POLITICS AND STRATEGY[2]
[Footnote 2: References: Luckwaldt: Oesterreich und die
Anfaenge des Befreiungskrieges von 1813: Vom Abschluss der
Allianz mit Frankreich, bis zum Eintritt in die Koalition.
Aster: Die Kriegsereignisse zwischen Peterswalde, Pirna,
Koenigstein und Priesten im August, 1813, und die Schlacht bei
Kulm. Wagner: Die Tage v. Dresden u. Kulm. Heft: Der
Waffenstillstand und die Schlacht bei Gross-Beeren nebst fuenf
Beilagen.]
Napoleon's Conduct after Dresden -- Military Considerations
Overruled by Political Schemes -- Probable Explanation of
Napoleon's Failure -- Prussian Victories at Grossbeeren and on
the Katzbach -- Vandamme Overwhelmed at Kulm -- Napoleon's
Responsibility -- Political Considerations again Ascendant -- The
System of "Hither and Thither" -- The Battle of Dennewitz -- Its
Disastrous Consequences -- Napoleon's Vacillation -- Strategy
Thwarted by Diplomacy.
Throughout the night after the victory at Dresden, Napoleon believed
that the enemy would return again to battle on the morrow. This is
conclusively shown by the notes which he made for Berthier during the
evening. These were based on the stated hypothesis that the enemy was
not really in retreat, but would on the morrow by a great battle
strive to retrieve his failure. But the Emperor was altogether
mistaken. To be sure, the council of the disheartened allies debated
far into the small hours whether an advantageous stand could not still
be made on the heights of Dippoldiswalde, but the decision was adverse
because the coalition army was sadly shattered, having lost a third of
its numbers. Crippled on its left and threatened on its rear, it
began next morning to retreat in fair order toward the Ore Mountains,
and so continued until it became known that Vandamme was directly in
the path, when a large proportion of the troops literally took to the
hills, and retreat became flight. Then first, at four in the
afternoon, Napoleon began to realize what had actually occurred. And
what did he do? Having ridden almost to Pirna before taking measures
of any kind to reap the fruits of victory, he there issued orders for
the single corps of Vandamme, slightly reinforced, to begin the
pursuit! Thereupon, leaving directions for Mortier to hold Pirna, he
entered a carriage and drove quietly back to Dresden!
These are the almost incredible facts: no terrific onslaught after the
first night, no well-ordered pursuit after the second, a mere pretense
of seizing the advantage on the third day! In fact, Napoleon, having
set his plan in operation at the very beginning of the battle, sank,
to all outward appearances, into a state of lassitude, the only sign
of alert interest he displayed throughout the conflict being shown
when he was told that Moreau had been mortally wounded. The cause may
have been physical or it may have been moral, but it was probably a
political miscalculation. If we may believe Captain Coignet, the talk
of the staff on the night of the twenty-seventh revealed a perfect
knowledge of the enemy's rout; they knew that the retreat of their
opponents had been precipitate, and they had credible information of
disordered bands seen hurrying through byways or rushing headlong
through mountain defiles. Yet for all this, they were thoroughly
discontented, and the burden of their conversation was execration of
the Emperor. "He's a -------- who will ruin us all," was the repeated
malediction. If we may believe Napoleon himself, he had a violent
attack of vomiting near Pirna, and was compelled to leave everything
on that fateful day to others. This is possible, but unlikely; the day
before, though listless, he was well enough to chat and take snuff as
he stood in a redoubt observing the course of events through his
field-glass; the day after he was perfectly well, and exercised
unusual self-control when tidings of serious import were brought from
the north. The sequel goes to show that neither his own sickness nor
the bad temper of the army sufficiently accounts for Napoleon's
unmilitary conduct on the twenty-eighth; it appears, on the contrary,
as if he refrained of set purpose from annihilating the Austrian army
in order to reknit the Austrian alliance and destroy the coalition.
This he never was willing to admit; but no man likes to confess
himself a dupe.
Had Oudinot and Macdonald succeeded in their offensive operations
against Berlin, and had Napoleon himself done nothing more than hold
Dresden, a place which we must remember he considered from the outset
as a defensive point, it would have sufficed, in order to obtain the
most favorable terms of peace, to throw back the main army of the
coalition, humiliated and dispirited, through Bohemia to Prague. But,
as we have repeatedly seen, long service under the Empire had
destroyed all initiative in the French marshals: in Spain one mighty
general after another had been brought low; those who were serving in
Germany seemed stricken with the same palsy. It is true that in the
days of their greatness they had commanded choice troops, and that now
the flower of the army was reserved for the Emperor; but it is
likewise true that then they had fought for wealth, advancement, and
power. Now they yearned to enjoy their gains, and were embittered
because Napoleon had not accepted Austria's terms of mediation until
it was too late. Moreover, Bernadotte, one of their opponents, had
been trained in their own school, and was fighting for a crown. To
Bluecher, untamed and untrustworthy in temper, had been given in the
person of Gneisenau an efficient check on all headlong impulses, and
Buelow was a commander far above mediocrity. Such considerations go far
to account for three disasters--those, namely, of Grossbeeren,
Katzbach, and Kulm--which made it insufficient for Napoleon to hold
Dresden and throw back the main army of the allies, and which thwarted
all his strategy, military and political.
The first of these affairs was scarcely a defeat. Oudinot, advancing
with seventy thousand men by way of Wittenberg to seize Berlin, found
himself confronted by Bernadotte with eighty thousand. The latter,
with his eye on the crown of France, naturally feared to defeat a
French army; at first he thought of retreating across the Spree and
abandoning the Prussian capital. But the Prussians were outraged at
the possibility of such conduct, and the schemer was convinced that a
show of resistance was imperative. On August twenty-second a few
skirmishes occurred, and the next day Buelow, disobeying his orders,
brought on a pitched battle at Grossbeeren, which was waged, with
varying success, until nightfall left the village in French hands.
Oudinot, however, discouraged alike by the superior force of the
enemy, by the obstinate courage of the Prussians, and by the dismal
weather, lost heart, and retreated to Wittenberg. The heavy rains
prevented an effective pursuit, but the Prussians followed as far as
Treuenbrietzen. On August twenty-first, Bluecher, aware of the
circumstances which kept Napoleon at Dresden, had finally determined
to attack Macdonald. The French marshal, by a strange coincidence,
almost simultaneously abandoned the defensive position he had been
ordered to hold, and advanced to give battle. It was therefore a mere
chance when on the twenty-fifth the two armies came together, amid
rain and fog, at the Katzbach. After a bitter struggle the French were
routed with frightful loss. A terrific rain-storm set in, and the
whole country was turned into a marsh. For five days Bluecher continued
the pursuit, until he reached Naumburg, on the right bank of the
Queiss, where he halted, having captured eighteen thousand prisoners
and a hundred and three guns.
To these misfortunes the affair at Kulm was a fitting climax. No worse
leader for a delicate independent movement could have been selected
than the reckless Vandamme. He was so rash, conceited, and brutish
that Napoleon once exclaimed in sheer desperation: "If there were two
Vandammes in my army, nothing could be done until one had killed the
other." As might have been expected, the headlong general far
outstripped the columns of Marmont, Saint-Cyr, and Murat, which had
been tardily sent to support him. Descending without circumspection
into the plain of Kulm, he found himself, on the twenty-ninth,
confronted by the Russian guard; and next morning, when attacked by
them in superior force, he was compelled to retreat through a mountain
defile toward Peterswald, whence he had come. At the mouth of the
gorge he was unexpectedly met by the Prussian corps of Kleist. Each
side thought the other moving to cut it off. They therefore rushed one
upon the other in despair, with no other hope than that of breaking
through to rejoin their respective armies. The shock was terrible, and
for a time the confusion seemed inextricable. But the Russians soon
came up, and Vandamme, with seven thousand men, was captured, the loss
in slain and wounded being about five thousand. Saint-Cyr, Marmont,
and Murat halted and held the mountain passes.
This was the climax of disaster in Napoleon's great strategic plan. In
no way responsible for Grossbeeren, nor for Macdonald's defeat on the
Katzbach, he was culpable both for the selection of Vandamme and for
failure to support him in the pursuit of Schwarzenberg. At St. Helena
the Emperor strove in three ways to account for the crash under which
he was buried after Dresden: by the sickness which made him unable to
give attention to the situation, by the inundation which rendered
Macdonald helpless at the crossing of the Bober, and by the arrival of
a notification from the King of Bavaria that, after a certain date, he
too would join the coalition. This was not history, but an appeal to
public sentiment, carefully calculated for untrained readers.
The fact was that at Dresden the gradual transformation of the
strategist into the politician, which had long been going on, was
complete. The latter misapprehended the moment for diplomatic
negotiations, conceiving the former's victory to have been
determinative, when in reality it was rendered partial and contingent
by failure to follow it up. Great as Napoleon was in other respects,
he was supremely great as a strategist; it is therefore his
psychological development and decline in this respect which are
essential to the determination of the moment in which he became
bankrupt in ability. This instant was that of course in which his
strategic failures became no longer intermittent, but regular; and
after Dresden such was the case. As to conception and tactics there
never was a failure--the year 1814 is the wonder-year of his
theoretical genius; but after Dresden there is continuous failure in
the practical combination of concept and means, in other words, of
strategic mastery. This contention as to the clouding of Napoleon's
vision by the interference of political and military considerations
is proved by his next step. Hitherto his basal principle had been to
mass all his force for a determinative blow, his combinations all
turning about hostile armies and their annihilation, or at least about
producing situations which would make annihilation possible. Now he
was concerned, not with armies, but with capital cities. Claiming that
to extend his line toward Prague would weaken it, in order to resume a
strong defensive he chose the old plan of an advance to Berlin, and
Ney was sent to supersede Oudinot, Schwarzenberg being left to
recuperate unmolested. The inchoate idea of political victory which
turned him back from Pirna was fully developed; by a blow at Berlin
and a general northward movement he could not merely punish Prussia,
but alarm Russia, separate the latter's army from that of the other
allies, and then plead with Austria his consideration in not invading
her territories. In spite of all that has been written to the
contrary, there was some strength in this idea, unworthy as it was of
the author's strategic ability. Ney was to advance immediately, while
he himself pressed on to Hoyerswerda, where he hoped to establish
connections for a common advance.
Such a concentration would have been possible if for a fortnight
Macdonald had been able to hold Bluecher, and Murat had succeeded in
checking Schwarzenberg. But the news of Macdonald's plight compelled
Napoleon to march first toward Bautzen, in order to prevent Bluecher
from annihilating the army in Silesia. Exasperated by this unexpected
diversion, the Emperor started in a reckless, embittered temper. On
September fifth it became evident that Bluecher would not stand, and
Napoleon prepared to wheel in the direction of Berlin; but the orders
were almost immediately recalled, for news arrived that Schwarzenberg
was marching to Dresden. At once Napoleon returned to the Saxon
capital. By September tenth he had drawn in his forces, ready for a
second defense of the city; but learning that sixty thousand Austrians
had been sent over the Elbe to take on its flank any French army sent
after Bluecher, he ordered the young guard to Bautzen for the
reinforcement of Macdonald. Thereupon Schwarzenberg, on the
fourteenth, made a feint to advance. On the fifteenth Napoleon replied
by a countermove on Pirna, where pontoons were thrown over the river
to establish connection with Macdonald. On the sixteenth Napoleon
reconnoitered, on the seventeenth there was a skirmish, and on the
eighteenth there were again a push and counterpush. These movements
convinced Napoleon that Schwarzenberg was really on the defensive, and
he returned to Dresden, determined to let feint and counter-feint, the
"system of hither and thither," as he called it, go on until the
golden opportunity for a crushing blow should be offered. Bluecher
meantime had turned again on Macdonald, who was now on the heights of
Fischbach with Poniatowski on his right. Mortier was again at Pirna;
Victor, Saint-Cyr, and Lobau were guarding the mountain passes from
Bohemia.
This was virtually the situation of a month previous to the battle.
Schwarzenberg might feel that he had prevented the invasion of
Austria; Napoleon, that he had regained his strong defensive. While
the victory of Dresden had gone for nothing, yet this situation was
nevertheless a double triumph for Napoleon. Ney, in obedience to
orders, had advanced on the fifth. Bernadotte lay at Jueterbog, his
right being westerly at Dennewitz, under Tauenzien. Bertrand was to
make a demonstration on the sixth against the latter, so that behind
this movement the rest of the army should pass by unnoticed. But Ney
started three hours late, so that the skirmish between Tauenzien and
Bertrand lasted long enough to give the alarm to Buelow, who hurried
in, attacked Reynier's division, and turned the affair into a general
engagement. At first the advantage was with the Prussians; then Ney,
at an opportune moment, began to throw in Oudinot's corps--a move
which seemed likely to decide the struggle in favor of the French. But
Borstell, who had been Buelow's lieutenant at Grossbeeren, brought up
his men in disobedience to Bernadotte's orders, and threw them into
the thickest of the conflict. Hitherto the Saxons had been fighting
gallantly on the French side; soon they began to waver, and now,
falling back, they took up many of Oudinot's men in their flight. The
Prussians poured into the gap left by the Saxons, and when Bernadotte
came up with his Swedes and Russians the battle was over. Ney was
driven into Torgau, with a loss of fifteen thousand men, besides
eighty guns and four hundred train-wagons. The Prussians lost about
nine thousand killed and wounded.
This affair concentrated into one movement the moral effects of all
the minor defeats, an influence which far outweighed the importance
of Dresden. The French still fought superbly in Napoleon's presence,
but only then, for they were heartily sick of the war. Nor was this
all: the Bavarians and Saxons were coming to feel that their
obligations to France had been fully discharged. They were infected
with the same national spirit which made heroes of the Prussians.
These, to be sure, were defending their homes and firesides; but
seeing the great French generals successively defeated, and that
largely by their own efforts, they were animated to fresh exertions
by their victories; even the reserves and the home guard displayed
the heroism of veterans. On September seventh Ney wrote to Napoleon:
"Your left flank is exhausted--take heed; I think it is time to
leave the Elbe and withdraw to the Saale"; and his opinion was that
of all the division commanders. Throughout the country-side
partizans were seizing the supply-trains; Davout had found his Dutch
and Flemings to be mediocre soldiers, unfit at crucial moments to
take the offensive; the army had shrunk to about two hundred and
fifty thousand men all told; straggling was increasing, and the
country was virtually devastated. To this last fact the plain
people, sufferers as they were, remained in their larger patriotism
amazingly indifferent: the "hither-and-thither" system tickled their
fancy, and they dubbed Napoleon the "Bautzen Messenger-boy."
Uneasiness pervaded every French encampment; on the other side
timidity was replaced by courage, dissension by unity.
This transformation of German society seemed further to entangle the
political threads which had already debased the quality of Napoleon's
strategy. Technically no fault can be found with his prompt changes of
plan to meet emergencies, or with the details of movements which led
to his prolonged inaction. Yet, largely considered, the result was
disastrous. The great medical specialist refrains from the immediate
treatment of a sickly organ until the general health is sufficiently
recuperated to assure success; the medicaster makes a direct attack on
evident disease. Napoleon conceived a great general plan for
concentrating about Dresden to recuperate his forces; but when Bluecher
prepared to advance he grew impatient, saw only his immediate trouble,
and ordered Macdonald to make a grand dash. Driving in the hostile
outposts to Foerstgen, he then spent a whole day hesitating whether to
go on or to turn westward and disperse another detachment of his
ubiquitous foe, which, as he heard from Ney, had bridged the Elbe at
the mouth of the Black Elster. It was the twenty-third before he
turned back to do neither, but to secure needed rest on the left bank
of the Elbe. But if Napoleon's own definition of a truly great man be
accurate,--namely, one who can command the situations he creates,--he
was himself no longer great. The enemy not only had bridges over the
Elbe at the mouth of the Elster, but at Acken and Rosslau. The left
bank was as untenable for the French as the right, and it was of stern
necessity that the various detachments of the army were called in to
hold a line far westward, to the north of Leipsic. Oudinot, restored
to partial favor, was left to keep the rear at Dresden with part of
the young guard. On October first it was learned that Schwarzenberg
was manoeuvering on the left to surround the invaders if possible
by the south, and that Bluecher, with like aim, was moving to the
north. It was evident that the allies had formed a great resolution,
and Napoleon confessed to Marmont that his "game of chess was becoming
confused."
The fact was, the Emperor's diplomacy had far outstripped the
general's strategy. It was blazoned abroad that on September
twenty-seventh a hundred and sixty thousand new conscripts from the
class of 1815, with a hundred and twenty thousand from the arrears of
the seven previous classes, would be assembled at the military depots
in France. Boys like these had won Luetzen, Bautzen, and Dresden, and a
large minority would be able-bodied men, late in maturing, perhaps,
but strong. With this preliminary blare of trumpets, a letter for the
Emperor Francis was sent to General Bubna. The bearer was instructed
to say that Napoleon would make great sacrifices both for Austria and
Prussia if only he could get a hearing. It was too late: already, on
September ninth, the three powers had concluded an offensive and
defensive alliance for the purpose of liberating the Rhenish princes,
of making sovereign and independent the states of southern and
western Germany, and of restoring both Prussia and Austria to their
limits of 1805. This was the treaty which beguiled Bavaria from the
French alliance, and made the German contingents in the French armies,
the Saxons among the rest, wild for emancipation from a hated service.
It explained the notification previously received from the King of
Bavaria, who, in return for the recognition of his complete autonomy,
formally joined the coalition on October eighth, with an army of
thirty-six thousand men. How much of all this the French spies and
emissaries made known to Napoleon does not appear. One thing only is
certain, that Napoleon's flag of truce was sent back with his message
undelivered. This ominous fact had to be considered in connection with
the movements of the enemy. They had learned one of Napoleon's own
secrets. In a bulletin of 1805 are the words: "It rains hard, but that
does not stop the march of the grand army." In 1806 he boasted
concerning Prussia: "While people are deliberating, the French army is
marching." In 1813, while he himself was vacillating, his foes were
stirring. On October third, Bluecher, having accomplished a superb
strategic march, drove Bertrand to Bitterfeld, and stood before
Kemberg, west of the Elbe, with sixty-four thousand men; Bernadotte,
with eighty thousand, was crossing at Acken and Rosslau; and
Schwarzenberg, with a hundred and seventy thousand, was already south
of Leipsic; Bennigsen, with fifty thousand reserves, had reached
Teplitz. The enemy would clearly concentrate at Leipsic and cut off
Napoleon's base unless he retreated. But it was October fifth before
the bitter resolution to do so was taken, and then the movement began
under compulsion. Murat was sent, with three infantry corps and one of
cavalry, to hold Schwarzenberg until the necessary manoeuvers could
be completed.