CHAPTER XLIV.

BLOCKADE OF CUBAN PORTS.

Contraband of War--Confiscation of Cargoes--Establishment of a

Blockade--Notice to Other Nations--Prizes, Lawful and Unlawful--

Privateering Abolished--Distribution of Prize Money--The Use the

Government Makes of Its Share.

While the great blockade was in progress the air was full of talk

about "prizes," "contraband," "search," and "seizure," and some of

the terms proved rather puzzling to the average citizen who had

never had occasion to study the rules of war.

First about "contraband." It is one of the strictest rules of war

that neutral nations must not interfere nor in any way give help

to either party. To furnish ships or arms or ammunition might

greatly prolong the conflict or even change its result, especially

where this assistance is extended to a nation--like Spain to-day--

ill supplied and of small resources. This would be manifestly

unfair, and for a neutral to offer or abet such aid is a grave

offense. For remissness in an aggravated case of this sort (that

of the Alabama) England was forced to pay us heavy damages.

Neither national sympathy nor national interests afford any

excuse.

That is why we restrained and punished those who organized

expeditions to help the Cubans while we were still at peace with

Spain. But nations engaged in war must not ask too much. They may

insist that a neutral shall allow no hostile operations to be

carried on within its territory, but they have no right to demand

that it shall punish its private citizens for engaging in trade in

articles that may be helpful to the enemy, for that would be

imposing too much trouble and expense upon a nation which has no

concern in the quarrel. Such trade is punishable, but it is the

business of the nation injured by it to catch the ships engaged in

it and enforce the penalty--which is usually confiscation of the

goods as "contraband of war." To do this it may stop and search

any ships--except warships--which it finds at sea; and so long as

no outrages are committed the neutral must submit and has no

ground for complaint. Trade in contraband goods is tolerated, but

it is carried on at the trader's own risk. His government will not

undertake to protect him from the legitimate consequences of his

venture.

As has been stated, the contraband goods are confiscated by the

captor. The vessel, however, must be captured while the guilty

goods are still on board; to seize the proceeds after the cargo

has been sold and landed is not allowable, though it has sometimes

been done. If the ship belongs to the same owner as the forfeited

goods, it, too, is confiscated; otherwise it goes free after the

goods are taken off.

It is very important to know just what articles are contraband and

what are not; but this is often hard to decide. There is no

question about weapons, military equipments and ammunition. These

are plainly contraband, and the materials from which they are made

are classed with them whenever they seem intended for military

uses. Thus sulphur and saltpeter are always contraband. The

detached parts of cannon and naval engines do escape by the trick

of separation.

Cloth is not contraband in itself, but if of a quality evidently

designed for the manufacture of uniform it would probably be

seized. Horses are so useful in war that most nations treat them

as contraband--though, oddly enough, Russia has never done so.

Still more objectionable, nowadays, is coal, which will never be

allowed to reach the bunkers of hostile warships if it can be

prevented. This shows plainly how uncertain and changeful is the

list, for fifty years ago coal was as free as provisions, though

even food must not be run through the lines of a blockade.

Articles, such as coal, which are of great value in war, but are

also largely used for peaceful purposes, are called "occasional

contraband" and their seizure has given rise to endless disputes.

There is no justice in treating them as contraband except when

they are obviously destined for hostile use. Sometimes, in

doubtful cases, such goods, instead of being confiscated, are

seized and paid for to prevent their reaching the enemy. This is

called "pre-emption;" but, fair as it seems, there is much danger

that it will be made a pretext for appropriating goods which ought

to go quite free, and the practice is generally condemned.

Search at sea is extremely annoying, and ships entirely innocent

of contraband are often subjected to great inconvenience. That

must be endured; to attempt to resist or escape would make them

liable to confiscation, whatever their cargo might prove to be.

Only properly commissioned vessels, however, are entitled to hold

up merchantmen for this purpose. Another kind of meddling in war

for which a neutral citizen may be punished by confiscation, but

for which his government is not held responsible, is blockade

running.

A blockade, such as we maintained around Cuba, is established by

stationing war vessels at the entrances of harbors and at

intervals along the blockaded coast. Its purpose is to cut off

supplies and stop all communication with the enemy by sea. The

merchant ships of all nations are therefore forbidden to pass or

even to approach the line, and the penalty for disobedience is the

confiscation of both ship and cargo--whether the latter is

contraband or not here makes no difference. If the ship does not

stop when hailed she may be fired upon, and if she is sunk while

endeavoring to escape it is her own fault. And unlike vessels

merely guilty of carrying contraband, she is no less liable to

seizure on her return voyage, after her cargo has been disposed

of. Altogether, blockade running is perilous business. It is

usually attempted under cover of night or stormy weather, and it

is as full of excitement and adventure as war itself. The motive

is usually either to take advantage of famine prices, or to aid

the enemy by bringing supplies or carrying dispatches.

Neutral ships, however, are entitled to some sort of warning that

a blockade exists. Notice is therefore sent to all neutral

governments, announcing the fact and stating exactly the extent of

coast covered. Besides this, until the blockade has lasted for

some time and thus has become generally known it is customary for

the officers of the blockading fleet to visit and warn every ship

that approaches, the warning, with the date, being entered upon

her register. If, after that, she approaches the forbidden coast,

she is liable to confiscation--though possibly great stress of

weather might excuse her provided she landed no cargo.

Instructions of this sort were issued by President McKinley to our

squadron blockading Cuba. A reasonable time, also, was granted to

ships that were lying in the blockaded ports at the time when the

blockade was declared, to make their escape. President McKinley

allowed thirty days for this purpose, which was unusually liberal.

Nations engaged in war have sometimes assumed that they could

establish a blockade by simply issuing a proclamation forbidding

neutrals to approach the enemy's coast, without stationing ships

to enforce it. For example, during the Napoleonic wars, France

declared the whole coast of England to be blockaded at a time when

she scarcely dared send out a ship from her ports, having been

soundly thrashed at Trafalgar. But these "paper blockades" are a

mere waste of time and ink. They are not valid, and except in the

way of angry and contemptuous protest, no nation would consider

them worthy of the slightest attention. If Spain, for instance,

should attempt a desperate game of bluff by declaring New Orleans,

New York and Boston under blockade, all neutral ships would come

and go just the same, and she would meddle with them at her peril.

This question--if it ever was a question--was finally decided by

the epoch-making convention of the powers at the close of the

Crimean war (treaty of Paris, 1856), which, along with other rules

that have revolutionized naval warfare, declared that "blockades

in order to be binding must be effective." This means that they

must be maintained by a force actually stationed on the blockaded

coast, strong enough to make it decidedly dangerous to attempt to

run through. The temporary absence of some of the ships, however,

either in pursuit of an enemy or on account of a violent storm,

would not invalidate the blockade, and ships seeking to take

advantage of such an opening would be liable to the full penalty

if caught.

And now a few words about "prizes"--a particularly interesting and

timely theme, for during the very first week of the war our fleet

captured no fewer than fifteen of them.

In time of war properly commissioned ships are entitled to capture

not only the armed vessels but also the helpless merchantmen of

the enemy. It does seem a good deal like piracy, but it has been

the universal practice from time immemorial. These captured

vessels are taken to some convenient port of the captor's own

country that the courts may pass judgment on them, and if there

has been no mistake made in the seizure they are forthwith

condemned as "lawful prize." Then they are sold, and "prize money"

is awarded the captors in proportion to the value of the prize.

The cargo is treated in the same way, unless it happens to belong

to a neutral, in which case it is free; though the owner must put

up with the inconvenience and delay resulting from the seizure,

since he deliberately took that risk when he placed his goods in a

hostile craft. Formerly his property was sometimes confiscated

under these circumstances, but the treaty of Paris, already

mentioned, put a stop to that. Formerly, too, the goods of enemies

could be taken from neutral ships and confiscated in the same

manner as contraband of war, but the treaty of Paris made an end

of that also.

Another excellent rule adopted on that notable occasion abolished

privateering. Privateers were armed ships belonging to private

citizens who had obtained from their own government a commission

(letter of marque) which authorized them to make prize of the

enemy's merchant vessels and appropriate the proceeds. The

abolition of privateering was a long step in the right direction,

for the privateer's motive was mainly plunder, and the whole

business was really close kin to piracy. Neither the United States

nor Spain signed the original agreement, but both have acceded to

it now--Spain, evidently, very much against her will, for her

citizens thirsted for the rich booty of our commerce, a fact which

makes supremely ridiculous her crazy ravings against our

legitimate captures as "American piracy."

DISTRIBUTION OF PRIZE MONEY.

The prize money adjudged to captors is distributed in the

following proportions:

1. The commander of a fleet or squadron, one-twentieth part of all

prize money awarded to any vessel or vessels under his immediate

command.

2. To the commander of a division of a fleet or squadron, a sum

equal to one-fiftieth of any prize money awarded to a vessel of

the division under his command, to be paid from the moiety due the

United States, if there be such moiety; if not, from the amount

awarded the captors.

3. To the fleet captain, one-hundredth part of all prize money

awarded to any vessel of the fleet in which he is serving, in

which case he shall share in proportion to his pay, with the other

officers and men on board such vessel.

4. To the commander of a single vessel, one-tenth of all the prize

money awarded to the vessel.

5. After the foregoing deductions, the residue is distributed

among the others doing duty on board, and borne upon the books of

the ship, in proportion to their respective rates of pay.

All vessels of the navy within signal distance of the vessel

making the capture, and in such condition as to be able to render

effective aid if required, will share in the prize. Any person

temporarily absent from his vessel may share in the captures made

during his absence. The prize court determines what vessels shall

share in a prize, and also whether a prize was superior or

inferior to the vessel or vessels making the capture.

The share of prize money awarded to the United States is set apart

forever as a fund for the payment of pensions to naval officers,

seamen and marines entitled to pensions.

Our War with Spain for Cuba's Freedom · 第 19 / 30 章