FOREIGN AFFAIRS: 1572-1583
The year 1572 witnessed two events of capital importance in European
history: the rising in the Netherlands, which resulted in the
establishment of the Dutch Republic (April); and the massacre of St.
Bartholomew, which marked the decisive rejection of Protestantism by
France (August).
In the beginning of that year--a few weeks before the proceedings in
Parliament just narrated--Elizabeth had at last concluded the defensive
alliance with France for which she had been so long negotiating (April
19). It cannot be too often repeated that this was the corner-stone of
her foreign policy. For the sake of its superior importance she had
abstained from the interference in Scotland which her Ministers were
always urging. The more she interfered there the more she would have to
interfere, till it would end in her having a rebellious province on her
hands in addition to the hostility of both France and Spain; whereas an
alliance with France would give her security on all sides, Scotland
included. In the treaty it was agreed that if either country were
invaded “under any pretence or cause, none excepted,” the other should
send 6000 troops to its assistance. This was accompanied with an
explanation, in the King’s handwriting, that “any cause” included
religion. The article relating to Scotland is not less significant. The
two sovereigns “shall make no innovations in Scotland, but defend it
against foreigners, not suffering strangers to enter, or foment the
factions in Scotland; but it shall be lawful for the Queen of England to
chastise by arms the Scots who shall countenance the English rebels now
in Scotland.” Mary was not mentioned. France therefore tacitly renounced
her cause. Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty Charles IX.
formally proposed a marriage between Elizabeth and his youngest brother,
Alençon. This proposal she managed to encourage and elude for eleven
years.
It was just at this moment that the seizure of Brill by some Dutch
rovers, who had taken refuge on the sea from the cruelty of Alva, caused
most of the towns of Holland and Zealand to blaze into rebellion (April
1). Thus began the great war of liberation, which was to last
thirty-seven years. The Protestant party in England hailed the revolt
with enthusiasm. Large subscriptions were made to assist it, and
volunteers poured across to take part in the struggle. Charles IX. and
his mother, full of schemes of conquest in the Netherlands, urged
Elizabeth to join them in a war against Philip. But, with a sagacity and
self-restraint which do her infinite honour, she refused to be drawn
beyond the lines laid down in the recent defensive alliance. Security,
economy, fructification of the tax-payers’ money in the tax-payers’
pocket--such were the guiding principles of her policy. She was not to
be dragged into dangerous enterprises either ambitious or Quixotic.
Schemes for the partition of the Netherlands were laid before her.
Zealand, it was said, would indemnify her for Calais. What Englishman
with any common sense does not now see that she was right to reject the
bribe?
To Elizabeth no rebellion against a legitimate sovereign could be
welcome in itself. Since Philip was so possessed by religious bigotry as
to be dangerous to all Protestant States, she was not sorry that he
should wear out his crusading ardour in the Netherlands; and she was
ready to give just as much assistance to the Dutch, in an underhand way,
as would keep him fully occupied without bringing a declaration of war
upon herself. But she would have vastly preferred that he should repress
Catholic and Protestant fanatics alike, and get along quietly with the
mass of his subjects as his father had done before him. Charles IX. was
eager to strike in if she would join him. Those who blame her so
severely for her refusal seem to forget that a French conquest of the
Netherlands would have been far more dangerous to this country than
their possession by Spain. To keep them out of French hands has indeed
been the traditional policy of England during the whole of modern
history.
But, it is said, such a war would have clinched the alliance recently
patched up between the French court and the Huguenots; there would have
been no Bartholomew Massacre; “on Elizabeth depended at that moment
whether the French Government would take its place once for all on the
side of the Reformation.”
Whether it would have been for the advantage of European progress in the
long-run that France should settle down into Calvinism, I will forbear
to inquire. Fortunately for the immediate interests of England,
Elizabeth understood the situation in France better than some of her
critics do, even with the results before their eyes. The Huguenots were
but a small fraction of the nation. Whatever importance they possessed
they derived from their rank, their turbulence, and the ambition of
their leaders. In a few towns of the south and south-west they formed a
majority of the population. But everywhere else they were mostly
noblemen, full of the arrogance and reckless valour of their class,
anything but puritans in their morals, and ready to destroy the unity of
the kingdom for political no less than for religious objects. They had
been losing ground for several years. The mass of the people abhorred
their doctrines, and protested against any concession to their
pretensions. Charles and his mother were absolutely careless about
religion. Their feud with the Guises and their designs on the
Netherlands had led them to invite the Huguenot chiefs to court, and so
to give them a momentary influence in shaping the policy of France. It
was with nothing more solid to lean on than this ricketty and
short-lived combination that Burghley and Walsingham were eager to
launch England into a war with the most powerful monarchy in Europe.
The massacre of St. Bartholomew (August 24) was a rude awakening from
these dreams. That thunder-clap did not show that, in signing the
treaty with England and in proposing an attack on Philip, the French
Government had been playing a treacherous game all along, in order to
lure the Huguenots to the shambles. But it did show that when the
Catholic sentiment in France was thoroughly roused, the dynasty itself
must bend before it or be swept away. England might help the Huguenots
to keep up a desultory and harassing civil war; she could no more enable
them to control the policy of the French nation and wield its force,
than she could at the present day restore the Bourbons or Bonapartes.
The first idea of Elizabeth and her ministers, on receiving the news of
the massacre, naturally was that the French Government had been playing
them false from the first, that the Catholic League for the extirpation
of heresy in Europe, which had been so much talked of since the Bayonne
interview in 1565, was after all a reality, and that England might
expect an attack from the combined forces of Spain and France. Thanks to
the prudent policy of Elizabeth, England was in a far better position to
meet all dangers than she had been in 1565. The fleet was brought round
to the Downs. The coast was guarded by militia. An expedition was
organised to co-operate with the Dutch insurgents. Money was sent to the
Prince of Orange. Huguenot refugees were allowed to fit out a flotilla
to assist their co-religionists in Rochelle. The Scotch Regent Mar was
informed, with great secrecy, that if he would demand the extradition of
Mary, and undertake to punish her capitally for her husband’s murder,
she should be given up to him.
A few weeks sufficed to show that there was no reason for panic.
Confidence, indeed, between the French and English Governments had been
severely shaken. Each stood suspiciously on its guard. But the alliance
was too well grounded in the interests of both parties to be lightly
cast aside. The French ambassador was instructed to excuse and deplore
the massacre as best he could, and to press on the Alençon marriage.
Elizabeth, dressed in deep mourning, gave him a stiff reception, but let
him see her desire to maintain the alliance. The massacre did not
restore the ascendancy of the Guises. To the Huguenots, as religious
reformers, it gave a blow from which they did not recover. But as a
political faction they were not crushed. Nay, their very weakness became
their salvation, since it compelled them to fall into the second rank
behind the _Politiques_, the true party of progress, who were before
long to find a victorious leader in Henry of Navarre.
Philip, for his part, was equally far from any thought of a crusade
against England. Sir Humphrey Gilbert, commanding several companies of
English volunteers, with the hardly concealed sanction of his
government, was fighting against the Spaniards in Walcheren and hanging
all his prisoners. Sir John Hawkins, with twenty ships, had sailed to
intercept the Mexican treasure fleet. Yet Alva, though gnashing his
teeth, was obliged to advise his master to swallow it all, and to be
thankful if he could get Elizabeth to re-open commercial intercourse,
which had been prohibited on both sides since the quarrel about the
Genoese treasure. A treaty for this purpose was in fact concluded early
in 1573. Thus the chief result of the Bartholomew Massacre, as far as
Elizabeth was concerned, was to show how strong her position was, and
that she had no need either to truckle to Catholics or let her hand be
forced by Protestants. A balance of power on the Continent was what
suited her, as it has generally suited this country. Let her critics say
what they will, it was no business of hers to organise a Protestant
league, and so drive the Catholic sovereigns to sink their mutual
jealousies and combine against the common enemy.
The Scotch Regent was quite ready to undertake the punishment of Mary,
but only on condition that Elizabeth would send the Earl of Bedford or
the Earl of Huntingdon with an army to be present at the execution and
to take Edinburgh Castle. It need hardly be said that there was also a
demand for money. Mar died during the negotiations, but they were
continued by his successor Morton. Elizabeth was determined to give no
open consent to Mary’s execution. She meant, no doubt, as soon as it
should be over, to protest, as she did fifteen years afterwards, that
there had been an unfortunate mistake, and to lay the blame of it on the
Scotch Government and her own agents. This part of the negotiation
therefore came to nothing. But money was sent to Morton, which enabled
him to establish a blockade of Edinburgh Castle, and by the mediation of
Elizabeth’s ambassador, the Hamiltons, Gordons, and all the other
Marians except those in the Castle, accepted the very favourable terms
offered them, and recognised James.
All that remained was to reduce the Castle. Its defenders numbered less
than two hundred men. The city and the surrounding country were--as far
as preaching and praying went--vehemently anti-Marian. The Regent had
now no other military task on his hands. Elizabeth might well complain
when she was told that unless she sent an army and paid the Scotch
Protestants to co-operate with it, the Castle could not be taken. For
some time she resisted this thoroughly Scotch demand. But at last she
yielded to Morton’s importunity. Sir William Drury marched in from
Berwick, did the job, and marched back again (May 1573). Among the
captives were the brilliant Maitland of Lethington, once the most active
of Anglophiles, and Kirkaldy of Grange, who had begun the Scottish
Reformation by the murder of Cardinal Beaton, and had taken Mary
prisoner at Carberry Hill. A politician who did not turn his coat at
least once in his life was a rare bird in Scotland. Maitland died a few
days after his capture, probably by his own hand. Kirkaldy was hanged by
his old friend Morton.
By taking Edinburgh Castle Elizabeth did not earn any gratitude from the
party who had called her in. What they wanted, and always would want,
was money. Morton himself, treading in the steps of his old leader
Moray, remained an unswerving Anglophile. But his coadjutors told the
English ambassador plainly that, if they could not get money from
England, they could and would earn it from France. Elizabeth’s
councillors were always teasing her to comply with these impudent
demands. If there had been a grown-up King on the throne, a man with a
will of his own, and whose right to govern could not be contested, it
might have been worth while to secure his good-will by a pension; and
this was what Elizabeth did when James became real ruler of the country.
But she did not believe in paying a clique of greedy lords to call
themselves the English party. An English party there was sure to be, if
only because there was a French party. Their services would be neither
greater nor smaller whether they were paid or unpaid. The French poured
money into Scotland, and were worse served than Elizabeth, who kept her
money in her treasury. It was no fault of Elizabeth if the conditions of
political life in Scotland during the King’s minority were such that a
firmly established government was in the nature of things impossible.
As Mary was kept in strict seclusion during the panic that followed on
the Bartholomew Massacre, she did not know how narrow was her escape
from a shameful death on a Scottish scaffold. When the panic subsided
she was allowed to resume her former manner of life as the honoured
guest of Lord Shrewsbury, with full opportunities for communication with
all her friends at home and abroad. Any alarm she had felt speedily
disappeared. If Elizabeth had for a moment contemplated striking at her
life or title by parliamentary procedure, that intention was evidently
abandoned when the Parliament of 1572 was prorogued without any such
measure becoming law. The public assumed, and rightly, that Elizabeth
still regarded the Scottish Queen as her successor. Peter Wentworth in
the next session (1576) asserted, and probably with truth, that many
who had been loud in their demands for severity repented of their
forwardness when they found that Mary might yet be their Queen, and
tried to make their peace with her. Wentworth’s outburst (for which he
was sent to the Tower) was the only demonstration against Mary in that
session. She told the Archbishop of Glasgow that her prospects had never
been better, and when opportunities for secret escape were offered her
she declined to use them, thinking that it was for her interest to
remain in England.
The desire of the English Queen to reinstate her rival arose principally
from an uneasy consciousness that, by detaining her in custody, she was
fatally impairing that religious respect for sovereigns which was the
main, if not the only, basis of their power. The scaffold of Fotheringay
was, in truth, the prelude to the scaffold of Whitehall. But as year
succeeded year, and Elizabeth became habituated to the situation which
had at first given her such qualms, she could not shut her eyes to the
fact that, troublesome and even dangerous as Mary’s presence in England
was, the trouble and the danger had been very much greater when she was
seated on the Scottish throne. The seething caldron of Scotch politics
had not, indeed, become a negligible quantity. It required watching. But
experience had shown that, while the King was a child, the Scots were
neither valuable as friends nor formidable as foes. This was a truth
quite as well understood at Paris and Madrid as at London, though the
French, no less keen in those days than they are now to maintain that
shadowy thing called “legitimate French influence” in countries with
which they had any historical connection, continued to intrigue and
waste their money among the hungry Scotch nobles. It was a fixed
principle with Elizabeth, as with all English statesmen, not to tolerate
the presence of foreign troops in Scotland. But she believed--and her
belief was justified by events--that a French expedition was not the
easy matter it had been when Mary of Guise was Regent of Scotland and
Mary Tudor Queen of England. And, more important still, in spite of much
treachery and distrust, the French and English Governments were bound
together by a treaty which was equally necessary to each of them.
Scotland, therefore, was no longer such a cause of anxiety to Elizabeth
as it had been during the first ten years of her reign. Her ministers
had neither her coolness nor her insight. Yet modern historians, proud
of having unearthed their croaking criticisms, ask us to judge
Elizabeth’s policy by prognostications which turned out to be false
rather than by the known results which so brilliantly justified it.
How to deal with the Netherlands was a much more complicated and
difficult problem. Here again Elizabeth’s ministers were for carrying
matters with a high hand. In their view, England was in constant danger
of a Spanish invasion, which could only be averted by openly and
vigorously supporting the revolted provinces. They would have had
Elizabeth place herself at the head of a Protestant league, and dare the
worst that Philip could do. She, on the other hand, believed that every
year war could be delayed was so much gained for England. There were
many ways in which she could aid the Netherlands without openly
challenging Philip. A curious theory of international relations
prevailed in those days--an English Prime Minister, by the way, found it
convenient not long ago to revive it--according to which, to carry on
warlike operations against another country was a very different thing
from going to war with that country. Of this theory Elizabeth largely
availed herself. English generals were not only allowed, but encouraged,
to raise regiments of volunteers to serve in the Low Countries. When
there, they reported to the English Government, and received
instructions from it with hardly a pretence of concealment. Money was
openly furnished to the Prince of Orange. English fleets--also nominally
of volunteers--were encouraged to prey on Spanish commerce, Elizabeth
herself subscribing to their outfit and sharing in the booty.
We are not to suppose, because the revolt of the Netherlands crippled
Philip for any attack on England, that Elizabeth welcomed it, or that
she contemplated the prolongation of the struggle with cold-blooded
satisfaction. Its immediate advantage to this country was obvious. But
Elizabeth had a sincere abhorrence of war and disorder. She was equally
provoked with Philip for persecuting the Dutch Protestants into
rebellion, and with the Dutch for insisting on religious concessions
which Philip could not be expected to grant, and which she herself was
not granting to Catholics in England. At any time during the struggle,
if Philip would have guaranteed liberty of conscience (as distinguished
from liberty of public worship), the restoration of the old charters,
and the removal of the Spanish troops, Elizabeth would not only have
withheld all help from the Dutch, but would have put pressure on them to
submit to Philip. The presence of Spanish veterans opposite the mouth of
the Thames was a standing menace to England. “As they are there,” argued
Burghley, “we must help the Dutch to keep them employed.” “If the Dutch
were not such impracticable fanatics,” rejoined Elizabeth, “the Spanish
veterans need not be there at all.”
The “Pacification of Ghent” (November 1576), by which the Belgian
Netherlands, for a short time, made common cause with Holland and
Zealand, relieved Elizabeth, for a time, from the necessity of taking
any decisive step. Philip was still recognised as sovereign, but he was
required to be content with such powers as the old constitution gave
him. It seemed likely that Catholic bigots would have to give up
persecuting, and Protestant bigots to acquiesce in the official
establishment of the old religion. This was precisely the settlement
Elizabeth had always desired. It would get rid of the Spanish troops. It
would keep out the French. It would relieve her from the necessity of
interfering. If it put some restriction on the open profession of
Calvinism she would not be sorry.
If this arrangement could have been carried out, would it in the
long-run have been for the benefit of Europe? Those who hold that the
conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism was simply a conflict
between truth and falsehood will, of course, have no difficulty in
giving their answer. Others may hold that freedom of conscience was all
that was needed at the time, and they may picture the many advantages
which Europe would have reaped during the last three centuries from the
existence of a united Netherlands, independent, as it must soon have
become, of Spain, and able to make its independence respected by its
neighbours.
Short-lived as the coalition was destined to be, it secured for the
Dutch a breathing-time when they were most sorely pressed, and enabled
Elizabeth to avoid quarrelling with Spain. The first step of the newly
allied States was to apply to her for assistance and a loan of money.
The loan they obtained--£40,000--a very large sum in those days. But she
earnestly advised them that if the new Governor, Don John of Austria,
would accept the Pacification, they should use the money to pay the
arrears of the Spanish troops; otherwise they would refuse to leave the
country for Don John or any one else. This was done. Don John had
treachery in his heart. But the departure of the Spaniards was a solid
gain; and if the Protestants and Catholics of the Netherlands had been
able to tolerate each other, they would have achieved the practical
independence of their country, and achieved it by their own unaided
efforts.
But Don John, the crusader, the victor of Lepanto, the half-brother of
Philip, was a man of soaring ambition. His dream was to invade England,
marry the Queen of Scots, and seat himself with her on the English
throne. It was in vain that Philip, who never wavered in his desire to
conciliate Elizabeth, and was jealous of his showy brother, had strictly
enjoined him to leave England alone. He persisted in his design, and
sent his confidant Escovedo to persuade Philip that to conquer the
Netherlands it was necessary to begin by conquering England.
For a pair of determined enemies, Elizabeth and Philip were just now
upon most amicable, not to say affectionate, terms. She knew well that
he had incited assassins to take her life, and that nothing would at any
time give him greater pleasure than to hear that one of them had
succeeded. But she bore him no malice for that. She took it all in the
way of business, and intended, for her part, to go on robbing and
damaging him in every way she could short of going to war. Philip bore
it all meekly. Alva himself insisted that he could not afford to quarrel
with her. Diplomatic relations by means of resident ambassadors, which
had been broken off by the expulsion of De Espes in 1571, were resumed;
and English heretics in the prisons of the Inquisition were released in
spite of the outcries of the Grand Inquisitor.
In the summer of 1577 it seemed as if Don John’s restless ambition would
interrupt this pacific policy which suited both monarchs. He had sent
for the Spanish troops again. He was known to be projecting an invasion
of England. He was said to have a promise of help from Guise.
Elizabeth’s ministers, as usual, believed that she was on the brink of
ruin, and implored her to send armies both to the Netherlands and to
France. But she refused to be hustled into any precipitate action, and
reasons soon appeared for maintaining an expectant attitude. The treaty
of Bergerac between Henry III. and Henry of Navarre (September 1577)
showed once more that the French King had no intention of letting the
Huguenots be crushed. The invitation of the Archduke Matthias by the
Belgian nobles showed that they were deeply jealous of English
interference. Here, surely, was matter for reflection. The most
Elizabeth could be got to do was to become security for a loan of
£100,000 to the States, on condition that Matthias should leave the real
direction of affairs to William of Orange, and to _promise_ armed
assistance (January 1578). At the same time she informed Philip that she
was obliged to do this for her own safety; that she had no desire to
contest his sovereignty of the Netherlands; on the contrary, she would
help him to maintain it if he would govern reasonably; but he ought to
remove Don John, who was her mortal enemy, and to appoint another
Governor of his own family; in other words, Matthias. Her policy could
not have been more candidly set forth, and Philip showed his disapproval
of Don John’s designs in a characteristic way--by causing Escovedo to be
assassinated. Don John himself died in the autumn, of a fever brought on
by disappointment, or, as some thought, of a complaint similar to
Escovedo’s (September 1578).
When Elizabeth feared that Don John’s scheme was countenanced by his
brother, she had risked an open rupture by promising to send an army to
the Netherlands. The murder of Escovedo and the arrival of the Spanish
ambassador Mendoza (March 1578) reassured her. Philip was evidently
pacific to the point of tameness. Instead, therefore, of sending an
English army, she preferred to pay John Casimir, the Count Palatine, to
lead a German army to the assistance of the States. As far as military
strength went, they were probably no losers by the change. But what they
wanted was to see Elizabeth committed to open war with Philip, and that
was just what she desired to avoid. Indirect and underhand blows she was
prepared to deal him, for she knew by experience that he would put up
with them. Thus in the preceding autumn she had despatched Drake on his
famous expedition to the South Pacific.
Don John was succeeded by his nephew, Alexander of Parma. The fine
prospects of the revolted provinces were now about to be dashed. In the
arts which smooth over difficulties and conciliate opposition, Parma had
few equals. He was a head and shoulders above all contemporary generals;
and no soldiers of that time were comparable to his Spanish and Italian
veterans. When he assumed the command, he was master of only a small
corner of the Low Countries. What he effected is represented by their
present division between Belgians and Dutch. The struggle in the
Netherlands continued, therefore, to be the principal object of
Elizabeth’s attention.
Shortly before the death of Don John, the Duke of Alençon,[3] brother
and heir-presumptive of Henry III. had been invited by the Belgian
nobles to become their Protector, and Orange, in his anxiety for union,
had accepted their nominee. Alençon was to furnish 12,000 French troops.
It was hoped and believed that, though Henry had ostensibly disapproved
of his brother’s action, he would in the end give him open support,
thus resuming the enterprise which had been interrupted six years before
by the Bartholomew Massacre.
Now, how was Elizabeth to deal with this new combination? The
Protectorship of Alençon might bring on annexation to France, the result
which most of all she wished to avoid. For a moment she thought of
offering her own protection (which Orange would have much preferred),
and an army equal to that promised by Alençon. But upon further
reflection, she determined to adhere to the policy of not throwing down
the glove to Philip, and to try whether she could not put Alençon in
harness, and make him do her work. One means of effecting this would be
to allow him subsidies--the means employed on such a vast scale by Pitt
in our wars with Napoleon. But Elizabeth intended to spend as little as
possible in this way. She relied chiefly on a revival of the marriage
comedy--now to be played positively for the last time; the lady being
forty-five, and her wooer twenty-four.
A dignified policy it certainly was not. All that was ridiculous and
repulsive in her coquetry with Henry had now to be repeated and outdone
with his younger brother. To overcome the incredulity which her previous
performances had produced, she was obliged to exaggerate her
protestations, to admit a personal courtship, to simulate amorous
emotion, and to go through a tender pantomime of kisses and caresses.
But Elizabeth never let dignity stand in the way of business. What to
most women would have been an insupportable humiliation did not cost her
a pang. She even found amusement in it. From the nature of the case,
she could not take one of her counsellors into her confidence. There was
no chance of imposing upon foreigners unless she could persuade those
about her that she was in earnest. They were amazed that she should run
the risk of establishing the French in the Netherlands. She had no
intention of doing so. When Philip should be brought so low as to be
willing to concede a constitutional government, she could always throw
her weight on his side and get rid of the French.
The match with Alençon had been proposed six years before. It had lately
slumbered. But there was no difficulty in whistling him back, and making
it appear that the renewed overture came from his side. After tedious
negotiations, protracted over twelve months, he at length paid his first
visit to Elizabeth (August 1579). He was an under-sized man with an
over-sized head, villainously ugly, with a face deeply seamed by
smallpox, a nose ending in a knob that made it look like two noses, and
a croaking voice. Elizabeth’s liking for big handsome men is well known.
But as she had not the least intention of marrying Alençon, it cost her
nothing to affirm that she was charmed with his appearance, and that he
was just the sort of man she could fancy for a husband. The only
agreeable thing about him was his conversation, in which he shone, so
that people who did not thoroughly know him always at first gave him
credit for more ability than he possessed. Elizabeth, who had a pet name
for all favourites, dubbed him her “frog”; and “Grenouille” he was fain
to subscribe himself in his love-letters. This first visit was a short
one, and he went away hopeful of success.
The English people could only judge by appearances, and for the first
time in her reign Elizabeth was unpopular. The Puritan Stubbs published
his _Discovery of a Gaping Gulf wherein England is like to be swallowed
by another French Marriage_. But the excitement was by no means confined
to the Puritans. Hatred of Frenchmen long remained a ruling sentiment
with most Englishmen. Elizabeth vented her rage on Stubbs, who had been
so rude as to tell her that childbirth at her age would endanger her
life. He was sentenced to have his hand cut off. “I remember,” says
Camden, “being then present, that Stubbs, after his right hand was cut
off, put off his hat with his left, and said with a loud voice, ‘God
save the Queen,’ The multitude standing about was deeply silent.”
Not long after Alençon’s visit, a treaty of marriage was signed
(November 1579), with a proviso that two months should be allowed for
the Queen’s subjects to become reconciled to it. If, at the end of that
time, Elizabeth did not ratify the treaty, it was to be null and void.
The appointed time came and went without ratification. Burghley, as
usual, predicted that the jilted suitor would become a deadly enemy, and
drew an alarming picture of the dangers that threatened England, with
the old exhortation to his mistress to form a Protestant league and
subsidise the Scotch Anglophiles. But in 1572 she had slipped out of the
Anjou marriage, and yet secured a French alliance. She confided in her
ability to play the same game now. Though she had not ratified the
marriage treaty, she continued to correspond with Alençon and keep up
his hopes, urging him at the same time to lead an army to the help of
the States. This, however, he was unwilling to do till he had secured
the marriage. The French King was ready, and even eager, to back his
brother. But he, too, insisted on the marriage, and that Elizabeth
should openly join him in war against Spain.
In the summer of 1580, Philip conquered Portugal, thus not only rounding
off his Peninsular realm, but acquiring the enormous transmarine
dominions of the Portuguese crown. All Europe was profoundly impressed
and alarmed by this apparent increase of his power. Elizabeth
incessantly lectured Henry on the necessity of abating a preponderance
so dangerous to all other States, and tried to convince him that it was
specially incumbent on France to undertake the enterprise. But she
preached in vain. Henry steadily refused to stir unless England would
openly assist him with troops and money, of which the marriage was to be
the pledge. He did not conceal his suspicion that, when Elizabeth had
pushed him into war, she would “draw her neck out of the collar” and
leave him to bear the whole danger.
This was, in fact, her intention. She believed that a war with France
would soon compel Philip to make proper concessions to the States;
whereupon she would interpose and dictate a peace. “Marry my brother,”
Henry kept saying, “and then I shall have security that you will bear
your fair share of the fighting and expenses.” “If I am to go to war,”
argued Elizabeth, “I cannot marry your brother; for my subjects will say
that I am dragged into it by my husband, and they will grudge the
expense. Suppose, instead of a marriage, we have an alliance not binding
me to open war; then I will furnish you with money _underhand_. You know
you have got to fight. You cannot afford to let Philip go on increasing
his power.”
Henry remained doggedly firm. No marriage, no war. At last, finding she
could not stir him, Elizabeth again concluded a treaty of marriage, but
with the extraordinary proviso that six weeks should be left for private
explanations by letter between herself and Alençon. It soon appeared
what this meant. In these six weeks Elizabeth furnished her suitor with
money, and incited him to make a sudden attack on Parma, who was then
besieging Cambray, close to the French frontier. Alençon, thinking
himself now sure of the marriage, collected 15,000 men; and Henry,
though not openly assisting him, no longer prohibited the enterprise.
But, as soon as Elizabeth thought they were sufficiently committed, she
gave them to understand that the marriage must be again deferred, that
her subjects were discontented, that she could only join in a defensive
alliance, but that she would furnish money “in reasonable sort”
_underhand_.
All this is very unscrupulous, very shameless, even for that shameless
age. Hardened liars like Henry and Alençon thought it too bad. _They_
were ready for violence as well as fraud, and availed themselves of
whichever method came handiest. Elizabeth also used the weapon which
nature had given her. Being constitutionally averse from any but
peaceful methods, she made up for it by a double dose of fraud. _Dente
lupus, cornu taurus._ It would have been useless for a male statesman to
try to pass himself off as a fickle impulsive, susceptible being, swayed
from one moment to another in his political schemes by passions and
weaknesses that are thought natural in the other sex. This was
Elizabeth’s advantage, and she made the most of it. She was a masculine
woman simulating, when it suited her purpose, a feminine character. The
men against whom she was matched were never sure whether they were
dealing with a crafty and determined politician, or a vain, flighty,
amorous woman. This uncertainty was constantly putting them out in their
calculations. Alençon would never have been so taken in if he had not
told himself that any folly might be expected from an elderly woman
enamoured of a young man.
On this occasion Elizabeth scored, if not the full success she had hoped
from her audacious mystification, yet no inconsiderable portion of it.
Henry managed to draw back just in time, and was not let in for a big
war. But Alençon, at the head of 15,000 men, and close to Cambray, could
not for very shame beat a retreat. Parma retired at his approach, and
the French army entered Cambray in triumph (August 1581). Alençon
therefore had been put in harness to some purpose.
Though Henry III. had good reason to complain of the way he had been
treated, he did not make it a quarrel with Elizabeth. His interests, as
she saw all along, were too closely bound up with hers to permit him to
think of such a thing. On the contrary, he renewed the alliance of 1572
in an ampler form, though it still remained strictly defensive.
Alençon, after relieving and victualling Cambray, disbanded his army,
and went over to England again to press for the marriage (Nov. 1581).
Thither he was followed by ambassadors from the States. By the advice of
Orange they had resolved to take him as their sovereign, and they were
now urgently pressing him to return to the Netherlands to be installed.
Elizabeth added her pressure; but he was unwilling to leave England
until he should have secured the marriage. For three months (Nov.
1581--Feb. 1582) did Elizabeth try every art to make him accept promise
for performance. She was thoroughly in her element. To win her game in
this way, not by the brutal arbitrament of war, or even by the ordinary
tricks of vicarious diplomacy, but by artifices personally executed,
feats of cajolery that might seem improbable on the stage,--this was
delightful in the highest degree. The more distrustful Alençon showed
himself, the keener was the pleasure of handling him. One day he is
hidden behind a curtain to view her elegant dancing; not, surely, that
he might be smitten with it, but that he might think she desired him to
be smitten. Another day she kisses him on the lips (_en la boca_) in the
presence of the French ambassador. She gives him a ring. She presents
him to her household as their future master. She orders the Bishop of
Lincoln to draw up a marriage service. It is a repulsive spectacle; but,
after all, we are not so much disgusted with the elderly woman who
pretends to be willing to marry the young man, as with the young man who
is really willing to marry the elderly woman. Unfortunately for
Elizabeth, her acting was so realistic that it not only took in
contemporaries, but has persuaded many modern writers that she was
really influenced by a degrading passion.
Henry III. himself was at last induced to believe that Elizabeth was
this time in earnest. But he could not be driven from his determination
to risk nothing till he saw the marriage actually concluded. Pinart, the
French Secretary of State, was accordingly sent over to settle the
terms. Elizabeth demanded one concession after another, and finally
asked for the restitution of Calais. There was no mistaking what this
meant. Pinart, in the King’s name, formally forbade Alençon to proceed
to the Netherlands except as a married man, and tried to intimidate
Elizabeth by threatening that his master would ally himself with Philip.
But she laughed at him, and told him that _she_ could have the Spanish
alliance whenever she chose, which was perfectly true. Alençon himself
gave way. He felt that he was being played with. He had come over here,
with a _fatuité_ not uncommon among young Frenchmen, expecting to bend a
love-sick Queen to serve his political designs. He found himself, to his
intense mortification, bent to serve hers. Ashamed to show his face in
France without either his Belgian dominions or his English wife, he was
fain to accept Elizabeth’s solemn promise that she would marry him as
soon as she could, and allowed himself to be shipped off under the
escort of an English fleet to the Netherlands (Feb. 1582).
According to Mr. Froude, “the Prince of Orange intimated that Alençon
was accepted by the States only as a pledge that England would support
them; if England failed them, they would not trust their fortunes to so
vain an idiot.” This statement appears to be drawn from the second-hand
tattle of Mendoza, and is probably, like much else from that source,
unworthy of credit. But whether Orange sent such an “intimation” or not,
it cannot be allowed to weigh against the ample evidence that Alençon
was accepted by him and by the States mainly for the sake of the French
forces he could raise on his own account, and the assistance which he
undertook to procure from his brother. Neither Orange nor any one else
regarded him as an idiot. Orange had not been led to expect that he
would bring any help from England except money supplied underhand; and
money Elizabeth did furnish in very considerable quantities. But the
Netherlanders now expected everything to be done for them, and were
backward with their contributions both in men and money. Clearly there
is something to be said for the let-alone policy to which Elizabeth
usually leant.
The States intended Alençon’s sovereignty to be of the strictly
constitutional kind, such as it had been before the encroachments of
Philip and his father. This did not suit the young Frenchman, and at the
beginning of 1583 he attempted a _coup-d’état_, not without
encouragement from some of the Belgian Catholics. At Antwerp his French
troops were defeated with great bloodshed by the citizens, and the
general voice of the country was for sending him about his business. But
both Elizabeth and Orange, though disconcerted and disgusted by his
treachery, still saw nothing better to be done than to patch up the
breach and retain his services. Both of them urged this course on the
States--Orange with his usual dignified frankness; Elizabeth in the
crooked, blustering fashion which has brought upon her policy, in so
many instances, reproach which it does not really deserve. Norris, the
commander of the English volunteers, had discountenanced the
_coup-d’état_ and taken his orders from the States. Openly Elizabeth
reprimanded him, and ordered him to bring his men back to England.
Secretly she told him he had done well, and bade him remain where he
was. Norris was in fact there to protect the interests of England quite
as much against the French as against Spain. There is not the least
ground for the assertion that in promoting reconciliation with Alençon,
Orange acted under pressure from Elizabeth. Everything goes to show that
he, the wisest and noblest statesman of his time, thought it the only
course open to the States, unless they were prepared to submit to
Philip. Both Elizabeth and Orange felt that the first necessity was to
keep the quarrel alive between the Frenchman and the Spaniard. The
English Queen therefore continued to feed Alençon with hopes of
marriage, and the States patched up a reconciliation with him (March
1583). But his heart failed him. He saw Parma taking town after town. He
knew that he had made himself odious to the Netherlanders. He was
covered with shame. He was fatally stricken with consumption. In June
1583 he left Belgium never to return. Within a twelvemonth he was dead.