THOMAS TURNS ON HIS NAGGERS.

There was one thing in which General Thomas was slow. He was not swift to

give expression to indignation over wrong treatment. To this latter, as

the culmination of the series, he at last responded with this crushing

statement:

"General Hood's army is being pursued as rapidly and as vigorously as it

is possible for one army to pursue another. We cannot control the

elements, and you must remember that to resist Hood's advance into

Tennessee I had to reorganize and almost thoroughly equip the force now

under my command. I fought the battles of the 15th and 16th inst. with the

troops but partially equipped, and notwithstanding the inclemency of the

weather and the partial equipment, have been enabled to drive the enemy

beyond Duck River, crossing the two streams with my troops, and driving

the enemy from position to position, without the aid of pontoons, and with

but little transportation to bring up supplies and ammunition.

"I am doing all in my power to crush Hood's army, and, if it be possible,

will destroy it, but pursuing an enemy through an exhausted country, over

mud roads, completely sogged with heavy rains, is no child's play, and

cannot be accomplished as quickly as thought of. I hope, in urging me to

push the enemy, the department remembers that General Sherman took with

him the complete organizations of the Military Division of the

Mississippi, well equipped in every respect as regards ammunition,

supplies, and transportation, leaving me only two corps--partially

stripped of their transportation to accommodate the force taken with

him--to oppose the advance into Tennessee of that army which had resisted

the advance of the army of the Military Division of the Mississippi on

Atlanta from the commencement of the campaign until its close, and which

is now, in addition, aided by Forrest's cavalry. Although my progress may

appear slow, I feel assured that Hood's army can be driven from Tennessee,

and eventually driven to the wall, by the force under my command, but too

much must not be expected of troops which have to be reorganized,

especially when they have the task of destroying a force in a winter

campaign which was able to make an obstinate resistance to twice its

numbers in spring and summer. In conclusion, I can safely state that this

army is willing to submit to any sacrifice to oust Hood's army, or to

strike any other blow which would contribute to the destruction of the

rebellion."

The next day Stanton thus again extended his steady support:

"I have seen to-day General Halleck's dispatch of yesterday and your

reply. It is proper for me to assure you that this department has the most

unbounded confidence in your skill, vigor, and determination to employ to

the best advantage all the means in your power to pursue and destroy the

enemy. No department could be inspired with more profound admiration and

thankfulness for the great deeds you have already performed, or more

confiding faith that human effort could accomplish no more than will be

done by you and the gallant officers and soldiers of your command."

To this Thomas responded in terms which show his deep appreciation of the

only unqualifiedly friendly voice that had reached his ear from those in

high authority:

"I am profoundly thankful for the hearty expression of your confidence in

my determination and desire to do all in my power to destroy the enemy and

put down the rebellion."

As pertinent to this history it is well to recall two facts: First,

Sherman reached Savannah, having avoided all fortified places, had

encountered no enemy in force during his march, sat down before the city,

and awoke one morning to find that Hardee with his 10,000 men had slipped

out of the city over the river and escaped.

Second, the Army of the Potomac, which had 87,000 present for duty

equipped, and which was not obliged to depend upon quartermasters'

employees, citizens, and convalescents for its reserves, remained quietly

in its camps in front of City Point and in sight of the enemy from

November to April, giving plenty of leisure for complaining that the Army

of the Cumberland did not attack at the dropping of a handkerchief.

With the dispersion of Hood's army General Thomas set about preparing for

a spring campaign which should open at the earliest possible day. His plan

contemplated the assembling and putting in thorough condition an army of

cavalry to penetrate the South under his trusted commander, General James

H. Wilson.

Was General Thomas Slow at Nashville? With a Description of the Greatest Cavalry Movement of the War and General James H. Wilson's Cavalry Operations in Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia · 第 13 / 18 题