1824-1825.
Battle of Kykloo—Thantabain—Maha Bundoola—Successes of the
British—Discomfiture of Maha Bundoola—Campbell marches into the
interior—Arrival at Donabew—Repulse—Death of Bundoola—Capture
of Donabew.
October began very inauspiciously. Colonel Smith, with about eight
hundred men, was detached against Kykloo on the 5th, and at Tadaghee he
was successful against a stockade. It was not until he had reached this
place that he found the enemy was much stronger than was suspected. The
colonel immediately applied for reinforcements, but he obtained only
native troops and two Europeans. Two howitzers were sent with the Madras
troop, which increased the number of cannon to four. With this force,
inadequate enough to anything effectual, Smith arrived before the Burmese
stockades at Kykloo on the 7th of October.
The breastworks, which impeded the attack of the principal
fortifications, were soon in the hands of the British. The principal
stronghold was an intrenchment, with a fortified pagoda. Major Wahab
was placed in charge of the storming party. Captain Wilson was directed
to assault the stockades in flank; and a division of the 28th native
infantry was to carry the pagoda; and Colonel Smith took charge of a
reserve parity, to act wherever it was most needed.
On the advance of Major Wahab, a volley was fired from the pagoda; but
the stockaded Burmese, who seemed to have been superhumanly cunning
_for Burmese_, waited until certain destruction might be dealt from
their position, when they commenced firing with the greatest precision.
Major Wahab and his men were obliged to lie flat on the ground to avoid
the peppering. Like ill-fortune attended the efforts of all the other
divisions, and on a retreat being sounded, the men took to flight. The
loss on this occasion was twenty-one killed, and seventy-four wounded.
However, this reverse was counterbalanced by the success of Major Evans,
at Thantabain, where the first minister of state, the Kyee Woongyee, was
posted. After skirmishing with the war-boats on the river, the detachment
arrived opposite the village, which, after a brisk fire, soon surrendered
on the 8th of October. Next morning the principal stockade was attacked,
and carried without any opposition. The Burmese having always carried off
their dead, it was impossible to find out how many were killed in the
encounter; but the place was riddled with shot, and a bungalow in the
centre almost destroyed. The detachment returned home without the loss of
a man.
Brigadier M’Creagh, too, speedily returned to the charge at Kykloo, and
finding the place, he went on, and after doing much damage, he returned
to Kykloo and Rangoon. “On their advance,” we are told, “they [the
soldiers] had an opportunity of witnessing the barbarous character of the
enemy, many of the bodies of the sipahis and pioneers, who fell in the
former attack, having been fastened to the trunks of trees, and mutilated
by imbecile and savage exasperation.”[301]
In such operations as these, many months passed away. Every successive
encounter with the British troops gave the Burmese an additional hint
that they must tax their energies to the utmost in order to bring about
a tolerable issue. It might now be seen that the choicest troops of the
empire must be opposed to the British invaders who had so coolly taken up
their quarters among them; and in the secrecy with which they summoned
Bundoola, the great general of the age, in their estimation, from
Arakhan, they showed much diplomatic genius; for ere Sir A. Campbell knew
he was coming, he was at Donabew, and actively employed in concentrating
all the available force of Burmah and Laos. It was about the end of
August when he left Arakhan, and in November everything was prepared
for a vigorous effort. “No pains nor expense were spared to equip this
favourite general for the field, and by the approach of the season for
active exertions, it was estimated that fifty thousand men were collected
for the advance upon Rangoon, who were to exterminate the invaders,
or carry them captives to the capital, where the chiefs were already
calculating on the number of slaves who were, from their source of
supply, to swell their train. Reports of the return of the Arakhan army
soon reached Rangoon, but some period elapsed before any certainty of its
movements was obtained. By the end of November, an intercepted despatch
from Bundoola, to the governor of Martaban,[302] removed all doubt,
and announced the departure of the former from Prome, at the head of a
formidable host. His advance was hailed with delight, and preparations
were made immediately for his reception.”[303] Gradually and slowly the
Burmese posts were stretched close to Rangoon, Dalla, Kemendine, the
Shoo Dagon to Puzendown creek, and no opposition was offered to their
operations. By the end of December their careful and costly preparations
were completed. On our part there was little fear. Determination was the
ruling sentiment in every bosom, and extraneously there was also no want
of protection by fortifications and shipping.
The enemy commenced by attacking Kemendine on the 1st of December, but
were repulsed by Major Yates, and Captain Ryers, of H.M.S. _Sophia_; and
though throughout an aggressive skirmishing was carried on, fatiguing our
troops considerably, yet the advantage remained on our side. Fire-rafts,
sent down in great numbers, had no effect, as our seamen were on the
look-out.
From the 1st to the 5th constant sallies were made under able commanders,
and many of the posts regained from the enemy. The Burmese showed no
want of activity, yet, as a recent writer observes, “little harm was
effected by this show of activity; but as the Burman force could no
longer be permitted to harass the troops with impunity, and it was not
impossible for them to escape from the consequences of a defeat, the
commander-in-chief resolved to become the assailant, and terminate the
expectations in which they had hitherto been permitted to indulge.”[304]
Now, at length, had the time arrived when the primary intentions of the
general might be carried out,—now, indeed, was that grand, resistless
march to begin which finds no parallel in the history of any nation of
modern times save our own. Sallies were continually made,—the men spared
no nerve,—the officers no thought,—all was bent upon the grand idea of
driving the enemy’s vast army back into me heart of the land whence it
had come. First, the Burmese posts at Puzendown were taken _au point de
l’épée_ by Majors Sale and Walker, the latter of whom fell during the
contest,—then the division at Dalla was routed by Lieut.-Colonel Farrier
and Lieut.-Colonel Parlby. Maha Bundoola himself began to be afraid of
the redoubtable “foreigners,” and retired from the active direction
of the battle-field, giving up the executive command to Maha Thilwa,
formerly governor of Asam, who stockaded his troops four miles to the
north at Kokein. Emissaries were now set at work to destroy Rangoon by
fire, and half of it was burnt, including the official quarter of the
Madras commissariat. It became necessary to dislodge this body, and it
was accordingly done under the direction of General Campbell. In fifteen
minutes the strong stockades were in the possession of the British, and
thus fifteen hundred determined men put to the rout twenty thousand—for
such, it appeared, was the enemy’s force—with only the loss of eighteen
killed, though many were wounded. During these engagements the greatest
terror was excited by the _Diana_ steam-packet, by the aid of which many
war-boats were captured. “The Burmans,” concludes Wilson, “no longer
dared attempt offensive operations, but restricted themselves to the
defence of their positions along the river; and the road was now open to
the British army, which, agreeably to the policy that had been enjoined
by the events of the war, prepared to dictate the terms of peace, if
necessary, within the walls of the capital.”[305]
Maha Bundoola was so dispirited by the events of the last few days,
that he retreated to Donabew again, and concentrated his forces at that
place. His proud heart was broken, however, and he began to treat with
the British residents at Rangoon; however, he would not make any direct
advance to the officials, with whom alone a formal peace could be
concluded. It was intimated to him that he should pursue such a course,
but he returned no answer to the letter, probably feeling reassured by
an accession of forces. The country being now clear, it appeared to Sir
A. Campbell that an immediate advance should be made into the interior;
and the arrival of H. M.’s 47th and some other reinforcements placed him
in a position of being able to do so without fear of losing anything
behind him. On the 11th of February, after the dispersion of the Burmese
garrison in the fort of Syriam, the army was at liberty to move. All fear
of insurrection on the part of the conquered provinces was at an end, as
the Peguers, the principal inhabitants of the district, had deserted to
the side of the British.
The preliminary movement of the army was the dislodgment of the advanced
guard of the native army at Thantabain, which was effectually done by
Colonel Godwin. This done, the army began its march in three divisions;
one, under General Campbell himself, was to proceed by land, and left
Rangoon on the 13th of February, 1825; the next went by water up the
Irawadi, on the 16th; and the third, under the command of Major Sale,
set out for Bassein, which it was proposed first to occupy, on the 17th.
Brigadier M’Creagh stayed in garrison with the reserve of feeble or
invalid men.
The water-column, after having taken and destroyed several stockades in
its way, arrived before Donabew on the 6th of March; Brigadier-General
Cotton immediately summoned the garrison to surrender, a summons which
was of course useless. A party was then sent to reconnoitre; and though
the Burmese poured a heavy fire upon our men, a complete knowledge of the
neighbourhood was gained.
“The fortified post of Donabew was of considerable extent and breadth,
situated on the right bank of the Irawadi, and commanding its whole
channel. The main-work was a stockade parallelogram of one thousand by
seven hundred yards, which was a little withdrawn from the bed of the
river, on a bank rising above its level. The river face mounted fifty
pieces of ordnance, of various sizes. The approach to the main structure
from the south was defended by two outworks, one about four hundred yards
lower down the river, and another about three hundred yards below it.
Each was constructed of square beams of timber, provided with platforms,
and pierced for cannon, and was strengthened by an exterior fosse, the
outer edge of which was guarded with sharp-pointed timbers, planted
obliquely, and a thick abatis of felled trees and brushwood. The lowest
outwork was a square of about two hundred yards, with a pagoda in the
centre; the highest, of an irregular shape, running along the bank of
a rivulet flowing into the main stream; both works were occupied with
strong parties of the enemy.”[306] The first stockade was attacked by
the six hundred men yet at General Cotton’s disposal (the rest being in
garrison, or with the flotilla), and was gained by the loss of twenty of
our men. The faithless Burmese fled, leaving two hundred and eighty of
their comrades in the hands of the enemy. But at the second stockade,
a determined resistance met the fatigued troops, already clogged and
weakened by the care of the numerous prisoners. A destructive fire
was opened on them, and the only safe course was in flight, or, as it
is named to “ears polite,” in a retreat. General Cotton, therefore,
receded to Yoong-yoon, where he awaited the answer to his account of the
proceedings from General Campbell, who, in the mean time, had arrived at
Yuadit, twenty-six miles above Tharawa. That answer was delivered by the
general himself, who joined Cotton before Donabew by the 27th of March,
after much vexation and toil.[307] Operations were immediately commenced;
and notwithstanding numerous sorties (on one occasion, Bundoola himself
headed his seventeen elephants and infantry), they advanced their works,
and fatal were the effects of the mortars and bombs that were thrown
into the thickly-peopled inclosure. The feeling of fear grew strong with
the Burmese; and on the evening of the 31st, a soldier brought a laconic
letter from Bundoola, couched in these terms:—“In war we find each
other’s force; the two countries are at war for nothing, and we know not
each other’s minds!”[308] It seemed from what the soldier knew of the
matter, which was very little, that the Burmese general desired peace.
Very doubtful is the authenticity of this letter, when compared with the
spirited reply seat to General Willoughby Cotton’s summons of surrender.
“We are each fighting for our country, and you will find me as steady in
defending mine, as you in maintaining the honour of yours. If you wish
to see Donabew, come as friends, and I will show it you. If you come as
enemies, LAND!”[309]
On the 1st of April the batteries opened, and by the 2nd the enemy had
decamped. It was discovered that Bundoola had met his death on the
preceding day, by the bursting of a shell. All the courage of the Burmese
warriors had fled with his departing spirit. The greatest general,
since the golden days of Alompra, the devoted to Buddha; he had won his
way to the most responsible position in the king’s service, only to be
singled out, as it were, by some supernatural power, as the victim of
the fireballs of the persevering islanders of the far-off ocean. No
wonder, then, that the superstitious Burmese, on beholding the fate of
their commander, gave themselves up for lost. What a mysterious power
the English seemed to have of singling out the head of their army,
and destroying him! So they fled, and the British became masters of
Donabew, where they found much welcome supply of corn and military
stores. Notwithstanding the momentary panic of the Avan government, it
soon regained its customary arrogance. The _Edinburgh Review_ has some
remarks, which, though rather premature for our progress in the history,
I shall here introduce.
“But blood and treasure might be still more unprofitably expended. The
ignorance and arrogance of the court of Ava are almost beyond occidental
credence. When its favourite general, Bundoola, invaded Chittagong, our
southernmost district, at the commencement of the last war, he brought
with him golden fetters to bind Lord Amherst withal; and had orders,
after he had taken Calcutta, to march on to take London! Defeat after
defeat seemed to produce little sobering effect upon the drunkenness of
Indo-Chinese pride; the officers who were flying before our army in its
advance upon the capital, and who must have felt the utter hopelessness
of the contest, were obliged, as their intercepted letters vouched,
to account in the most absurd manner for their inability to stop us;
and the unfortunate wretch who commanded the troops that made the last
stand against us, at a place called Pagahm Mew, was trampled to death by
elephants on his return with the news of his defeat. It was not until our
army arrived within three days’ march of the capital that the king’s eyes
appeared to be opened to any rational sense of his perilous situation;
and there was evidence enough, before we evacuated the country, that
the effect even of such severe discipline as the exaction of a million
sterling towards the expenses of the war, and the cession of some of his
most valued provinces, was not likely to be permanent.”[310]