THE SUFFRAGE IS NOT A NATURAL RIGHT BUT A FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT
AND MAY THEREFORE PROPERLY BE RESTRICTED TO THOSE COMPETENT TO
EXERCISE IT.
Those citizens who think that they have or anybody has or can have a
natural right to vote are absolutely mistaken. There is a general
impression that such a right exists, created partly by the twaddlers who
write on politics for schools and colleges; but it is a false one, and
it is seriously misleading, because it negatives in advance all effort
to elevate the standard of the electorate by excluding the notoriously
unfit from its membership. The citizen votes not in the exercise of a
right or a privilege, but in performance of a governmental function,
involving the execution of a trust which should be confined to those
competent to exercise it.
Political voting for candidates for office is part of the process of the
creation of a governing power, and it is itself an act, part and
function of government; by it the voter declares his judgment as well as
proposes agents or representatives to enact and to execute the law.
Society therefore has a right to regulate its exercise, and to see that
it is entrusted into proper and competent hands. This theory of the
right of Society or the State to control and limit the suffrage has been
adopted not only by European nations in dealing with inferior races but
also by ourselves at home. We do not for instance permit the Chinese to
vote; we exclude from the suffrage youths under twenty-one years of age
and unnaturalized aliens, notwithstanding that they may pay large
amounts in taxes and be perfectly honorable and well meaning members of
the community; also tramps, paupers and the insane. So the policy of
excluding the colored race from full participation in the government of
the country is thoroughly established in the United States. Negroes are
not actually allowed to vote except where they are in a safe minority.
In the States of California, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Washington and Wyoming there is a
nominal educational qualification by which at least a pretence has been
made of excluding ignorant whites from the franchise, and which has been
effectively used in some of these States to exclude thousands of colored
voters. The suffrage has been denied to non-taxpaying Indians in all
parts of the United States, notwithstanding that many of them may be
decent and intelligent people. One Northern State, New Hampshire, and
eleven Southern States make payment of a poll tax a necessary
prerequisite to voting. A certain period of preliminary residence is
prescribed in all the States. In thirty-eight states a previous
registration is required; and this provision every year disfranchises
thousands of travelling salesmen and others. Thirty-two States exclude
women from all or specified elections, and though the expediency of this
exclusion has been seriously challenged, the right to enact it is
unquestioned by most people.
Thus it will be seen that in the American polity the principle is
practically well recognized that voting is not a natural right but a
function of government which may properly be restricted, either to
property holders as in fact it was by our ancestors restricted, or to
any other class as the State may ordain. There is however, reason to
believe that the general public has not reflected enough on the subject
to assimilate or even to accept this proposition. The American masses
take most of their so-called opinions ready made, and as far as any
popular theory upon the subject or conception thereof is to be found
among them, it is apparently a vague loose notion of a natural equality
among men; an understanding that it is part of the original American
tradition that every man has an equal natural right to take part in
government or at least to “express himself” by his vote. We have seen
in the last chapter that the original American tradition is just to the
contrary, and demands a substantial property qualification for all
voters. In a subsequent chapter it will appear how that original
American tradition was foolishly and thoughtlessly abandoned, when
manhood suffrage and the spoils system were together foisted upon us in
the time of Andrew Jackson.
As already stated, an examination of the libraries does not disclose any
strong authority or well reasoned argument in favor of the practice of
giving a vote to every adult man or woman. The doctrine of the natural
right to vote which was first practised by the French radicals of the
eighteenth century appears to have been accepted as a piece of popular
sentimentality; apparently it has not been adopted by any great thinker
or writer. Those writers who favor it are generally superficialists, and
are content to refer to it vaguely as a step in the progress of the age
without any close examination of its merits. As for the theories of
natural equality between men, and of the right to vote as a means of
self expression neither of them will stand a moment’s serious
reflection. No equality of any kind whatsoever exists or ever can exist
between men. It is impossible even to imagine a tolerable existence
under the crushing weight of the monotony of equality. Along with
variety would perish love, hope and joy; ambition, the great source of
initiative and the most powerful stimulus to effort would be destroyed;
life would lose its picturesqueness, and instead of a bright running
stream it would become a stagnant pool. Equality means death; its domain
is the cemetery. The champions of manhood suffrage therefore will have
to look elsewhere for its justification than in an assertion of an
equality which cannot exist.
But we will be told that there is an “equality of rights.” Here is
another absurd phrase, which as generally applied is false or
meaningless. By equality of rights people generally refer to personal
rights such as the right to life, to personal liberty, etc. But there
is no point of resemblance, no analogy even, between the character of
such a right and of the asserted right to suffrage. The latter is a
claim to share with others, and therefore acquired and artificial. The
right of a man to his life, however, is not one in which others can
share; and all natural rights are of the same general character,
absolute, strictly personal and exclusive. The claim to vote rests on an
entirely different basis from such; it is social, and involves others
and the rights of others, it is a claim to govern; it vitally affects
every one else and therefore no man can assert it without the others
being consulted, since to do so would infringe upon _their_ social
rights. No such right can possibly be an original or natural right; for
natural rights are of course common to all men; and the absurdity of
every man having the natural right to impose his will upon another man
is manifest. To say that there exists a natural right common to all men
involving power over others, or that one man has a natural right to
interfere with the actions of others, or of a society formed of others,
or a natural right whose exercise by some would deprive other men of
their own similar rights is nonsense; since these last would have the
same power over the first and the result would be chaos. Such a
proposition involves a complete contradiction of itself, and an
impossibility.
Society and political organizations are artificially created, and all
rights under them are artificially acquired. The result of the exercise
of some power, or founded upon an agreement of some kind, express or
implied, they are in the nature of gifts or functions conferred by
society upon the individual. Of this character is the voting franchise.
There can be no natural right to the control of society or even to take
part in society against its will, both of which as social and legal, not
natural rights, are asserted and employed by every voter. The only
natural right that a man can have towards society is to escape from it
altogether to a place not occupied by other men.
These considerations dispose of the sentimental twaddle uttered
sometimes by shallow magazine writers and unsophisticated college
professors that every man has a natural right to what they call
“political self expression.” Self expression by political voting always
involves in some way the exercise of power over others; and no one can
have a natural right to such power.
The above reasoning applies of course to the exercise of the voting
power where it affects the property of others as well as where it
directly affects only the person. No man can have a natural right to
dispose of another’s property or any part of it by voting or otherwise.
To talk of a natural right to vote away another man’s property is
downright nonsense. Imagine a small independent island inhabited by one
hundred families each with property honestly acquired. Would an
immigrant body of five hundred have a natural right by a vote to
confiscate this property? The proposition is monstrous, yet it is all
implied in the theory of a natural right to vote.
Our Courts and Judges have never held suffrage to be a natural right,
and it has never been treated as such in our legislation. Marshall,
Chief Justice of the United States, says: “The granting of the franchise
has always been regarded in the practice of nations as a matter of
expediency and not as an inherent right.” And Judge Cooley: “Suffrage
cannot be the natural right of the individual because it does not exist
for the benefit of the individual but for the benefit of the State
itself.” (_Principles of Constitutional Law_, p. 249.) So on our statute
books voting is not treated as a natural right, nor is the citizen mass
considered as the supreme power in the state; but the constitution and
functions of the electorate are created and determined by the
legislative body, or under its direction, and its capacity is fixed by
law and derived from the law just as truly as that of any other body
exercising political powers in the government.
If suffrage were a natural right, the voter might exercise it to please
himself or solely for his own interest. But nobody pretends that this is
the case. It is conceded that the function of the voter is not to
gratify himself nor to practise experiments, nor to express his own
personal ideas, nor primarily nor mainly to foster his own interests or
those of his class, but to propose the best men and measures for the
country at large. He is not to seek direct personal benefit or gain by
his vote but is expected thereby to contribute his opinion, his wisdom,
his experience, to the promotion of the general welfare. He is not to
vote for a judge because he expects him to decide a lawsuit in his
favor; nor for a congressman because he hopes that he will help to
secure him a contract or a pension or a tariff rate favorable to his
business; but it is his duty to vote for judges and congressmen who will
decide and legislate justly, that is, with due regard for all. This
makes it clear that the franchise is not a gift of nature, but a trust
or function created by society for its own high purposes; that the voter
comes to the polls to take part in that function not as a master but as
a servant of the State in obedience to her mandate; and must be clad
with such qualifications as she prescribes. The voters are not masters
or rulers as is so often erroneously said, they are merely called upon
to designate the real rulers and masters of the land. When the citizen
approaches the polls on election day he there finds in operation a
formidable electoral machine which he is sometimes told is a contrivance
whose object is to establish the rule of the people. But this is a
superficial understanding of the matter; the people cannot possibly rule
themselves; the existence of any rule whatever implies rulers as well as
those ruled over; to talk of the people ruling is nonsense, or at best a
mere figure of speech to indicate that they have a choice of rulers.
Here as elsewhere there is and must be a government ruling by force;
here as elsewhere that government is a human machine wielding or
intended to wield irresistible power over its subjects, and constantly
menacing the disobedient with deprivation of property, liberty and life.
Our elective system is really a means for sustaining this tremendous
apparatus and of keeping it in operation and effective. It is that all
powerful governmental organism and not the people which rules the
country. Every American is just as much under the control of the
authority thus created as the subject of any ruler whatever. Freedom in
the sense of liberty to the individual to thwart or neglect governmental
authority is not within the American scheme. This is why resident
foreigners, deceived by the silly newspaper cant about the “people”
ruling are frequently surprised to find themselves more restricted in
some respects than they were in their own native monarchical countries.
This view of the matter whereby it appears that an election is the first
step in the process of the creation of a government requires the manhood
suffrage question to be presented in a different form from the usual one
which is, “Has a man as such a right to vote?” He has no such inherent
or natural right, and the real question is whether he is of the proper
material for use in the first process of democratic government making.
It follows too that the burden is on the would-be voter to show that he
is fit for that purpose. The mere fact that he is a dweller in the land
cannot possibly confer upon him the right to inject poor material into
the government-making process, any more than one of a number interested
in a cider press would have the right to insist on putting decayed
apples into the hopper.
But even if there was a natural right to vote Society would still have
the power to regulate its exercise and to establish conditions thereof.
Certainly Society would have the right to prohibit that exercise and it
would be its duty to do so when the same would operate against the
welfare of the community at large; or against the welfare of every other
person in it except the voter himself; or even against the welfare of
the majority of the citizens of the community. A man can no more have a
natural right to injure his neighbor by his vote than by any other
means; and just as he is free to use his personal liberty only to the
extent to which his actions are harmless or beneficial to the community,
so as a matter of natural right he should be only free to vote or
legislate and take part in government affairs, great or small, to the
extent to which his acts in that capacity are harmless or beneficial.
In any aspect of the matter therefore Society has the right to limit the
suffrage to such as are likely to exercise it for the benefit of the
commonwealth.
Thus by disposing of the vague idea of a natural right to vote, the way
is cleared for a consideration of the proper qualifications which
Society should require from voters. That there are men and classes of
men naturally incapable of exercising the judgment necessary to cast a
ballot helpful to the community is known to all of us. Says Amiel in his
Journal:
“The pretension that every man has the necessary qualities of a citizen
simply because he was born twenty-one years ago, is as much as to say
that labor, merit, virtue, character and experience are to count for
nothing.”
Not only has the country the right to exclude incapables from the
suffrage, but it is the patriotic duty of the good citizen to place a
voluntary limitation on himself, and to refrain altogether from voting
where through ignorance of the candidates or subject matter his vote
cannot be intelligently cast. For, just as the voter is peremptorily
called upon in casting his vote to disregard entirely his own interest
and pleasure, and even to vote contrary to his interests and prejudices
for the benefit of his country, so surely he can also be required in the
public interest to surrender his privilege of voting, to remain
altogether silent, and to allow the choice of men and measures to be
made by his more intelligent neighbors. And it further follows, that
where the ignorant voter knowingly and wilfully insists upon expressing
his own opinion or prejudice at the polls in opposition to the judgment
of another better qualified than he, his act is immoral and unpatriotic;
and equally immoral and unpatriotic is the conduct of the legislator,
writer or voter who knowingly countenances or assists in the
enfranchisement of a class of people who are incompetent to vote on the
questions to be presented to them, or to select the proper candidates
for public offices.
Voting at a political election being an act of government, the proper
test of the voter is that of capacity to govern. As Bagehot puts it:--
“Fitness to govern must depend on the community to be governed and
on the merits of other persons who may be capable of governing that
community. A savage chief may be capable of governing a savage
tribe. He may have the right of governing it, for he may be the
sole person capable of so doing: but he would have no right to
govern England. Whatever may be your capacity for rule, you have no
right to obtain the opportunity of exercising it by dethroning a
person who is more capable; you are wronging the community if you
do, if you are depriving it of a better government than that which
you can give to it.... The true principle is, that every person has
a right to so much political power as he can exercise, without
impeding any other person who would more fitly exercise such
power.... Any such measure for enfranchising the lower orders as
would overpower and consequently disfranchise the higher should be
resisted on the ground of abstract right; you are proposing to take
power from those who have the superior capacity, and to rest it in
those who have but an inferior capacity or in many cases no
capacity at all.” (_Parliamentary Reform_, 1859.)
In calling to its counsels at the polls such citizens as the State may
deem competent for that purpose, it is practically impossible to select
individuals; but it is quite possible to designate certain classes to
whom suffrage may or may not be permitted; and when these classes are
open to receive accessions indefinitely upon conditions useful to the
State and attainable by all, there is nothing in the whole transaction
inimical to the best democracy, or of which complaint can be made on the
ground of monopoly or injustice. The acquisition and judicious
management of a reasonable amount of property are terms and conditions
of just this character and experience has amply shown the necessity for
their imposition in the interests of society.
To summarize this branch of the subject. The primary object of an ideal
election is not to ascertain where lies the interest or to gratify the
caprices or whims of individuals, but to continue and sustain, and if
necessary to create the government of the country. The exercise of this
function is in itself an act of government or in aid of government, and
the privilege of participation therein is an acquired, a conferred
authority or function, not a natural right, and should be bestowed
solely for merit or capacity to be exercised in trust for the common
benefit. It is the patriotic duty of all incapable, unprepared or
unqualified citizens voluntarily to refrain from taking part in this
function; and it is the right and duty of the State by appropriate
legislation to exclude peremptorily therefrom all classes of men
incapable of its proper exercise, and for this purpose to establish
racial, property, educational, or other appropriate qualifications.
On the theory that the State itself may be supposed to have been
originally inaugurated and its operations originally sanctioned by the
suffrages of all its citizens as their creature and agent, a curious
question has been raised by some writers, namely, on what ground the
State can exclude from the constituent franchise a part, though ever so
small, of its original creators or principals. Such writers have,
however, overlooked the existence of a power higher and mightier than
that of the State or of its inhabitants at any particular period; a
power which is the real source of the authority of the State. This power
is “Society,” and its relation to the subject of the franchise will be
dealt with in the next chapter.