DECLARATION OF WAR.
The Spanish Minister in Washington Demands His Passports--
Minister Woodford Leaves Madrid--Formal Declaration of War--Our
Government Declares Its Intentions--The War Feeling in Spain--
Effect of the Declaration in Cuba--Opinion of the Vice-President
of the Cuban Republic.
Spain was given until Saturday, April 23, at noon, to answer the
demand of our government expressed in, the joint Cuban
resolutions, passed by both Houses of Congress, and signed by the
President. In default of an answer by that time, the President
declared his intention to carry out the purpose of the ultimatum.
A copy of this ultimatum was delivered to Senor Polo, the Spanish
Minister at Washington. Senor Polo instantly demanded his
passports, declared all diplomatic relations between himself as
Minister and the United States no longer possible, and within a
few hours was on his way to Canada.
At Madrid, before our Minister could comply with his instructions,
he was notified by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs that
diplomatic relations were at an end. He at once asked for his
passports, and the same day left for Paris.
President McKinley rightly regarded the conduct of Spain in
breaking off diplomatic intercourse and refusing even to receive
his demand, as an equivalent to an absolute refusal. There
remained no reason to await action till Saturday noon, as no
possible reply could be expected to a demand the very presentation
of which had been positively rejected. In short, Spain instantly
showed that it regarded the act of Congress and President as
practically a declaration of war, and there remained no resort
except to arms.
On Monday, April 25, the President sent to Congress a message
asking for a joint resolution declaring that a state of war
existed between Spain and the United States, and a bill was at
once introduced into the House declaring that war did exist, and
had existed, since and including April 21, which passed in less
than two minutes. The Senate promptly concurred and the bill
became a law.
While the United States was not a party to the Declaration of
Paris, the government made known its intention to maintain its
four cardinal principles: (1) Privateering abolished. (2) Neutral
flags to exempt an enemy's goods from capture, except contraband
of war. (3) Neutral goods under an enemy's flag not to be seized
(4) Blockade to be binding must be effective. Spain, on her part,
issued a decree recognizing the fact that a state of war existed,
breaking off all treaties with the United States, and promising to
observe the rules just given, except that she maintained her right
to grant letters of marque to privateers. But this exception was
modified by Spain's declaring her intention to send out only
auxiliary cruisers taken from the mercantile marine and kept under
naval control. One consideration which may have influenced this
decision was the self-evident fact that the European Powers would
certainly interfere, in the event that Spain attempted to carry on
privateering under the old methods.
THE WAR FEELING IN SPAIN.
In Spain the war feeling was high. The Queen Regent, in her
speech to the Cortes, declared "the unalterable resolution of my
government to defend our rights, whatsoever sacrifices may be
imposed upon us in accomplishing this task." She said further:
"Thus identifying myself with the nation, I not only fulfil the
oath I swore in accepting the regency, but I follow the dictates
of a mother's heart, trusting to the Spanish people to gather
behind my son's throne and to defend it until he is old enough to
defend it himself, as well as trusting to the Spanish people to
defend the honor and territory of the nation."
THE POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
The President and Congress undoubtedly acted on the lines of good
policy in making a formal declaration of war. As Mr. McKinley said
in his message to Congress, the trend of events compelled him to
take measures of a hostile kind. A blockade had been established
and Spanish vessels had been captured. While every civilized power
on earth immediately learned the facts, there still remained the
necessity of going through the formal act of notifying them of
this government's intentions. In this instance, as in others in
the nation's history, the actual hostilities were begun before it
seemed necessary for the government to make a formal declaration.
According to the authorities on international law, "a declaration
may be necessary, but is not essential." In this case, when it
became so evident that a general conflict was imminent, the
administration did fairly by the commercial nations of the world
in formally stating its position, and giving them all warning as
to the consequences which might follow in the case of vessels
attempting to enter Cuban waters.
The resolutions were admirably brief and concise, merely declaring
the existence of a state of war, and authorizing the President to
do whatever he thought best with the army and the navy.
By this act, while the situation was in itself no way changed, the
nation assumed a definite diplomatic status as a power at war, and
was free to proceed to any such acts as came within the laws of
civilized nations in time of war.
EFFECT OF THE DECLARATION IN CUBA.
When the news of the action of the administration reached the
insurgents in Cuba it caused great rejoicing among them, for they
felt that the hour of their deliverance was at last at hand. In
speaking of it, Dr. Capote, Vice-President of the Cuban Republic,
said:
I desire to thank the great American people and their government
for the resolution they have made to free us from the tyrannical
rule of Spain. The people of Cuba believe in the good faith of the
people of America. They believe in their honesty of purpose to
free Cuba and are confident of their ability to do so; but it must
be borne in mind that the loadstar of the Cuban is not merely
freedom from the dominion of Spain, but independence from outside
control, however beneficent that control might be, and absolute
non-interference by others in the management of our own affairs.
"Cuba free and independent" is the watchword of Cuban liberty.
The Cuban commanders await some decisive step on the part of your
generals. If you can open up and maintain communication with the
Cuban armies, and give us a plentiful supply of arms and
ammunition, we will free Cuba without the loss of an American
soldier. Our position on the field is precarious. For lack of
supplies, we cannot concentrate our troops. Our camps shift from
place to place, according to food conditions. We are hampered and
embarrassed for lack of ammunition. We cannot arm the men we are
able to put in the field. Open up communication, give us arms and
supplies, and we ask no more.
As to the eventual settlement of the island, when the war is ended
and when the last Spanish soldier has left Cuba, the work of the
provisional government will be ended. The people of Cuba, whatever
the class or sympathy, will then say how we shall be governed.
There will be no reprisals, no confiscation, no distinctions.