CHAPTER XVII

THE EFFECT OF MANHOOD SUFFRAGE IS TO ENSURE INEFFICIENCY IN

DOMESTIC LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

It is expressing oneself very mildly to say that manhood suffrage

produces inefficiency; rather one may say that inefficiency is of its

very essence. Preparedness is a major essential of the management of our

successful business enterprises, while unpreparedness is a

characteristic feature of our government administration. To take a

concrete and conceded instance. The Spanish war of 1898 found us totally

unprepared for war; without guns, powder, artillery, transports or

officers trained for high command. (Alger, _Spanish-American War_, p.

455.) Our troops in that war were not properly equipped, rationed or

cared for. The cause, says Stickney, was “the wholesale fraud and

corruption which then permeated the entire administrative force in

Washington. That fraud and corruption still continue in full force.” In

the _New York Sun_ of February 7th, 1920, the leading editorial was on

American want of preparedness. The writer said, “We are a people who

will not practice preparedness. We did not prepare for war, we did not

prepare for peace. We have never prepared for anything. But sooner or

later the man that will not prepare must be damned.” This

well-recognized want of foresight in national matters is not an American

failing; it is entirely due to the manhood suffrage habit of voting into

responsible positions men of intrigue and oratory instead of men of

business. Says Reemelin, “There is not a bank, a factory, a store or a

farm, which if managed on the basis of American government would not

impoverish its owner.” (_American Politics_, 1881, p. 324.)

In every department of human activity, including government, the chief

desideratum is efficiency. In the primary struggle for a bare existence,

it is efficiency that wins. The first and principal enemy of man is

Nature; her wildness and inclemency must first be overcome, and food,

shelter and clothing be forced from her bosom at the price of an endless

and ceaseless vigilance. As human society grows older the efficiency

which comes of systematic training becomes more essential to its

maintenance. People may doubt whether the world improves or whether

human existence becomes more precious and enjoyable with the passing of

time, but no one can doubt that life is growing more complicated every

year. The increase of population, the achievements of invention, the

growth of knowledge of our environment, and the cultivation of new

tastes and desires have all tended and are tending with accumulated

force to make life more difficult for the uninstructed and to increase

the necessity for scientific thinking and acting in dealing with new

problems. As stated by Mr. Lowell the specialization of occupations is

brought about by complexity of civilization, growth of accurate

knowledge, progress of invention and the keenness of competition. A few

years ago a private citizen could take up a new business without prior

preparation; he can no longer safely do so. The use of experts is

increasing in business concerns and industrial enterprises. Universities

are erecting new specialized departments. Sixty years ago there was

scarcely a school of engineers in the country; to-day there are many of

them. The inexorable rule of the tendency of the fittest to survive is

still an active force in the world, and the recent struggle with Germany

gave terrible warning that efficiency is more than ever the price of

existence.

Next to the struggle with wild Nature comes the contest with human

disorder and the necessity for government, in order that men may best

secure and enjoy the spoils and fruits achieved from Nature; and again

efficiency is the essential quality. We hear much these days about moral

force; but there is no force but material force; what is usually meant

by moral force is the influence of moral ideas directing action, for

without efficient action, moral ideas will be fruitless. They will not

make crops grow nor cause a machine to operate, nor check the deadly

velocity of a volley of musketry, nor save a sinking ship, nor check a

conflagration; moral force will not win a battle, a campaign or a war,

nor save a nation. Combe in his _Constitution of Man_, long ago pointed

out that a pirate in a good sea-going ship was safer than a missionary

in an unseaworthy one. Moral ideas may serve to give action a right

direction; but training and force are necessary to make it effective;

without training in action and a proper supply of material force, the

moral ideas will never be manifested at all to our senses, and therefore

efficiency in action is the final object of all practical teaching, and

the true test of good government. Governmental efficiency means good

order; wise legislation; foresight in public affairs; the proper

selection of work to be done; the doing it well and expeditiously;

speedy and impartial justice; good home administration generally and

wisdom and firmness in foreign relations. It is difficult to see how a

government which is efficient can be bad, or one which is inefficient

can be good. In fact, efficiency makes more for human happiness than any

other governmental quality. The ultimate object of the creation of the

Federal Union was to secure increased efficiency in government. The old

Confederation had been inefficient and was justly condemned and

abolished; and the present Federal government was therefore established

with powers as stated in the Constitution to levy and carry on war, to

control and promote commerce, to establish and sustain postal facilities

and a national coinage and to secure peace with foreign nations; all of

which purposes might be included in the phrase “national efficiency.”

In an address delivered at Chicago, January 12th, 1918, by Otto H. Kahn,

a patriotic and far-sighted New York business man familiar with German

methods, he truly said:

“One of the main reasons for Germany’s remarkable development in

peace and amazing power of resistance in war, is the way she has

dealt with the complex and difficult problems of economic,

commercial and fiscal policy. She recognized, long since, that such

problems cannot be successfully handled haphazardly or in

town-meeting fashion, or emotionally; still less can they be made

the football of politics. The German way has been to turn such

matters over for study and report to those best qualified by

experience and training, and thus having obtained expert advice to

respect it and in its large outlines to follow it. And appointments

to office are made not on a basis of political affiliations or

personal friendship or social sympathies, but for experience and

tested fitness.”

He is right, and it is a well-recognized fact that German efficiency in

the late war enabled her to make head for over three years against the

most powerful combination of modern times.

Consider the vast importance of the work of our own Congress and of our

state legislatures. Think of what is committed to the charge of these

bodies; reflect for a moment on the importance of our state affairs; our

harbors, canals, railroads, highways, schools, colleges, courts of

justice, penal and charitable institutions, public utilities, all the

manifold commercial, political and criminal legislation of the State;

and then glance at the immense fields of Congressional authority: the

power of declaring war and making treaties; the maintenance and support

of the army and navy; foreign affairs, tariffs; interstate railroads;

the post-office; the federal courts of justice. The human mind is

appalled at the magnitude of the task of properly governing the enormous

population and of safeguarding the immense wealth and interests of the

United States. The future political existence of the country and its

status as a nation may and very probably will depend on the capacity and

ability of its legislators and administrators. Yet but few voters

realize the necessity of business experience and of technical knowledge

to members of the state or national legislatures. It is not

sufficiently considered that by far the greater part of legislative work

is made up of strictly business matters requiring special knowledge.

Take for instance one item of Federal legislation, namely, that relating

to the administration of 200,000 square miles of timbered land owned by

the United States government--an area equal to France--where the people

dwelling or operating in the lower regions derive their water from

wooded uplands: and also relating to another area of 100,000,000 acres

or 150,000 square miles containing petroleum, coal and other minerals.

In these two tracts “The government will henceforth be selling standing

timber to lumbermen, water power for electrical transmission, water for

irrigation rights, and oil, coal, and mineral privileges, on an

ever-increasing scale of magnitude; while it will rent grazing lands

equal in extent to the greater part of the country east of the

Mississippi River.” (_Shaw on Political Problems_, p. 114.)

This case is not exceptional in Congress as may be seen by the following

list, which includes all the important general Federal legislation for

the year 1917, which happens to be the latest at hand:

1. Increasing the membership of the Interstate Commerce Commission,

and increasing the powers of the Commission.

2. Excess Profits Tax on Corporations.

3. Civil Government for Porto Rico.

4. Literary Test for Alien Immigrants.

5. Military Measures, namely, Declaration of War against Germany;

Liberty Bond Issue; Ship and War Material Act; Draft Law; Food

Control; Espionage; War Risk Insurance.

6. Appropriation Bills.

These measures are all of general effect and all require expert

knowledge. It appears from a mere reading of the list that they are such

as to presume and require in the legislators a knowledge of finance;

taxation; shipping; food production; transportation; insurance; and

other subjects.

New York state legislation for 1917 dealt with the following subjects,

all or nearly all relating to business matters: Court officers and

judicial procedure; decedents’ estates; domestic relations, including

marriage and illegitimacy laws; penal and criminal statutes; civil

service laws; state accounting and budget; state police; municipal

government regulations; sales act; warehouse receipt act; partnership;

cold-storage; negotiable instruments; extradition; land registration;

probate of wills; highways and motor vehicles; dog licenses; railroad

crossing protection; commercial regulations relating to trading stamps;

patent medicines; food products; blue sky law; insurance laws;

corporations; regulation of public utilities; conservation of resources;

taxation laws; the care of the insane; building regulations; banking;

education; public health; liquor dealing and labor laws. This list is

not at all exceptional and the public need of trained and informed men

in government service is more apparent every day.

“There is now” (says Willoughby) “demanded on the part of our

lawmakers, not only patriotism and political sagacity of the

highest order, but scientific knowledge, and strict

disinterestedness far beyond that formerly required. Many of the

economic interests that are now discussed in our legislative halls

require, in the highest degree, scholarly research and judgment.”

(_Nature of the State_, p. 416.)

Now, when manhood suffrage was established here as an institution; when,

as the twaddlers like to say, the people took command, it became the

privilege and the duty of the ruling populace to establish and enforce

proper standards of qualification for its representatives and agents.

Its orators professed that they were going to show the world great

results of popular government. The wretched practical results we know.

But what efforts did they make? What have they in fact done in three

generations towards securing efficiency in their elective officers?

Absolutely nothing. If any despot had ever shown such complete disregard

of decency and propriety in his system of appointments as our manhood

suffrage democracy has, he would be held up to public reprobation. Not

only are and have been the state and national legislators and other

elective officials commonplace or below commonplace in character and

ability, but no effort whatever has been made or is being made; no

scheme has been even proposed, whereby to secure men of efficiency for

these important places in the gift of the people. The manhood suffrage

electorates are reckless, unscrupulous and hopelessly behind the age;

they never have recognized the growing need for efficiency. As Lowell

says, “We are training men for all services but that of the public.”

In fact, the scheme of manhood suffrage makes no provision for

efficiency, nor any serious pretence thereof; it ignores it completely

in the selection of its agents and otherwise. Whatever efficiency may be

secured in a democracy is obtained in some way other than by a manhood

suffrage vote. The only test applied by the populace at an election is

the oratorical test, and sometimes not even that. Its favorites at the

polls are the talkers; by talk they become known; by talk they become

candidates; by speeches they gain elections and by speeches they

maintain their places. No one knows or cares whether they can do

anything else but talk. No one ever heard of a candidate for an elective

public office being required to produce proof of his equipment for the

place. A candidate for alderman is not expected to have served an

apprenticeship in any city department; nor to pass an examination in

harbor facilities, sanitation, school management, public lighting,

sewage, water supply, transportation nor any of the departments of city

government. The candidate for mayor of New York is not required to know

the contents of the Charter of the city. Congress is supposed to be the

real governing body in this country, and would be such if it were not so

scandalously incompetent and untrustworthy. But a man who can get by

hook or crook on the machine ticket and can make what the rabble calls

“a rattlin’ good speech” is qualified for a seat in Congress. Whoever

heard of a candidate for Congress or a state legislature being required

to know anything whatever about anything or to have ever done anything

as a prerequisite to his candidacy? Such tests would be inconsistent

with the very theory of manhood suffrage as now entertained. That

standards will ultimately have to be applied even to elective offices if

democracy is to prevail no far-seeing man can doubt. And there is

nothing impracticable about the suggestion. Even now, in the states

where judges are elective, custom requires that the candidate shall have

previously passed an examination for admission to the bar. There is no

reason whatever why all candidates for elective offices should not be

required to be reasonably qualified for the offices they seek; nor why

the electors themselves should not be such persons as are qualified to

vote, and have proved their fitness for the ballot by the record of

their lives in the community. But the essential quality of manhood

suffrage is that it rejects all tests for voters, and so beginning at

the very source of government its anti-efficient influence extends all

along the line, and tends to neutralize every effort to elevate the

standard of democratic administration. Its spirit is directly opposed to

the demand for efficiency in governmental affairs. Efficiency is

exclusive, it applies tests, and rejects those who fail. Beginning with

the voter, manhood suffrage refuses to apply to him any tests whatever,

and denies not only the policy of their application but the right to use

them. It views the elective franchise as the personal belonging of the

individual, even the most ignorant and degraded, to be used to justify

his whim, his pleasure, his spite, his prejudice. The newspapers,

unconsciously perhaps, voice this spirit. We constantly read in the

public press urgent invitations to vote, addressed to the careless or

indifferent in politics, those who presumably have no compelling

opinions and are therefore quite unprepared and unfit to vote. Instead

of being warned of the wrong and danger of frivolous and ignorant

voting, they are urged by the newspapers to go to the polls as if to

take part in an amateur baseball game: “Come, join in; even if you don’t

do it well; it’s the national game! There are prizes too, the spoils;

and though you don’t compete yourself you may have the fun of seeing

them distributed, and root for the victors.” People are more careless in

voting for high officials than in hiring an office boy. They vote for

men whom they do not know even by sight; whose very names are

unfamiliar; and are usually quite unashamed of trifling with the

suffrage in a manner deserving punishment. This is one result of our

cheapening of the franchise.

If the reader will peruse the list of measures passed or considered by

Congress or his state legislature for the current year, he will perhaps

be able to judge whether his representative in Washington or in the

state capital is competent to deal with such matters. Not one in a

hundred is fit for the job. For most of the subjects of legislation the

average public representative has had no previous training whatever. And

if after long service he happens to become proficient in any of them,

the chances are that he will be sent back to private life by the vote of

a manhood suffrage constituency under orders of the district boss. As a

consequence it is well known that the legislative output is and has been

for generations past very inferior indeed. The abuse of state

legislation is dealt with elsewhere in this volume; it is so notorious

that it needs no proof, and is so vast that its complete discussion is

far beyond the compass of this work. The reader experienced in politics

is probably well aware that Ostrogorski is right, in his brief summary

(p. 374): “The laws are made with singular incompetence and

carelessness. Their number is excessive, running into volumes each

session; but they are mostly laws of local or private interest. The

motives which enter into the making of these laws are often of an

obviously mercenary nature.” (_Democracy._)

Before the German war the state legislative output in the United States

was about fifteen thousand enactments per year, of which about one-third

were public or general laws and the remaining two-thirds special and

local statutes. This year it is probably greater. In a recent single

session of Congress upwards of twenty thousand bills and resolutions

were introduced, of which about five thousand were passed, including

nearly two thousand public or general laws. Probably nine-tenths of this

legislation is unnecessary and a large part of it is undoubtedly

vicious.

The just resentment of America’s business men is being constantly voiced

at the manner in which business interests are being flouted by the

doctrinaires and demagogues to whom our political system entrusts the

reins of government. The following extracts from the address of Otto H.

Kahn, before referred to, will serve to illustrate some phases of this

attitude of business towards politics:

“A somewhat similar case is the railroad legislation which Congress

enacted under the Taft administration. That legislation represented

the tearing to shreds and the subsequent recasting, patching up and

ill-devised piecing together by Congress of a carefully thought

out, though, in my opinion, by no means faultless measure, which

had been introduced with the backing of the Administration. You all

know the result. The spirit of enterprise in railroading was

killed. Subjected to an obsolete and incongruous national policy,

hampered, confined, harassed by incessant, minute, narrow,

multifarious and sometimes contradictory regulations, that great

industry began to fall away. Initiative on the part of those in

charge became chilled, the free flow of investment of capital was

halted, creative activity was stopped, growth was stifled, credit

was crippled....”

“What we business men protest against is ignorance, shallow thought

or doctrinairism assuming the place belonging to expert opinion and

tested practical ability. We protest against sophomorism rampant,

strutting about in the cloak of superior knowledge, mischievously

and noisily, to the disturbance of quiet and orderly mental

processes and sane progress. We protest against sentimental,

unseasoned, intolerant and cocksure ‘advanced thinkers’ being given

leave to set the world by the ears and with their strident and

ceaseless voices to drown the views of those who are too busy doing

to indulge in much talking. And finally do we protest against

demagogism, envy and prejudice, camouflaging under the flag of war

necessity and social justice in order to wage a campaign through

inflammatory appeal, misstatement and specious reasoning to punish

success, despoil capital and harass business.”

And further on:

“We deny the suggestion that patriotism, virtue and knowledge

reside primarily with those who have been unsuccessful, those who

have no practical experience of business, or, be it said with all

respect, with those who are politicians or office holders.”

This remonstrance of Mr. Kahn is but a sample which might be multiplied

by the hundreds. It is typical of a constant stream of complaints which

business men in all parts of the country are continually uttering. The

universal testimony of our merchants, manufacturers and financiers is

that neither at the federal or state capitols do they find men either

capable of understanding the rules and operations of business or willing

to study them, or interested in the business prosperity of the people.

If the reader will but examine a list of members of any legislative body

he will understand the cause of this deplorable situation. Let him study

the names of the delegation at present representing in the state

legislature the immense interests of the City of New York, her commerce,

manufactures, wealth and population. She ought to be represented there

by the class of honorable and successful active or retired merchants;

financiers of high standing; manufacturers of note and ability and

leaders in the professions; by publicists; scholars, and men of the

first prominence in labor organizations; to be or to have been a member

of a state legislature should be a badge of honor. On that list he will

probably find not one name known outside the ranks of petty ward

politicians; and men of the high character above described would feel it

as a stigma to have it said that they had served in a legislative body.

Next, as to the judiciary. It is the property of evil to spread, and it

is one of the curses of the manhood suffrage system, that not content

with control of the legislature which is properly elective, it seizes

upon and degrades the judicial and administrative branches of government

which are both naturally appointive. Its effect upon the judicial bench

has been necessarily bad, frequently covering the ermine with the mire

of politics. During the period from 1865 to 1873 so many of the judges

sitting in New York City were notoriously unfit and corrupt, that their

doings furnished material for a great scandal. The state supreme court

judges, elected by manhood suffrage, were the most conspicuous sinners,

but many of the inferior judges, including those appointed by a manhood

suffrage mayor, were equally unworthy. Bryce visited one of those

courts, probably about 1870, and this is what he saw:

“An ill-omened looking man, flashily dressed and rude in demeanor,

was sitting behind a table; two men in front were addressing him;

the rest of the room was given up to disorder. Had one not been

told that he was a judge of the highest court of the city, one

might have taken him for a criminal. His jurisdiction was unlimited

in amount, and though an appeal lay from him to the Court of

Appeals of the State, his power to issue injunctions put all the

property in the district at his mercy.”

He further declares that at that time there were on the bench in New

York City, bar room loafers, broken-down Tombs attorneys, needy

adventurers, whose want of character made them absolutely dependent on

their patrons. “They did not regard social censure, for they were

already excluded from decent society. Impeachment had no terrors for

them, since the state legislature, as well as the executive machinery of

the city, was in the hands of their masters. It would have been vain to

expect such people, without fear of God or man before their eyes, to

resist the temptations which capitalists and powerful company could

offer.” And further:

“A system of client robbery had sprung up, by which each judge

enriched the knot of disreputable lawyers who surrounded him; he

referred cases to them, granted them monstrous allowances in the

name of costs, gave them receiverships with a large percentage,

and so forth; they in turn either at the time sharing the booty

with him, or undertaking to do the same for him when he should have

descended to the Bar and they have climbed to the Bench. Nor is

there any doubt that criminals who had any claim on their party

often managed to elude punishment. The police, it was said, would

not arrest such an offender if they could help it; the District

Attorney would avoid prosecuting; the court officials, if public

opinion had forced the attorney to act, would try to pack the jury;

the judge, if the jury seemed honest, would do his best to procure

an acquittal; and if, in spite of police, attorney, officials, and

judge, the criminal was convicted and sentenced, he might still

hope that the influence of his party would procure a pardon from

the governor of the State, or enable him in some other way to slip

out of the grasp of justice. For governor, judge, attorney,

officials, and police were all of them party nominees; and if a man

cannot count on being helped by his party at a pinch, who will be

faithful to his party?” (_American Commonwealth_, Vol. II, pp. 637,

639, 640.)

Although this extremely degraded judiciary has passed away, yet the

whole story is as pertinent today as it ever was, for the vileness Bryce

describes was the result of the operation of manhood suffrage in a large

city; and the same causes are still in existence. In practice in the

great cities the higher state judges are usually selected by the

political bosses; and the election is often a mere form, or at most a

contest between rival bosses in which the public takes but a languid and

futile interest. When the boss is a rich man as often happens in a great

city, he gets to know some able lawyers and sometimes makes fairly good

selections for the higher judicial vacancies. This is far better than

the populace would be likely to do if left to themselves. Another means

of protection for judicial honor has been the influence of an educated

bar, endeavoring to enforce the traditions of the past, and the examples

of other civilized countries to the effect that judges should be exempt

from political influence and bias. But when all is said and done it is

largely a matter of luck even in the highest courts whether the judges

are fit or otherwise. That the highest judges are still “bossed” is not

a mere vulgar notion. How can they escape? In the election for judges of

the highest New York courts in 1919, the charge that certain judicial

candidates were “bossed” was publicly and persistently made by ex-judges

and leading lawyers.

Of the California judges in 1877, Bryce says:

“The judges were not corrupt, but most of them, as was natural,

considering the scanty salaries assigned to them, were inferior

men, not fit to cope with the counsel who practised before them.

Partly owing to the weakness of juries, partly to the intricacies

of the law and the defects of the recently adopted code, criminal

justice was halting and uncertain, and malefactors often went

unpunished. It became a proverb that you might safely commit a

murder if you took the advice of the best lawyers.” (_American

Commonwealth_, Vol. II, p. 430.)

The most determined efforts of the lawyers of our great cities to make a

manhood suffrage constituency understand a judicial election have been

complete failures. It is sometimes amusing to see the straits to which

lawyers and their intelligent friends are driven to keep the judiciary

from degradation. In New York, for instance, where the judges are

elected for fourteen-year terms, the lawyers hit upon the plan of

demanding that sitting judges whose terms expire should always be

renominated by the bosses, on pain of active opposition to the entire

ticket, including their proposed successors. This really involved a

violation of the spirit of the constitution, for it aimed at a life

tenure for judges instead of the fourteen years fixed by that

instrument, to which these lawyers had sworn allegiance. It further

involved the absurdity of allowing the boss to select a judge, but never

to drop him, no matter what his record; and it resulted that a candidate

might be opposed by the bar the first time, but if elected would

certainly be supported by them the next time without in either instance

any real investigation of his record, character or attainments. All this

absurdity has been and is committed by intelligent lawyers in their

efforts to avoid the risk of manhood suffrage popular elections of high

judges. The reader can judge from this how lively the fear of popular

judicial elections must be in the hearts of the lawyers of the city of

New York.

There is of course something repulsive in the very thought of a judge of

a high court being selected in an election contest, and of his owing his

place to the suffrages of a low populace. And then, there is the

practical objection to an elective judiciary, that a judge’s qualities

are special and such as can only be ascertained upon personal

acquaintance and by men of superior attainments. The office is properly

an appointive one, but with manhood suffrage in play, some of the worst

selections for the bench have been made by state governors, in order to

reward followers or venal newspapers. There is really no remedy and no

way of taking the judiciary out of politics while either the judge

himself or the appointing power is created by manhood suffrage. The

trail of the serpent is over everything that comes from that quarter. As

for the lower courts, the selections of their judges have been

scandalous; men have been put on the bench who were ignorant of the

first principles of law; drunkards, reckless politicians, ignorant,

dishonest, uncouth, unmannerly specimens who have sought judicial office

because they had no taste for hard work, or because their ignorance or

habits were such that they were unable to earn an honest living at the

bar. Some of them are notoriously owned by politicians. Senator Breen

says that “After being whispered about among a coterie of closest

friends it becomes well-known that this particular politician owns a

certain judge and can get him to do anything.... The miserable creature

who is robed in judicial honors reposes in perfect ignorance of the

ignominy which his acts of dishonor are bringing on his name. This has

been the fate of many a judge.” (_Thirty Years in New York Politics_, p.

25.) A New York newspaper in the Tweed days said that there was no

quarter of the civilized world where the name of a New York judge is not

a hissing and a byword. The New York bench has on the whole improved

since 1871 when this was written; but it is very far from being what it

ought to be, and its attainment of a high standard is impossible under

manhood suffrage.

Taking the judicial system of the United States as a whole for the last

three quarters of a century it must be said that the administration of

justice has been inefficient; a large percentage of the judges have been

and are unfit for their places; clerks and sheriffs corrupt and

incapable; there have been chronic and intolerable delays; juries almost

everywhere carelessly selected, and usually incompetent and morally weak

or dishonest; inferior magistrates corrupt and unfit; many of the trial

judges weak and slow and referees and masters grasping and extortionate.

Congress and the several states have adopted the stupid policy of

underpaying the bench, apparently on the theory that any lawyer is

capable of being a judge; and of employing as few judges as possible in

order to save some of the money elsewhere so wickedly squandered. These

foolish economies to offset reckless waste are characteristic of the

lower classes; they are given effect by universal suffrage, and

harmonize with the whole inefficient outfit. The result is that in many

cities important cases are on the trial calendars for months and even

years waiting to be heard because there are not judges enough to hear

them promptly; erroneous decisions of weak and ignorant judges keep the

appellate courts busy ordering reversals and granting new trials; and a

controversy that ought to be disposed of in a few months may drag along

for years and until some of the witnesses have disappeared or died and

others have forgotten all they once knew about the case. Mr. Bryce, in

his _American Commonwealth_, treats the subject of the judiciary with

great circumspection, and with an evident desire to speak well of the

American bench, but is unable after “careful inquiries” to answer even

in the matter of honesty for more than “nearly all the northern and most

of the southern and western states.” He says that “In a few states,

probably six or seven in all, suspicions have at one time or another

within the last twenty years attached to one or more of the Supreme

judges,” and has “never heard of a state in which more than two or three

judges were the objects of distrust at the same time.” It is worth while

to stop to realize what this amounts to: from twelve to twenty dishonest

judges of the highest state courts in the United States, actually

sitting day after day, dealing out infamy under the name of justice;

criminals put on the bench by the election machinery; a judiciary in six

or seven states so tainted that the foul smell reached the nostrils of a

visitor from other lands. This state of things makes one suspect a low

standard for the entire judiciary, or at least for that of each of those

six or seven suspected states, for it indicates the unscrupulous power

of politics. In a state where even two or three judges sell or barter

justice for politics, who will not suspect that others, promoted by the

same bosses, or by the same system, are incompetent, careless or

otherwise unfit?

The third class of public officers, being that which is generally styled

administrative, ought not, any more than the judiciary, to be affected

by politics and should therefore never be chosen by popular election.

The function of the legislator is to enact new measures in accordance

with the progressive needs of the people, and he should therefore to a

certain extent consult their wishes in framing legislation. But the

administrative official is there to obey and to enforce the law as it

exists; his duty is merely that of an honest, painstaking expert, and

his office should be appointive and should never be treated as

political. This distinction between legislative and administrative

officials is plain and wide to the vision of any man with the least

knowledge of government; and yet in preparing the constitutions and laws

with which they deign to provide us, it is frequently ignored by

politicians in pursuit of political power and patronage; the pretense

being the furtherance of democratic institutions and the rule of the

people. And so in the great state of New York the attorney general, the

state engineer and surveyor, the secretary of state and the state

treasurer have been made and are elective officials; and since female

suffrage has been established in that state we have the edifying

spectacle of those important offices being filled and their incumbents

chosen, not by the governor of the state, nor by any body of experienced

lawyers, engineers, business men or others somewhat acquainted with the

workings of the respective offices and candidates, but by four millions

of miscellaneous people; including motormen, hod carriers, servant

maids, seamstresses, society ladies, firemen, boiler makers, farm

laborers, gamblers, loafers, etc., of whom ninety-nine out of a hundred

have no idea what an attorney general or a state engineer is, nor what

are the duties of any of these officials, and would be unable the day

after election even to name the candidates for whom they voted for those

offices. In fact the gross ineptitude of the institution of manhood

suffrage is nowhere more strikingly apparent than in the election of

state officers in the Empire State.

Nowhere in private life is the principle of popular election applied to

the choice of administrators or managers; such folly is confined to

public affairs. The merchant service and the army and navy are not

conducted upon the principle of universal suffrage; neither the crew nor

the passengers, nor both united, are permitted to select the officers of

a ship; nor are the rank and file permitted to vote for their officers

in any navy, or in any well-disciplined army. The sick man does not

choose his physician, nor the business man his lawyer or broker by

taking the votes of his neighbors or friends. In all these instances,

and in every similar case of necessary care in making a choice of an

agent, the prerequisite which is insisted upon as first indispensable

and controlling is efficiency; and such efficiency can only be obtained

by intelligent selection. Administrative officials should always be

possessed of character, experience, intelligence and other qualities

which go to produce efficiency. Such possessions can only be recognized

by those who are personally acquainted with the candidates and are

competent to pass upon these qualities. Their selection should

preferably be made by those who are to supervise their conduct in

office, and to keep them up to the standard required. An appointing body

is able to consider all the candidates who present themselves or whose

friends present them; the electorate can only consider two or three to

any advantage. The appointing body can examine personally all the

candidates; the voters are incapable of properly examining any, and have

neither the means nor the leisure for the careful scrutiny needed to

estimate professional or expert qualifications. All administrative

officers should therefore be placed in office by appointment of their

superiors or supervisors who are to be held responsible for their

conduct in office, and never by popular election at the polls. Of

course, the politicians may reply, though they are not likely to do so,

that the election of these state officers is a sham; that they are

usually far from being the nondescripts whom the populace might choose

if left unbossed; that they are really selected in secret long before

election, by a political autocracy, which taking advantage of the

ignorance and indifference of the mass of voters, sees to it that the

powers and patronage of these offices go in the direction of selected

favorites of the machine, not destitute of ability. This is at least

partly true, for the tendency of manhood suffrage is to turn the

elections into mere formal ratifications of the will of the bosses. And

a machine appointment to an administrative office usually results much

better for the public interest than a choice by manhood suffrage,

especially where there are spoils in sight and where rival organizations

sharpen their claws, as for instance in a mayoralty contest in a large

city. Then ensues a real struggle, heightened by newspaper lies and

clamor, with a tendency to give the victory to that one of the factions

whose managers are most artful, impudent and mendacious. In the

_American Popular Science Review_, February, 1918, p. 121, Edgar Dawson,

speaking of the election of a city mayor, an office which under any

rational system is treated as administrative, says:

“Does it require argument to prove to thoughtful people that wise

choice is not likely to be made in the midst of the revel of

hysteria, sham, demagogy, falsehood and ignorance, which we call a

direct popular election of administrative officers? Is choice

likely to be wise when nine out of ten of those who make it know

nothing of the candidates they support or oppose, and are equally

ignorant of the work the candidates ask the privilege of doing?”

Thus arises a question difficult to decide, between appointments by a

machine, and those of a machine-directed populace.

The immense importance of scientific management of cities is so obvious

as not to need discussion. It is set forth in detail in a book published

in 1918 by M. L. Cooke, Director of Public Works in Philadelphia, to

which the reader is referred. The author states that “Governmental work,

Federal, State and Municipal, is still almost exclusively in the

unsystematized stage.”

Here is an extract from a competent writer, a man of actual experience

in city matters:

“_When the Public Builds Buildings._ Twenty-seven million dollars

for a City Hall that was to have cost $7,000,000; no water on the

second floor of a public bath because the water mains were made too

small; an emergency order, without competitive bids, for repairing

a police precinct, given to a contractor sixteen miles away;

$20,000 for cleaning a City Hall that could be kept clean for

$2,000; fifteen employees dead from tuberculosis in one

germ-infested, dark, unclean room. What’s the use of multiplying

examples?” (_Woman’s Part in Government_, by W. H. p. 330.)

The lack of efficiency in Federal administration which has been

notorious for ninety years is due to the malign influence of manhood

suffrage which renders it impossible to enforce standards of capacity.

What Faguet calls “the religion of incompetency” is displayed even in

the presidential appointments where men are moved about from office to

office like checkers on a board, and put in places for which they have

had no previous training whatever. This method of appointment is in

itself convincing proof, not merely of the unfitness of the

appointments, but of the vice of the whole system of selection. A jack

of all trades is master of none. What would be said of the fitness of a

man to superintend a watch-making establishment who had never worked at

the trade or business of maker or of dealer in watches, and whose entire

experience had consisted of one or two years in each of the employments

of carpenter, dentist, cook and piano tuner? Yet the practice of

politics sanctions just such appointments as that would be. Even for

great offices requiring the highest skill, preparatory training or

experience is rarely required. Looking back from 1918; out of forty-four

United States Secretaries of State from the beginning of our history,

thirty-three were lawyers; only three or four had any previous

diplomatic experience; out of the sixteen last Secretaries of the

Treasury, twelve were lawyers and only four bankers; out of the last

thirteen Postmasters General, only one had ever before been in the Post

Office Department; of forty-nine Secretaries of War in our history

thirty-five were lawyers; the others were editors, bankers, etc., and

only three or four had any previous military experience; out of

thirty-eight Secretaries of the Navy twenty-seven were lawyers, three

authors, and seven were business men. Not one of them all had any naval

experience prior to taking control of the United States Navy. A former

Secretary of the Navy gave the writer to understand that he had been

appointed principally to distribute the patronage and to hold the state

politically in line. Now, while it is quite true that a knowledge of the

law and a training in the art of reading and understanding law is

extremely important to any cabinet official, yet surely a lawyer cannot

be expected to build ships, conduct a post-office business, direct the

diplomacy of a great nation or carry on war properly without any

appropriate previous training whatever. Yet under a system of government

by manhood or universal suffrage untrained men are sure to get these

high appointments because they are vote-getters and can obtain the

support of the controllable class for the party in power; in short

because they are machine men and the needs of the machine are first and

imperative.

The extent to which some of these cabinet officers have been shifted

about is astonishing. Mr. Cortelyou for instance had been stenographer

and private secretary to President McKinley; and in a few years

thereafter filled the offices of Secretary of Commerce and Labor,

Postmaster General and Secretary of the Treasury. Mr. Meyer was

Postmaster General under Roosevelt and Secretary of the Navy under Taft,

the next President. Moody from the place of Secretary of the Navy under

Roosevelt was suddenly jumped onto the bench and made Justice of the

Supreme Court. Charles Bonaparte was Attorney General when he was

shifted into the place of Secretary of the Navy. Now it is a sufficient

tax on human credulity to ask one to believe that the original

appointments of these men were made entirely because of fitness; but it

exceeds the limit when we are required to suppose that while in the

office of Postmaster General Mr. Cortelyou was really learning finance

and becoming fitted for Secretary of the Treasury, while Mr. Meyer in

the same Postmaster General’s office was becoming a great naval expert,

a real seadog justified to be “Ruler of Uncle Sam’s Navee.”

It is notorious that all state appointments by the governor are made not

for merit, but as a reward for political service, and invariably from

the members of the political oligarchy who procured the governor’s

election, or under their direction to members of their family or

backers. The results are often grotesque. Look for a moment at a batch

of state appointments; take the very first that happens to come to hand

from New York. State Tax Commissioner W. was formerly State Comptroller

and before that Postmaster. Election Superintendent R., formerly

Assistant District Attorney in New York City, was before that in the

Attorney General’s office in Albany and Superintendent of State Prisons.

R. 2 was recently Collector of the Port of Rochester; he now holds a

state office. Another couple:--V. has been successively Commissioner of

Excise, Commissioner of Police, Commissioner of Docks, Police Justice,

Commissioner of Elections; Superintendent of Public Buildings;

Superintendent of Elections. H. has held the offices of Deputy Collector

of Internal Revenue; member of Board of Alderman; Grain Superintendent;

Sealer of Weights and Measures; Superintendent of Streets and Clerk of

the Court. The practice is the same in all states and cities, and these

five instances could be easily increased to five thousand and with time

and research to five hundred thousand. In fact it is rare to find a man

of over thirty-five years of age in public office who has not filled

several entirely different political employments. It is said that one of

the members of the New York Constitutional Convention of 1846 proposed

that public officials should be selected by lot; and it is doubtful

whether in some cases the result would not be an improvement on the

present system. Is it any wonder that government administration is a

joke, an object of scorn to business men? Efficiency cannot be expected

in any department of government or business whose chief is ignorant of

the details of its operations. And yet so demoralizing has been the

effect of the manhood suffrage political tradition, so accustomed are

not merely the politicians but the public to the vicious practice of

distributing these most important offices as rewards for political work,

that the proposal to require them to be filled by men of experience and

training in the work of their respective offices would probably be met

with derisive laughter in every governmental department.

Let us not flatter ourselves, therefore, that under a manhood suffrage

government any real improvement can be obtained by the mere expedient so

often urged of filling the offices by appointment instead of by

election. Experience teaches the contrary. At present the appointments

to office, whether made by the president, governor or other officer are

of the same general character as those made by popular election; that

is, they are nearly all bad; the spirit of Jackson still controls most

of them; the spirit of politics, of deference to the will of the

machine, of compliance with the theory on which universal suffrage

stands; the theory that participation in the activities, honors and

emoluments of government is a sort of perquisite of citizenship or

privilege in which each citizen is entitled to share. This pernicious

theory must be forever cast out of our political system and replaced by

the true one; namely, that both the vote and office are to be entrusted

only to the qualified, before we can expect permanent improvement in the

administration of public affairs. In vain we may continue the long

struggle to abolish the spoils system as long as every candidate from

the president down to constable has to face the demands of the

insatiable regular army of the politicians. Not only every legislative

candidate, but every aspirant for a judicial or administrative office,

has now in one way or another to satisfy these disciplined gangs of

political marauders, their bosses and their machines. These hireling

bands must be disfranchised and disbanded and the institution of manhood

suffrage overthrown before efficiency will become an established feature

of our governmental system.

Of the fact that a pure and efficient administration of public affairs

is possible there cannot be the slightest doubt. The result was actually

achieved in this country in federal administration by President

Washington, and continued in the forty years that intervened till

Jackson’s time. It has also been accomplished by ourselves in the

Philippines, by the French and Dutch in some of their colonies, and

notably by Great Britain in all parts of the world. Read for instance

the report from which the following is an extract, made by Alleyne

Ireland, a specialist in Colonial affairs, appointed Colonial

Commissioner in the Far East, by the University of Chicago. (_North

American Review, May, 1918._)

“Administration as a non-political function of government is a

conception unfamiliar to the American mind; and I propose to

describe in outline how administrative problems appear to the eye

of a man who has spent twenty years in studying those forms of

government in which administration is conducted on a non-political

basis. I have observed in actual operation ten distinct forms of

government which conform to this condition. They are the Crown

Colony System in various British Colonies; the Central Government

of India; the Indian Provincial System in Burma; the system of

Protected Native States in the Malay Peninsula; the Government of a

Commercial Company in Borneo; the Rule of an Independent White Raja

in Sarawak; the early American Government in Mindanao; limited

Parliamentary Government in British Guiana and Barbados; the French

Colonial System in Indo-China; and the Dutch Colonial System in

Java. In the countries I have named there are administered the

public affairs of more than 300,000,000 people. Although these

governments have been constantly attacked on the ground of their

lack of a popular political element it is the general verdict of

those who have observed them in action that, leaving political

participation aside, they furnish this vast population with a

larger measure of the tangible fruits of good government than is

enjoyed by any people under the more ‘liberal’ constitutions of

Europe and America.... The influence exerted upon policy by the one

and by the other of these two modes of procedure differs

profoundly. In the United States the matter is decided, initially,

by some hundreds of men, and many having strong political motives

for taking a particular view; in India the matter is decided,

initially, by six men, each of whom is a trained and experienced

administrator, and none of whom has any electorate to please, any

powerful business interest to placate, or any political party to

support. In the former instance the veto rests with one man who may

have no more than an amateur’s acquaintance with the question

involved; in the latter the veto also rests with one man, but this

man is, in practice, guided by the advice of the India Council, a

body of from ten to fourteen men, sitting in London, composed as to

the majority, of ex-Indian officials of long service and varied

administrative experience.”

We are not lacking in material in America; we have the best in the

world; energetic, honest, upright, clear-headed, healthy, vigorous,

disinterested, patriotic, well-educated men; noble fellows, plenty of

them; eager for work; but they are not in politics and never will be

there under the present vile régime. It is just because they prize honor

and reputation that they stay out of politics. Bryce truly says that

“the American system does not succeed in bringing the best men to the

top. Yet in Democracy more perhaps than in other governments, seeing it

is the most delicate and difficult of governments, it is essential that

the best men should come to the top.” What prevents our best men from

coming to the top? What prevents our having in this country the purity

and efficiency witnessed by Mr. Ireland in ten different jurisdictions?

Principally, our political spoils system, whose source and support are

manhood suffrage and the controllable vote. Secondarily, our failure to

recognize formally and actually the principle of efficiency as the prime

essential in government. Such recognition will neither be genuine nor

effective unless it begins with requiring an efficient electorate. After

that what remains to be done will be comparatively easy and natural.

Without it, the cause of substantial reform is practically hopeless.

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