AN INTERNATIONAL POSSE COMITATUS
Most Western Americans who are past middle age remember young, rapidly
growing, and turbulent communities in which there was at first
complete anarchy. During the time when there was no central police
power to which to appeal every man worth his salt, in other words
every man fit for existence in such a community, had to be prepared
to defend himself; and usually, although not always, the fact that he
was prepared saved him from all trouble, whereas unpreparedness was
absolutely certain to invite disaster.
In such communities before there was a regular and fully organized
police force there came an interval during which the preservation of
the peace depended upon the action of a single official, a sheriff
or marshal, who if the law was defied in arrogant fashion summoned
a posse comitatus composed of as many armed, thoroughly efficient,
law-abiding citizens as were necessary in order to put a stop to the
wrong-doing. Under these conditions each man had to keep himself armed
and both able and willing to respond to the call of the peace-officer;
and furthermore, if he had a shred of wisdom he kept himself ready in
an emergency to act on his own behalf if the peace-officer did not or
could not do his duty.
In such towns I have myself more than once seen well-meaning but
foolish citizens endeavor to meet the exigencies of the case by simply
passing resolutions of disarmament without any power back of them.
That is, they passed self-denying ordinances, saying that nobody was
to carry arms; but they failed to provide methods for carrying such
ordinances into effect. In every case the result was the same. Good
citizens for the moment abandoned their weapons. The bad men continued
to carry them. Things grew worse instead of better; and then the
good men came to their senses and clothed some representative of the
police with power to employ force, potential or existing, against the
wrong-doers.
Affairs in the international world are at this time in analogous
condition. There is no central police power, and not the least
likelihood of its being created. Well-meaning enthusiasts have tried
their hands to an almost unlimited extent in the way of devising
all-inclusive arbitration treaties, neutrality treaties, disarmament
proposals, and the like, with no force back of them, and the result
has been stupendous and discreditable failure. Preparedness for war on
the part of individual nations has sometimes but not always averted
war. Unpreparedness for war, as in the case of China, Korea, and
Luxembourg, has invariably invited smashing disaster, and sometimes
complete conquest. Surely these conditions should teach a lesson that
any man who runs may read unless his eyes have been blinded by folly or
his heart weakened by cowardice.
The immediately vital lesson for each individual nation is that as
things are now it must in time of crisis rely on its own stout hearts
and ready hands for self-defense. Existing treaties are utterly
worthless so far as concerns protecting any free, well-behaved people
from one of the great aggressive military monarchies of the world. The
all-inclusive arbitration treaties such as those recently negotiated
by Messrs. Wilson and Bryan, when taken in connection with our refusal
to act under existing treaties, represent about the highest point of
slightly mischievous fatuity which can be attained in international
matters. Inasmuch as we ourselves are the power that initiated their
negotiation, we can do our plain duty to ourselves and our neighbors
only by ourselves proceeding from the outset on the theory, and by
warning our neighbors, that these treaties in any time of crisis will
certainly not be respected by any serious adversary, and probably will
of necessity be violated by ourselves. They do not in even the very
smallest degree relieve us of the necessity of preparedness for war. To
this point of our duty to be prepared I will return later.
But we ought not to and must not rest content merely with working for
our own defense. The utterly appalling calamity that has befallen
the civilized world during the last five months, and, above all, the
horrible catastrophe that has overwhelmed Belgium without Belgium’s
having the smallest responsibility in the matter, must make the
least thoughtful realize how unsatisfactory is the present basis of
international relations among civilized powers. In order to make things
better several things are necessary. We must clearly grasp the fact
that mere selfish avoidance of duty to others, even although covered by
such fine words as “peace” and “neutrality,” is a wretched thing and an
obstacle to securing the peace of righteousness throughout the world.
We must recognize clearly the old common-law doctrine that a right
without a remedy is void. We must firmly grasp the fact that measures
should be taken to put force back of good faith in the observance of
treaties. The worth of treaties depends purely upon the good faith with
which they are executed; and it is mischievous folly to enter into
treaties without providing for their execution and wicked folly to
enter into them if they ought not to be executed.
It is necessary to devise means for putting the collective and
efficient strength of all the great powers of civilization back of any
well-behaved power which is wronged by another power. In other words,
we must devise means for executing treaties in good faith, by the
establishment of some great international tribunal, and by securing
the enforcement of the decrees of this tribunal through the action of
a posse comitatus of powerful and civilized nations, all of them being
bound by solemn agreement to coerce any power that offends against
the decrees of the tribunal. That there will be grave difficulties in
successfully working out this plan I would be the first to concede,
and I would be the first to insist that to work it out successfully
would be impossible unless the nations acted in good faith. But the
plan is feasible, and it is the only one which at the moment offers
any chance of success. Ever since the days of Henry IV of France there
has been a growth, slow and halting to be sure but yet evidently a
growth, in recognition by the public conscience of civilized nations
that there should be a method of making the rules of international
morality obligatory and binding among the powers. But merely to trust
to public opinion without organized force back of it is silly. Force
must be put back of justice, and nations must not shrink from the duty
of proceeding by any means that are necessary against wrong-doers.
It is the failure to recognize these vital truths that has rendered
the actions of our government during the last few years impotent
to preserve world peace and fruitful only in earning for us the
half-veiled derision of other nations.
The attitude of the present administration during the last five months
shows how worthless the present treaties, unbacked by force, are, and
how utterly ineffective mere passive neutrality is to secure even
the smallest advance in world morality. I have been very reluctant
in any way to criticise the action of the present administration in
foreign affairs; I have faithfully, and in some cases against my
own deep-rooted personal convictions, sought to justify what it has
done in Mexico and as regards the present war; but the time has come
when loyalty to the administration’s action in foreign affairs means
disloyalty to our national self-interest and to our obligations toward
humanity at large. As regards Belgium the administration has clearly
taken the ground that our own selfish ease forbids us to fulfil our
explicit obligations to small neutral states when they are deeply
wronged. It will never be possible in any war to commit a clearer
breach of international morality than that committed by Germany in the
invasion and subjugation of Belgium. Every one of the nations involved
in this war, and the United States as well, have committed such
outrages in the past. But the very purpose of the Hague conventions
and of all similar international agreements was to put a stop to such
misconduct in the future.
At the outset I ask our people to remember that what I say is based on
the assumption that we are bound in good faith to fulfil our treaty
obligations; that we will neither favor nor condemn any other nation
except on the ground of its behavior; that we feel as much good-will
to the people of Germany or Austria as to the people of England, of
France, or of Russia; that we speak for Belgium only as we could
speak for Holland or Switzerland or one of the Scandinavian or Balkan
nations; and that if the circumstances as regards Belgium had been
reversed we would have protested as emphatically against wrong action
by England or France as we now protest against wrong action by Germany.
The United States and the great powers now at war were parties to the
international code created in the regulations annexed to the Hague
conventions of 1899 and 1907. As President, acting on behalf of this
government, and in accordance with the unanimous wish of our people,
I ordered the signature of the United States to these conventions.
Most emphatically I would not have permitted such a farce to have
gone through if it had entered my head that this government would not
consider itself bound to do all it could to see that the regulations to
which it made itself a party were actually observed when the necessity
for their observance arose. I cannot imagine any sensible nation
thinking it worth while to sign future Hague conventions if even such a
powerful neutral as the United States does not care enough about them
to protest against their open breach. Of the present neutral powers the
United States of America is the most disinterested and the strongest,
and should therefore bear the main burden of responsibility in this
matter.
It is quite possible to make an argument to the effect that we never
should have entered into the Hague conventions, because our sole duty
is to ourselves and not to others, and our sole concern should be to
keep ourselves at peace, at any cost, and not to help other powers
that are oppressed, and not to protest against wrong-doing. I do not
myself accept this view; but in practice it is the view taken by the
present administration, apparently with at the moment the approval of
the mass of our people. Such a policy, while certainly not exalted, and
in my judgment neither far-sighted nor worthy of a high-spirited and
lofty-souled nation, is yet in a sense understandable, and in a sense
defensible.
But it is quite indefensible to make agreements and not live up to
them. The climax of absurdity is for any administration to do what
the present administration during the last five months has done. Mr.
Wilson’s administration has shirked doing the duty plainly imposed on
it by the obligations of the conventions already entered into; and at
the same time it has sought to obtain cheap credit by entering into a
couple of score new treaties infinitely more drastic than the old ones,
and quite impossible of honest fulfilment. When the Belgian people
complained of violations of the Hague tribunal, it was a mockery,
it was a timid and unworthy abandonment of duty on our part, for
President Wilson to refer them back to the Hague court, when he knew
that the Hague court was less than a shadow unless the United States
by doing its clear duty gave the Hague court some substance. If the
Hague conventions represented nothing but the expression of feeble
aspirations toward decency, uttered only in time of profound peace, and
not to be even expressed above a whisper when with awful bloodshed and
suffering the conventions were broken, then it was idle folly to enter
into them. If, on the other hand, they meant anything, if the United
States had a serious purpose, a serious sense of its obligations to
world righteousness, when it entered into them, then its plain duty as
the trustee of civilization is to investigate the charges solemnly made
as to the violation of the Hague conventions. If such investigation is
made, and if the charges prove well founded, then it is the duty of the
United States to take whatever action may be necessary to vindicate the
principles of international law set forth in these conventions.
I am not concerned with the charges of individual atrocity. The prime
fact is that Belgium committed no offense whatever, and yet that her
territory has been invaded and her people subjugated. This prime fact
cannot be left out of consideration in dealing with any matter that
has occurred in connection with it. Her neutrality has certainly been
violated, and this is in clear violation of the fundamental principles
of the Hague conventions. It appears clear that undefended towns have
been bombarded, and that towns which were defended have been attacked
with bombs at a time when no attack was made upon the defenses. This
is certainly in contravention of the Hague agreement forbidding the
bombardment of undefended towns. Illegal and excessive contributions
are expressly condemned under Articles 49 and 52 of the conventions. If
these articles do not forbid the levying of such sums as $40,000,000
from Brussels and $90,000,000 from the province of Brabant, then the
articles are absolutely meaningless. Articles 43 and 50 explicitly
forbid the infliction of a collective penalty, pecuniary or otherwise,
on a population on account of acts of individuals for which it cannot
be regarded as collectively responsible. Either this prohibition is
meaningless or it prohibits just such acts as the punitive destruction
of Visé, Louvain, Aerschot, and Dinant. Furthermore, a great deal of
the appalling devastation of central and eastern Belgium has been
apparently terrorizing and not punitive in its purpose, and this is
explicitly forbidden by the Hague conventions.
Now, it may be that there is an explanation and justification for
a portion of what has been done. But if the Hague conventions mean
anything, and if bad faith in the observation of treaties is not
to be treated with cynical indifference, then the United States
government should inform itself as to the facts, and should take
whatever action is necessary in reference thereto. The extent to
which the action should go may properly be a subject for discussion.
But that there should be some action is beyond discussion; unless,
indeed, we ourselves are content to take the view that treaties,
conventions, and international engagements and agreements of all kinds
are to be treated by us and by everybody else as what they have been
authoritatively declared to be, “scraps of paper,” the writing on
which is intended for no better purpose than temporarily to amuse the
feeble-minded.
If the above statements seem in the eyes of my German friends hostile
to Germany, let me emphasize the fact that they are predicated upon a
course of action which if extended and applied as it should be extended
and applied would range the United States on the side of Germany if
any such assault were made upon Germany as has been made upon Belgium,
or if either Belgium or any of the other allies committed similar
wrong-doing. Many Germans assert and believe that if Germany had not
acted as she did France and England would have invaded Belgium and have
committed similar wrongs. In such case it would have been our clear
duty to behave toward them exactly as we ought now to behave toward
Germany. But the fact that other powers might under other conditions do
wrong, affords no justification for failure to act on the wrong that
has actually been committed. It must always be kept in mind, however,
that we cannot expect the nation against whose actions we protest to
accept our position as warranted, unless we make it clear that we have
both the will and the power to interfere on behalf of that nation if in
its turn it is oppressed. In other words, we must show that we believe
in right and therefore in living up to our promises in good faith; and,
furthermore, that we are both able and ready to put might behind right.
As I have before said, I think that the party in Germany which believes
in a policy of aggression represents but a minority of the nation.
It is powerful only because the great majority of the German people
are rightfully in fear of aggression at the expense of Germany, and
sanction striking only because they fear lest they themselves be
struck. The greatest service that could be rendered to peace would
be to convince Germany, as well as other powers, that in such event
we would do all we could on behalf of the power that was wronged.
Extremists in England, France, and Russia talk as if the proper outcome
of the present war would be the utter dismemberment of Germany and her
reduction to impotence such as that which followed for her upon the
Thirty Years’ War. I have actually received letters from Frenchmen and
Englishmen upbraiding me for what they regard as a pro-German leaning
in these articles I have written. To these well-meaning persons I can
only say that Americans who remember the extreme bitterness felt by
Northerners for Southerners, and Southerners for Northerners, at the
end of the Civil War, are saddened but in no wise astonished that
other peoples should show a like bitterness. I can only repeat that to
dismember and hopelessly shatter Germany would be a frightful calamity
for mankind, precisely as the dismemberment and shattering of the
British Empire or of the French Republic would be. It is right that the
United States should regard primarily its own interests. But I believe
that I speak for a considerable number of my countrymen when I say that
we ought not solely to consider our own interests. Above all, we should
not do as the present administration does; for it refuses to take any
concrete action in favor of any nation which is wronged; and yet it
also refuses to act so that we may ourselves be sufficient for our own
protection.
We ought not to trust in words unbacked by deeds. We should be able
to defend ourselves. We should also be ready and able to join in
preventing the infliction of disaster of the kind of which I speak upon
any civilized power, great or small, whether it be at the present time
Belgium, or at some future day Germany or England, Holland, Sweden or
Hungary, Russia or Japan.
So much for questions of international right, and of our duty to others
in international affairs. Now for our duty to ourselves.
A sincere desire to act well toward other nations must not blind us to
the fact that as yet the standard of international morality is both
low and irregular. The behavior of the great military empires of the
Old World, in reference to their treaty obligations and their moral
obligations toward countries such as Belgium, Finland, and Korea, shows
that it would be utter folly for us in any grave crisis to trust to
anything save our own preparedness and resolution for our safety. The
other day there appeared in the newspapers extracts from a translation
of a report made by an officer of the Prussian army staff outlining
the plan of operations by Germany in the event of war with America.
Great surprise was expressed by innocent Americans that such plans
should be in existence, and certain gentlemen who speak for Germany
denied that the report (which was printed and openly sold in Germany
in pamphlet form) was “official.” Neither the resentment expressed
nor yet the denials were necessary. One feature of the admirable
preparedness in which Germany and Japan stand so far above all other
nations, and especially above our own, is their careful consideration
of hostilities with all possible antagonists. Bernhardi’s famous books
treat of possible war with Austria, and possible attack by Austria upon
Germany, although the prime lessons that they teach are those contained
in the possibility of war as it has actually occurred, with Germany
and Austria in alliance. This does not indicate German hostility to
Austria; it merely indicates German willingness to look squarely in
the face all possible facts. Of course, and quite properly, the German
General Staff has carefully considered the question of hostilities
with America, and, of course, plans were drawn up with minute care
and prevision at the time when there was friction between the two
countries over Samoa, at the time when Admiral Dietrich clashed with
Dewey in Manila Bay, and on the later occasion when there was friction
in connection with Venezuela. This did not represent any special German
ill will toward America. It represented the common-sense--albeit
somewhat cold-blooded--consideration of possibilities by Germany’s
rulers; and the failure to give this consideration would have reflected
severely upon these rulers--although I do not regard some of the
actions proposed as proper from the standpoint of warfare as the United
States has practised it. To become angry because such plans exist would
be childish. To fail to profit by our knowledge that they certainly
do exist would, however, be not merely childish but imbecile. I have
myself become personally cognizant of the existence of such plans for
operations against us, and of the larger features of their details, in
two cases, affecting two different nations.
The essential feature of these plans was (and doubtless is) the
seizure of some of our great coast cities and the terrorization of
these cities so as to make them give enormous ransoms; ransoms of
such size that our own country would be crippled, whereas our foes
would be enabled to run the war against us with a handsome profit to
themselves. These plans are based, of course, upon the belief that we
have not sufficient foresight and intelligence to keep our navy in
first-class condition, and upon not merely the belief but the knowledge
that our regular army is so small and our utter unpreparedness
otherwise so great that on land we would be entirely helpless against
a moderate-sized expeditionary force belonging to any first-class
military power. Foreign military and naval observers know well that
our navy has been used during the last eighteen months in connection
with the Mexican situation in such manner as to accomplish the minimum
of results as regards Mexico, while at the same time to do the maximum
of damage in interrupting the manœuvring and the gun practice of our
fleets. They regard Messrs. Wilson and Bryan as representative of the
American people in their entire inability to understand the real nature
of the forces that underlie international relations and the importance
of preparedness. They are entirely cold-blooded in their views of us.
Foreign rulers may despise us for our supine unpreparedness, and for
our readiness to make treaties, taken together with our refusal to
fulfil these treaties by seeking to avert wrong done to others. But
their contempt will not prevent their using this nation as arbiter in
order to bring about peace if to do so suits their purposes; and if, on
the contrary, one or the other of the several great military empires
becomes the world mistress as the result of this war, that power
will infringe our rights whenever and to the extent that it deems it
advantageous to do so, and will make war upon us whenever it believes
that such war will be to its own advantage.
In the event of such a war against us it is well to remember that the
spiritless and selfish type of neutrality which we have observed in
the present war will be remembered by all other nations on whichever
side they have been engaged in this contest, and will give each of them
more or less satisfaction in the event of disaster befalling us. These
nations, if they come to a deadlock as the result of this war, will not
be withheld by any sentiment of indignation against or contempt for us
from utilizing the services of the President as a medium for bringing
about peace, if this seems the most convenient method of getting peace.
But, whether they do this or not, they will retain a smouldering ill
will toward us, one and all of them; and if we were assailed it would
be utterly quixotic, utterly foolish of any one of them to come to
our aid no matter what wrongs were inflicted upon us. It would be
quite impossible for any power to treat us worse than Belgium has been
treated by Germany or to attack us with less warrant than was shown
when Belgium was attacked. Bombs have been continually dropped by the
Germans in the city of Paris and in other cities, wrecking private
houses and killing men, women, and children at a time when there was no
pretense that any military attacks were being made upon the cities, or
that any other object was served than that of terrorizing the civilian
population. Cities have been destroyed and others held to huge ransom.
All these practices are forbidden by the Hague conventions. Inasmuch as
we have not made a single protest against them when other powers have
suffered, it would be both ridiculous and humiliating for us to make
even the slightest appeal for assistance or to expect any assistance
from any other powers if ever we in our turn suffer in like fashion.
It would be purely our affair. We would have no right to expect that
other powers would take the kind of action which we ourselves have
refused to take. It would be our time to take our medicine, and it
would be folly and cowardice to make wry faces over it or to expect
sympathy, still less aid, from outsiders. As I have already stated, my
own view is most strongly that, if we are assailed in accordance with
the plans of foreign powers above mentioned, it would be our business
positively to refuse to allow any city to ransom itself, and sternly
to accept the destruction of New York, or San Francisco, or any other
city as the alternative of such ransom. Our duty would be to accept
these disasters as the payment rightfully due from us to fate for our
folly in having listened to the clamor of the feeble folk among the
ultrapacificists, and in having indorsed the unspeakable silliness of
the policy contained in the proposed all-inclusive arbitration treaties
of Mr. Taft and in the accomplished all-inclusive arbitration treaties
of Messrs. Wilson and Bryan.
I very earnestly hope that this nation will ultimately adopt a
dignified and self-respecting policy in international affairs. I
earnestly hope that ultimately we shall live up to every international
obligation we have undertaken--exactly as we did live up to them
during the seven and a half years while I was President. I earnestly
hope that we shall ourselves become one of the joint guarantors of
world peace under such a plan as that I in this book outline, and that
we shall hold ourselves ready and willing to act as a member of the
international posse comitatus to enforce the peace of righteousness as
against any offender big or small. This would mean a great practical
stride toward relief from the burden of excessive military preparation.
It would mean that a long step had been taken toward at least
minimizing and restricting the area and extent of possible warfare. It
would mean that all liberty-loving and enlightened peoples, great and
small, would be freed from the haunting nightmare of terror which now
besets them when they think of the possible conquest of their land.
Until this can be done we owe it to ourselves as a nation effectively
to safeguard ourselves against all likelihood of disaster at the hands
of a foreign foe. We should bring our navy up to the highest point of
preparedness, we should handle it purely from military considerations,
and should see that the training was never intermitted. We should make
our little regular army larger and more effective than at present. We
should provide for it an adequate reserve. In addition, I most heartily
believe that we should return to the ideal held by our people in the
days of Washington although never lived up to by them. We should
follow the example of such typical democracies as Switzerland and
Australia and provide and require military training for all our young
men. Switzerland’s efficient army has unquestionably been the chief
reason why in this war there has been no violation of her neutrality.
Australia’s system of military training has enabled her at once to ship
large bodies of first-rate fighting men to England’s aid. Our northern
neighbors have done even better than Australia; perhaps special mention
should be made of St. John, Newfoundland, which has sent to the front
one in five of her adult male population, a larger percentage than
any other city of the empire; a feat probably due to the fact that in
practically all her schools there is good military training, while her
young men have much practice in shooting tournaments. England at the
moment is saved from the fate of Belgium only because of her navy; and
the small size of her army, her lack of arms, her lack of previous
preparations doubtless afford the chief reason why this war has
occurred at all at this time. There would probably have been no war if
England had followed the advice so often urged on her by the lamented
Lord Roberts, for in that case she would have been able immediately to
put in the field an army as large and effective as, for instance, that
of France.
Training of our young men in field manœuvres and in marksmanship, as
is done in Switzerland, and to a slightly less extent in Australia,
would be of immense advantage to the physique and morale of our whole
population. It would not represent any withdrawal of our population
from civil pursuits, such as occurs among the great military states
of the European Continent. In Switzerland, for instance, the ground
training is given in the schools, and the young man after graduating
serves only some four months with the branch of the army to which he
is attached, and after that only about eight days a year, not counting
his rifle practice. All serve alike, rich and poor, without any
exceptions; and all whom I have ever met, the poor even more than the
rich, are enthusiastic over the beneficial effects of the service and
the increase in self-reliance, self-respect, and efficiency which it
has brought. The utter worthlessness of make-believe soldiers who have
not been trained, and who are improvised on the Wilson-Bryan theory,
will be evident to any one who cares to read such works as Professor
Johnson’s recent volume on Bull Run. Our people should make a thorough
study of the Swiss and Australian systems, and then adapt them to our
own use. To do so would not be a stride toward war, as the feeble folk
among the ultrapacificists would doubtless maintain. It would be the
most effectual possible guarantee that peace would dwell within our
borders; and it would also make it possible for us not only to insure
peace for ourselves, but to have our words carry weight if we spoke
against the commission of wrong and injustice at the expense of others.
But we must always remember that no institutions will avail unless the
private citizen has the right spirit. When a leading congressman,
himself with war experience, shows conclusively in open speech in
the House that we are utterly unprepared to do our duty to ourselves
if assailed, President Wilson answers him with a cheap sneer, with
unworthy levity; and the repeated warnings of General Wood are treated
with the same indifference. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this
attitude on the part of our public servants really represents the real
convictions of the average American. The ideal citizen of a free state
must have in him the stuff which in time of need will enable him to
show himself a first-class fighting man who scorns either to endure
or to inflict wrong. American society is sound at core and this means
that at bottom we, as a people, accept as the basis of sound morality
not slothful ease and soft selfishness and the loud timidity that
fears every species of risk and hardship, but the virile strength of
manliness which clings to the ideal of stern, unflinching performance
of duty, and which follows whithersoever that ideal may lead.