THE BELGIAN TRAGEDY
Peace is worthless unless it serves the cause of righteousness. Peace
which consecrates militarism is of small service. Peace obtained
by crushing the liberty and life of just and unoffending peoples
is as cruel as the most cruel war. It should ever be our honorable
effort to serve one of the world’s most vital needs by doing all in
our power to bring about conditions which will give some effective
protection to weak or small nations which themselves keep order and
act with justice toward the rest of mankind. There can be no higher
international duty than to safeguard the existence and independence of
industrious, orderly states, with a high personal and national standard
of conduct, but without the military force of the great powers; states,
for instance, such as Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian
countries, Uruguay, and others. A peace which left Belgium’s wrongs
unredressed and which did not provide against the recurrence of such
wrongs as those from which she has suffered would not be a real peace.
As regards the actions of most of the combatants in the hideous
world-wide war now raging it is possible sincerely to take and defend
either of the opposite views concerning their actions. The causes of
any such great and terrible contest almost always lie far back in the
past, and the seeming immediate cause is usually itself in major part
merely an effect of many preceding causes. The assassination of the
heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne was partly or largely due to the
existence of political and often murderous secret societies in Servia
which the Servian government did not suppress; and it did not suppress
them because the “bondage” of the men and women of the Servian race in
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria was such a source of ever-present
irritation to the Servians that their own government was powerless to
restrain them. Strong arguments can be advanced on both the Austrian
and the Servian sides as regards this initial cause of the present
world-wide war.
Again, when once the war was started between Austria and Servia, it can
well be argued that it was impossible for Russia not to take part. Had
she not done so, she would have forfeited her claims to the leadership
of the smaller Slav peoples; and the leading Russian liberals
enthusiastically support the Russian government in this matter,
asserting that Russia’s triumph in this particular struggle means a
check to militarism, a stride toward greater freedom, and an advance
in justice toward the Pole, the Jew, the Finn, and the people of the
Caucasus.
When Russia took part it may well be argued that it was impossible
for Germany not to come to the defense of Austria, and that disaster
would surely have attended her arms had she not followed the course
she actually did follow as regards her opponents on her western
frontier. As for her wonderful efficiency--her equipment, the foresight
and decision of her General Staff, her instantaneous action, her
indomitable persistence--there can be nothing but the praise and
admiration due a stern, virile, and masterful people, a people entitled
to hearty respect for their patriotism and far-seeing self-devotion.
Yet again, it is utterly impossible to see how France could have acted
otherwise than as she did act. She had done nothing to provoke the
crisis, even although it be admitted that in the end she was certain
to side with Russia. War was not declared by her, but against her,
and she could not have escaped it save by having pursued in the past,
and by willingness to pursue in the future, a course which would have
left her as helpless as Luxembourg--and Luxembourg’s fate shows that
helplessness does not offer the smallest guarantee of peace.
When once Belgium was invaded, every circumstance of national honor
and interest forced England to act precisely as she did act. She could
not have held up her head among nations had she acted otherwise. In
particular, she is entitled to the praise of all true lovers of peace,
for it is only by action such as she took that neutrality treaties
and treaties guaranteeing the rights of small powers will ever be
given any value. The actions of Sir Edward Grey as he guided Britain’s
foreign policy showed adherence to lofty standards of right combined
with firmness of courage under great strain. The British position, and
incidentally the German position, are tersely stated in the following
extract from the report of Sir Edward Goschen, who at the outset of the
war was British ambassador in Berlin. The report, in speaking of the
interview between the ambassador and the German imperial chancellor,
Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, says:
The chancellor [spoke] about twenty minutes. He said the step
taken by Great Britain was terrible to a degree. Just for a
word, “neutrality,” a word which in war time had been so often
disregarded, just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was
going to make war on a kindred nation. What we had done was
unthinkable. It was like striking a man from behind while he was
fighting for his life against two assailants.
I protested strongly against this statement, and said that in
the same way as he wished me to understand that for strategical
reasons it was a matter of life or death to Germany to advance
through Belgium and violate the latter’s neutrality, so I would
wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of life
or death for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her
solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium’s neutrality
if attacked. A solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what
confidence could any one have in England’s engagement in the
future?
There is one nation, however, as to which there is no room for
difference of opinion, whether we consider her wrongs or the justice
of her actions. It seems to me impossible that any man can fail to
feel the deepest sympathy with a nation which is absolutely guiltless
of any wrong-doing, which has given proof of high valor, and yet which
has suffered terribly, and which, if there is any meaning in the words
“right” and “wrong,” has suffered wrongfully. Belgium is not in the
smallest degree responsible for any of the conditions that during the
last half century have been at work to impress a certain fatalistic
stamp upon those actions of Austria, Russia, Germany, and France which
have rendered this war inevitable. No European nation has had anything
whatever to fear from Belgium. There was not the smallest danger of
her making any aggressive movement, not even the slightest aggressive
movement, against any one of her neighbors. Her population was mainly
industrial and was absorbed in peaceful business. Her people were
thrifty, hard-working, highly civilized, and in no way aggressive.
She owed her national existence to the desire to create an absolutely
neutral state. Her neutrality had been solemnly guaranteed by the great
powers, including Germany as well as England and France.
Suddenly, and out of a clear sky, her territory was invaded by an
overwhelming German army. According to the newspaper reports, it
was admitted in the Reichstag by German members that this act was
“wrongful.” Of course, if there is any meaning to the words “right”
and “wrong” in international matters, the act was wrong. The men who
shape German policy take the ground that in matters of vital national
moment there are no such things as abstract right and wrong, and that
when a great nation is struggling for its existence it can no more
consider the rights of neutral powers than it can consider the rights
of its own citizens as these rights are construed in times of peace,
and that everything must bend before the supreme law of national
self-preservation. Whatever we may think of the morality of this plea,
it is certain that almost all great nations have in time past again and
again acted in accordance with it. England’s conduct toward Denmark in
the Napoleonic wars, and the conduct of both England and France toward
us during those same wars, admit only of this species of justification;
and with less excuse the same is true of our conduct toward Spain in
Florida nearly a century ago. Nevertheless we had hoped by the action
taken at The Hague to mark an advance in international morality in such
matters. The action taken by Germany toward Belgium, and the failure by
the United States in any way to protest against such action, shows that
there has been no advance. I wish to point out just what was done, and
to emphasize Belgium’s absolute innocence and the horrible suffering
and disaster that have overwhelmed her in spite of such innocence. And
I wish to do this so that we as a nation may learn aright the lessons
taught by the dreadful Belgian tragedy.
Germany’s attack on Belgium was not due to any sudden impulse. It had
been carefully planned for a score of years, on the assumption that
the treaty of neutrality was, as Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg observed,
nothing but “paper,” and that the question of breaking or keeping
it was to be considered solely from the standpoint of Germany’s
interest. The German railways up to the Belgian border are for the
most part military roads, which have been double-tracked with a view
to precisely the overwhelming attack that has just been delivered into
and through Belgium. The great German military text-books, such as that
of Bernhardi, in discussing and studying possible German campaigns
against Russia and France, have treated advances through Belgium or
Switzerland exactly as they have treated possible advances through
German territory, it being assumed by the writers and by all for whom
they wrote that no efficient rulers or military men would for a second
consider a neutrality treaty or any other kind of treaty if it became
to the self-interest of a party to break it. It must be remembered
that the German system in no way limits its disregard of conventions
to disregard of neutrality treaties. For example, in General von
Bernhardi’s book, in speaking of naval warfare, he lays down the
following rule: “Sometimes in peace even, if there is no other means
of defending one’s self against a superior force, it will be advisable
to attack the enemy by torpedo and submarine boats, and to inflict
upon him unexpected losses.... War upon the enemy’s trade must also be
conducted as ruthlessly as possible, since only then, in addition to
the material damage inflicted upon the enemy, the necessary terror is
spread among the merchant marine, which is even more important than
the capture of actual prizes. A certain amount of terrorism must be
practised on the sea, making peaceful tradesmen stay in safe harbors.”
Belgium has felt the full effect of the practical application of these
principles, and Germany has profited by them exactly as her statesmen
and soldiers believed she would profit. They have believed that the
material gain of trampling on Belgium would more than offset any
material opposition which the act would arouse, and they treat with the
utter and contemptuous derision which it deserves the mere pacificist
clamor against wrong which is unaccompanied by the intention and effort
to redress wrong by force.
The Belgians, when invaded, valiantly defended themselves. They
acted precisely as Andreas Hofer and his Tyrolese, and Koerner and
the leaders of the North German Tugendbund acted in their day; and
their fate has been the fate of Andreas Hofer, who was shot after his
capture, and of Koerner, who was shot in battle. They fought valiantly,
and they were overcome. They were then stamped under foot. Probably it
is physically impossible for our people, living softly and at ease, to
visualize to themselves the dreadful woe that has come upon the people
of Belgium, and especially upon the poor people. Let each man think of
his neighbors--of the carpenter, the station agent, the day-laborer,
the farmer, the grocer--who are round about him, and think of these
men deprived of their all, their homes destroyed, their sons dead or
prisoners, their wives and children half starved, overcome with fatigue
and horror, stumbling their way to some city of refuge, and when they
have reached it, finding air-ships wrecking the houses with bombs and
destroying women and children. The King shared the toil and danger of
the fighting men; the Queen and her children suffered as other mothers
and children suffered.
Unquestionably what has been done in Belgium has been done in
accordance with what the Germans sincerely believe to be the course
of conduct necessitated by Germany’s struggle for life. But Germany’s
need to struggle for her life does not make it any easier for the
Belgians to suffer death. The Germans are in Belgium from no fault
of the Belgians but purely because the Germans deemed it to their
vital interest to violate Belgium’s rights. Therefore the ultimate
responsibility for what has occurred at Louvain and what has occurred
and is occurring in Brussels rests upon Germany and in no way upon
Belgium. The invasion could have been averted by no action of Belgium
that was consistent with her honor and self-respect. The Belgians would
have been less than men had they not defended themselves and their
country. For this, and for this only, they are suffering, somewhat as
my own German ancestors suffered when Turenne ravaged the Palatinate,
somewhat as my Irish ancestors suffered in the struggles that attended
the conquests and reconquests of Ireland in the days of Cromwell
and William. The suffering is by no means as great, but it is very
great, and it is altogether too nearly akin to what occurred in the
seventeenth century for us of the twentieth century to feel overmuch
pleased with the amount of advance that has been made. It is neither
necessary nor at the present time possible to sift from the charges,
countercharges, and denials the exact facts as to the acts alleged
to have been committed in various places. The prime fact as regards
Belgium is that Belgium was an entirely peaceful and genuinely neutral
power which had been guilty of no offence whatever. What has befallen
her is due to the further fact that a great, highly civilized military
power deemed that its own vital interests rendered imperative the
infliction of this suffering on an inoffensive although valiant and
patriotic little nation.
I admire and respect the German people. I am proud of the German blood
in my veins. But the sympathy and support of the American people should
go out unreservedly to Belgium, and we should learn the lesson taught
by Belgium’s fall. What has occurred to Belgium is precisely what would
occur under similar conditions to us, unless we were able to show that
the action would be dangerous.
The rights and wrongs of these cases where nations violate the rules
of morality in order to meet their own supposed needs can be precisely
determined only when all the facts are known and when men’s blood is
cool. Nevertheless, it is imperative, in the interest of civilization,
to create international conditions which shall neither require nor
permit such action in the future. Moreover, we should understand
clearly just what these actions are and just what lessons we of the
United States should learn from them so far as our own future is
concerned.
There are several such lessons. One is how complicated instead of how
simple it is to decide what course we ought to follow as regards any
given action supposed to be in the interest of peace. Of course I am
speaking of the thing and not the name when I speak of peace. The
ultrapacificists are capable of taking any position, yet I suppose
that few among them now hold that there was value in the “peace” which
was obtained by the concert of European powers when they prevented
interference with Turkey while the Turks butchered some hundreds of
thousands of Armenian men, women, and children. In the same way I do
not suppose that even the ultrapacificists really feel that “peace”
is triumphant in Belgium at the present moment. President Wilson has
been much applauded by all the professional pacificists because he
has announced that our desire for peace must make us secure it for
ourselves by a neutrality so strict as to forbid our even whispering a
protest against wrong-doing, lest such whispers might cause disturbance
to our ease and well-being. We pay the penalty of this action--or,
rather, supine inaction--on behalf of peace for ourselves, by
forfeiting our right to do anything on behalf of peace for the Belgians
in the present. We can maintain our neutrality only by refusal to do
anything to aid unoffending weak powers which are dragged into the gulf
of bloodshed and misery through no fault of their own. It is a grim
comment on the professional pacificist theories as hitherto developed
that, according to their view, our duty to preserve peace for ourselves
necessarily means the abandonment of all effective effort to secure
peace for other unoffending nations which through no fault of their own
are trampled down by war.
The next lesson we should learn is of far more immediate consequence
to us than speculations about peace in the abstract. Our people
should wake up to the fact that it is a poor thing to live in a
fool’s paradise. What has occurred in this war ought to bring home
to everybody what has of course long been known to all really
well-informed men who were willing to face the truth and not try to
dodge it. Until some method is devised of putting effective force
behind arbitration and neutrality treaties neither these treaties nor
the vague and elastic body of custom which is misleadingly termed
international law will have any real effect in any serious crisis
between us and any save perhaps one or two of the great powers. The
average great military power looks at these matters purely from the
standpoint of its own interests. Several months ago, for instance,
Japan declared war on Germany. She has paid scrupulous regard to
our own rights and feelings in the matter. The contention that she
is acting in a spirit of mere disinterested altruism need not be
considered. She believes that she has wrongs to redress and strong
national interests to preserve. Nineteen years ago Germany joined
with Russia to check Japan’s progress after her victorious war with
China, and has since then itself built up a German colonial possession
on Chinese soil. Doubtless the Japanese have never for one moment
forgotten this act of Germany. Doubtless they also regard the presence
of a strong European military power in China so near to Korea and
Manchuria as a menace to Japan’s national life. With businesslike
coolness the soldierly statesmen of Nippon have taken the chance which
offered itself of at little cost retaliating for the injury inflicted
upon them in the past and removing an obstacle to their future
dominance in eastern Asia. Korea is absolutely Japan’s. To be sure, by
treaty it was solemnly covenanted that Korea should remain independent.
But Korea was itself helpless to enforce the treaty, and it was out of
the question to suppose that any other nation with no interest of its
own at stake would attempt to do for the Koreans what they were utterly
unable to do for themselves. Moreover, the treaty rested on the false
assumption that Korea could govern herself well. It had already been
shown that she could not in any real sense govern herself at all. Japan
could not afford to see Korea in the hands of a great foreign power.
She regarded her duty to her children and her children’s children as
overriding her treaty obligations. Therefore, when Japan thought the
right time had come, it calmly tore up the treaty and took Korea, with
the polite and businesslike efficiency it had already shown in dealing
with Russia, and was afterward to show in dealing with Germany. The
treaty, when tested, proved as utterly worthless as our own recent
all-inclusive arbitration treaties--and worthlessness can go no further.
Hysteria does not tend toward edification; and in this country hysteria
is unfortunately too often the earmark of the ultrapacificist. Surely
at this time there is more reason than ever to remember Professor
Lounsbury’s remark concerning the “infinite capacity of the human brain
to withstand the introduction of knowledge.” The comments of some
doubtless well-meaning citizens of our own country upon the lessons
taught by this terrible cataclysm of war are really inexplicable to
any man who forgets the truth that Professor Lounsbury thus set forth.
A writer of articles for a newspaper syndicate the other day stated
that Germany was being opposed by the rest of the world because it had
“inspired fear.” This thesis can, of course, be sustained. But Belgium
has inspired no fear. Yet it has suffered infinitely more than Germany.
Luxembourg inspired no fear. Yet it has been quietly taken possession
of by Germany. The writer in question would find it puzzling to point
out the particulars in which Belgium and Luxembourg--not to speak of
China and Korea--are at this moment better off than Germany. Of course
they are worse off; and this because Germany _has_ “inspired fear,”
and they have not. Nevertheless, this writer drew the conclusion that
“fear” was the only emotion which ought not to be inspired; and he
advocated our abandonment of battle-ships and other means of defense,
so that we might never inspire “fear” in any one. He forgot that,
while it is a bad thing to inspire fear, it is a much worse thing to
inspire contempt. Another newspaper writer pointed out that on the
frontier between us and Canada there were no forts, and yet peace
obtained; and drew the conclusion that forts and armed forces were
inimical to national safety. This worthy soul evidently did not know
that Luxembourg had no forts or armed forces, and therefore succumbed
without a protest of any kind. If he does not admire the heroism of the
Belgians and prefer it to the tame submission of the Luxembourgers,
then this writer is himself unfit to live as a free man in a free
country. The crown of ineptitude, however, was reached by an editor
who announced, in praising the recent all-inclusive peace treaties,
that “had their like been in existence between some of the European
nations two weeks ago, the world might have been spared the great war.”
It is rather hard to deal seriously with such a supposition. At this
very moment the utter worthlessness, under great pressure, of even the
rational treaties drawn to protect Belgium and Luxembourg has been
shown. To suppose that under such conditions a bundle of bits of paper
representing mere verbiage, with no guarantee, would count for anything
whatever in a serious crisis is to show ourselves unfit to control the
destinies of a great, just, and self-respecting people.
These writers wish us to abandon all means of defending ourselves.
Some of them advocate our abandoning the building of an efficient
fleet. Yet at this moment Great Britain owes it that she is not in
worse plight than Belgium solely to the fact that with far-sighted
wisdom her statesmen have maintained her navy at the highest point of
efficiency. At this moment the Japanese are at war with the Germans,
and hostilities have been taking place in what but twenty years ago
was Chinese territory, and what by treaty is unquestionably Chinese
territory to-day. China has protested against the Japanese violation of
Chinese neutrality in their operations against the Germans, but no heed
has been paid to the protest, for China cannot back the protest by the
use of armed force. Moreover, as China is reported to have pointed out
to Germany, the latter power had violated Chinese neutrality just as
Japan had done.
Very possibly the writers above alluded to were sincere in their belief
that they were advocating what was patriotic and wise when they urged
that the United States make itself utterly defenseless so as to avoid
giving an excuse for aggression. Yet these writers ought to have known
that during their own lifetime China has been utterly defenseless and
yet has suffered from aggression after aggression. Large portions
of its territory are now in the possession of Russia, of Japan, of
Germany, of France, of England. The great war between Russia and Japan
was fought on what was nominally Chinese territory. At present, because
a few months ago Servian assassins murdered the heir to the Austrian
monarchy, Japan has fought Germany on Chinese territory. Luxembourg
has been absolutely powerless and defenseless, has had no soldiers and
no forts. It is off the map at this moment. Not only are none of the
belligerents thinking about its rights, but no neutral is thinking
about its rights, and this simply because Luxembourg could not defend
itself. It is our duty to be patient with every kind of folly, but it
is hard for a good American, for a man to whom his country is dear and
who reveres the memories of Washington and Lincoln, to be entirely
patient with the kind of folly that advocates reducing this country to
the position of China and Luxembourg.
One of the main lessons to learn from this war is embodied in the
homely proverb: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Persistently only
half of this proverb has been quoted in deriding the men who wish to
safeguard our national interest and honor. Persistently the effort has
been made to insist that those who advocate keeping our country able to
defend its rights are merely adopting “the policy of the big stick.”
In reality, we lay equal emphasis on the fact that it is necessary to
speak softly; in other words, that it is necessary to be respectful
toward all people and scrupulously to refrain from wronging them,
while at the same time keeping ourselves in condition to prevent wrong
being done to us. If a nation does not in this sense speak softly,
then sooner or later the policy of the big stick is certain to result
in war. But what befell Luxembourg five months ago, what has befallen
China again and again during the past quarter of a century, shows that
no amount of speaking softly will save any people which does not carry
a big stick.
America should have a coherent policy of action toward foreign powers,
and this should primarily be based on the determination never to
give offense when it can be avoided, always to treat other nations
justly and courteously, and, as long as present conditions exist, to
be prepared to defend our own rights ourselves. No other nation will
defend them for us. No paper guarantee or treaty will be worth the
paper on which it is written if it becomes to the interest of some
other power to violate it, unless we have strength, and courage and
ability to use that strength, back of the treaty. Every public man,
every writer who speaks with wanton offensiveness of a foreign power or
of a foreign people, whether he attacks England or France or Germany,
whether he assails the Russians or the Japanese, is doing an injury to
the whole American body politic. We have plenty of shortcomings at home
to correct before we start out to criticise the shortcomings of others.
Now and then it becomes imperatively necessary in the interests of
humanity, or in our own vital interest, to act in a manner which will
cause offense to some other power. This is a lamentable necessity; but
when the necessity arises we must meet it and act as we are honorably
bound to act, no matter what offense is given. We must always weigh
well our duties in such a case, and consider the rights of others as
well as our own rights, in the interest of the world at large. If after
such consideration it is evident that we are bound to act along a
certain line of policy, then it is mere weakness to refrain from doing
so because offense is thereby given. But we must never act wantonly or
brutally, or without regard to the essentials of genuine morality--a
morality considering our interests as well as the interests of others,
and considering the interests of future generations as well as of the
present generation. We must so conduct ourselves that every big nation
and every little nation that behaves itself shall never have to think
of us with fear, and shall have confidence not only in our justice
but in our courtesy. Submission to wrong-doing on our part would be
mere weakness and would invite and insure disaster. We must not submit
to wrong done to our honor or to our vital national interests. But
we must be scrupulously careful always to speak with courtesy and
self-restraint to others, always to act decently to others, and to give
no nation any justification for believing that it has anything to fear
from us as long as it behaves with decency and uprightness.
Above all, let us avoid the policy of peace with insult, the policy of
unpreparedness to defend our rights, with inability to restrain our
representatives from doing wrong to or publicly speaking ill of others.
The worst policy for the United States is to combine the unbridled
tongue with the unready hand.
We in this country have of course come lamentably short of our ideals.
Nevertheless, in some ways our ideals have been high, and at times we
have measurably realized them. From the beginning we have recognized
what is taught in the words of Washington, and again in the great
crisis of our national life in the words of Lincoln, that in the
past free peoples have generally split and sunk on that great rock
of difficulty caused by the fact that a government which recognizes
the liberties of the people is not usually strong enough to preserve
the liberties of the people against outside aggression. Washington
and Lincoln believed that ours was a strong people and therefore fit
for a strong government. They believed that it was only weak peoples
that had to fear strong governments, and that to us it was given to
combine freedom and efficiency. They belonged among that line of
statesmen and public servants whose existence has been the negation of
the theory that goodness is always associated with weakness, and that
strength always finds its expression in violent wrong-doing. Edward
the Confessor represented exactly the type which treats weakness and
virtue as interchangeable terms. His reign was the prime cause of the
conquest of England. Godoy, the Spanish statesman, a century ago, by
the treaties he entered into and carried out, actually earned the title
of “Prince of Peace” instead of merely lecturing about it; and the
result of his peacefulness was the loss by Spain of the vast regions
which, she then held in our country west of the Mississippi, and
finally the overthrow of the Spanish national government, the setting
up in Madrid of a foreign king by a foreign conqueror, and a long-drawn
and incredibly destructive war. To statesmen of this kind Washington
and Lincoln stand in as sharp contrast as they stand on the other side
to the great absolutist chiefs such as Cæsar, Napoleon, Frederick the
Great, and Cromwell. What was true of the personality of Washington
and Lincoln was true of the policy they sought to impress upon our
nation. They were just as hostile to the theory that virtue was to
be confounded with weakness as to the theory that strength justified
wrong-doing. No abundance of the milder virtues will save a nation that
has lost the virile qualities; and, on the other hand, no admiration
of strength must make us deviate from the laws of righteousness. The
kind of “peace” advocated by the ultrapacificists of 1776 would have
meant that we never would have had a country; the kind of “peace”
advocated by the ultrapacificists in the early ’60’s would have meant
the absolute destruction of the country. It would have been criminal
weakness for Washington not to have fought for the independence of this
country, and for Lincoln not to have fought for the preservation of
the Union; just as in an infinitely smaller degree it would have been
criminal weakness for us if we had permitted wrong-doing in Cuba to go
on forever unchecked, or if we had failed to insist on the building
of the Panama Canal in exactly the fashion that we did insist; and,
above all, if we had failed to build up our navy as during the last
twenty years it has been built up. No alliance, no treaty, and no
easy good-will of other nations will save us if we are not true to
ourselves; and, on the other hand, if we wantonly give offense to
others, if we excite hatred and fear, then some day we will pay a heavy
penalty.
The most important lesson, therefore, for us to learn from Belgium’s
fate is that, as things in the world now are, we must in any great
crisis trust for our national safety to our ability and willingness to
defend ourselves by our own trained strength and courage. We must not
wrong others; and for our own safety we must trust, not to worthless
bits of paper unbacked by power, and to treaties that are fundamentally
foolish, but to our own manliness and clear-sighted willingness to face
facts.
There is, however, another lesson which this huge conflict may at least
possibly teach. There is at least a chance that from this calamity
a movement may come which will at once supplement and in the future
perhaps altogether supplant the need of the kind of action so plainly
indicated by the demands of the present. It is at least possible that
the conflict will result in a growth of democracy in Europe, in at
least a partial substitution of the rule of the people for the rule of
those who esteem it their God-given right to govern the people. This,
in its turn, would render it probably a little more unlikely that there
would be a repetition of such disastrous warfare. I do not think that
at present it would prevent the possibility of warfare. I think that
in the great countries engaged, the peoples as a whole have been behind
their sovereigns on both sides of this contest. Certainly the action of
the Socialists in Germany, France, and Belgium, and, so far as we know,
of the popular leaders in Russia, would tend to bear out the truth of
this statement. But the growth of the power of the people, while it
would not prevent war, would at least render it more possible than at
present to make appeals which might result in some cases in coming to
an accommodation based upon justice; for justice is what popular rule
must be permanently based upon and must permanently seek to obtain or
it will not itself be permanent.
Moreover, the horror that right-thinking citizens feel over the awful
tragedies of this war can hardly fail to make sensible men take an
interest in genuine peace movements and try to shape them so that they
shall be more practical than at present. I most earnestly believe in
every rational movement for peace. My objection is only to movements
that do not in very fact tell in favor of peace or else that sacrifice
righteousness to peace. Of course this includes objection to all
treaties that make believe to do what, as a matter of fact, they
fail to do. Under existing conditions universal and all-inclusive
arbitration treaties have been utterly worthless, because where there
is no power to compel nations to arbitrate, and where it is perfectly
certain that some nations will pay no respect to such agreements unless
they can be forced to do so, it is mere folly for others to trust to
promises impossible of performance; and it is an act of positive bad
faith to make these promises when it is certain that the nation making
them would violate them. But this does not in the least mean that we
must abandon hope of taking action which will lessen the chance of
war and make it more possible to circumscribe the limits of war’s
devastation.
For this result we must largely trust to sheer growth in morality and
intelligence among the nations themselves. For a hundred years peace
has obtained between us and Great Britain. No frontier in Europe is
as long as the frontier between Canada and ourselves, and yet there
is not a fort, nor an armed force worthy of being called such, upon
it. This does not result from any arbitration treaty or any other
treaty. Such treaties as those now existing are as a rule observed
only when they serve to make a record of conditions that already exist
and which they do not create. The fact simply is that there has been
such growth of good feeling and intelligence that war between us and
the British Empire is literally an impossibility, and there is no more
chance of military movements across the Canadian border than there
is of such movement between New York and New Hampshire or Quebec
and Ontario. Slowly but surely, I believe, such feelings will grow,
until war between the Englishman and the German, or the Russian, or
the Frenchman, or between any of them and the American, will be as
unthinkable as now between the Englishman or Canadian and the American.
But something can be done to hasten this day by wise action. It may
not be possible at once to have this action as drastic as would be
ultimately necessary; but we should keep our purpose in view. The utter
weakness of the Hague court, and the worthlessness when strain is put
upon them of most treaties, spring from the fact that at present there
is no means of enforcing the carrying out of the treaty or enforcing
the decision of the court. Under such circumstances recommendations for
universal disarmament stand on an intellectual par with recommendations
to establish “peace” in New York City by doing away with the police.
Disarmament of the free and liberty-loving nations would merely mean
insuring the triumph of some barbarism or despotism, and if logically
applied would mean the extinction of liberty and of all that makes
civilization worth having throughout the world. But in view of what has
occurred in this war, surely the time ought to be ripe for the nations
to consider a great world agreement among all the civilized military
powers _to back righteousness by force_. Such an agreement would
establish an efficient world league for the peace of righteousness.