it unnecessary to exclude a very possible error. If by “good” is meant
that which is worthy of being loved for its own sake, then by “better”
appears to be meant that which is worthy of being loved with a greater
love. But is this really so? What is meant by “with greater love”? Is it
spatial magnitude? Hardly; no one would propose to measure pleasure or
displeasure in feet and inches. “The intensity of the pleasure,” some
will perhaps say, “is what is meant in speaking of love as great.”
According to this “better” would mean that which pleases with a more
intense pleasure. But such a definition closely examined would involve
the greatest absurdities. According to this view, each single case in
which joy is felt in anything would seem only to admit of a certain
measure of joy, whereas one would naturally think that it could not
possibly be reprehensible to rejoice in what is really good to the
fullest extent possible. Or, as we say, “with all one’s heart.”
Descartes has already observed that the act of loving (when directed
towards what is good at all) can never be too intense.[36] And he is
manifestly right. Were it otherwise what cautiousness should we not be
called upon to exercise considering the limits of our mental strength!
Every time one wished to rejoice over something good, an anxious survey
would be necessary respecting other existing goods in order that the
measure of proportion to our total strength might in no way be exceeded.
And if one believes in a God, understanding thereby the Infinite Good,
the Ideal of all ideals, then, since a man, even with his whole soul and
strength can only love God with an act of love of finite intensity he
will therefore be compelled to love every other good with an infinitely
small degree of intensity, and, since this is impossible, must cease as
a matter of fact to love it at all.
All this is manifestly absurd.
30. And yet it must be said that the better is that which is rightly
loved with a greater love, which is rightly more pleasing, though in
quite another sense. The “more” refers not to the relation of intensity
between the two acts, but rather to a peculiar species of phenomena
belonging to the general class of pleasure and displeasure, i.e., to the
phenomena of choice. Thereby are meant relating acts which in their
peculiar nature are known to every one in experience. In the province of
ideas there is nothing analogous. In the province of judgment there are,
it is true, alongside the simple, subjectless propositions, predicative
judgments which are acts of a relative character, but this resemblance
is very imperfect. The case here which has most similarity is that of a
decision respecting a dialectically propounded question: “Is this true
or false?” in which a sort of preference is given to one above the
other. But even here it is always something true which is, so to speak,
preferred to something false, never something more true over something
less true. Whatever is true is true in a like degree, but whatever is
good is not good in equal degree, and by “better” nothing else is meant
than what, when compared with another good, is preferable, i.e.
something which for its own sake, is preferred with a right preference.
For the rest a somewhat wider usage of language allows us also to speak
of a good as “better” over against a bad or purely indifferent, or even
to call something bad over against something still worse “the better.”
We then say not of course that it is good, but still better than the
other.
This shortly in explanation of the notion of the better.
31. Next the question: How do we know that anything is really the
better? Assuming the existence of simple knowledge of things as good and
bad, we appear, so analogy suggests, to derive this insight from certain
acts of preferring which have the character of rightness. For, like the
simple exercise of pleasure, so also the act of preferring is sometimes
of a lower or impulsive, and sometimes of a higher kind, and like the
evident judgment, is qualified as right. The cases in point are,
however, of such a nature that many might say, and perhaps with a better
right, that it is analytical judgments which furnish us here with the
means of progress, and that instead of our learning the preferability
from the actual preferences, the preferences have the qualification of
rightness because they already presume the recognition of the standard
of preferability.[37]
Chiefly belonging to this class are obviously (1) the case where we
prefer something good, and recognized as good, to something bad, and
recognized as bad. Also (2) the case where we prefer the existence of
something recognized as good to its non-existence, or the non-existence
of something recognized as bad to its existence.
This case embraces in itself a series of important cases, as the case
where we prefer a good to the same good with an admixture of the bad;
and, on the other hand, where we prefer something bad, with an admixture
of good, to the same bad purely for its own sake. Further, the cases in
which we prefer the whole of a good to its part, and again, the part of
something bad to its whole. Aristotle has already called attention to
the fact that in the case of the good the sum is always better than the
separate parts which together make up its sum. Such a case of summation
presents itself wherever a state has a certain permanence. The same
amount of joy which endures an hour is better than if it only lasted for
a moment. Whoever denies this, like Epicurus when he would console us on
account of the mortality of the soul, may easily be led into still more
striking absurdities. For then an hour’s torture would be no worse than
that of a moment. And, by combining both these propositions, we should
have to assume that an entire life full of joy with a single moment of
pain is in no way preferable to an entire life full of pain with a
single moment of joy. This is a result at which not only every sound
mind in general would demur, but also one respecting which Epicurus in
particular, expressly asserts the contrary.
Closely related to this is the case (3) where one good is preferred to
another, which, while forming no part of the first, is yet similar in
every respect to one of its parts. It is not merely by adding a good to
the same good but also by adding it to a good which is in every respect
similar that we get a better for total. The case is analogous when to a
similar bad another bad is thought of as added. When therefore, for
example, a fine picture is seen, the first time as a whole, the second
time only partially though exactly in the same way, we must then say
that the first view, considered in itself, is better: Or, when one
imagines something that is good and a second time not only imagines it
even as perfectly as before, but also loves it, this latter sum of
psychical acts is then something better.
Cases of difference in degree belong also to this third class, and are
especially worthy of mention. If one good, e.g. one joy is in every
respect quite equal to another, only more intense, then the preference
which is given to the more intense is qualified as right, the more
intense is the better. Conversely, the bad which is more intense, e.g. a
more intense pain, is worse. That is to say: the degree of intensity
corresponds with the distance from the zero point, and the distance of
the greater degree of intensity from zero is compounded of its distance
from the weaker degree of intensity plus the distance of this from zero.
We have, therefore, really to do with a kind of addition, a view which
has been disputed.
32. Many a one will, perhaps, think to himself that the three cases
which I have set forth are so self-evident and insignificant that it is
a matter for surprise that I have lingered over them at all.
Self-evident they are of course, and this must be so, since we have
here to do with what has to serve as a fundamentum. The case would be
worse if they were insignificant; for, I confess it frankly, I have
scarcely another further case to add: in all, or, at any rate, most of
the cases not here included a criterion fails us completely.[38]
An example. All insight is, we have said, something good in itself, and
all noble love is likewise something good in itself. We recognize both
these things clearly. But who shall say whether this act of insight or
that act of love is in itself, the better? There have, of course, not
been wanting those who have given a verdict on this point; some have
even asserted that it is certain every act of noble love for its own
sake is a good so high that, taken by itself, it is better than all
scientific insight taken together. In my judgment this view is not only
doubtful but altogether absurd. For a single act of noble love worthy as
it is, is yet a certain finite good. But every act of insight is also a
finite good and if I keep adding this finite quantity to itself _ad
libitum_, its sum is bound some time to exceed every given finite
measure of good. On the other hand, Plato and Aristotle were inclined to
regard the act of knowing considered in itself as higher than ethically
virtuous acts, this also quite unjustly, and I only mention it since the
opposition of opinions here is a confirmatory proof of the absence of
any criterion. As often happens in the sphere of the psychical,[39] so
also here, real measurements are impossible. Now where the inner
preference is not to be detected there holds good here what was said in
a similar case of simple goodness--as far as our knowledge and practical
concern go it is as good as non-existent.
33. There are some who, in opposition to the clear teaching of
experience, assert that only pleasure is good for its own sake, and
pleasure is _the_ good. Assuming this view to be right, would it have
the advantage, as many have believed, and as Bentham in particular
maintained in its favour,[40] that we should at once attain to a
determination of the relative value of goods, seeing that now we should
have only homogeneous goods and these admit of being measured side by
side? Every more intense pleasure would then be a greater good than one
less intense, and a good having double the intensity would be equal to
two of half the intensity. In this way everything would become clear.
A moment’s reflection only is needed to shatter an illusion born of such
hope. Are we really able to find out that one pleasure is twice as great
as another? Gauss[41] himself, who knew something about measurements,
has denied this. A more intense pleasure is never really made up of
twelve less intense pleasures distinguishable as equal parts within it,
as a foot is made up of twelve inches. So the matter presents itself
even in simpler cases. But how foolish would any one appear were he to
assert that the pleasure he had in smoking a good cigar increased 127,
or, let us say, 1077 times in intensity yielded a measure of the
pleasure experienced by him in listening to a symphony of Beethoven or
contemplating one of Raphael’s madonnas![42] I think I have said enough,
and do not need to allude to the further difficulty involved in
comparing the intensity of pleasure with that of pain.
34. Only therefore to this very limited extent are we able to derive
from experience a knowledge of what is better in itself.
I can well understand how any one, reflecting upon this for the first
time, will be led to fear that the great gaps which remain must, in
practice, prove in the highest degree embarrassing. Yet as we proceed
and make a vigorous use of what we do possess, we shall find that the
most sensible deficiencies may fortunately turn out harmless in
practice.
35. For, from the cases we adduced of preference qualified as right, the
important proposition follows that the province of the highest practical
good embraces everything which is subject to our rational operation in
so far as a good can be realized in such matter. Not merely the self but
also the family, the town, the state, the whole present world of life,
even distant future times, may here be taken into account. All this
follows from the principle of the summation of the good. To promote as
far as possible the good throughout this great whole, that is manifestly
the right end in life, towards which every act is to be ordered; that is
the one, the highest command upon which all the rest depend.[43]
Self-devotion and, on occasion, self-sacrifice are, therefore, duties;
an equal good wherever it be, and therefore in the person of another
also, is, in proportion to its value, and, therefore, everywhere equally
to be loved, and jealousy and malignant envy are excluded.
36. And now, since all lesser goods are to be made subservient to the
good of this widest sphere, light may also be shed from utilitarian
considerations upon those dark regions where before we found a standard
of choice wanting. If, for example, it was true that acts of insight and
acts of noble love are not to be measured as to their inner worth in
terms of one another, it is now clear that at any rate neither of these
two sides may be entirely neglected at the expense of the other. If one
person had perfect knowledge without noble love, and another perfect
noble love without knowledge, neither would be able to use his gifts in
the service of the still greater collective good. A certain harmonious
development and exercise of all our noblest powers seems, therefore,
from this point of view to be, at any rate, what we must strive
after.[44]
37. And now after seeing how many duties of love towards the highest
practical good come to light, we proceed to the origin of duties of law.
That association which renders possible a division of labour is the
indispensable condition of the advancement of the highest good as we
have learnt to understand it. Man therefore is morally destined to live
in society, and it is easily demonstrable that limits must exist in
order that one member of society may not be more of a hindrance than a
help to another,[45] and that these limits (though much in this respect
is settled by considerations of natural common-sense) require to be more
exactly marked by positive laws, and need the further security and
support of public authority.
And while in this way our natural insight demands and sanctions positive
law in general, it may, in particular, raise demands on the fulfillment
of which depends the measure of the blessing which the state of law is
to bring with it.
In this way does truth, bearing the supreme crown, give, or refuse, to
the products of positive legislation its sanction, and it is from this
crown that they derive their true binding force.[46] For as the old sage
of Ephesus says in one of his pregnant Sibyl-like utterances: “All human
laws are fed from the _one_ divine law.”[47]
38. Besides the laws referring to the limits of right, in every society
there are other positive enactments as to the way in which an individual
is to act inside his own sphere of right, how he is to make use of his
liberty and his property. Public opinion approves industry, generosity,
and economy each in its place, while disapproving idleness, greed,
prodigality and much else. In the statutes no such laws are to be found,
but they stand written within the hearts of the people. Nor are reward
and punishment lacking as regards this kind of positive law. These
consist in the advantages and disadvantages of good and bad reputation.
There exists here, as it were, a positive code of morality, the
complement of the positive code of law. This positive code of morality
also may contain both right and wrong enactments. To be truly binding
they need to be in accord with the rules which, as we have already seen,
are capable of recognition by the reason, as a duty of love towards the
highest practical good.
And so we have really found the natural sanction of morality which we
sought.
39. I do not linger here to show how this sanction operates. Every one
would rather say to himself: “I am acting rightly,” than “I am acting
foolishly.” And to no one capable of recognizing what is better is this
fact entirely indifferent in choosing. In the case of some it is nearly
so, whereas for others it is of the very first importance. Innate
dispositions are themselves diverse and much advance may be made by
education and one’s own ethical conduct. Enough, truth speaks, and
whoever is of the truth hears her voice.
40. Throughout the multiplicity of derived laws graven by nature herself
upon the tables of the law, utilitarian considerations, as we have seen,
form the standard. As now, in different situations, we resort to
different means, so also with regard to these different situations
different special precepts must hold good. They may be quite conflicting
in their tenour without of course being really contradictory, since they
are intended for different circumstances. In this sense, then, a
relativity in ethics is rightly asserted.
Ihering has drawn attention to this,[48] but he is not as he seems to
think, one of the first. On the contrary the doctrine was known of old
and is insisted upon by Plato in his _Republic_.[49] Aristotle in his
_Ethics_, and with special emphasis in his _Politics_ has affirmed
it.[50] The scholastic philosophers also held fast to the doctrine, and
in modern times men even of such energetic ethical and political
convictions as Bentham[51] have not denied it. If the fanatics of the
French Revolution failed to recognize it, still the clear-headed among
their fellow-citizens, even in that time, did not fall into such a
delusion. Laplace, for example, in his _Essai philosophique sur les
probabilités_ occasionally bears witness to the true teaching and raises
his voice in warning.[52]
Thus it happens that the distinguished investigator who has disclosed to
us the spirit of Roman law and to whom, as the author of _Der Zweck im
Recht_, we also are bound in many respects to tender our thanks, has yet
here, as we see, done nothing else than render the doctrine unclear by
confounding it with an essentially different and false doctrine of
relativity. According to this doctrine, no proposition in ethics, not
even the proposition that the best in the widest sphere ought to be the
determining standard of action, would have unexceptional validity. In
primitive times and even later, throughout long centuries, such a
procedure would, he expressly says, have been as immoral as, in later
times, the opposite conduct. We must, he thinks, on looking back into
the times of cannibalism sympathize rather with the cannibals, and not
with those who perhaps, in advance of their time, preached even then the
universal love of neighbour.[53] These are errors which have been
crushingly refuted not merely by philosophical reflection upon the
fundamental principles of ethics, but also by the successes of Christian
missionaries.
41. Thus the road leading to the goal which we set before us has been
traversed. For a time it led us through strange and rarely trodden
districts, finally, however, the results at which we have arrived smile
upon us like old acquaintances. In declaring love of neighbour and
self-sacrifice, both for our country and for mankind to be duties, we
are only echoing what is proclaimed all around us. We should also find
by going further into particulars that lying, treachery, murder,
debauchery and much besides that is held to be morally base are,
measured by the standard of the principles we have set up, condemned,
one as unjust, another as immoral.
All this would seem, in a measure, familiar to us as the shores of his
native land to the sea-farer when, after a voyage happily consummated,
he sees them rise suddenly into view, and the smoke curling from the old
familiar chimney.
42. And certainly we are at liberty to rejoice over this. The absolute
clearness with which all this follows is good omen for the success of
our undertaking, since it is the method by which we arrived at our
result, which is obviously the most essential feature in it. Without it
what advantage can our inquiry be said to have over that of others?
Even Kant, for example, whose doctrines concerning the principles of
ethics were quite different, arrived, in the further course of his
statement, pretty much to the popular view. But what we miss in him is
strict logical coherence. Beneke has shown that the Categorical
Imperative as Kant used it, may be so employed as to prove, in the same
case, contradictory statements and so everything and nothing.[54] If,
none the less, Kant is able to arrive so often at right conclusions,
this must be attributed to the fact that from the outset he had
harboured such opinions. Even Hegel, had he not known in other ways that
the sky was blue, would certainly never have succeeded by means of his
dialectic in deducing this _à priori_. Did he not equally succeed in
demonstrating that there were seven planets, a number accepted in his
day, but which in our time science has long left behind?
The causes of this phenomenon, therefore, are easily understood.
43. But there is another point which appears enigmatical. How does it
happen that the prevailing public opinion respecting law and morality is
itself, in so many respects, obviously right? If a thinker like Kant was
unable to discover the sources from which ethical knowledge flows, how
can we believe that the common folk succeeded in drawing therefrom? And
if this were not the case, how were they able, while ignorant of the
premises, still to reach the conclusions? Here the phenomenon cannot
possibly be explained from the fact that the right view was long before
established.
This difficulty also resolves itself in a very simple manner when we
reflect that much in our store of knowledge exists, and contributes
towards the attainment of new knowledge, without the knowledge of the
process itself being clearly present to consciousness.
It must not be supposed that in saying this I am an adherent of the
wonderful philosophy of the unconscious. I am speaking here only of
undeniable and well known truths. Thus it has often been observed that
for thousands of years men have drawn right conclusions without bringing
the procedure and the principles which form the condition of the formal
validity of the inference into clear consciousness by means of
reflection. Indeed when Plato first took the step of reflecting upon it,
he was led to set up an entirely false theory which assumed that every
inference was a process of reminiscence.[55] What was perceived and
experienced on earth recalled to the memory knowledge acquired in a
pre-mundane existence. Nowadays this error has disappeared. Still, false
theories concerning the fundamental principles of syllogism are
continually emerging, as, for example, when Albert Lange,[56] finds them
in space-perceptions and in synthetic propositions _à priori_, or
Alexander Bain[57] in the experience that the moods Barbara, Celarent,
etc., have up to the present time been found to be valid in every case:
mere crude errors which overlook the immediate intuitions forming the
conditions of right conclusions, but which do not prevent Plato, Lange,
and Bain from arguing in general exactly like other people. In spite of
their false conception of the true fundamental principles, these still
continue to operate in their reasoning.
But why do I go so far for examples? Let the experiment be made with the
first “plain man” who has just drawn a right conclusion, and demand of
him that he give you the premises of his conclusion. This he will
usually be unable to do and may perhaps make entirely false statements
about it. On requiring the same man to define a notion with which he is
familiar, he will make the most glaring mistakes and so show once again
that he is not able rightly to describe his own thinking.
44. Meantime, however dark the road to ethical knowledge might appear,
both to the “plain man” and to the philosopher, we must still expect,
since the process is a complicated one and many combined principles
operate therein, that the traces of the operation of each separate
principle will be evident in history, and this fact, even more than
agreement in respect of the final results, is a confirmation of the
right theory.