orders for these were first placed with the Acme Die Castings

Co. and the National Lead Casting Co. for 3,375,000 castings from each

concern. But these companies failed to make satisfactory deliveries,

and in May, 1918, a contract for 5,000,000 caps was let to the Doehler

Die Castings Co. which reached quantity production in August. After

that the Single Service Package Corporation, the chief contractor,

forged ahead in its work and on November 11 was producing the bodies

for offensive grenades at the rate of 55,000 to 60,000 daily. By

December 6, 1918, the Government had accepted 6,179,321 completed

bodies. The signing of the armistice brought to an end a project to

build 17,599,000 additional grenades of this type.

The production of gas grenades offered some peculiar difficulties.

We set out at first to produce 3,684,530 of them. By January, 1918,

the engineers of the Ordnance Department had completed the plans and

specifications for the American gas grenade, and on February 12, an

order for 1,000,000 of them was placed with the Maxim Silencer Co., of

Hartford, Conn.

The gas grenades were to be delivered at the filling plants complete

except for the detonator thimbles, which seal both gas and phosphorus

grenades and act as sockets for the firing mechanism. It was seen

that the construction of these thimbles might be a choke point in the

construction of grenades of both types, and orders were early placed

for them--1,500,000 to be delivered by the Maxim Silencer Co. and an

equal quantity by the Bassic Co., of Bridgeport, Conn. On December 6,

1918, these concerns had produced 1,982,731 detonator thimbles.

The body of the gas grenade is built of two sheet-metal cups welded

together to be gas-tight. Since, when we started out on this

production, we did not know what kind of gas would be used or at what

pressure it would be held within the grenade, we set the specifications

to make grenade bodies to hold an air pressure of 200 pounds. The

welding of the cups frequently failed to hold such pressure, so that

the rejections of gas-grenade bodies under this test ran as high as

50 per cent. But in June, 1918, the gas for the grenades had been

developed, and we were thereupon able to reduce the pressure of the

standard test to 50 pounds. Under such a test the bodies readily passed

inspection.

In September, 1918, we let additional contracts for gas

grenades--500,000 to the Evinrude Motor Co., of Milwaukee; 500,000 to

the John W. Brown Manufacturing Co., of Columbus, Ohio; and 400,000 to

the Zenite Metal Co., of Indianapolis.

On November 11 gas grenade bodies were being produced at the rate of

22,000 per day, and the total production up to December 6 was 936,394.

The phosphorus grenade was similar to the gas grenade in construction.

The plans and specifications for this weapon were ready in January,

1918. In February the following contracts were let: Metropolitan

Engineering Co., Brooklyn, N. Y., 750,000; Evinrude Motor Co.,

Milwaukee, 750,000; Zenite Metal Co., Indianapolis, 500,000. On

December 6, 1918, these concerns had delivered a total of 521,948

phosphorus grenade bodies.

The difficulties which had been experienced in the production of gas

grenades were repeated in this project. The Evinrude Co. was especially

quick in getting over the obstacles to quantity production. The

Metropolitan Engineering Co. was already engaged with large orders for

adapters and boosters in the heavy-gun ammunition manufacture for the

Ordnance Department and found that the order for phosphorus grenades

conflicted to a considerable extent with its previous war work. The

matter was thrashed out in the Ordnance Department, which gave the

priority in this plant to the adapters and boosters, with the result

that this firm was able to make only a small contribution to the total

production of phosphorus grenade bodies.

The development of thermit grenades was still in the experimental

stage when the armistice was signed. There was no actual production

in this country of grenades of this character. In October, however,

the development of the grenade in design had reached a stage where we

felt justified in letting a contract for 655,450 die-casting parts to

the Doehler Die Castings Co., at its Toledo plant, and for an equal

number of bodies with firing-mechanism assemblies to the Stewart-Warner

Speedometer Corporation at Chicago.

The incendiary grenade not only did not get out of the development

stage, but even a perfected model was regarded as of doubtful value by

the officers of the American Expeditionary Forces. Nevertheless, the

Chemical Warfare Service was of the opinion that such a grenade should

be worked out, and an order for 81,000 had been given to the Celluloid

Co., of Newark, N. J. Experimental work was progressing satisfactorily

when the armistice was signed.

When the war ended, we were adapting to American manufacture a

combination hand and rifle phosphorus grenade, borrowed from the

English. The body of this grenade was built of terneplate and it had a

removable stem, so that it could be thrown by hand or fired from the

end of a service rifle. The American Can Co. built 1,000 of these to

try out the design and strengthen the weak features.

-----------------------+----------------+--------------+--------------

Article. | Completed to | Completed to |Sent overseas.

| Nov. 8, 1918. |Feb. 1, 1919. |

-----------------------+----------------+--------------+--------------

Dummy hand grenade | 415,870 | 415,870 |

Practice hand grenade | 3,605,864 | 3,605,864 |

Defensive hand grenade | 17,477,245 | 25,312,794 | 516,533

Offensive hand grenade | 5,359,321 | 7,000,000 | 173,136

Gas hand grenade | 635,561 | 1,501,176 | 249,239

Phosphorus hand grenade| 505,192 | 521,948 | 150,600

Thermit hand grenade | | |

-----------------------+----------------+--------------+--------------

NOTE.--In above figures all grenades are unloaded with the

exception of those sent overseas, which were loaded.

RIFLE GRENADES.

In the construction of our rifle grenades there was another unfortunate

experience due to a faulty design. The rifle grenade fits in a holder

at the muzzle of an ordinary service rifle. When the rifle is fired

the bullet passes through a hole in the middle of the grenade, and

the gases of the discharge following the bullet throw the grenade

approximately 200 yards. Any man within 75 yards of an exploding rifle

grenade is likely to be wounded or killed. The rifle grenade is used

both as a defensive and offensive weapon, since the firer is well out

of range of the exploding missile.

In developing a rifle grenade for American manufacture our engineers

adopted the French Viven-Bessiere type. The French service ammunition

is larger than ours, and it was therefore necessary to design our

grenade with a smaller hole. But in the anxiety to produce this weapon

in the shortest time possible the models were not sufficiently tested,

and no consideration was taken of the difference in design between

a French bullet and an American bullet. The result was that the

French grenade did not function well with our ammunition, due to the

splitting of the Springfield bullet as it passed through the grenade.

The result was that in May, 1918, several months after the manufacture

of this grenade had been in progress, the entire undertaking was

canceled pending the development of new designs; and 3,500,000

completed grenades had to be salvaged.

[Illustration: LEFT TO RIGHT--DEFENSIVE HAND GRENADE, OFFENSIVE HAND

GRENADE, GAS HAND GRENADE, PHOSPHORUS HAND GRENADE.]

[Illustration: THROWING A HAND GRENADE. FIRST OPERATION: WITHDRAWING

THE COTTER PIN.]

[Illustration: THROWING A HAND GRENADE. SECOND OPERATION: RELEASING THE

GRENADE AND FIRING LEVER.]

[Illustration: V. B. RIFLE GRENADE, LIVE, MARK 1.]

[Illustration: V. B. RIFLE GRENADE, MARK 1, AND DISCHARGER.]

[Illustration: 6-INCH TRENCH MORTAR SHELL.]

The original contract for rifle grenades had been let to the

Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. of Pittsburgh. This called

for the production of all parts by the Westinghouse Co. and the

assembling of them in the Westinghouse plant to the number of 5,000,000

grenades. But there was such a diversity of material employed in the

manufacture of rifle grenades that succeeding contracts were let for

parts and for assembling separately.

After the rifle grenade had been redesigned new contracts were let

for a total of 30,115,409 of them. In August, a few weeks later, the

daily production of these grenades in the various plants had reached

a total of 130,000 and by the end of October the daily production was

250,000. The goal toward which this production was aiming was the

expected spring offensive of the American Expeditionary Forces in 1919.

We should have met this event adequately because, while only 685,200

American rifle grenades had actually been shipped overseas when the

fighting ceased, we had 20,000,000 of them ready for loading at that

time and the production was already heavy and constantly increasing.

Special consideration is due the following-named firms for their

efforts in developing the production of rifle grenades:

Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., Pittsburgh, Pa.

Briggs & Stratton Co., Milwaukee, Wis.

Holcomb & Hoke, Indianapolis, Ind.

Stewart-Warner Speedometer Corporation, Chicago, Ill.

Cutler-Hammer Manufacturing Co., Milwaukee, Wis.

American Radiator Co., Buffalo, N. Y.

Link-Belt Co., Indianapolis, Ind.

Doehler Die Castings Co., Brooklyn, N. Y.

TOXIC GAS EQUIPMENT.

America entered the war nearly two years after the Germans had made

their first gas attack. In those intervening months gas warfare had

grown to be a science in itself, requiring special organizations with

each army to handle it.

The employment of toxic gas had developed along several lines. The

original attack by the Germans upon the mask-less Canadians at Ypres

had been in the form of a gas cloud from projectors, these latter being

pressure tanks with nozzle outlets. For some time the Germans continued

the use of gas solely by this method. Retaliation on the part of the

allies quickly followed. However, the employment of gas cloud attacks

involved great labor of preparation and was absolutely dependent

upon certain combinations of weather conditions. In consequence, the

launching of a gas attack in this form could not be timed with regard

to other tactical operations. Therefore the allies were put to the

necessity of developing other means of throwing toxic gases, and this

they did by inclosing the gas in shell shot from the big guns of the

artillery, in grenades thrown by hand from the trenches, and--most

effectively of all--by the agency of an ingenious invention of the

British known as the Livens projector.

The Livens projector was deadly in its effect, since it could throw

suddenly and in great quantity gas bombs, or drums, into the enemy's

ranks. It is notable that although the British used this device with

great success throughout much of the latter period of the war, and

though the French and Americans also adopted it and used it freely,

the Germans were never able to discover what the device was that

threw such havoc into their ranks, nor were they ever able to produce

anything that was similar to it. The Livens projector remained a deep

secret until the close of hostilities, and the Government offices in

Washington, where the design was adapted to American manufacture, and

the American plants producing the parts, were always closely guarded

against enemy espionage.

Without going into details of the construction of the Livens projector

it may be said that it was usually fired by electricity in sets of 25

or multiples thereof. The drums, which were cylindrical shell about

24 inches long and 8 inches in diameter, were ejected from long steel

tubes, or barrels, buried in the ground resting against pressed-steel

base plates. At the throwing of an electric switch a veritable rain

of these big shell, as many as 2,500 of them sometimes, with their

lethal contents, would come hurtling down upon the enemy. The Livens

projectors could throw their gas drums nearly a mile.

The projector was entirely a new type of munition for our manufacturers

to handle. The Trench Warfare Section of the Ordnance Department

took up the matter late in 1917 and by May, 1918, had designed the

weapon for home manufacture. Early in June the contracts were allotted

for barrels and gas drums, or shell. The production of barrels was

exclusively in the hands of the National Tube Co., of Pittsburgh, Pa.,

and the Harrisburg Pipe & Pipe-Bending Co., of Harrisburg, Pa. These

companies reached the production stage in August, 1918, and completed

about 63,000 barrels before the armistice was signed. Their respective

plants reached a daily production rate of approximately 600 barrels per

day.

Somewhat later in the spring of 1918 the contracts for base plates, on

which the barrels rest when ready for firing, muzzle covers, and for

various other accessories were closed. Over 100,000 base plates were

produced by the Gier Pressed Steel Co., of Lansing, Mich., and the

American Pulley Co., of Philadelphia, Pa. The Perkins-Campbell Co.,

of Philadelphia, built the muzzle covers, 66,180 of them. Cartridge

cases were manufactured by Art Metal (Inc.), of Newark, N. J., and the

Russakov Can Co., of Chicago, the former producing 288,838 and the

latter 47,511.

[Illustration: EIGHT-INCH LIVENS PROJECTOR, MARK II, WITH POWDER CHARGE

AND SHELL.

Vertical cross section as laid in the ground ready for firing at 45°

elevation.]

[Illustration: EFFECTS OF LIVENS PROJECTOR SHELL.]

The Ensign-Bickford Co., of Simsbury, Conn., produced 334,300 fuses for

Livens shell; the Artillery Fuse Co., of Wilmington, Del., assembled

26,000 firing mechanisms; the E. I. du Pont Co., at its Pompton Lakes

(N. J.) plant, manufactured 20,000 detonators, and 487,350 detonators

were produced by the Aetna Explosives Co., at Port Ewan, N. Y.; while

the American Can Co., at Lowell, Mass., assembled 256,231 firing

mechanisms.

Shear wire pistols were used in the operation of the Livens projector.

The Edison Phonograph Co., of Orange, N. J., produced 181,900 of these,

and the Artillery Fuse Co., of Wilmington, Del., 11,747. The adapters

and boosters of the shell were all built by the John Thompson Press, of

New York. The Waterbury Brass Goods Co., of Waterbury, Conn., made the

fuse casing. Adapters and boosters to the number of 334,500 were turned

out by the former, and 299,900 fuse casings by the latter.

The manufacture of gas drums for the projectors was delayed for some

time because of difficulties in welding certain parts of the drums.

Acetylene and arc welding processes were tried out, and a good many

shell were made by such welding; but the lack of expert welders for

these processes, and the rejections of shell due to leakage in the

welded joints, caused the manufacturer to turn to fire welding, the

process for which had been developed by the Air-tight Steel Tank Co.,

of Pittsburgh, Pa. At the time the armistice was signed the welding

problem had been overcome and the production was going forward at a

rate to meet the requirements of the expected fighting in the spring of

1919. The shell delivered were produced as follows:

By the Federal Pressed Steel Co., of Milwaukee, Wis., 5,609; by the

Pressed Steel Tank Co., also of Milwaukee, 20,536; by the Air-tight

Steel Tank Co., of Pittsburgh, Pa., 600; by the National Tube Co., of

Pittsburgh, 27,098; by the Truscon Steel Co., of Youngstown, Ohio,

19,880. The entire Livens shell program, as it existed in November,

1918, called for the production of 334,000 shell.

TRENCH MORTARS.

The production of trench mortars was not only an important part of our

ordnance program but it was an undertaking absolutely new to American

experience. Not only did we have to produce mortars, but we had to

supply them with shell in great quantities, this latter in itself an

enterprise of no mean proportions.

Some seven different types of mortars were in use when we came into the

war. Our ordnance program contemplated the manufacture of all seven

of them, but we actually succeeded in bringing only four types into

production. These four were the British Newton-Stokes mortars of the

3-inch, 4-inch, and 6-inch calibers, and the French 240-millimeter

mortar, which had also been adopted by the British. As usual in the

adoption of foreign devices, we had to redesign these weapons to make

them adaptable to American shop methods. We encountered much difficulty

throughout the whole job, largely because of insufficient information

furnished from abroad, and because in spite of this handicap we had

to produce mortars and ammunition that would be interchangeable with

French and British munitions stocks.

The first one of these weapons which we took up for production here

was the 3-inch Newton-Stokes. The first contract for the manufacture

of mortars of this size was placed with the Crane Co., of Chicago, on

November 8, 1917, for 1,830 mortars. This concern at once arranged with

the Ohio Seamless Tube Co., of Shelby, Ohio, for the drawing of steel

tubes for the mortar barrels. This latter concern, however, was already

handling large contracts for the Navy and for the aircraft program,

and these operations took priority over the mortar contracts. But the

Crane Co. took advantage of the interim to build the accessories for

the weapons--the tripods, clinometers, base plates, and tool boxes.

In the spring of 1918 the company received the first barrel tubes and

began producing completed weapons. But when these mortars were sent to

the proving ground the test-firing deformed the barrels and broke the

metal bases. Finally it was decided that the propelling explosive used

was not a suitable one for the purpose. Another was substituted. The

new propellant permitted as great a range of fire without damage to the

mortar in firing.

The Crane Co. was eventually able to reach a production of 33 of the

3-inch mortars a day, and up to December 5, 1918, it had built 1,803

completed weapons, together with the necessary tools and spare parts.

In the early fall of 1918 an additional contract for 677 of these

mortars was placed with the Crane Co. and another for 2,000 mortars of

this size with the International Harvester Co., of Chicago. Neither of

these two latter contracts ever came to the production stage.

A few days after the original contract for 3-inch mortars was let the

Trench Warfare Section took up the matter of producing ammunition for

these weapons. Two sorts of shell were to be required--live shell

filled with high explosive and practice shell made of malleable

iron. The original program adopted in November, 1917, called for the

production of 5,342,000 live shell for the 3-inch mortars and 1,500,000

practice shell.

[Illustration: 3-INCH STOKES TRENCH MORTAR.]

[Illustration: 4-INCH STOKES TRENCH MORTAR AND AMMUNITION.]

[Illustration: 6-INCH SUTTON TRENCH MORTAR.]

[Illustration: 11-INCH SUTTON TRENCH MORTAR.]

The plan was adopted of building these shell of lap-welded, 3-inch

steel tubing, cut into proper lengths. The contracts for the finished

machined and assembled shell were placed with the General Motors

Corporation at its Saginaw (Mich.) plant, with H. C. Dodge (Inc.),

at South Boston, Mass., and with the Metropolitan Engineering Co.,

of Brooklyn, N. Y. In order to facilitate production, the Government

agreed to furnish the steel tubing. For this purpose it ordered from

the National Tube Co., of Pittsburgh, Pa., 1,618,929 pieces of steel

tubing, each 11 inches in length, and from the Allegheny Steel Co.,

at Brakenridge, Pa., 2,332,319 running feet of tubing. These tube

contracts were filled by the early spring of 1918.

The railroad congestion of February and March, 1918, held up the

delivery of tubing, but the assembly plants utilized the time in

tooling up for the future production. All the plants thereafter soon

reached a quantity production, the General Motors Corporation in

particular tuning up its shop system until it was able to reach a

maximum daily production in a 10-hour shift of 35,618 completed shell.

The casting of malleable iron bodies for the practice shell of this

caliber was turned over to the Erie Malleable Iron Co., of Erie, Pa.,

and to the National Malleable Castings Co., with plants at Cleveland,

Chicago, Indianapolis, and Toledo. The former concern cast 196,673

bodies and the latter 1,015,005. The Gorham Manufacturing Co., of

Providence, R. I.; the Standard Parts Co., of Cleveland, Ohio; and

the New Process Gear Corporation, of Syracuse, N. Y., machined and

assembled the practice shell. When the armistice was declared, these

three contracts were approximately seven-tenths complete.

We were dissatisfied with our 3-inch shell, for the reason that they

tumbled in air and were visible to the eye. The French had developed a

mortar shell on the streamline principle which was invisible in flight

and had twice the range of ours. Had the war continued the Trench

Warfare Section would have produced streamline shell for mortars.

The second mortar project undertaken was the manufacture of the

240-millimeter weapon. This was the largest mortar which we produced,

its barrel having a diameter of approximately 10 inches. It proved to

be one of the toughest nuts to crack in the whole mortar undertaking.

The British designs of this French weapon we found to be quite unsuited

to our factory methods, and for the sake of expediency we frequently

modified them in the course of the development. The total contracts

called for the production of 938 mortars.

It was obvious that the manufacture of this and of other larger mortars

would fall into three phases. The forging of barrels, breechblocks,

and breech slides was a separate type of work, and we allotted the

contracts for this work to the Standard Forging Co., of Indiana Harbor,

Ind. The machining of these parts to the fine dimensions required by

the design was an entirely separate phase of manufacturing, and we

placed this work with the American Laundry Machine Co., of Cincinnati.

Still a third class of work was that of assembling the completed

mortars, and this contract went to the David Lupton Sons Co., of

Philadelphia, who also engaged to manufacture the metal and timber

bases and firing mechanisms. These big mortars had to have mobile

mountings, and the contract for the mortar carts we placed with the

International Harvester Co., of Chicago. These contracts were signed in

December, 1917.

The Lupton plant had difficulty in securing the heavy machinery

it needed for this and for other mortar contracts, its machinery

being held up by the freight congestion. Early in 1918 the American

Expeditionary Forces advised us to redesign the 240-millimeter mortar

to give it a stronger barrel. Consequently all work was stopped until

this could be done. The first mortars of the new design to be tested

were still unsatisfactory with respect to the strength of the barrels;

and as a consequence the Standard Forging Co. urged that nickel steel

be substituted for basic open-hearth steel as the material for the

barrels. This change proved to be justified.

There was also trouble at the shops of the American Laundry Machine

Co., its equipment not having the precision to do machining of the

type required in these weapons. Accordingly a new machining contract

was made with the Symington-Anderson Co., of Rochester, N. Y., which

concern was eventually able to reach a production of 20 machined

barrels per week.

In all we produced 24 of the 240-millimeter mortars in this country.

Certain of the parts were manufactured up to the total requirements

of the contracts, but others were not built in such numbers. The

International Harvester Co. built all 999 carts ordered.

The production of shell for these big mortars was another difficult

undertaking. After consultation with manufacturers we designed shell of

two different types. One of these was a shell of pressed plates welded

together longitudinally; and a contract for the production of 283,096

of these was placed with the Metropolitan Engineering Co. The other

form was that of two steel hemispheres welded together. The Michigan

Stamping Co., of Detroit, undertook to build 50,000 of these.

These shell contracts were placed in December, 1917. The Michigan

Stamping Co. had to wait five months before it could secure and install

its complete equipment of machinery. It was September before all of

the difficulties in the Detroit plant's project could be overcome and

quantity production could be started. The concern eventually, before

and after the signing of the armistice, built 9,185 shell of this type

at a maximum rate of 56 per day.

Greater promise seemed to be held forth by the Metropolitan Engineering

Co.'s project to build shell of pressed-out plates, electrically

welded. The Government undertook to furnish the steel plates for this

work and secured from the American Rolling Mills Co., of Middletown,

Ohio, a total production of 6,757 tons of them. The Metropolitan

Engineering Co. had great difficulty in perfecting a proper welding

process; and the concern lost a great deal of money on the contract,

yet cheerfully continued its development without prospect of recompense

in order that we might have in this country the knowledge of how to

build such shell. In all, including production after the armistice was

signed, the Metropolitan Engineering Co. built 136,189 shell bodies of

this size at a maximum rate of 987 per day.

During the summer of 1918 a single-piece shell body of the

240-millimeter size, produced by a deep-drawing process, was worked

out. A contract for 125,000 of them was given to the Ireland & Matthews

Manufacturing Co., of Detroit, Mich. The armistice brought this

contract to an end before it had produced any shell of this new and

most promising type.

Early in 1918 we received the first samples of the 6-inch trench

mortar. By April all the plans were ready for American production.

Again this work was divided by types. The National Tube Co., of

Pittsburgh, contracted to build 510 rough forgings of mortar barrels

at its Christy Park plant. The Symington-Anderson Co. undertook to

machine these barrels. The David Lupton Sons Co. agreed to assemble the

mortars, as well as to produce the metal and timber bases for them.

The first machined barrels reached the Lupton plant in June and

found bases ready for them. But, as the assembling was in progress,

the American Expeditionary Forces cabled that the British producers

of mortars had changed their designs, and that we must suspend our

manufacture until we also could adopt the changes. The altered plans

reached us some weeks later; yet, nevertheless, we were able to make

good our original promise to deliver 48 of the 6-inch Newton-Stokes

mortars at the port of embarkation in October, 1918.

Meanwhile we had increased the contracts by an additional requirement

of 1,577 mortars of this size. The National Tube Co. eventually

reached a maximum daily production of 60 barrel forgings. The

Symington-Anderson Co. machined the barrels finally at a 33-per-day

clip. As many as 11 proof-fired guns per day came from the David Lupton

Sons Co.

An interesting fact in connection with the production of shell for the

6-inch mortars is that they were built principally by American makers

of stoves. The 6-inch mortar-shell bodies were of cast iron instead

of steel, and thus were adaptable to manufacture in stove works. Each

shell weighed 40 pounds without its explosive charge. Such shell were

used at the front for heavy demolition purposes.

The contracts for these shell were placed in March, 1918. The Trench

Warfare Section was immediately called upon to secure favorable

priority for the pig iron required for this purpose. The various

stove works did not have the necessary machinery for building these

shell, and so a special equipment in each case had to be built. At the

tests the first castings which came through the foundry were found to

leak, and this required further experiments in the design, holding up

production until July, 1918.

Because of the many troubles encountered in this work the various stove

makers in the summer of 1918 formed an association which they called

the Six-inch Trench-mortar Shell Manufacturers' Association. This

association held monthly meetings and its members visited the various

plants where shell castings were being made. The United States Radiator

Corporation, the Foster-Merriam Co., and the Michigan Stove Co., were

especially active in improving methods for making these shell.

The various concerns producing 6-inch mortar shell and the amounts

turned out were as follows:

Foster Merriam Co., Meriden, Conn. 33,959

U. S. Radiator Corporation, Detroit, Mich. 240,700

Globe Stove & Range Co., Kokomo, Ind. 17,460

Rathbone, Sard & Co., Albany, N. Y. 97,114

Michigan Stove Co., Detroit, Mich. 100,000

The following concerns shortly before the armistice was signed received

contracts for the production of 6-inch mortar shell, orders ranging in

quantity from 50,000 to 150,000, but none of these concerns started

production:

Wm. Crane Co., Jersey City, N. J.

Frontier Iron Works, Buffalo, N. Y.

Henry E. Pridmore, (Inc.), Chicago, Ill.

Best Foundry Co., Bedford, Ohio.

McCord & Co., Chicago, Ill.

It was not until July, 1918, that the plans were ready for the 4-inch

Newton-Stokes trench mortars. The American Expeditionary Forces

estimated that they would require 480 of these weapons. A total of

500 drawn barrel tubes was ordered from the Ohio Seamless Tube Co.,

of Shelby, Ohio. This concern was able to ship one-fifth of its order

within 10 days after receiving it. The barrels were sent to the Rock

Island Arsenal for machining. The Crane Co., of Chicago, held the

contract for building the bases, tripods, spare parts, and tools, and

also for the assembling of the completed mortars. This factory was

already equipped with tools for this work, since it had been building

similar parts for 3-inch mortars. Consequently, the Crane Co., in

August, almost within a month of receiving its contract, was producing

completed 4-inch mortars and sending them to the Rock Island Arsenal

for proof firing. The Ohio Seamless Tube Co. reached a high daily

production of 83 barrel forgings per day; the Rock Island Arsenal, 10

machined barrels per day; and the Crane Co., 19 assembled mortars per

day.

[Illustration: 240-MILLIMETER TRENCH MORTAR.]

[Illustration: 240-MILLIMETER TRENCH MORTAR SHELL.]

We planned to build only smoke shell and gas shell for the 4-inch

mortars. Large contracts for various parts of these shell were placed

and the enterprise was gaining great size when the armistice was

declared, but no finished smoke shell and only a few gas shell for

4-inch trench mortars had been produced. The contracts for the smoke

shell were let in October, 1918, and work had not started further

than the procurement of raw material before the armistice came. A

large number of contractors expected to produce the parts for the

4-inch gas shell, and considerable of the raw materials were actually

produced; but only one of the machining and assembling contractors, the

Paige-Detroit Motor Car Co., actually completed any of these shell, and

production at this plant did not start until December 5, 1918.

_Production of trench mortars and trench-mortar ammunition._

TRENCH MORTARS.

-----------------------------+------------------+-----------------+----------

| Completions to | Completions to | Shipped

Character. | Nov. 11, 1918. | Feb. 1, 1919. | overseas.

-----------------------------+------------------+-----------------+----------

3-inch | 1,609| 1,830| 843

4-inch | 444| 778|

6-inch | 368| 500| 48

240-millimeter (9.45 inches) | 29| 30|

-----------------------------+------------------+-----------------+----------

TRENCH-MORTAR AMMUNITION.

-----------------------------+------------------+-----------------+----------

| Completions | Completions | Shipped

Character. | to Nov. 11 | to Feb. 1 | overseas

| 1918 (unloaded). |1919 (unloaded). | (loaded).

-----------------------------+------------------+-----------------+----------

| _Rounds._ | _Rounds._ | _Rounds._

3-inch live | 3,136,275 | 3,741,237 | 157,785

3-inch practice | 607,178 | 782,340 |

4-inch gas | | 212 |

4-inch smoke | | |

6-inch live | 292,882 | 492,404 |

240-millimeter (9.45 inches) | 67,829 | 131,124 |

-----------------------------+------------------+-----------------+----------

TOXIC GAS SETS.

Another extensive project in the trench-warfare program was the

manufacture of the so-called toxic gas sets. Each set consisted of

a one-man portable cylinder equipped with a nozzle and a firing

mechanism. Each set was ready for firing as soon as it was placed in

position.

In August, 1918, the toxic-gas-set project was taken up by the

Trench Warfare Section. Contracts for cylinders were awarded to the

Ireland-Matthews Manufacturing Co., of Detroit, Mich., who produced

13,642 cylinders, and to the American Car & Foundry Co. at its Milton,

Pa., plant, which concern turned out 11,046 cylinders.

The Pittsburgh Reinforcing, Brazing & Machine Co. produced 9,765 valves

for the cylinders in two months after receiving the contract. The Yale

& Towne Manufacturing Co., of Stamford, Conn., which received the

contract for nozzles on September 5, 1918, manufactured 20,501 of them

before the armistice was signed; and J. N. Smith & Co., of Detroit,

Mich., who did not receive their contract until September 26, built

3,252 nozzles before the fighting stopped. The Liquid Carbolic Co.,

of Chicago, and the Ruud Manufacturing Co., of Pittsburgh, had the

contracts for the firing mechanism; but none of these was produced

because at the time the armistice was signed the firing mixture to be

used with the cylinders had not been developed.

In connection with the production of materials for gas warfare the

Ordnance Department also designed several types of containers for the

shipment of poison gas, these including not only the portable cylinders

but larger tanks and even tank cars.

PYROTECHNICS.

A few years ago, when we allowed the adventurous American boy to blow

off his fingers and hands by the indiscriminate use of explosives

in celebrating the Nation's birthday, we had an extensive fireworks

industry in this country. But the spread of the sane Fourth reform

had virtually killed this manufacture, so that when we entered the

war there were only three or four plants in the United States making

fireworks. These concerns kept the trade secrets closely guarded.

However, as we approached the brink of hostilities it was evident we

would have to build up a large production capacity for the pyrotechnics

demanded by the various new types of fighting which had sprung into

existence since 1914. Fireworks were extensively used principally for

signaling at night and as an aid to aviators in the dark.

One of the men to foresee this need was Lewis Nixon, who had long been

in the public eye and was known especially for his advocacy of an

American merchant marine. He organized a pyrotechnics concern known as

the Nixon Fulgent Products Co., built a plant at Brunswick, N. J., and

was ready to talk business with the Government when the war began.

Also there had long been in existence that perennial delight of

children and adults alike known as Paine's Fireworks, whose spectacular

exhibitions are familiar to most city dwellers in the United States.

This concern had its own manufacturing plant, which was ready to expand

to meet Government war requirements.

In addition, two other concerns of the formerly declining industry were

ready to increase their facilities and produce pyrotechnics for war

purposes. These were the Unexcelled Manufacturing Co., of New York, and

the National Fireworks Co., of West Hanover, Mass. The four concerns

proved to be able to meet every war requirement we had.

Prior to the war some few military pyrotechnics had been procured

by the Signal Corps, the Coast Artillery, the Engineer Corps, and

also by the Navy; but on September 27, 1917, the design of all Army

pyrotechnics was centralized in the Trench Warfare Section.

Much experimentation was necessary before specifications could be

prepared, since the entire fire-signaling field had long been in

confusion. We had made our own designs and were proceeding with

production in the spring of 1918, when the American Expeditionary

Forces made the positive recommendation that the entire French program

of pyrotechnics be adopted by the United States. This meant a fresh

start in the business, but nevertheless pyrotechnic devices were

developed to meet all of our needs. These devices included signal

rockets, parachute rockets, signal pistols and their ammunition,

position and signal lights, flares, smoke torches, and lights to be

thrown by the V. B. discharger, the French device attached to the end

of the rifle in which a rifle grenade fits.

At the outset of our efforts we started to build signal rockets,

position lights, rifle lights, signal lights, and lights for use with

the Very signal pistol. The Very signal pistol, which we adopted first,

had the caliber of a 10-gauge shotgun, and its cartridges resembled

shotgun shells in appearance, although containing Roman candle balls of

various colors instead of leaden shot. The orders from abroad in the

spring of 1918 changed the caliber of the Very pistol to 25 millimeters

and brought into our requirements some 16 different styles of star

and parachute cartridges. In addition to these, there were required

about 20 styles of star and parachute cartridges for the French V.

B. discharger. The recommendations from France brought in 13 new

styles of signal rockets, as well as smoke torches, wing-tip flares

for airplanes, parachute flares for lighting the ground under bombing

airplanes, and also 12 styles of cartridges for a new 35-millimeter

Very pistol for the use of aviators.

After we received these instructions there was great uncertainty here

as to the quantity of each item that should be produced; and this

matter was not settled until August 5, 1918, when an enormous program

of requirements was issued. At first it seemed that the Government

itself must build new factories to take care of these needs, but a

careful examination showed that the existing facilities could be

expanded to take care of the production. The placing of contracts in

this undertaking was under way when the armistice stopped the work.

The following table indicates the size of the pyrotechnic undertaking

and also what was accomplished. All of this production came from the

plants of the four companies which have been named. In addition to

the fireworks themselves, accessories were produced by a number of

other concerns. The Japan Paper Co., New York City, manufactured and

imported from Japan approximately 3,000,000 paper parachutes. The

Remington Arms Co., New Haven, Conn., built about 2,500,000 10-gauge

signal-pistol cartridges, except for the stars they contained.

The Empire Art Metal Co., College Point, N. Y., produced nearly

2,000,000 Very pistol cartridge cases. The Winchester Repeating Arms

Co., Bridgeport, Conn., supplied nearly 5,000,000 primers for these

cartridges. Rose Bros. & Co., Lancaster, Pa., produced 65,600 silk

parachutes for Very cartridges. Cheney Bros., South Manchester, Conn.;

D. G. Dery (Inc.), Allentown, Pa.; Stehli Silk Corporation, New York

City; Sauquoit Silk Co., Philadelphia; Lewis Roessel & Co., Hazleton,

Pa.; Schwarzenback-Huber Co., New York City; and the Duplane Silk

Corporation, Hazleton, Pa., produced a total of 1,231,728 yards of silk

for parachutes to float airplane flares. The parachutes themselves for

the airplane flares, a total of 28,570 of them, were manufactured by

the Duplane Silk Corporation; Folmer-Clogg Co., Lancaster, Pa.; and

Jacob Gerhardt Co., Hazleton, Pa. The Edw. G. Budd Manufacturing Co.,

Philadelphia, built 41,020 metal cases for the airplane flares.

--------------------------------+-----------+---------------+--------------

Articles. | Ordered. | Completed to | Completed to

| | Nov. 8, 1918. | Feb. 1, 1919.

--------------------------------+-----------+---------------+--------------

Signal rockets | 615,000 | 437,101 | 544,355

Position lights | 2,072,000 | 1,187,532 | 1,670,070

Rifle lights | 55,000 | 55,000 | 55,000

Signal lights | 3,110,000 | 2,661,008 | 2,710,268

V. B. cartridges | 1,215,000 | 110 000 | 673,200

Very cartridges, 25-millimeter | 300,000 | |

Smoke torches | 500,000 | 31,000 | 188,102

Wing-tip flares | 112,000 | 70,000 | 100,865

Airplane flares | 50,083 | 2,100 | 8,000

--------------------------------+-----------+---------------+--------------

We also contracted for the production of many thousands of Very signal

pistols. Before the original program was canceled the Remington Arms

Co. had produced 24,460 of the 10-gauge pistols in contracts calling

for a total output of 35,000.

In August, 1918, we let contracts for 135,000 of the 25-millimeter

pistols and for approximately 30,000 of the 35-millimeter pistols. The

A. H. Fox Gun Co. completed 4,193 of the smaller pistols and the Scott

& Fetzger Machine Co. turned out 7,750 of them. Other concerns which

had taken contracts but had not come into production when the armistice

was signed were the National Tool & Manufacturing Co., the Doehler Die

Castings Co., the Hammond Typewriter Co., and Parker Bros.

Considerable experimental work of an interesting nature was carried out

looking toward the development of incendiary devices. Three types of

flame projectors, flaming bayonets, an airplane destroyer, incendiary

darts, and the smoke knapsack were among the projects undertaken.

Owing in large measure to changes in requirements by the American

Expeditionary Forces none of these devices was actually turned out on

any considerable scale.

America's Munitions 1917-1918 · 第 13 / 22 章