From the first this cavalry campaign had proceeded according to a clearly
formed plan. It was made after full conference with General Wilson. First,
it was decided that to render an attack upon Hood's line certain of
success a sufficient cavalry force must be in hand to turn his flank. The
next requirement, that of pursuing so effectively as to break up Hood,
could not be met without sufficient cavalry. So General Thomas held on in
the face of what has been related till he was so nearly ready to strike
that he felt certain of success. As a result, the ends in view were
attained. The cavalry flanking circuits made possible the driving of the
enemy from his extended position. The pursuit by a thoroughly equipped
cavalry force made possible and secured the virtual destruction of Hood's
army.
The next campaign, urged by Wilson and approved by Thomas, had for its
objective the destruction of the military storehouses and manufactories,
and the fatal crippling of the Confederacy. How complete was the success
of this second campaign the outlines already presented sufficiently
attest.
In summarizing this attempt to again direct attention to this wonderful
cavalry campaign, it may be permissible to repeat the form in which I have
heretofore set it forth in a volume (the concluding chapters of Colonel
Donn Piatt's "Life of Thomas") covering the ground of this article at much
greater length:
It should be remembered forever in the annals of war that Thomas insisted
upon waiting to remount a portion of the (cavalry) corps before he would
consent to deliver battle, and that when he did march forth against the
veteran and almost invincible infantry of Hood, strongly intrenched in his
front, it was the cavalry corps which broke through his left, and wheeling
grandly in the same direction, captured twenty-seven guns from their
redoubts on the first day, and which, continuing its movement on the
second day, enveloped and took in reverse the left and left center of the
Confederate intrenchments, and so shook their entire line as to make it a
walkover for the infantry which Thomas finally hurled against them. It was
the harrassing pursuit of Hood by the cavalry corps which, notwithstanding
the rains and sleet of midwinter and the swollen rivers, broke up and
scattered the host which had so confidently invaded Middle Tennessee only
a month before. Pausing on the banks of the Tennessee till the rough edge
of winter had passed, to gather in the distant detachments, to procure
remounts, clothing, and equipments, and to weld the growing force into a
compact and irresistible army corps of horsemen, the cavalry commander,
with the full concurrence of Thomas, the beau ideal of American soldiers,
began his final and most glorious campaign. No historian or military
critic can read the story of the operations which followed without coming
to the conclusion that they were characterized by the most remarkable
series of successes ever gained by cavalry in modern warfare. They
illustrate, first, the importance of concentrating that arm in compact
masses under one competent commander, and in operations of the first
importance; second, the tremendous advantage of celerity of movement,
especially in modern warfare, where improved firearms play such a decisive
part; third, that the chief use of horses, notwithstanding that they may
in exceptional cases add to the shock of the charge, is to transport
fighting men rapidly to the vital point of a battlefield, and especially
to the flank and rear of the enemy's position, or deeply into the interior
of the enemy's country against his lines of supply and communication, and
also his arsenals, armories, and factories; fourth, that the best infantry
armed with the best magazine carbines or rifles make the best mounted
troops, irrespective of whether they be called cavalry, dragoons, or
mounted infantry.
When the fact is recalled that the seven divisions of this corps at the
close of the war mustered about 35,000 men for duty with the colors, and
that had the war lasted sixty days longer they could, and probably would,
have been concentrated in Virginia, it will be seen to what a high degree
of perfection the organization had been brought, and that it fully
justified Sherman's declaration that it was by far the largest, most
efficient, and most powerful body of horse that had ever come under his
command. But when the captures of the strongly fortified towns of Selma,
West Point, and Columbus are considered, with all the romantic incidents
of night fighting, together with the surrender of the no less strongly
fortified cities and towns of Montgomery, Macon, and West Point, carrying
with them the destruction of the last and only remaining arsenals,
armories, factories, storehouses, and military munitions and supplies, and
also the destruction of the railways connecting those places with their
bridges and rolling stock, it will be seen that Johnston and his generals
had nothing else left them but to lay down their arms and surrender. It
was no longer possible for them to concentrate an army, or to supply it
with food, or to keep it armed and equipped. With those places and the
manufacturing plants which they contained still in their possession, and
with the railways connecting them still unbroken, they might have
collected together in the Carolinas a force amply able to cope with
Sherman, and possibly to overwhelm him before reinforcements could reach
him. That brilliant but erratic leader, with his splendid army, it will be
remembered, had avoided Macon on the one hand and Augusta on the other,
both the seats of important military industries, and by an eccentric and
unnecessary movement from his true line of operations, had gone to
Savannah, leaving the direct railroads and highways behind him open and
free for the use of the remnants of Hood's army and of the other scattered
detachments which were hastening to form a junction with Johnston, now
the sole hope of the Confederacy.
Had it not been for Wilson's wide swath of victory and destruction through
and not around the important cities in his way, during which he captured
8500 prisoners and 280 guns, and afterward paroled 59,000 rebel soldiers
belonging to the armies of Lee, Johnston, and Beauregard, it would have
been easy for Johnston and Beauregard, had they been so minded, to
continue the war indefinitely. As it was, to continue it was simply
impossible, and for this the country is indebted, first, to Wilson and his
gallant troopers, and second, to Thomas, who insisted that they should
have time to remount and prepare for the work before them. Neither the
army nor the country ever appreciated that invincible body of horsemen, or
their division, brigade, regimental, and company commanders, or the high
character of the enlisted men, or the performances of the whole at their
real worth. There were officers among them fit for any command that could
have been given them, and as a body they were as gallant and capable
soldiers as ever drew saber or wore uniform. Had the war lasted a few
months longer their fame would have been a household word. The leaders,
though young in years, were old in war. Wilson himself was at the close
not yet twenty-eight. Kilpatrick was about the same age. Upton was
several months younger. Winslow, Alexander, Croxton, La Grange, Watkins,
Atkins, Murray, Palmer, Noble, Kitchell, Benteen, Cooper, Young, Bacon,
and Weston were of the younger set, while McCook, Minty, Long, Hatch, R.
W. Johnson, Knipe, Kelly, Hammond, Coon, G. M. L. Johnson, Spalding,
Pritchard, Miller, Harrison, Biggs, Vail, Israel Garrard, McCormick,
Pierce, and Frank White were somewhat older, though none of them had
reached middle life. Harnden, as sturdy as Balfour of Burleigh, and
Eggleston, the type of those who rode with Cromwell at Marston Moor, were
graybeards, but were full of activity and courage. Ross Hill and Taylor,
although captains, were mere boys, but full of experienced valor.
The men in the ranks were mostly from the Western and Northwestern and
upper slave States, and of them it may be truthfully averred that their
superiors for endurance, self-reliance, and pluck could nowhere be found.
After they were massed at Nashville they believed themselves to be
invincible, and it was their boast that they had never come in sight of a
hostile gun or fortification that they did not capture. Armed with
Spencers, it was their conviction that elbow to elbow, dismounted, in
single line, nothing could withstand their charge. "Only cover our
flanks," said Miller to Wilson, as they were approaching Selma, "and
nothing can stop us!" In conclusion, it may be safely said that no man
ever saw one of them in the closing campaign of the war skulking before
battle or sneaking to the rear after the action began. They seemed to know
by instinct when and where the enemy might be encountered, and then the
only strife among them was to see who should be first in the onset. With a
corps of such men, properly mounted and armed, and with such organization
and discipline as prevailed among them during their last great campaign,
no hazard of war can be regarded as too great for them to undertake, and
nothing should be counted as impossible except defeat.
When the "records" are all published and the story properly written, it
will show that no corps in the army, whether cavalry or infantry, ever
inflicted greater injury upon the "Lost Cause," or did more useful service
toward the re-establishment of the Union under the Constitution and the
laws, than was done by the cavalry corps of the Military Division of the
Mississippi.