[1] See also ALPACA, FELT, MOHAIR, SHODDY and WOOL.
[2] Col. Ind. Exhibition, 1886, _Miscellaneous Reports_.
FIBRIN, or FIBRINE, a protein formed by the action of the so-called
fibrin-ferment on fibrinogen, a constituent of the blood-plasma of all
vertebrates. This change takes place when blood leaves the arteries, and
the fibrin thus formed occasions the clotting which ensues (see BLOOD).
To obtain pure coagulated fibrin it is best to heat blood-plasma
(preferably that of the horse) to 56 deg. C. The usual method of beating
a blood-clot with twigs and removing the filamentous fibrin which
attaches itself to them yields a very impure product containing
haemoglobin and much globulin; moreover, it is very difficult to purify.
Fibrin is a very voluminous, tough, strongly elastic, jelly-like
substance; when denaturalized by heat, alcohol or salts, it behaves as
any other coagulated albumin.
FICHTE, IMMANUEL HERMANN (originally HARTMANN) VON (1797-1879), German
philosopher, son of J.G. Fichte, was born at Jena on the 18th of July
1797. Having held educational posts at Saarbrucken and Dusseldorf, in
1836 he became extraordinary professor of philosophy at Bonn, and in
1840 full professor. In 1842 he received a call to Tubingen, retired in
1867, and died at Stuttgart on the 8th of August 1879. The most
important of his comprehensive writings are: _System der Ethik_
(1850-1853), _Anthropologie_ (1856, 3rd ed. 1876), _Psychologie_
(1864-1873), _Die theistische Weltansicht_ (1873). In 1837 he had
founded the _Zeitschrift fur Philosophie_ as an organ of his views, more
especially on the subject of the philosophy of religion, where he was in
alliance with C.H. Weisse; but, whereas Weisse thought that the Hegelian
structure was sound in the main, and that its imperfections might be
mended, Fichte held it to be incurably defective, and spoke of it as a
"masterpiece of erroneous consistency or consistent error." Fichte's
general views on philosophy seem to have changed considerably as he
advanced in years, and his influence has been impaired by certain
inconsistencies and an appearance of eclecticism, which is strengthened
by his predominantly historical treatment of problems, his desire to
include divergent systems within his own, and his conciliatory tone. His
philosophy is an attempt to reconcile monism (Hegel) and individualism
(Herbart) by means of theism (Leibnitz). He attacks Hegelianism for its
pantheism, its lowering of human personality, and imperfect recognition
of the demands of the moral consciousness. God, he says, is to be
regarded not as an absolute but as an Infinite Person, whose nature it
is that he should realize himself in finite persons. These persons are
objects of God's love, and he arranges the world for their good. The
direct connecting link between God and man is the "genius," a higher
spiritual individuality existing in man by the side of his lower,
earthly individuality. Fichte, in short, advocates an ethical theism,
and his arguments might easily be turned to account by the apologist of
Christianity. In his conception of finite personality he recurs to
something like the monadism of Leibnitz. His insistence on moral
experience is connected with his insistence on personality. One of the
tests by which Fichte discriminates the value of previous systems is the
adequateness with which they interpret moral experience. The same reason
that made him depreciate Hegel made him praise Krause (panentheism) and
Schleiermacher, and speak respectfully of English philosophy. It is
characteristic of Fichte's almost excessive receptiveness that in his
latest published work, _Der neuere Spiritualismus_ (1878), he supports
his position by arguments of a somewhat occult or theosophical cast, not
unlike those adopted by F.W.H. Myers. He also edited the complete works
and literary correspondence of his father, including his life.
See R. Eucken, "Zur Erinnerung I. H. F.," in _Zeitschrift fur
Philosophie_, ex. (1897); C.C. Scherer, _Die Gotteslehre von I. H. F._
(1902); article by Karl Hartmann in _Allegemeine deutsche Biographie_
xlviii. (1904). Some of his works were translated by J.D. Morell under
the title of _Contributions to Mental Philosophy_ (1860).
FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB (1762-1814), German philosopher, was born at
Rammenau in Upper Lusatia on the 19th of May 1762. His father, a
ribbon-weaver, was a descendant of a Swedish soldier who (in the service
of Gustavus Adolphus) was left wounded at Rammenau and settled there.
The family was distinguished for piety, uprightness, and solidity of
character. With these qualities Fichte himself combined a certain
impetuosity and impatience probably derived from his mother, a woman of
a somewhat querulous and jealous disposition.
At a very early age the boy showed remarkable mental vigour and moral
independence. A fortunate accident which brought him under the notice of
a neighbouring nobleman, Freiherr von Miltitz, was the means of
procuring him a more excellent education than his father's circumstances
would have allowed. He was placed under the care of Pastor Krebel at
Niederau. After a short stay at Meissen he was entered at the celebrated
school at Pforta, near Naumburg. In 1780 he entered the university of
Jena as a student of theology. He supported himself mainly by private
teaching, and during the years 1784-1787 acted as tutor in various
families of Saxony. In 1787, after an unsuccessful application to the
consistory for pecuniary assistance, he seems to have been driven to
miscellaneous literary work. A tutorship at Zurich was, however,
obtained in the spring of 1788, and Fichte spent in Switzerland two of
the happiest years of his life. He made several valuable acquaintances,
among others Lavater and his brother-in-law Hartmann Rahn, to whose
daughter, Johanna Maria, he became engaged.
Settling at Leipzig, still without any fixed means of livelihood, he was
again reduced to literary drudgery. In the midst of this work occurred
the most important event of his life, his introduction to the philosophy
of Kant. At Schulpforta he had read with delight Lessing's _Anti-Goeze_,
and during his Jena days had studied the relation between philosophy and
religion. The outcome of his speculations, _Aphorismen uber Religion und
Deismus_ (unpublished, date 1790; _Werke_, i. 1-8), was a species of
Spinozistic determinism, regarded, however, as lying altogether outside
the boundary of religion. It is remarkable that even for a time fatalism
should have been predominant in his reasoning, for in character he was
opposed to such a view, and, as he has said, "according to the man, so
is the system of philosophy he adopts."
Fichte's _Letters_ of this period attest the influence exercised on him
by the study of Kant. It effected a revolution in his mode of thinking;
so completely did the Kantian doctrine of the inherent moral worth of
man harmonize with his own character, that his life becomes one effort
to perfect a true philosophy, and to make its principles practical
maxims. At first he seems to have thought that the best method for
accomplishing his object would be to expound Kantianism in a popular,
intelligible form. He rightly felt that the reception of Kant's
doctrines was impeded by their phraseology. An abridgment of the _Kritik
der Urtheilskraft_ was begun, but was left unfinished.
Fichte's circumstances had not improved. It had been arranged that he
should return to Zurich and be married to Johanna Rahn, but the plan was
overthrown by a commercial disaster which affected the fortunes of the
Rahn family. Fichte accepted a post as private tutor in Warsaw, and
proceeded on foot to that town. The situation proved unsuitable; the
lady, as Kuno Fischer says, "required greater submission and better
French" than Fichte could yield, and after a fortnight's stay Fichte set
out for Konigsberg to see Kant. His first interview was disappointing;
the coldness and formality of the aged philosopher checked the
enthusiasm of the young disciple, though it did not diminish his
reverence. He resolved to bring himself before Kant's notice by
submitting to him a work in which the principles of the Kantian
philosophy should be applied. Such was the origin of the work, written
in four weeks, the _Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung_ (Essay
towards a Critique of all Revelation). The problem which Fichte dealt
with in this essay was one not yet handled by Kant himself, the
relations of which to the critical philosophy furnished matter for
surmise. Indirectly, indeed, Kant had indicated a very definite opinion
on theology: from the _Critique of Pure Reason_ it was clear that for
him speculative theology must be purely negative, while the _Critique of
Practical Reason_ as clearly indicated the view that the moral law is
the absolute content or substance of any religion. A _critical_
investigation of the conditions under which religious belief was
possible was still wanting. Fichte sent his essay to Kant, who approved
it highly, extended to the author a warm reception, and exerted his
influence to procure a publisher. After some delay, consequent on the
scruples of the theological censor of Halle, who did not like to see
miracles rejected, the book appeared (Easter, 1792). By an oversight
Fichte's name did not appear on the title-page, nor was the preface
given, in which the author spoke of himself as a beginner in philosophy.
Outsiders, not unnaturally, ascribed the work to Kant. The _Allgemeine
Literatur-Zeitung_ went so far as to say that no one who had read a line
of Kant's writings could fail to recognize the eminent author of this
new work. Kant himself corrected the mistake, at the same time highly
commending the work. Fichte's reputation was thus secured at a stroke.
The _Critique of Revelation_ marks the culminating point of Fichte's
Kantian period. The exposition of the conditions under which revealed
religion is possible turns upon the absolute requirements of the moral
law in human nature. Religion itself is the belief in this moral law as
divine, and such belief is a practical postulate, necessary in order to
add force to the law. It follows that no revealed religion, so far as
matter or substance is concerned, can contain anything beyond this law;
nor can any fact in the world of experience be recognized by us as
supernatural. The supernatural element in religion can only be the
divine character of the moral law. Now, the revelation of this divine
character of morality is possible only to a being in whom the lower
impulses have been, or are, successful in overcoming reverence for the
law. In such a case it is conceivable that a revelation might be given
in order to add strength to the moral law. Religion ultimately then
rests upon the practical reason, and expresses some demand or want of
the pure ego. In this conclusion we can trace the prominence assigned by
Fichte to the practical element, and the tendency to make the
requirements of the ego the ground for all judgment on reality. It was
not possible that having reached this point he should not press forward
and leave the Kantian position.
This success was coincident with an improvement in the fortunes of the
Rahn family, and the marriage took place at Zurich in October 1793. The
remainder of the year he spent at Zurich, slowly perfecting his thoughts
on the fundamental problems left for solution in the Kantian philosophy.
During this period he published anonymously two remarkable political
works, _Zuruckforderung der Denkfreiheit von den Fursten Europas_ and
_Beitrage zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums uber die
franzosische Revolution_. Of these the latter is much the more
important. The French Revolution seemed to many earnest thinkers the one
great outcry of modern times for the liberty of thought and action which
is the eternal heritage of every human being. Unfortunately the
political condition of Germany was unfavourable to the formation of an
unbiassed opinion on the great movement. The principles involved in it
were lost sight of under the mass of spurious maxims on social order
which had slowly grown up and stiffened into system. To direct attention
to the true nature of revolution, to demonstrate how inextricably the
right of liberty is interwoven with the very existence of man as an
intelligent agent, to point out the inherent progressiveness of state
arrangements, and the consequent necessity of reform or amendment, such
are the main objects of the _Beitrage_; and although, as is often the
case with Fichte, the arguments are too formal and the distinctions too
wire-drawn, yet the general idea is nobly conceived and carried out. As
in the _Critique of Revelation_ so here the rational nature of man and
the conditions necessary for its manifestation or realization become the
standard for critical judgment.
Towards the close of 1793 Fichte received an invitation to succeed K.L.
Reinhold as extraordinary professor of philosophy at Jena. This chair,
not in the ordinary faculty, had become, through Reinhold, the most
important in the university, and great deliberation was exercised in
selecting his successor. It was desired to secure an exponent of
Kantianism, and none seemed so highly qualified as the author of the
_Critique of Revelation_. Fichte, while accepting the call, desired to
spend a year in preparation; but as this was deemed inexpedient he
rapidly drew out for his students an introductory outline of his system,
and began his lectures in May 1794. His success was instantaneous and
complete. The fame of his predecessor was altogether eclipsed. Much of
this success was due to Fichte's rare power as a lecturer. In oral
exposition the vigour of thought and moral intensity of the man were
most of all apparent, while his practical earnestness completely
captivated his hearers. He lectured not only to his own class, but on
general moral subjects to all students of the university. These general
addresses, published under the title _Bestimmung des Gelehrten_
(Vocation of the Scholar), were on a subject dear to Fichte's heart, the
supreme importance of the highest intellectual culture and the duties
incumbent on those who had received it. Their tone is stimulating and
lofty.
The years spent at Jena were unusually productive; indeed, the completed
Fichtean philosophy is contained in the writings of this period. A
general introduction to the system is given in the tractate _Uber den
Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre_ (On the Notion of the Theory of
Science), 1794, and the theoretical portion is worked out in the
_Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre_ (Foundation of the whole
Theory of Science, 1794) and _Grundriss des Eigenthumlichen d.
Wissenschaftslehre_ (Outline of what is peculiar in the Theory of
Science, 1794). To these were added in 1797 a _First_ and a _Second
Introduction to the Theory of Science_, and an _Essay towards a new
Exposition of the Theory of Science_. The _Introductions_ are masterly
expositions. The practical philosophy was given in the _Grundlage des
Naturrechts_ (1796) and _System der Sittenlehre_ (1798). The last is
probably the most important of all Fichte's works; apart from it, his
theoretical philosophy is unintelligible.
During this period Fichte's academic career had been troubled by various
storms, the last so violent as to put a close to his professorate at
Jena. The first of them, a complaint against the delivery of his general
addresses on Sundays, was easily settled. The second, arising from
Fichte's strong desire to suppress the _Landsmannschaften_ (students'
orders), which were productive of much harm, was more serious. Some
misunderstanding caused an outburst of ignorant ill-feeling on the part
of the students, who proceeded to such lengths that Fichte was compelled
to reside out of Jena. The third storm, however, was the most violent.
In 1798 Fichte, who, with F.I. Niethammer (1766-1848), had edited the
_Philosophical Journal_ since 1795, received from his friend F.K.
Forberg (1770-1848) an essay on the "Development of the Idea of
Religion." With much of the essay he entirely agreed, but he thought the
exposition in so many ways defective and calculated to create an
erroneous impression, that he prefaced it with a short paper _On the
Grounds of our Belief in a Divine Government of the Universe_, in which
God is defined as the moral order of the universe, the eternal law of
right which is the foundation of all our being. The cry of atheism was
raised, and the electoral government of Saxony, followed by all the
German states except Prussia, suppressed the _Journal_ and confiscated
the copies found in their universities. Pressure was put by the German
powers on Charles Augustus, grand-duke of Saxe-Weimar, in whose
dominions Jena university was situated, to reprove and dismiss the
offenders. Fichte's defences (_Appellation an das Publicum gegen die
Anklage des Atheismus_, and _Gerichtliche Verantwortung der Herausgeber
der phil. Zeitschrift_, 1799), though masterly, did not make it easier
for the liberal-minded grand-duke to pass the matter over, and an
unfortunate letter, in which he threatened to resign in case of
reprimand, turned the scale against him. The grand-duke accepted his
threat as a request to resign, passed censure, and extended to him
permission to withdraw from his chair at Jena; nor would he alter his
decision, even though Fichte himself endeavoured to explain away the
unfortunate letter.
Berlin was the only town in Germany open to him. His residence there
from 1799 to 1806 was unbroken save for a course of lectures during the
summer of 1805 at Erlangen, where he had been named professor.
Surrounded by friends, including Schlegel and Schleiermacher, he
continued his literary work, perfecting the _Wissenschaftslehre_. The
most remarkable of the works from this period are--(1) the _Bestimmung
des Menschen_ (Vocation of Man, 1800), a book which, for beauty of
style, richness of content, and elevation of thought, may be ranked with
the Meditations of Descartes; (2) _Der geschlossene Handelsstaat_, 1800
(The Exclusive or Isolated Commercial State), a very remarkable
treatise, intensely socialist in tone, and inculcating organized
protection; (3) _Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grossere Publicum uber die
neueste Philosophie_, 1801. In 1801 was also written the _Darstellung
der Wissenschaftslehre_, which was not published till after his death.
In 1804 a set of lectures on the _Wissenschaftslehre_ was given at
Berlin, the notes of which were published in the _Nachgelassene Werke_,
vol. ii. In 1804 were also delivered the noble lectures entitled
_Grundzuge des gegenwartigen Zeitalters_ (Characteristics of the Present
Age, 1804), containing a most admirable analysis of the _Aufklarung_,
tracing the position of such a movement of thought in the natural
evolution of the general human consciousness, pointing out its inherent
defects, and indicating as the ultimate goal of progress the life of
reason in its highest aspect as a belief in the divine order of the
universe. The philosophy of history sketched in this work has something
of value with much that is fantastic. In 1805 and 1806 appeared the
_Wesen des Gelehrten_ (Nature of the Scholar) and the _Anweisung zum
seligen Leben oder Religionslehre_ (Way to a Blessed Life), the latter
the most important work of this Berlin period. In it the union between
the finite self-consciousness and the infinite ego or God is handled in
an almost mystical manner. The knowledge and love of God is the end of
life; by this means only can we attain blessedness (_Seligkeit_), for in
God alone have we a permanent, enduring object of desire. The infinite
God is the all; the world of independent objects is the result of
reflection or self-consciousness, by which the infinite unity is broken
up. God is thus over and above the distinction of subject and object;
our knowledge is but a reflex or picture of the infinite essence. Being
is not thought.
The disasters of Prussia in 1806 drove Fichte from Berlin. He retired
first to Stargard, then to Konigsberg (where he lectured for a time),
then to Copenhagen, whence he returned to the capital in August 1807.
From this time his published writings are practical in character; not
till after the appearance of the _Nachgelassene Werke_ was it known in
what shape his final speculations had been thrown out. We may here note
the order of these posthumous writings as being of importance for
tracing the development of Fichte's thought. From the year 1806 we have
the remarkable _Bericht uber die Wissenschaftslehre_ (_Werke_, vol.
viii.), with its sharp critique of Schelling; from 1810 we have the
_Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns_, published in 1817, of which another
treatment is given in lectures of 1813 (_Nachgel. Werke_, vol. i.). Of
the _Wissenschaftslehre_ we have, in 1812-1813, four separate treatments
contained in the _Nachgel Werke_. As these consist mainly of notes for
lectures, couched in uncouth phraseology, they cannot be held to throw
much light on Fichte's views. Perhaps the most interesting are the
lectures of 1812 on _Transcendental Logic_ (_Nach. Werke_, i. 106-400).
From 1812 we have notes of two courses on practical philosophy,
_Rechtslehre_ (_Nach. Werke_, vol. ii.) and _Sittenlehre_ (_ib._ vol.
iii.). A finished work in the same department is the _Staatslehre_,
published in 1820. This gives the Fichtean utopia organized on
principles of pure reason; in too many cases the proposals are identical
with principles of pure despotism.
During these years, however, Fichte was mainly occupied with public
affairs. In 1807 he drew up an elaborate and minute plan for the
proposed new university of Berlin. In 1507-1808 he delivered at Berlin,
amidst danger and discouragement, his noble addresses to the German
people (_Reden an die deutsche Nation_). Even if we think that in these
pure reason is sometimes overshadowed by patriotism, we cannot but
recognize the immense practical value of what he recommended as the only
true foundation for national prosperity.
In 1810 he was elected rector of the new university founded in the
previous year. This post he resigned in 1812, mainly on account of the
difficulties he experienced in his endeavour to reform the student life
of the university.
In 1813 began the great effort of Germany for national independence.
Debarred from taking an active part, Fichte made his contribution by way
of lectures. The addresses on the idea of a true war (_Uber den Begriff
eines wahrhaften Kriegs_, forming part of the _Staatslehre_) contain a
very subtle contrast between the positions of France and Germany in the
war.
In the autumn of 1813 the hospitals of Berlin were filled with sick and
wounded from the campaign. Among the most devoted in her exertions was
Fichte's wife, who, in January 1814, was attacked with a virulent
hospital fever. On the day after she was pronounced out of danger Fichte
was struck down. He lingered for some days in an almost unconscious
state, and died on the 27th of January 1814.
The philosophy of Fichte, worked out in a series of writings, and
falling chronologically into two distinct periods, that of Jena and
that of Berlin, seemed in the course of its development to undergo a
change so fundamental that many critics have sharply separated and
opposed to one another an earlier and a later phase. The ground of the
modification, further, has been sought and apparently found in quite
external influences, principally that of Schelling's
_Naturphilosophie_, to some extent that of Schleiermacher. But as a
rule most of those who have adopted this view have done so without the
full and patient examination which the matter demands; they have been
misled by the difference in tone and style between the earlier and
later writings, and have concluded that underlying this was a
fundamental difference of philosophic conception. One only, Erdmann,
in his _Entwicklung d. deut. Spek. seit Kant_, S 29, seems to give
full references to justify his opinion, and even he, in his later
work, _Grundriss der Gesch. der Philos._ (ed. 3), S 311, admits that
the difference is much less than he had at the first imagined. He
certainly retains his former opinion, but mainly on the ground, in
itself intelligible and legitimate, that, so far as Fichte's
philosophical reputation and influence are concerned, attention may be
limited to the earlier doctrines of the _Wissenschaftslehre_. This may
be so, but it can be admitted neither that Fichte's views underwent
radical change, nor that the _Wissenschaftslehre_ was ever regarded as
in itself complete, nor that Fichte was unconscious of the apparent
difference between his earlier and later utterances. It is
demonstrable by various passages in the works and letters that he
never looked upon the _Wissenschaftslehre_ as containing the whole
system; it is clear from the chronology of his writings that the
modifications supposed to be due to other thinkers were from the first
implicit in his theory; and if one fairly traces the course of thought
in the early writings, one can see how he was inevitably led on to the
statement of the later and, at first sight, divergent views. On only
one point, the position assigned in the _Wissenschaftslehre_ to the
absolute ego, is there any obscurity; but the relative passages are
far from decisive, and from the early work, _Neue Darstellung der
Wissenchaftslehre_, unquestionably to be included in the Jena period,
one can see that from the outset the doctrine of the absolute ego was
held in a form differing only in statement from the later theory.
Fichte's system cannot be compressed with intelligibility. We shall
here note only three points:--(a) the origin in Kant; (b) the
fundamental principle and method of the _Wissenschaftslehre_; (c) the
connexion with the later writings. The most important works for (a)
are the "Review of Aenesidemus," and the _Second Introduction to the
Wissenschaftslehre_; for (b) the great treatises of the Jena period;
for (c) the _Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns_ of 1810.
(a) The Kantian system had for the first time opened up a truly
fruitful line of philosophic speculation, the transcendental
consideration of knowledge, or the analysis of the conditions under
which cognition is possible. To Kant the fundamental condition was
given in the synthetical unity of consciousness. The primitive fact
under which might be gathered the special conditions of that synthesis
which we call cognition was this unity. But by Kant there was no
attempt made to show that the said special conditions were necessary
from the very nature of consciousness itself. Their necessity was
discovered and proved in a manner which might be called empirical.
Moreover, while Kant in a quite similar manner pointed out that
intuition had special conditions, space and time, he did not show any
link of connexion between these and the primitive conditions of pure
cognition. Closely connected with this remarkable defect in the
Kantian view--lying, indeed, at the foundation of it--was the doctrine
that the matter of cognition is altogether _given_, or thrown into the
_form_ of cognition from without. So strongly was this doctrine
emphasized by Kant, that he seemed to refer the _matter_ of knowledge
to the action upon us of a non-ego or _Ding-an-sich_, absolutely
beyond consciousness. While these hints towards a completely
intelligible account of cognition were given by Kant, they were not
reduced to system, and from the way in which the elements of cognition
were related, could not be so reduced. Only in the sphere of practical
reason, where the intelligible nature prescribed to itself its own
laws, was there the possibility of systematic deduction from a single
principle.
The peculiar position in which Kant had left the theory of cognition
was assailed from many different sides and by many writers, specially
by Schultze (Aenesidemus) and Maimon. To the criticisms of the latter,
in particular, Fichte owed much, but his own activity went far beyond
what they supplied to him. To complete Kant's work, to demonstrate
that all the necessary conditions of knowledge can be deduced from a
single principle, and consequently to expound the complete system of
reason, that is the business of the _Wissenschaftslehre_. By it the
theoretical and practical reason shall be shown to coincide; for while
the categories of cognition and the whole system of pure thought can
be expounded from one principle, the ground of this principle is
scientifically, or to cognition, inexplicable, and is made conceivable
only in the practical philosophy. The ultimate basis for the activity
of cognition is given by the will. Even in the practical sphere,
however, Fichte found that the contradiction, insoluble to cognition,
was not completely suppressed, and he was thus driven to the higher
view, which is explicitly stated in the later writings though not, it
must be confessed, with the precision and scientific clearness of the
_Wissenschaftslehre_.
(b) What, then, is this single principle, and how does it work itself
out into system? To answer this one must bear in mind what Fichte
intended by designating all philosophy _Wissenschaftslehre_, or theory
of science. Philosophy is to him the rethinking of actual cognition,
the _theory_ of knowledge, the complete, systematic exposition of the
principles which lie at the basis of all reasoned cognition. It
traces the necessary acts by which the cognitive consciousness comes
to be what it is, both in form and in content. Not that it is a
natural history, or even a _phenomenology_ of consciousness; only in
the later writings did Fichte adopt even the genetic method of
exposition; it is the complete statement of the pure principles of the
understanding in their rational or necessary order. But if complete,
this _Wissenschaftslehre_ must be able to deduce the whole organism of
cognition from certain fundamental axioms, themselves unproved and
incapable of proof; only thus can we have a _system_ of reason. From
these primary axioms the whole body of necessary thoughts must be
developed, and, as Socrates would say, the argument itself will
indicate the path of the development.
Of such primitive principles, the absolutely necessary conditions of
possible cognition, only three are thinkable--one perfectly
unconditioned both in form and matter; a second, unconditioned in form
but not in matter; a third, unconditioned in matter but not in form.
Of these, evidently the first must be the fundamental; to some extent
it conditions the other two, though these cannot be deduced from it or
proved by it. The statement of these principles forms the introduction
to _Wissenschaftslehre_.
The method which Fichte first adopted for stating these axioms is not
calculated to throw full light upon them, and tends to exaggerate the
apparent airiness and unsubstantiality of his deduction. They may be
explained thus. The primitive condition of all intelligence is that
the ego shall posit, affirm or be aware of itself. The ego is the ego;
such is the first pure act of conscious intelligence, that by which
alone consciousness can come to be what it is. It is what Fichte
called a Deed-act (_Thathandlung_); we cannot be aware of the
process,--the ego _is_ not until it has affirmed itself,--but we are
aware of the result, and can see the necessity of the act by which it
is brought about. The ego then posits itself, as real. What the ego
posits is real. But in consciousness there is equally given a
primitive act of op-positing, or contra-positing, formally distinct
from the act of position, but materially determined, in so far as what
is op-posited must be the negative of that which was posited. The
non-ego--not, be it noticed, the world as we know it--is op-posed in
consciousness to the ego. The ego is not the non-ego. How this act of
op-positing is possible and necessary, only becomes clear in the
practical philosophy, and even there the inherent difficulty leads to
a higher view. But third, we have now an absolute antithesis to our
original thesis. Only the ego is real, but the non-ego is posited in
the ego. The contradiction is solved in a higher synthesis, which
takes up into itself the two opposites. The ego and non-ego _limit_
one another, or determine one another; and, as limitation is negation
of part of a divisible quantum, in this third act, the divisible ego
is op-posed to a divisible non-ego.
From this point onwards the course proceeds by the method already made
clear. We progress by making explicit the oppositions contained in the
fundamental synthesis, by uniting these opposites, analysing the new
synthesis, and so on, until we reach an ultimate pair. Now, in the
synthesis of the third act two principles may be distinguished:--(1)
the non-ego determines the ego; (2) the ego determines the non-ego. As
determined the ego is theoretical, as determining it is practical;
ultimately the opposed principles must be united by showing how the
ego is both determining and determined.
It is impossible to enter here on the steps by which the theoretical
ego is shown to develop into the complete system of cognitive
categories, or to trace the deduction of the processes (productive
imagination, intuition, sensation, understanding, judgment, reason) by
which the quite indefinite non-ego comes to assume the appearance of
definite objects in the forms of time and space. All this evolution is
the necessary consequence of the determination of the ego by the
non-ego. But it is clear that the non-ego cannot really determine the
ego. There is no reality beyond the ego itself. The contradiction can
only be suppressed if the ego itself opposes to itself the non-ego,
places it as an _Anstoss_ or plane on which its own activity breaks
and from which it is reflected. Now, this op-positing of the _Anstoss_
is the necessary condition of the practical ego, of the will. If the
ego be a striving power, then of necessity a limit must be set by
which its striving is manifest. But how can the infinitely active ego
posit a limit to its own activity? Here we come to the _crux_ of
Fichte's system, which is only partly cleared up in the _Rechtslehre_
and _Sittenlehre_. If the ego be pure activity, free activity, it can
only become aware of itself by positing some limit. We cannot possibly
have any cognition of how such an act is possible. But as it is a free
act, the ego cannot be determined to it by anything beyond itself; it
cannot be aware of its own freedom otherwise than as determined by
other free egos. Thus in the _Rechtslehre_ and _Sittenlehre_, the
multiplicity of egos is deduced, and with this deduction the first
form of the _Wissenschaftslehre_ appeared to end.
(c) But in fact deeper questions remained. We have spoken of the ego
as becoming aware of its own freedom, and have shown how the existence
of other egos and of a world in which these egos may act are the
necessary conditions of consciousness of freedom. But all this is the
work of the ego. All that has been expounded follows if the ego comes
to consciousness. We have therefore to consider that the absolute ego,
from which spring all the individual egos, is not subject to these
conditions, but freely determines itself to them. How is this
absolute ego to be conceived? As early as 1797 Fichte had begun to see
that the ultimate basis of his system was the absolute ego, in which
is no difference of subject and object; in 1800 the _Bestimmung des
Menschen_ defined this absolute ego as the infinite moral will of the
universe, God, in whom are all the individual egos, from whom they
have sprung. It lay in the nature of the thing that more precise
utterances should be given on this subject, and these we find in the
_Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns_ and in all the later lectures. God in
them is the absolute Life, the absolute One, who becomes conscious of
himself by self-diremption into the individual egos. The individual
ego is only possible as opposed to a non-ego, to a world of the
senses; thus God, the infinite will, manifests himself in the
individual, and the individual has over against him the non-ego or
thing. "The individuals do not make part of the being of the one life,
but are a pure form of its absolute freedom." "The individual is not
conscious of himself, but the Life is conscious of itself in
individual form and as an individual." In order that the Life may act,
though it is not necessary that it _should act_, individualization is
necessary. "Thus," says Fichte, "we reach a final conclusion.
Knowledge is not mere knowledge of itself, but of being, and of the
one being that truly is, viz. God.... This one possible object of
knowledge is never known in its purity, but ever broken into the
various forms of knowledge which are and can be shown to be necessary.
The demonstration of the necessity of these forms is philosophy or
_Wissenschaftslehre_" (_Thats. des Bewuss. Werke_, ii. 685). This
ultimate view is expressed throughout the lectures (in the _Nachgel.
Werke_) in uncouth and mystical language.
It will escape no one (1) how the idea and method of the
_Wissenschaftslehre_ prepare the way for the later Hegelian dialectic,
and (2) how completely the whole philosophy of Schopenhauer is
contained in the later writings of Fichte. It is not to the credit of
historians that Schopenhauer's debt should have been allowed to pass
with so little notice.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.--Fichte's complete works were published by his son J.H.
Fichte, _Sammtliche Werke_ (8 vols., Berlin, 1845-1846), with
_Nachgelassene Werke_ (3 vols., Bonn, 1834-1835); also _Leben und
Briefwechsel_ (2 vols., 1830, ed. 1862). Among translations are those
of William Smith, _Popular Writings of Fichte, with Memoir_ (2 vols.,
London, 1848-1849, 4th ed. 1889); A.E. Kroeger, portions of the
_Wissenschaftslehre_ (_Science of Knowledge_, Philadelphia, 1868; ed.
London, 1889), the _Naturrecht_ (_Science of Rights_, 1870; ed.
London, 1889); of the _Vorlesungen u. d. Bestimmung d. Gelehrten_
(_The Vocation of the Scholar_, by W. Smith, 1847); _Destination of
Man_, by Mrs P. Sinnett; _Discours a la nation allemande_, French by
Leon Philippe (1895), with preface by F. Picavet, and a biographical
memoir.
The number of critical works is very large. Besides the histories of
post-Kantian philosophy by Erdmann, Fortlage (whose account is
remarkably good), Michelet, Biedermann and others, see Wm. Busse,
_Fichte und seine Beziehung zur Gegenwart des deutschen Volkes_
(Halle, 1848-1849); J.H. Lowe, _Die Philosophic Fichtes_ (Stuttgart,
1862); Kuno Fischer, _Geschichte d. neueren Philosophie_ (1869, 1884,
1890); Ludwig Noack, _Fichte nach seinem Leben, Lehren und Wirken_
(Leipzig, 1862); R. Adamson, Fichte (1881, in Knight's "Philosophical
Classics"); Oscar Benzow, _Zu Fichtes Lekre von Nicht-Ich_ (Bern,
1898); E.O. Burmann, _Die Transcendentalphilosophie Fichtes und
Schellings_ (Upsala, 1890-1892); M. Carriere, _Fichtes
Geistesentwickelung in die Reden uber d. Bestimmung des Gelehrten_
(1894); C.C. Everett, _Fichte's Science of Knowledge_ (Chicago, 1884);
O. Pfleiderer, J.G. _Fichtes Lebensbild eines deutschen Denkers und
Patrioten_ (Stuttgart, 1877); T. Wotschke, _Fichte und Erigena_
(1896); W. Kabitz, _Studien zur Entwickelungsgeschichte der Fichtehen
Wissenschaftslehre aus der Kantischen Philosophie_ (1902); E. Lask,
_Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte_ (1902); X. Leon, _La Philos.
de Fichte_ (1902); M. Wiener, J.G. _Fichtes Lehre vom Wesen und Inhalt
der Geschichte_ (1906).
On Fichte's social philosophy see, e.g., F. Schmidt-Warneck, _Die
Sociologie Fichtes_ (Berlin, 1884); W. Windelband, _Fichtes Idee des
deutschen Staates_ (1890); M. Weber, _Fichtes Sozialismus und sein
Verhaltnis zur Marx'schen Doctrin_ (1900); S.H. Gutman, J.G. _Fichtes
Sozialpadogogik_ (1907); H. Lindau, _Johann G. Fichte und der neuere
Socialismus_ (1900). (R. Ad.; X.)
FICHTELGEBIRGE, a mountain group of Bavaria, forming the centre from which
various mountain ranges proceed,--the Elstergebirge, linking it to the
Erzgebirge, in a N.E., the Frankenwald in a N.W., and the Bohmerwald in a
S.E. direction. The streams to which it gives rise flow towards the four
cardinal points,--e.g. the Eger eastward and the Saale northward, both to
the Elbe; the Weisser Main westward to the Rhine, and the Naab southward
to the Danube. The chief points of the mass are the Schneeberg and the
Ochsenkopf, the former having a height of 3448, and the latter of 3356 ft.
The whole district is pretty thickly populated, and there is great
abundance of wood, as well as of iron, vitriol, sulphur, copper, lead and
many kinds of marble. The inhabitants are employed chiefly in the iron
mines, at forges and blast furnaces, and in charcoal burning and the
manufacture of blacking from firewood. Although surrounded by railways and
crossed by the lines Nuremberg-Eger and Regensburg-Oberkotzau, the
Fichtelgebirge, owing principally to its raw climate and bleakness, is not
much visited by strangers, the only important points of interest being
Alexandersbad (a delightfully situated watering-place) and the granite
labyrinth of Luisenburg.
See A. Schmidt, _Fuhrer durch das Fichtelgebirge_ (1899); Daniel,
_Deutschland_; and Meyer, _Conversations-Lexikon_ (1904).
FICINO, MARSILIO (1433-1499), Italian philosopher and writer, was born
at Figline, in the upper Arno valley, in the year 1433. His father, a
physician of some eminence, settled in Florence, and attached himself to
the person of Cosimo de' Medici. Here the young Marsilio received his
elementary education in grammar and Latin literature at the high school
or studio pubblico. While still a boy, he showed promise of rare
literary gifts, and distinguished himself by his facility in the
acquisition of knowledge. Not only literature, but the physical
sciences, as then taught, had a charm for him; and he is said to have
made considerable progress in medicine under the tuition of his father.
He was of a tranquil temperament, sensitive to music and poetry, and
debarred by weak health from joining in the more active pleasures of his
fellow-students. When he had attained the age of eighteen or nineteen
years, Cosimo received him into his household, and determined to make
use of his rare disposition for scholarship in the development of a
long-cherished project. During the session of the council for the union
of the Greek and Latin churches at Florence in 1439, Cosimo had made
acquaintance with Gemistos Plethon, the Neo-Platonic sage of Mistra,
whose discourses upon Plato and the Alexandrian mystics so fascinated
the learned society of Florence that they named him the second Plato. It
had been the dream of this man's whole life to supersede both forms of
Christianity by a semi-pagan theosophy deduced from the writings of the
later Pythagoreans and Platonists. When, therefore, he perceived the
impression he had made upon the first citizen of Florence, Gemistos
suggested that the capital of modern culture would be a fit place for
the resuscitation of the once so famous Academy of Athens. Cosimo took
this hint. The second half of the 15th century was destined to be the
age of academies in Italy, and the regnant passion for antiquity
satisfied itself with any imitation, however grotesque, of Greek or
Roman institutions. In order to found his new academy upon a firm basis
Cosimo resolved not only to assemble men of letters for the purpose of
Platonic disputation at certain regular intervals, but also to appoint a
hierophant and official expositor of Platonic doctrine. He hoped by
these means to give a certain stability to his projected institution,
and to avoid the superficiality of mere enthusiasm. The plan was good;
and with the rare instinct for character which distinguished him, he
made choice of the right man for his purpose in the young Marsilio.
Before he had begun to learn Greek, Marsilio entered upon the task of
studying and elucidating Plato. It is known that at this early period of
his life, while he was yet a novice, he wrote voluminous treatises on
the great philosopher, which he afterwards, however, gave to the flames.
In the year 1459 John Argyropoulos was lecturing on the Greek language
and literature at Florence, and Marsilio became his pupil. He was then
about twenty-three years of age. Seven years later he felt himself a
sufficiently ripe Greek scholar to begin the translation of Plato, by
which his name is famous in the history of scholarship, and which is
still the best translation of that author Italy can boast. The MSS. on
which he worked were supplied by this patron Cosimo de' Medici and by
Amerigo Benci. While the translation was still in progress Ficino from
time to time submitted its pages to the scholars, Angelo Poliziano,
Cristoforo Landino, Demetrios Chalchondylas and others; and since these
men were all members of the Platonic Academy, there can be no doubt that
the discussions raised upon the text and Latin version greatly served to
promote the purpose of Cosimo's foundation. At last the book appeared
in 1482, the expenses of the press being defrayed by the noble
Florentine, Filippo Valori. About the same time Marsilio completed and
published his treatise on the Platonic doctrine of immortality
(_Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animae_), the work by which his
claims to take rank as a philosopher must be estimated. This was shortly
followed by the translation of Plotinus into Latin, and by a voluminous
commentary, the former finished in 1486, the latter in 1491, and both
published at the cost of Lorenzo de' Medici just one month after his
death. As a supplement to these labours in the field of Platonic and
Alexandrian philosophy, Marsilio next devoted his energies to the
translation of Dionysius the Areopagite, whose work on the celestial
hierarchy, though recognized as spurious by the Neapolitan humanist,
Lorenzo Valla, had supreme attraction for the mystic and uncritical
intellect of Ficino.
It is not easy to value the services of Marsilio Ficino at their proper
worth. As a philosopher, he can advance no claim to originality, his
laborious treatise on Platonic theology being little better than a mass
of ill-digested erudition. As a scholar, he failed to recognize the
distinctions between different periods of antiquity and various schools
of thought. As an exponent of Plato he suffered from the fatal error of
confounding Plato with the later Platonists. It is true that in this
respect he did not differ widely from the mass of his contemporaries.
Lorenzo Valla and Angelo Poliziano, almost alone among the scholars of
that age, showed a true critical perception. For the rest, it was enough
that an author should be ancient to secure their admiration. The whole
of antiquity seemed precious in the eyes of its discoverers; and even a
thinker so acute as Pico di Mirandola dreamed of the possibility of
extracting the essence of philosophical truth by indiscriminate
collation of the most divergent doctrines. Ficino was, moreover, a firm
believer in planetary influences. He could not separate his
philosophical from his astrological studies, and caught eagerly at any
fragment of antiquity which seemed to support his cherished delusions.
It may here be incidentally mentioned that this superstition brought him
into trouble with the Roman Church. In 1489 he was accused of magic
before Pope Innocent VIII., and had to secure the good offices of
Francesco Soderini, Ermolao Barbaro, and the archbishop Rinaldo Orsini,
in order to purge himself of a most perilous imputation. What Ficino
achieved of really solid, was his translation. The value of that work
cannot be denied; the impulse which it gave to Platonic studies in
Italy, and through them to the formation of the new philosophy in
Europe, is indisputable. Ficino differed from the majority of his
contemporaries in this that, while he felt the influence of antiquity no
less strongly than they did, he never lost his faith in Christianity, or
contaminated his morals by contact with paganism. For him, as for
Petrarch, St Augustine was the model of a Christian student. The
cardinal point of his doctrine was the identity of religion and
philosophy. He held that philosophy consists in the study of truth and
wisdom, and that God alone is truth and wisdom,--so that philosophy is
but religion, and true religion is genuine philosophy. Religion, indeed,
is common to all men, but its pure form is that revealed through Christ;
and the teaching of Christ is sufficient to a man in all circumstances
of life. Yet it cannot be expected that every man should accept the
faith without reasoning; and here Ficino found a place for Platonism. He
maintained that the Platonic doctrine was providentially made to
harmonize with Christianity, in order that by its means speculative
intellects might be led to Christ. The transition from this point of
view to an almost superstitious adoration of Plato was natural; and
Ficino, we know, joined in the hymns and celebrations with which the
Florentine Academy honoured their great master on the day of his birth
and death. Those famous festivals in which Lorenzo de' Medici delighted
had indeed a pagan tone appropriate to the sentiment of the Renaissance;
nor were all the worshippers of the Athenian sage so true to
Christianity as his devoted student.
Of Ficino's personal life there is but little to be said. In order that
he might have leisure for uninterrupted study, Cosimo de' Medici gave
him a house near S. Maria Nuova in Florence, and a little farm at
Montevecchio, not far from the villa of Careggi. Ficino, like nearly all
the scholars of that age in Italy, delighted in country life. At
Montevecchio he lived contentedly among his books, in the neighbourhood
of his two friends, Pico at Querceto, and Poliziano at Fiesole, cheering
his solitude by playing on the lute, and corresponding with the most
illustrious men of Italy. His letters, extending over the years
1474-1494, have been published, both separately and in his collected
works. From these it may be gathered that nearly every living scholar of
note was included in the list of his friends, and that the subjects
which interested him were by no means confined to his Platonic studies.
As instances of his close intimacy with illustrious Florentine families,
it may be mentioned that he held the young Francesco Guicciardini at the
font, and that he helped to cast the horoscope of the Casa Strozzi in
the Via Tornabuoni.
At the age of forty Ficino took orders, and was honoured with a canonry
of S. Lorenzo. He was henceforth assiduous in the performance of his
duties, preaching in his cure of Novoli, and also in the cathedral and
the church of the Angeli at Florence. He used to say that no man was
better than a good priest, and none worse than a bad one. His life
corresponded in all points to his principles. It was the life of a
sincere Christian and a real sage,--of one who found the best fruits of
philosophy in the practice of the Christian virtues. A more amiable and
a more harmless man never lived; and this was much in that age of
discordant passions and lawless licence. In spite of his weak health, he
was indefatigably industrious. His tastes were of the simplest; and
while scholars like Filelfo were intent on extracting money from their
patrons by flattery and threats, he remained so poor that he owed the
publication of all his many works to private munificence. For his old
patrons of the house of Medici Ficino always cherished sentiments of the
liveliest gratitude. Cosimo he called his second father, saying that
Ficino had given him life, but Cosimo new birth,--the one had devoted
him to Galen, the other to the divine Plato,--the one was physician of
the body, the other of the soul. With Lorenzo he lived on terms of
familiar, affectionate, almost parental intimacy. He had seen the young
prince grow up in the palace of the Via Larga, and had helped in the
development of his rare intellect. In later years he did not shrink from
uttering a word of warning and advice, when he thought that the master
of the Florentine republic was too much inclined to yield to pleasure. A
characteristic proof of his attachment to the house of Medici was
furnished by a yearly custom which he practised at his farm at
Montevecchio. He used to invite the contadini who had served Cosimo to a
banquet on the day of Saints Cosimo and Damiano (the patron saints of
the Medici), and entertained them with music and singing. This affection
was amply returned. Cosimo employed almost the last hours of his life in
listening to Ficino's reading of a treatise on the highest good; while
Lorenzo, in a poem on true happiness, described him as the mirror of the
world, the nursling of sacred muses, the harmonizer of wisdom and beauty
in complete accord. Ficino died at Florence in 1499.
Besides the works already noticed, Ficino composed a treatise on the
Christian religion, which was first given to the world in 1476, a
translation into Italian of Dante's _De monarchia_, a life of Plato, and
numerous essays on ethical and semi-philosophical subjects. Vigour of
reasoning and originality of view were not his characteristics as a
writer; nor will the student who has raked these dust-heaps of
miscellaneous learning and old-fashioned mysticism discover more than a
few sentences of genuine enthusiasm and simple-hearted aspiration to
repay his trouble and reward his patience. Only in familiar letters,
prolegomena, and prefaces do we find the man Ficino, and learn to know
his thoughts and sentiments unclouded by a mist of citations; these
minor compositions have therefore a certain permanent value, and will
continually be studied for the light they throw upon the learned circle
gathered round Lorenzo in the golden age of humanism.
The student may be referred for further information to the following
works:--_Marsilii Ficini opera_ (Basileae, 1576); _Marsilii Ficini
vita_, auctore Corsio (ed. Bandini, Pisa, 1771); Roscoe's _Life of
Lorenzo de' Medici_; Pasquale Villari, _La Storia di Girolamo
Savonarola_ (Firenze, Le Monnier, 1859); Von Reumont, _Lorenzo de'
Medici_ (Leipzig, 1874). (J. A. S.)
FICKSBURG, a town of Orange Free State 110 m. by rail E. by N. of
Bloemfontein. Pop. (1904) 1954, of whom 1021 were whites. The town is
situated near the north bank of the Caledon river and is the capital of
one of the finest agricultural and stock-raising regions of the
province. It has direct railway communication with Natal and an
extensive trade. In the neighbourhood are petroleum wells and a diamond
mine. In the fossilized ooze of the Wonderkop, a table mountain of the
adjacent Wittebergen, are quantities of petrified fish.
FICTIONS, or legal fictions, in law, the term used for false averments,
the truth of which is not permitted to be called in question. English
law as well as Roman law abounds in fictions. Sometimes they are merely
the condensed expression of a rule of law,--e.g., the fiction of English
law that husband and wife were one person, and the fiction of Roman law
that the wife was the daughter of the husband. Sometimes they must be
regarded as reasons invented in order to justify a rule of law according
to an implied ethical standard. Of this sort seems to be the fiction or
presumption that every one knows the law, which reconciles the rule that
ignorance is no excuse for crime with the moral commonplace that it is
unfair to punish a man for violating a law of whose existence he was
unaware. Again, some fictions are deliberate falsehoods, adopted as true
for the purpose of establishing a remedy not otherwise attainable. Of
this sort are the numerous fictions of English law by which the
different courts obtained jurisdiction in private business, removed
inconvenient restrictions in the law relating to land, &c.
What to the scientific jurist is a stumbling-block is to the older
writers on English law a beautiful device for reconciling the strict
letter of the law with common sense and justice. Blackstone, in noticing
the well-known fiction by which the court of king's bench established
its jurisdiction in common pleas (viz. that the defendant was in custody
of the marshal of the court), says, "These fictions of law, though at
first they may startle the student, he will find upon further
consideration to be highly beneficial and useful; especially as this
maxim is ever invariably observed, that no fiction shall extend to work
an injury; its proper operation being to prevent a mischief or remedy an
inconvenience that might result from the general rule of law. So true it
is that _in fictione juris semper subsistit aequitas_." Austin, on the
other hand, while correctly assigning as the cause of many fictions the
desire to combine the necessary reform with some show of respect for the
abrogated law, makes the following harsh criticism as to others:--"Why
the plain meanings which I have now stated should be obscured by the
fictions to which I have just adverted I cannot conjecture. A wish on
the part of the authors of the fictions to render the law as
_uncognoscible_ as may be is probably the cause which Mr Bentham would
assign. I judge not, I confess, so uncharitably; I rather impute such
fictions to the sheer imbecility (or, if you will, to the active and
sportive fancies) of their grave and venerable authors, than to any
deliberate design, good or evil." Bentham, of course, saw in fictions
the instrument by which the great object of his abhorrence, _judiciary
law_, was produced. It was the means by which judges usurped the
functions of legislators. "A fiction of law." he says, "may be defined
as a wilful falsehood, having for its object the stealing legislative
powers by and for hands which could not or durst not openly claim it,
and but for the delusion thus produced could not exercise it." A
partnership, he says, was formed between the kings and the judges
against the interests of the people. "Monarchs found force, lawyers
fraud; thus was the capital found" (_Historical Preface to the second
edition of the Fragment on Government_).[1]
Sir H. Maine (_Ancient Law_) supplies the historical element which is
always lacking in the explanations of Austin and Bentham. Fictions form
one of the agencies by which, in progressive societies, positive law is
brought into harmony with public opinion. The others are equity and
statutes. Fictions in this sense include, not merely the obvious
falsities of the English and Roman systems, but any assumption which
conceals a change of law by retaining the old formula after the change
has been made. It thus includes both the case law of the English and the
_Responsa Prudentum_ of the Romans. "At a particular stage of social
progress they are invaluable expedients for overcoming the rigidity of
law; and, indeed, without one of them, the fiction of adoption, which
permits the family tie to be artificially created, it is difficult to
understand how society would ever have escaped from its swaddling
clothes, and taken its first steps towards civilization."
The bolder remedial fictions of English law have been to a large extent
removed by legislation, and one great obstacle to any reconstruction of
the legal system has thus been partially removed. Where the real remedy
stood in glaring contrast to the nominal rule, it has been openly
ratified by statute. In ejectment cases the mysterious sham litigants
have disappeared. The bond of entail can be broken without having
recourse to the collusive proceedings of fine and recovery. Fictions
have been almost entirely banished from the procedure of the courts. The
action for damages on account of seduction, which is still nominally an
action by the father for loss of his daughter's services, is perhaps the
only fictitious action now remaining.
Fictions which appear in the form of principles are not so easily dealt
with by legislation. To expel them formally from the system would
require the re-enactment of vast portions of law. A change in legal
modes of speech and thought would be more effective. The legal mind
instinctively seizes upon concrete aids to abstract reasoning. Many hard
and revolting fictions must have begun their career as metaphors. In
some cases the history of the change may still almost be traced. The
conception that a man-of-war is a floating island, or that an
ambassador's house is beyond the territorial limits of the country in
which he resides, was originally a figure of speech designed to set a
rule of law in a striking light. It is then gravely accepted as true in
fact, and other rules of law are deduced from it. Its beginning is to be
compared with such phrases as "an Englishman's house is his castle,"
which have had no legal offshoots and still remain mere figures of
speech.
Constitutional law is of course honeycombed with fictions. Here there is
hardly ever anything like direct legislative change, and yet real change
is incessant. The rules defining the sovereign power and fixing the
authority of its various members are in most points the same as they
were at the last revolution,--in many points they have been the same
since the beginning of parliamentary government. But they have long
ceased to be true in fact; and it would hardly be too much to say that
the entire series of formal propositions called the constitution is
merely a series of fictions. The legal attributes of the king, and even
of the House of Lords, are fictions. If we could suppose that the
effects of the Reform Acts had been brought about, not by legislation,
but by the decisions of law courts and the practice of House of Commons
committees--by such assumptions as that freeholder includes lease-holder
and that ten means twenty--we should have in the legal constitution of
the House of Commons the same kind of fictions that we find in the legal
statement of the attributes of the crown and the House of Lords. Here,
too, fictions have been largely resorted to for the purpose of
supporting particular theories,--popular or monarchical,--and such have
flourished even more vigorously than purely legal fictions.