Standpunkt der Wissenschaft._ (Sendschreiben an Herrn Leibarzt Dr.
Beneke in Oldenburg.) Göttingen, 1857, p. 94 note. “Gauss said, the
author (of a certain psychological work) spoke of a want of exact
measurements in the case of psychical phenomena, but it would be good
if we only had clumsy ones, one could then make a beginning; but we
have none. There is here wanting the _conditio sine quâ non_ of all
mathematical treatment, i.e. whether and how far the changing of an
intensive into an extensive quantity is possible. Yet this is the
first and indispensable condition; then there were also others. On
this occasion Gauss spoke also about the usual incorrect definition
of quantity as an ‘ens’ which is capable of being increased or
diminished; one ought rather to say, an ‘ens’ that admits of being
divided into equal parts....”
[41] (_p. 27_). Fechner’s psycho-physical law, even were it assured,
whereas it awakens continually increasing doubt and opposition, could
only be used as a means of measuring the intensity of the content
of certain concrete perceptions, not, however, for measuring the
strength of the emotions like joy and sorrow. Attempts have been made
at determining the measure of feelings by means of the involuntary
movements and other externally visible changes accompanying them. To
me, this seems very much as if one were to seek to reckon the exact
date of the day of the month by means of the weather. The direct inner
consciousness, however imperfect its testimony may be, nevertheless
offers here far more. At least one draws from the spring itself,
whereas in the other case one has to do with water rendered impure by
a variety of influences.
42
: (_p. 27_). Sigwart, in his _Vorfragen der Ethik_ (p. 42),
emphasizes the fact that no more must be required from the human will
than what it is able to perform. This utterance, which coming from the
lips of so decided an indeterminist (cf. _Logic_, ii. p. 592) may
especially excite surprise, hangs together with his subjective view of
the good, from which view, in my opinion, there is offered no logical,
normal path to the peace of all who possess a good will. (Cf. e.g. the
way in which Sigwart, p. 15, passes over from egoism to regard for the
general good.)
But similar expressions are also heard from others. And it might really
appear doubtful whether the sublime command which bids us to subordinate
all our actions to the highest practical good is really the right
ethical principle. For, putting aside cases of want of reflection, which
do not, of course, enter here into consideration, the demand for such
complete self-devotion still seems too stringent, since there is no one,
however carefully he may conduct himself, who, looking sincerely into
his heart, will not frequently be compelled to say with Horace:--
“Nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor,
Et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor.”
And yet the doubt is unfounded, and a comparison may serve to make this
clear. It is certain that no one can entirely avoid error; still,
avoidable or unavoidable, every error remains a judgment, which is what
it should not be, and is opposed to the indispensable demands of logic.
What applies to logic in respect of weakness of thought applies to
ethics on the ground of weakness of will. Ethics cannot cease to demand
from a man that he should love the acknowledged good and prefer that
which is recognized to be better, not putting anything else before the
highest practical good. Even were it proved (which is not the case),
that in a definite class of cases all men without exception in respect
of these were never able to remain true to the highest practical good,
this would still not afford the slightest justification for setting
aside the fundamental ethical demand. Even then it would still remain an
evident and unchangeable truth, the sole and only right rule, here as
everywhere, to give the preference to the better over what is less good.
J. S. Mill fears that this would lead to endless self-reproaches and
that these constant reproaches would embitter the life of each
individual. This, however, is so little implied by the rule that it is
easily demonstrable that such a result is excluded. Goethe well
understood this,--
“Nichts taugt Ungeduld”
i.e. impatience in respect of one’s own imperfections, he says in one of
his by no means lax sayings,--
“Noch weniger Reue,”
--giving way to the stings of conscience, when fresh joyous resolve is
alone available,--
“Jene vermehrt die Schuld,
Diese schafft neue.”[A]
[A]
“Impatience naught avails
Nor more availeth rue,
One addeth to the fault,
The other maketh new.”--Tr.
In an album I once found in the hand of the pious Abbot Haneberg,
afterwards Bishop of Spires, the following lines, written to the same
effect:--
“Sonne dich mit Lust an Gottes Huld,
Hab’ mit allen--auch mit dir, Geduld.”[B]
[B]
“Bathe thyself with delight in the sunshine of heavenly grace,
Let patience toward all men abound--e’en with thyself find a place.”--Tr.
[43] (_p. 28_). It is necessary to be on one’s guard against drawing
from the principle of love of our neighbour the conclusion that each
has to _care for_ every other individual in the same degree as for
himself, which, far from conducing towards the universal good, would
rather essentially prejudice it. This is seen by reflecting on the
circumstance that to ourselves we stand in a position different from
that in which we stand to everybody else, while again in respect of
these others we are in a position to help, or to injure, one more,
the other less. If there are human beings in Mars the inhabitants of
the earth can and ought to wish them good also, not however to strive
after their good in the same manner as for himself and his fellow-men.
It is in this connexion that the injunction to take thought in the
first instance for oneself, a precept to be found in every system
of morality, is justifiable: “γνῷθι σαυτόν,” “Sweep before your own
doorstep,” etc. The demand to seek first of all the welfare of wife
and child, home and fatherland, is also universal. The command: “Take
no thought for the morrow,” in the sense in which it really offers
wise counsel, also flows as a result from the same source. That
my future happiness ought not to be so _dear_ to me as my present
happiness is not here implied.
So regarded, the communistic doctrines which illogical impetuosity
would seek to derive from the lofty principle of universal brotherhood
are shown to be unjustifiable.
[44] (_p. 29_). The fact that we are often unable to measure the more
remote results of our actions offers a more serious difficulty.
But even this thought will not discourage us if we love the universal
good. It may be said of all results which are unrecognizable in an
exactly equal degree, that one has just as many chances in its favour
as the others. According to the law of great numbers a compensation
will on the whole result, and so whatever calculable good we create
will stand as a plus on the one side and, just as though it stood
alone, will justify our choice.
From the same point of view, as I have already suggested in the
lecture (p. 22), the doubt is removed which in a similar manner might
arise through uncertainty as to whether everything that is good draws
from us a love having the qualification of rightness, and whether,
therefore, we are able to recognize it as good and to take due account
of it.
[45] (_p. 29_). That in the case of the limits of right
(Rechtsgrenzen) we have essentially to do with spheres which lie at
the disposal of the individual will has been frequently emphasized
both by philosophers (cf. in this respect e.g. Herbart’s Idea of
Right) and by able jurists. Ihering in his _Geist des römischen
Rechts_, iii. 1 (p. 320 note), demonstrates this with numerous
citations. Arndt e.g. in his _Handbuch der Pandekten_ defines law as
“supremacy of the will regarding an object”; for Sintenis it is, “the
will of one person raised to the universal will.” Windscheid defines
it as “a certain volition (Willensinhalt) of which the legal code in
a concrete case affirms that it may be made valid as against every
other will.” Puchta, who has perhaps expressed the thought in the
most manifold ways, says in his digest of Roman law, section 22, “as
the subjects of such a _will_ thought of potentially men are called
persons, ... personality is therefore the subjective possibility of
the legalized will, of a legal power.” In the same work (section 118,
note b) he observes in regard to a want of personality: “The principle
of modern law is inability to dispose of property”; many other of his
expressions convey the same meaning.
As however these legal authorities have concentrated their attention
exclusively upon legal duties, and do not touch upon the problem as to
the way in which the individual will has to rule in its legal sphere,
Ihering has interpreted them as meaning that they considered the
true and highest good, and the most intrinsic and final end, towards
which the legal code strives, to be the exercise of the will as will,
the joy of the individual in his volitional activity; “the final end
of all law is, for them, willing” (pp. 320, 325); “the end of law
(according to them) consists once for all in the power of the will,
in its supremacy” (p. 326). One can well understand how he comes to
condemn a theory so interpreted (p. 327), and even that he succeeds
in making it appear ridiculous. “According to this view,” he says,
(p. 320) “all private right is nothing less than an arena in which
the will moves and exercises itself; the will is the organ by which
the individual enjoys his right, the profit obtained from legal right
consists in feeling the joy and glory of power, in the satisfaction of
having realized an act of will, e.g. of having effected a mortgage,
transferred a title, and so proved oneself to be a legal personality.
What a poor thing would the will be if the bare and low regions of law
were the proper “sphere of its activity!”
Certainly the heaviest charges of absurdity and ridiculousness would
be well deserved if those scholars who regard the _immediate_ aim of
law as consisting in a limitation of the spheres at the disposal of
the will had intended in so doing to disavow all regard for the _final
ethical end_, i.e. the advancement of the highest practical good.
There is, however, absolutely nothing to justify this insinuation,
and therefore one could perhaps with more right smile at the zeal
of an attack which is really levelled merely against windmills.
Moreover, what Ihering proposes to set in its place is certainly a
bad substitute. For, in regarding the sphere ascribed by the legal
authority to the individual simply as a sphere consigned to their
egoism (a view which, as the author of _Der Zweck im Recht_, he
perhaps no longer holds), he is thus led to his definition: “Law
(Recht) is legal security for enjoyment,” whereas he would have been
more correct in saying: “Law is legal security for the undisturbed
disposal of individual power in the advancement of the highest good.”
Is then injustice something which exhausts bad conduct? By no means;
legal duties have limits; duty in general governs all our actions,
and this our popular religion expressly emphasizes, as, for instance,
when it asserts that for every idle word the individual must render an
account.
Besides this first objection, which rests upon a simple
misunderstanding of the intention, Ihering has also raised several
others which are essentially due to imperfections in the use of
language. If the legal code essentially consists in setting certain
limits to the activity of the individual will in order that one person
may not disturb the other in striving after the good, it follows that
he who has, or had, or will have no will has also no legal sphere. I
say, “has, or had, or will have,” for obviously regard must be paid to
the past and to the future. A dead man often exercises an influence
extending into the far distant future, so that Comte well says: the
living are more and more dominated by the dead. In like manner, the
situation will entail that, in respect of many problems, we leave
the decision to the future, i.e. renounce the sovereignty in favour
of a future will. This consideration resolves many a paradox urged
by Ihering (pp. 320-325); not however, all. In the case of one who
from birth has been an incurable imbecile, it is obvious that no
power of will whatever can be found, to which regard for the highest
practical good might allow a sphere; there remains therefore to him,
according to our view, really no legal sphere, and yet on every hand
we hear of a right which he possesses in his own life; even under
some circumstances, we refer to him as the owner of a great estate,
or ascribe to him the right of a crown or kingly rule. On examining
the relations closely, we find that we are never concerned here with
a true legal sphere respecting a subject incapable of being held
responsible, but rather with the legal spheres of other individuals,
as, for example, that of a father who, in providing for his imbecile
child, gives instructions in his will concerning his property, the
dominion of whose will is safeguarded after his death by the law of
the land; or (as, for example, the case where the imbecile’s life is
held to be sacred), quite apart from the injury done to the simple
duty of affection which this would involve, there is also in question
the State’s legal sphere, which permits no one else to commit a fatal
attack, and accordingly often imposes a punishment, even in the case
of an attempt at suicide.
A third objection of Ihering’s, i.e. that by a limitation of rights
as affecting spheres of will, even the most senseless dispositions of
will must be allowed legal validity (p. 325), this offers, after what
has been said, hardly any further difficulty. Certainly many a foolish
disposition of will must be allowed. Were the State not to admit
this, then it alone would possess a definitive right of disposal; all
private right would be at an end. So long as not merely subjects, but
also governments, are liable to commit acts of foolishness, such an
extension of the power of the State cannot be recommended. For the
rest, just as secondary ethical rules in general suffer exceptions,
and in particular expropriations in the case of private owners are
frequently necessary, so also it is clear and to be admitted without
contradiction, that senseless dispositions or dispositions which have
evidently lost all meaning and reference to the highest practical good
can be annulled by the State. Regard for the highest practical good
is here, as is the case of every other so-called collision of duties,
decisive.
[46] (_p. 29_). That a law, which in and for itself is bad and
contrary to nature, however condemnable from an ethical point of view,
and its modification urgently necessary, may yet in many cases receive
a provisional sanction from the reason, this has long been recognized
and made clear, as e.g. by Bentham in his _Traités de Législation
civ. et pén._ In antiquity Socrates, who deemed himself worthy to be
feasted in the Prytaneum, died for the sake of this conviction. The
positive legal code, despite all its defects, creates a condition
of things which is better than anarchy, and since each act of
insubordination to the law threatens to injure its force in general,
so in those circumstances brought about by the law itself, it may be
that provisionally and for the individual a mode of action even from
the rational standpoint is right, which, apart from this, would be in
no way justifiable. All this results without doubt from the relativity
of the secondary ethical rules, which will be treated later.
It may be added that errors respecting the laws of positive morality
(a point shortly to be discussed in the lecture) in a similar way
demand, under certain circumstances, to be taken into account.
It dare not, on the other hand, be overlooked that there are here
limits, and that the saying: “We ought to obey God rather than man,”
may not, in its free and sublime range, be allowed to suffer injury.
[47] (_p. 29_). Heraclitus of Ephesus (B.C. 500), the
oldest of the Greek philosophers, of whose philosophy we possess
rather extensive fragments.
[48] (_p. 31_). Ihering, _Der Zweck im Recht_, vol. ii. p. 119, and
other passages.
[49] (_p. 31_). _Politics_, vol. i. chap. 5.
[50] (_p. 31_). _Nic. Ethics_, v. 14, p. 1137 b. 13. _Politics_, iii.
and iv.
[51] (_p. 31_). Cf. Discours préliminaire to the _Traités de
Législation_, also the section “De l’influence des temps et des lieux
en matière de législation” of that work.
[52] (_p. 31_). _Philos. Versuch über die Wahrscheinlichkeiten von
Laplace_, translated from the sixth edition of the original text by N.
Schwaiger, Leipzig, 1886, p. 93 seq. (Application of the calculation
of probabilities to moral science.)
[53] (_p. 32_). Cf. _Allg. Juristenzeitung_, vii. p. 171; _Zweck im
Recht_, vol. ii. p. 118; 122 seq.
[54] (_p. 33_). _Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten._ Cf. above note
14, p. 49.
[55] (_p. 34_). Cf. e.g. the Meno dialogue.
[56] (_p. 34_). Friedr. Alb. Lange, _Logische Studien, ein Beitrag zur
Neubegründung der formalen Logik und der Erkenntnislehre_. Iserlohn,
1877.
[57] (_p. 34_). Alex. Bain, _Logic_, pt. 1. Deduction. London, 1870,
p. 159 seq.
[58] (_p. 35_). e.g. Bentham, also, in antiquity, Epicurus.
[59] (_p. 35_). e.g. Plato and Aristotle, and following them Thomas
Aquinas.
[60] (_p. 35_). The Stoics, and in the Middle Ages, the followers of
Scotus.
[61] (_p. 36_). This even Epicurus did not deny (little in harmony as
it is with his utterance quoted p. 54).
[62] (_p. 36_). _Nic. Ethics_, I. i.
[63] (_p. 36_). _Metaph._ Δ 10.
[64] (_p. 36_). _Metaph._ Δ 10.
[65] (_p. 36_). They made the relation to the greater whole serve as
an argument in favour of the view that the practical life (of the
politician) stands higher than that of the theorist.
[66] (_p. 36_). This testimony to the principle of summation likewise
reappears as often as in a theory based upon egoistic and utilitarian
grounds, the notion of God is employed in the construction of ethics
(e.g. Locke; Fechner in his work on the highest good; cf. also for
Leibnitz, Trendelenburg, _Histor. Beiträge_, vol. ii. p. 245). God,
so runs their argument, loves each of His creatures, and therefore
their totality more than the single individual; He therefore approves
and rewards the sacrifice of the individual to the whole, while
disapproving and punishing self-seeking injury.
In the desire after immortality also, the influence of the principle
of summation is manifest. Thus Helmholtz, (_über die Entstehung des
Planetensystems_, lecture delivered at Heidelberg and Cologne, 1871),
in seeking to offer a hopeful prospect to those who cherish this
desire, says: “The individual (if that which we achieve can ennoble
the lives of those who succeed us) may face fearlessly the thought
that the thread of his own consciousness will one day be broken. But
to the thought of a final annihilation of the race of living mortals,
and with them, the fruits of the striving of all past generations,
even men of minds so unfettered and great as Lessing and David Strauss
could scarcely reconcile themselves.” When it is scientifically shown
that the earth will one day be incapable of supporting living beings,
then, he thinks, the need of immortality will irresistibly return, and
we shall feel bound to cast about for something which will afford us
the possibility of assuming it.
[67] (_p. 34_). _Metaph._ Δ 10.
[68] (_p. 37_). This is the standing doctrine of the great
theologians, as e.g. Thomas Aquinas in his _Summa Theologica_.
Only certain nominalists, like Robert Holcot, teach the complete
arbitrariness of the divine commands. Cf. my essay on the _Geschichte
der kirchlichen Wissenschaften im Mittelalter_, in Möhler’s _Church
History_ (published by Gams, 1867) vol. ii. 526 seq., respecting
which, however, the reader is asked not to overlook the revision of
the printer’s errors in the “errata,” p. 103 seq., at the end of that
work.
[69] (_p. 39_). At a time when psychology was far less advanced
and inquiries into the province of the calculation of probability
had not brought sufficient clearness into the process of rational
induction, it was possible even for a Hume to fall a victim to this
gross confusion. Cf. his _Enq. concern. Hum. Underst._, chaps. v.
and vi. More striking is it that James Mill and Herbert Spencer have
still not advanced in the slightest degree beyond Hume; (Cf. _Anal.
of the Phen. of the Hum. Mind_, vol. ii. chap. ix. and note 108), and
that even the acute thinker, J. S. Mill, although Laplace’s _Essai
Philosophique sur les Probabilités_ lay at his disposal, never arrived
at a clear distinction of the essential difference between these two
forms of procedure. This hangs together with his failure to appreciate
the purely analytic character of mathematics and the import of the
deductive procedure in general. Indeed he has absolutely denied that
the syllogism leads to new knowledge. Whoever bases the whole of
mathematics upon induction cannot possibly justify mathematically the
inductive procedure. It would be for him a _circulus vitiosus_. It is
here beyond question that Jevon’s _Logic_ takes a truer view.
Even in the case of Mill, it sometimes appears as if an inkling of
the immense difference had begun to dawn upon him, as when, in a note
to his _Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind_ (vol. i., chap.
xi. p. 407), in criticizing his father’s theory, he says: “If belief
is only an inseparable association, belief is a matter of _habit_
and accident and not of reason. Assuredly an association, however
close, between two ideas is not a sufficient _ground_ (the italics
are his own) of belief; it is not evidence that the corresponding
facts are united in external nature. The theory seems to annihilate
all distinction between the belief of the wise, _which is regulated
by evidence_ and conforms to the real successions and co-existences
of the facts of the universe, and the belief of fools _which is
mechanically produced_ by any accidental association that suggests
the idea of a succession or co-existence to the mind; a belief aptly
characterized by the popular expression, believing a thing because
they have taken it into their heads.” This is all excellent. But it
is robbed of its most essential worth, when, in a later note (vol.
i. p. 438. note 110) we hear J. S. Mill say: “It must be conceded to
him (the author of the _Analysis_) that an association sufficiently
strong to exclude all ideas that would exclude itself, _produces
a kind of mechanical belief_, and that the processes by which the
belief is corrected, or reduced to rational bounds, _all consist in
the growth of a counter-association_ tending to raise the idea of a
disappointment of the first expectation, and as the one or the other
prevails in the particular case, the belief or expectation exists or
does not exist exactly as if the belief were the same thing with the
association,” and so on.
There is much here that calls for criticism. When ideas are mentioned
which mutually exclude one another it may well be asked what kind
of ideas these are? According to another utterance of Mill’s (vol.
i. p. 98 seq. note 30 and elsewhere), he knows “no case of absolute
incompatibility of thought except between the thought of the
presence of something and that of its absence.” But are even these
incompatible? Mill himself teaches elsewhere the very opposite when he
thinks that along with the idea of existence there is always given at
the same time the idea of non-existence (p. 126, note 39; “we are only
conscious,” he says, “of the presence of an object by comparison with
its absence”). Apart, however, from all this, how strange is it that
Mill here overlooks the fact that he abandons entirely the distinctive
character of self-evidence, and retains only that blind and mechanical
formation of judgment, which he rightly treats with contempt. The
sceptic Hume stands in this respect far higher, since he at least sees
that such an empirical (empiristisch) view of the process of induction
does not satisfy the requirements of our reason. Sigwart’s criticism
of Mill’s theory of Induction (_Logic_, vol. ii. p. 371) contains
here much that is true, though in appealing to his postulates he has
certainly not substituted anything truly satisfactory in the place of
what is defective in Mill.
[70] (_p. 40_). Cf. Hume, _Enquiry concerning Human Understanding_,
vol. ii. towards the end.
[71] (_p. 40_). _Nic. Ethics_, iii. 10. Cf. the subtle discussions in
the subsequent chapter on the five kinds of false courage.