from the fact that in order to proceed with the utmost caution and lay
claim to no unwarrantable example, he has not ventured to regard certain
propositions as subjectless, which, in truth, really are so. We saw that
Miklosich expressed the view that the finite verb of subjectless
propositions always stands in the third person of the singular, and,
when the form admits a difference of gender, in the neuter. This was
certainly too narrow a limit, a limit which he himself transgresses,
though this appears in a much later passage. In the second part of his
treatise he says: “In ‘es ist ein Gott,’ the notion ‘Gott’ is affirmed
absolutely without a subject, and this is also the case in the
proposition ‘_es sind Götter_’”; and he adds: The “ist” of the
existential proposition _takes the place of the so-called copula “ist,”_
which in many, though by no means in all, languages, is indispensable to
the expression of the judgment, and has the same significance as the
termination of person in the finite verb as is clearly shown in the
proposition “es ist Sommer, es ist Nacht” alongside the propositions,
“es sommert, es nachtet.” “Ist” is accordingly not a predicate (p. 34;
cf. also p. 21 above). As a matter of fact, if the proposition, “es
giebt einen Gott,” is to be considered subjectless, so also must the
proposition, “es ist ein Gott,” and therefore also, “es sind Götter”;
and thus the rule previously laid down has proved to be too narrow. That
the existential propositions and other analogous forms, which may be
found, are all to be reckoned as subjectless propositions may serve to
confirm what we have sought to show above, i.e. that no language exists,
or can exist, which entirely dispenses with these simplest forms of
propositions. Only certain special kinds of subjectless propositions
therefore, am I able, with Miklosich, to recognize as the peculiar
advantage of certain languages.
These are the criticisms which I have thought it necessary to make. It
will be seen that, if found to be justified, they do not in the
slightest degree prejudice either the correctness or the value of the
author’s main argument, but rather lend to it a still wider
significance. And so I conclude by expressing once again the wish that
this suggestive little work, which, on its first appearance did not
meet with sufficient general recognition, may in its second
edition--where individual points have been corrected, much extended, and
particularly the critical objections of scholars like Benfey, Steinthal
and others, refuted with a laconic brevity, yet rare dialectical
power--find that interest which the importance of the inquiry and its
excellent treatment deserve.
APPENDIX II
Franz Brentano, son of Christian Brentano, and nephew of Clemens
Brentano and Bettina von Arnim, was born on January 16, 1838, at
Marienberg, near Boppard on the Rhine. He early embraced the study of
philosophy and theology, both at Berlin, under Trendelenburg, and also
at Munich. In 1864 he was ordained priest, and two years later became
_privat docent_ in the University of Würzburg. In 1873 he was appointed
professor there, but in the same year resigned his office in consequence
of his changed attitude towards the Church, and as an opponent of the
Vatican Council. Somewhat later, in response to this change in his
convictions, he separated himself definitely from the Church.
In 1874 Brentano received a call to the University of Vienna, and
continued there teaching Philosophy until 1895, first as ordinary
professor, and afterwards, having meantime renounced his professorship,
as _privat docent_. The reasons which led him to retire from this post
also, are set forth in his work, _My Last Wishes for Austria_
(Stuttgart, 1895). After withdrawing from his post as teacher he took up
his residence at Florence.
Brentano regards Aristotle as his real teacher in philosophy, and his
two earliest publications, _Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden
nach Aristoteles_ (Freiburg, i. Br. 1862), and _Die Psychologie des
Aristoteles insbesondere seine Lehre vom_ νοῦς ποιητικός (Mainz, 1867),
are a testimony to his comprehensive study and thorough knowledge of
Aristotelian philosophy. Especially is he in agreement with the
Stagirite regarding the high position he would assign to the application
of the empirical method as the only one which, in regard alike to
scientific and philosophical problems, is able by cautious and gradual
advance, to attain to knowledge. These first principles of method,
especially in their relation to psychological research, he has set forth
and practised in his first systematic work, _Psychologie vom Empirischen
Standpunkte_ (vol. i., Leipzig, 1874). It was also his regard for this
method of inquiry which early imbued him with a special interest for the
works of the most eminent English philosophers of modern times, not only
John Locke and David Hume, but also Bentham, the two Mills, Jevons and
others. A study of these writers led Brentano to enter at length in his
Würzburg lectures into a critical and explanatory treatment of English
psychology and logic, characterizing it as a source of instruction and
inspiration at a time when other distinguished advocates of German
philosophy looked askance at this attitude towards English thought,
believing that by its contact with English writers the peculiar
character of German thought might suffer. It will be observed that only
the first volume of the _Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint_ has
hitherto appeared, and it seems hardly likely that the work in its
present form will be continued, for further reflection convinced
Brentano that _descriptive_[A] psychology, or Psychognosy, as of most
importance in the examination and presentation of psychological
problems, must be separated from _genetic psychology_,[B] a study
necessarily half physiological in character; and that the former problem
as the naturally earlier and least difficult study should first be as
far as possible completed.
[A] i.e. the closest possible description and analysis of psychical
_events_ and their contents, on the basis of inner observation.
[B] i.e. the more difficult inquiry into the laws underlying the
origin of phenomena.
Such _psychognostical inquiries_, although not yet in principle
separated from genetic inquiry, occupy by far the greater part of the
first volume of the _Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint_. Among
the subjects there treated are: 1, the fundamental revision of the
classification of psychical phenomena, and their division into the three
main classes: ideas, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate; 2, and
in particular, a new and more appropriate characterization of the
judgment.
The insufficiency of the old doctrine according to which judgment
consists essentially in a connexion of ideas, had already been shown by
Hume, and more recently was strongly emphasized by Mill, though neither
was able to arrive at perfect clearness respecting its real nature.
Notwithstanding this, the affinity of Brentano’s doctrine of the
judgment with that of Mill, led to a scientific correspondence, and
later to arrangements for a personal interview, when, at the last
moment, the plan was frustrated by the death of the great English
investigator.
The new description of the judgment and its essential qualities form the
basis for a reform of logic even in its most elementary stages, a reform
which, in its essential features, is suggested in the above-mentioned
work, and also touched upon in the Essay here translated; but this truer
description of the phenomenon of judgment also throws light upon the
description and classification of the _modes of speech from the point of
view of their function or meaning_,--a classification based upon true
and most essential distinctions. In comparison with phonetics this
branch is still little developed. What is here said, was seen by eminent
philologists like Fr. von Miklosich, the pioneer in the sphere of Slav
comparative philology. In the appendix will be found an article bearing
upon this view.
While engaged in a profound study of the descriptive peculiarities
connected with the third fundamental class of psychical states above
referred to--a study analogous to that previously undertaken by him with
regard to the judgment--Brentano was led to the discovery of the
_principles of ethical knowledge_ which form the subject of this
lecture. The author, in his lectures delivered before students of all
faculties, but especially to students in the faculty of law, during each
winter session throughout many years, presented a complete and fully
developed system of ethical teaching based upon these principles.[A]
Unfortunately, this lecture still remains unpublished. The same holds
good of many of his inquiries into “descriptive psychology,” or
psychognosie, e.g. inquiries into the nature of sense perceptions
according to their qualitative and spatial nature, the nature of the
continuum, the time phenomenon, etc., the results of which are hitherto
familiar only to those who have either attended his lectures, or have
been present during private conversations.
[A] Since this essay was written the statements as to the principles
here developed have been modified only in respect of two points which,
if not practically important, are still theoretically so, and these,
with the author’s permission, may be here shortly referred to:--
1. In the lecture (p. 15) it is said that anything may be either
affirmed or denied, and that if the affirmation is right its denial
must be considered wrong, and vice versâ. It is also stated that this
is true analogously in respect of love and hate.
This Brentano no longer asserts, but rather observes that whereas the
whole must be denied, if but a part is untrue, a sum of good and bad,
on the other hand, may be of such a nature as nevertheless as a whole
to be worthy of love. It may be also so constituted that good and bad
remain in equilibrium.
2. In the lecture (p. 24), and in the corresponding note 37 (p. 87),
it is said that our preference qualified as right in the case where,
for instance, to one good another is added, is drawn, not from our
knowledge of the preferability of the sum as opposed to the parts,
but that analytic judgments here yield the means of our advance in
knowledge, and that the corresponding preferences are therefore
qualified as right, since the knowledge (given analytically) is here
the criterion. Here it is overlooked that without the experience of
acts of preferring we neither have nor could have the conception,
and therefore also our notion of preferability. And so it is also
true that it is by no means evident from analysis that one good plus
another is preferable to each of these goods taken singly. Here also a
complete analogy to the sphere of the true is wanting.
One truth added to another does not yield something more true. On
the other hand, one good plus another good yields a better. But that
this is so can only be understood by means of a special experience
belonging peculiarly to this sphere, i.e. by means of the experience
of acts of preferring which are qualified as right.
As to the other branches of philosophy, the work of Brentano already
published forms but a portion--often but the smaller portion--of
investigations, which, in the manner above described, have become known
to a larger or smaller circle of disciples. This explains the striking
fact that, in proportion to the extent of what has been published, an
unusually large number of investigators and scholars appear in a greater
or lesser degree to have been influenced by Brentano. (Überweg-Heinze,
in the eighth edition of the _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_,
reckons, as belonging to his school, six names of men at present
occupying important positions as teachers of philosophy.)
One section of Brentano’s doctrine of sense-perception forms the
substance of a lecture, _Zur Lehre von der Empfindung_, delivered at the
Third International Psychological Congress held in Munich (1896), and
published in the report of its proceedings (1897). A fragment of the
above system of ethical inquiry, _Über das Schlechte als Gegenstand
dichterischer Darstellung_ (Leipzig, 1892), treats of the worth and
preferability of the ideas employed by the artist.
With regard to psycho-genetic problems, apart from the question as to
the meaning and validity of Fechner’s psycho-physical law, a question
discussed in the first volume of his _Psychology_ and elsewhere, and
that of the spirituality and immortality of the soul, which formed
repeatedly the substance of lectures at Vienna University, Brentano has
especially occupied himself with the laws of the association of ideas.
One result of this study is his lecture, _Das Genie_, published in 1892,
which seeks to explain the artistic productions of men of genius--often
regarded as something quite unique and inexplicable--as a development of
psychical events which universally control our imaginative life.
Of Brentano’s researches in _metaphysics_ and in the _theory of
knowledge_ it must also be said that hitherto they remain still
unpublished, though they are familiar to a greater or smaller circle of
disciples. In this latter sphere are to be mentioned particularly his
inquiries respecting the nature of our insight into the law of
causality, the logical justification of induction, the _a priori_ nature
of mathematics, and the nature of analytic judgments. In ontological
questions also psychognosie has proved fruitful to the investigator in
leading him to an understanding and to an analysis based upon
experience, of the most important metaphysical notions, as, for
instance, causality, substance, necessity, impossibility, etc., notions
which some, despairing of the task rightly insisted upon by Hume, of
showing their origin to be based upon perception and experience, have
sought to explain straight away as _a priori_ categories.
For the rest, Brentano, in regard to metaphysics, is a decided theist.
He is an adherent of the theory of evolution, while denying that
accidental variations and natural selection in the struggle for
existence render explicable the phenomena of evolution and the
teleological character of the organism, basing his objections, among
other things, upon the fact that this attempt at a solution not only
leaves unexplained the first beginnings of an organism, but also takes
too little account of the fact that with the increasing perfection and
complication of the organism it becomes more and more improbable that an
accidental variation will lead to an improvement upon that which already
exists. And yet if there is to be progress, the organisms which, in the
struggle for existence, survive must not only be more perfect than those
which perish, but also more perfect than the organisms through which
they themselves are descended.
Brentano’s views on the historical development of philosophical inquiry
and the causes determining that development, the present state of
philosophy and its views regarding the future, he has set forth in
various publications: _Die Geschichte der Philosophie im Mittelalter_
(Möhler’s _Kirchengeschichte_, vol. ii. 1868); _Über die Gründe der
Entmutigung auf philosophischem Gebiete_ (Vienna, 1874), delivered as an
inaugural address on entering upon his work at Vienna University; _Was
für ein Philosoph manchmal Epoche macht_ (Vienna, 1876); _Über die
Zukunft der Philosophie_ (Vienna, 1893); and _Die vier Phasen der
Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand_ (Stuttgart, 1895).
In the last work a concise survey is made of the entire course of the
History of Philosophy, and it is there shown how in the three periods,
rightly regarded as distinct (Greek Philosophy, the Philosophy of the
Middle Ages, and Modern Philosophy), there is each time an analogous
change, a rising or blossoming period, and three periods of decadence,
of which those which succeed are always the psychologically necessary
result of the preceding. That in so doing Brentano has characterized the
latest phase of German philosophy, the so-called idealistic direction
from Kant to Hegel as the third or mystic period of decadence (howbeit
with all due recognition of the talents of these writers) has naturally
aroused violent opposition, though it has not found any real refutation.
It has been already said that Brentano’s earliest efforts were directed
to historical inquiries and especially to a presentation of the
Aristotelian psychology and to important sections of his Metaphysics.
The results of these researches, diverging as they did in many respects
from the traditional view, did not fail to awaken the attention of other
investigators. Their attitude, however (with a few exceptions like
Trendelenburg, and in part also Grote), was, on the whole, hostile and
polemic. This was especially so in the case of E. Zeller, in the later
edition of his _Greek Philosophy_, and in view of the reputation which
this work enjoys, Brentano thought it necessary to offer, as against
Zeller’s attacks, at least with regard to one point, an apology for his
own view, a point where the threads of metaphysics and psychology become
most intimately related, and where at the same time, the contrast
between the opposing views of these two writers in the psychological and
metaphysical spheres alike culminate. And so there appeared in the
_Report of the Proceedings of the Imperial Academy of Sciences in
Vienna_ (1882) Brentano’s article: “Über den Creatianismus des
Aristoteles, in regard to which E. Zeller in the same year, in the
_Report of the Proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences in
Berlin_, (vol. 49), published a detailed reply under the title: “Über
die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Ewigkeit des Geistes.” The charge
which is there made by Zeller against Brentano of interpreting Aristotle
without sufficient confirmation and with over-confidence, Brentano has
sufficiently repelled in his _Offener Brief an Herrn Prof. Dr. E.
Zeller_ (Leipzig, 1883), and the proofs which are here offered of the
way in which Zeller, on his part, bases his own attempts at explanation
and his charges against Brentano show distinctly that, if here one of
the two opponents is really open to the charge of over-confidence, it is
at any rate not Brentano.
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A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS
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