1824.
Arrival at Rangoon—Taking of that town—Position of the
troops—State of the neighbourhood—Confidence of the
king of Ava—Attack of Joazong—Burmese embassy—Capture
of Kemendine—Reinforcements from Madras—Sickness of the
army—Endurance of the British soldier.
The country on the way to Rangoon is very flat, and consequently the
vessels were easily seen coming up the river; and they did not escape
the rayhoon of the city. So unusual a number of vessels (they were
forty-five in all) could not fail to arouse some dormant ideas of harm in
the minds of the treacherous officials. At the time of their descrial,
the principal European inhabitants were assembled at the house of Mr.
Sarkies, an Armenian merchant, where they were going to dine. The rayhoon
immediately sent for them, and demanded what the ships were. The reply
was, that there were some expected, and that these were probably them.
As the number of vessels was, however, continually increasing, the
governor was not satisfied, and he seized the equally ignorant Europeans,
and threatened their immediate execution. He also sent notice of his
intention to Sir Archibald Campbell, who declared his determination
of destroying the town altogether if the governor carried his menace
into effect.[279] Upon this the captives were chained and confined in
different places.
The _Liffey_ was the first to arrive opposite the king’s quay, where a
weak battery was planted, and it anchored at that place about twelve
o’clock in the forenoon; the other ships took their places in different
ways, so as to command the whole neighbourhood. I shall continue in the
words of an eye-witness:—
“Having furled sails and beat to quarters, a pause of some minutes
ensued, during which not a shot was fired; on our side, humanity forbade
that we should be the first aggressors upon an almost defenceless town,
containing, as we supposed, a large population of unarmed and inoffensive
people; besides, the proclamations and assurances of protection which
had been sent on shore the preceding day led us to hope that an offer of
capitulation would still be made.”[280] However, all the Burmans did was
to pour a feeble, ill-sustained fire into the _Liffey_, which, returning
it with tremendous force, forced away the natives.
Upon landing, after the second broadside, the author of Two Years in Ava
informs us that “three men lying dead, and the broken gun-carriages,
were the only vestiges of the injury done by the fire from the frigate.
The town was completely deserted. It seemed indeed incredible whither
the inhabitants could have fled to within such a short space of time;
and, as night was coming on, we could not proceed in search of them; the
troops, therefore, remained in and about the town, and the next morning
were placed in positions, in two lines, resting on the Great Pagoda and
the town. On entering the terrace of the Great Pagoda, the advanced guard
discovered in a miserable dark cell four of the European residents at
Rangoon, who were ironed, and had been otherwise maltreated; the others
had been released by us the evening before; so that we had now the
satisfaction of knowing that none of our countrymen were subjected to the
cruelty of the Burman chieftains.”[281]
After taking possession of the place, proclamations were immediately
sent out among the inhabitants through a few stragglers, assuring the
townspeople of protection, in the hope of inducing them to return. “The
strictest orders were issued to prevent plunder, and a Burman having
claimed several head of cattle which had been seized for the use of the
army, they were immediately restored, in order to prove the sincerity of
our protestations; but none of the inhabitants availed themselves of our
offers, and we understood that the officers of government were driving
the women and children into the interior, as hostages for the good
conduct of the men.”[282]
The soldiers while at Rangoon were billeted in a long street which leads
from the Dagon Pagoda to Rangoon, and in this exposed situation, without
fresh supplies, they had to await the arrival of information regarding
the position assumed by the Burmese government. Space will not permit me
to refer to the many anxieties which had to be considered in regard to
the present position of our troops, but the reader will find them amply
discussed in Snodgrass;[283] however, I shall lay before the reader a few
remarks of that gentleman, which will amply show the many difficulties
which beset the army.
“The enemy’s troops and new-raised levies were gradually collecting in
our front from all parts of the kingdom; a cordon was speedily formed
around our cantonments, capable, indeed, of being forced at every point,
but possessing, in a remarkable degree, all the qualities requisite
for harassing and wearing out in fruitless exertions the strength and
energies of European or Indian troops. Hid from our crew on every side
in the darkness of a deep, and, to regular bodies, impenetrable forest,
far beyond which the inhabitants and all the cattle of the Rangoon
district had been driven, the Burmese chiefs carried on their operation
and matured their future schemes with vigilance, secrecy, and activity.
Neither rumour nor intelligence of what was passing within his posts ever
reached us. Beyond the invisible line which circumscribed our position,
all was mystery or vague conjecture.[284].... To form a correct idea of
the difficulties which opposed the progress of the invading army, even
had it been provided with land-carriage and landed at the fine season of
the year, it is necessary to make some allusion to the natural obstacles
which the country presented, and to the mode of warfare generally
practised by the Burmese. Henzawaddy, or the province of Rangoon, is a
delta, formed by the mouths of the Irrawaddy, and, with the exception
of some considerable plains of rice-grounds, is covered by a thick and
tenacious jungle, interspersed by numerous creeks and rivers, from whose
wooded banks an enemy may, unseen and unexposed, render their passage
difficult and destructive.
“Roads, or anything deserving that name, are wholly unknown in the lower
provinces. Footpaths, indeed, lead through the woods in every direction,
but requiring great toil and labour to render them applicable to
military purposes: they are impassable during the rains, and are only
known and frequented by the Carian tribes, who cultivate the lands,
are exempt from military service, and may be considered as the slaves
of the soil, living in wretched hamlets by themselves, heavily taxed
and oppressed by the Burmese authorities, by whom they are treated as
altogether an inferior race of beings from their countrymen of Pegu....
The Burmese, in their usual mode of warfare, rarely meet their enemy in
the open field. Instructed and trained from their youth in the formation
and defence of stockades, in which they display great skill and judgment,
their wars have been for many years a series of conquests: every late
attempt of the neighbouring nations to check their victorious career
had failed, and the Burmese government, at the time of our landing at
Rangoon, had subdued and incorporated into their overgrown empire all the
petty states by which it was surrounded, and stood confessedly feared
and respected even by the Chinese, as a powerful and warlike nation.
When opposed to our small but disciplined body of men, it may easily be
conceived with how much more care and caution the system to which they
owed their fame and reputation as soldiers was pursued—constructing their
defences in the most difficult and inaccessible recesses of the jungle,
from which, by constant predatory inroads and nightly attacks, they
vainly imagined they would ultimately drive us from their country.”[285]
The confidence which the king of Ava had in his own military resources
is amply shown in a speech reported by Snodgrass.[286] “As to Rangoon,”
said the king, “I will take such measures as will prevent the English
from even disturbing the women of the town in cooking their rice.”
This speech, however, only lends additional force to the remark of the
Edinburgh Reviewer, that “the Burmese are much too arrogant even to
attempt to improve themselves; and such as their rabble of soldiery is
now, such it will be found fifty years hence—utterly unable to stand for
a moment against British troops, even when protected by stockades.”[287]
The events at present passing in the kingdom of Ava are but a practical
demonstration of the truth of this assertion. However, such preparations
as could be made were completed. Armies were stockaded in all directions
near Rangoon, nor was the river at all neglected. The boatmen, an
enterprising and brave part of the community, all attached to the royal
interests, were soon in readiness, and a respectable kind of fleet
covered the waters of the Irawadi.
Nothing of consequence occurred for some days. Some boats, sent up by
Sir A. Campbell to gather intelligence as to the force and resources
of the Burmese, were fired upon on the 15th May, near the village of
Kemendine, and to prevent the recurrence of such an event, a body of men
were embarked in order to drive the enemy from that place. Accordingly,
after some little skirmishing and the loss of some men and officers, the
detachment succeeded in their endeavours. Afterward, however, the Burmese
returned, and annoyed the Anglo-Indian army very much by attempting
to set the fleet on fire. “Our shipping,” says an eye-witness, “were
now daily and nightly exposed to a great deal of danger and annoyance
from an engine of destruction much confided in by our invisible enemy,
and which, if properly managed, might have caused us much injury. This
was a large raft formed of pieces of wood and beams tied together, but
loosely, so that if it came athwart a ship’s bows, it would swing round
and encircle her. On this were placed every sort of firewood, and other
combustibles, such as jars of petroleum or earth oil, which, rising in a
flame, created a tremendous blaze, and as this raft extended across the
river, it often threatened to burn a great portion of our fleet. Rafts of
this description were chiefly launched from Kemendine, where the greater
number of them were constructed; but fortunately the river made a bend
a little above the anchorage, and the current running strong towards
the opposite shore, the rafts were not unfrequently grounded, and thus
rendered useless; whilst, on the other hand, the precautions adopted
by our naval officers of anchoring a number of beams across the river,
in most instances effectually arrested those unwieldy masses in their
descent towards Rangoon.”[288]
During this time the confidence of the Burmese had increased, and on
the 27th they actually advanced within sight of the picquets, and sat
down. This was observed by Major Snodgrass, who, desirous of knowing
whether they were merely stragglers, or part of any considerable body,
immediately pursued them. He and his men found their way, however,
stopped by a small stockade stretching right across the road. After a
few shots, the British party, only twenty-two in number, charged the
work, and carried it. The natives, sixty in number, immediately fled.
The success which had attended this movement determined Sir Archibald
Campbell in his resolution to attempt a reconnoissance in person; a
measure that was put into execution the next morning. On arriving at the
stockade just mentioned, it was found reoccupied by the Burmese, who were
repairing it with great rapidity. However, on perceiving the troops,
they immediately fled. The same thing took place at a bridge beyond the
village of Kokein, “and,” observes Snodgrass, “at every turn of the road,
breastworks and half-finished stockades, hastily abandoned, proved that
so early a visit was neither anticipated nor provided for.”[289]
“Our troops,” says the author of Two Years in Ava,[290] “continued
advancing in echellon, the light company of the thirty-eighth on the left
skirting the jungle; the grenadiers in the centre, on the plain; and
the thirteenth on the right: when, at a sudden turn, the light company
observed a stockade about a hundred yards distant, having a ravine full
of water in front of it. A dead silence pervaded the work; and Captain
Piper, instantly forming his men in line, charged up to the stockade,
and through the ravine without firing a shot. When we were within about
thirty yards, the Burmans gave a most terrific yell, accompanied by
beating of drums, tom-toms, and other instruments, and opened a sharp
and well-directed fire, by which we suffered severely. As the enemy was
covered by a thick palisade, with loopholes, we saw not a man; and even
if we had, our fire could not have proved serviceable, as not a single
musket would go off, in consequence of the wet; whereas the Burmans
were protected from the weather by sheds, and consequently their arms
were uninjured. On arriving at the foot of the work, after forcing the
way through a capital abatis, the entrance was found barred up; and the
height of the work, and the want of ladders, preventing escalading,
the men were for some time, therefore, exposed to the assaults of the
enemy, who threw out spears, and tried every effort to drive us off.
They were unavailing: the passage was forced, and the troops rushed on
with the bayonet. Finding this face of the work carried, a number of
Burmans rushed with their spears to the opposite side, and there awaited
the approach of the assailants; but a section dashing at them with the
bayonets, annihilated almost the whole.... Evening was now coming on
fast, we were encumbered with between thirty and forty wounded, without
any means of carrying them, except the officers’ horses, and three
or four doolies;[291] and Sir A. Campbell, therefore, determined on
returning without attacking a small stockade a little farther on, having
first made a forward movement with his troops to see whether the Burman
line, which was still drawn up, would await our approach. It fell back
as we advanced, and we then, after burning the two stockades of Joazong,
recommenced the march home.” In this action several officers were
severely, some mortally, wounded. On the Burmese side the loss was about
four hundred. The commander on the native side was the former Rayhoon of
Rangoon, a man of talent and experience. The enemy retired from the field
during the night, after digging up and horribly mutilating the bodies of
two soldiers who had fallen there the day before!
The unexpected results of the skirmish opened the eyes of the Burmese
commanders to the inefficacy of their system of warfare. Feeling their
inferiority, and wishing to gain time for altering and strengthening
their defences, the Burmese sent two ambassadors to the English camp.
This was on the 9th June. Major Snodgrass thus describes the whole
interview:[292]—
“The principal personage of the two, who had formerly been governor of
Bassein, was a stout, elderly man, dressed in a long scarlet robe, with
a red handkerchief tied round his head, in the usual Burman style. His
companion, although dressed more plainly, had much more intelligence
in his countenance; and notwithstanding his assumed indifference and
humble demeanour, it soon became evident that to him the management of
the interview was intrusted, though his colleague treated him in every
respect as an inferior.
“The two chiefs, having entered the house, sat down with all the ease
and familiarity of old friends; neither constraint nor any symptom of
fear appeared about either; they paid their compliments to the British
officers, and made their remarks on what they saw with the utmost
freedom and good-humour. The elder chief then opened the subject of
their mission, with the question, ‘Why are you come here with ships
and soldiers?’ accompanied with many professions of the good faith,
sincerity, and friendly disposition of the Burmese government. The
causes of the war and the redress that was demanded were again fully
explained to them. The consequences of the line of conduct pursued by
their generals, in preventing all communication with the court, was
also pointed out, and they were brought to acknowledge that a free and
unreserved discussion of the points at issue could alone avert the evils
and calamities with which their country was threatened. Still they would
neither confess that the former remonstrances of the Indian government
had reached their king, nor enter into any arrangement for removing the
barrier they had placed in the way of negotiation, but urged, with every
argument they could think of, that a few days’ delay might be granted, to
enable them to confer with an officer of high rank then at some distance
up the river: they were, however, given to understand, that delay and
procrastination formed no part of our system, and that the war would
be vigorously prosecuted, until the king of Ava thought proper to send
officers with full authority to enter upon a treaty with the British
commissioners.
“The elder chief, who had loudly proclaimed his love of peace, continued
chewing his betel-nut with much composure, receiving the intimation
of a continuance of hostilities with more of the air and coolness of
a soldier who considered war as his trade, than became the pacific
character he assumed; while his more shrewd companion vainly endeavoured
to conceal his vexation at the unpleasant termination of their mission,
and unexpected failure of their arts and protestations. But although
the visit had evidently been planned for no other purpose than that of
gaining time, the chiefs did not object to carry with them to their camp
a declaration of the terms upon which peace would still be restored; and
that they might take their departure with a better grace, expressed their
intention of repeating their visit in the course of a few days, for the
purpose of opening a direct communication between the British general
and the Burmese ministers. The elder chief, again alluding to his being
no warrior, hoped that the ships had strict orders not to fire upon him;
but while he said so, in stepping into his boat, there was a contemptuous
smile upon his own face and the countenances of his men, that had more of
defiance than entreaty in it.”
The next morning (June 10th) the British intentions regarding Kemendine
were put into execution. A breach was soon made in the teak-wood stockade
by the cannon, and a column of English and Indian troops stormed the
place. Major Sale, with his detachment, had some hot work, for the
place at which he entered was full of men, who defended themselves with
the bravery of despair. Thirty of the Anglo-Indians fell, though for
them one hundred and sixty Burmese perished. Even when this place was
taken, little had been accomplished, as the principal stockade, about
half a mile distant, had yet to be besieged. “We lost no time,” says an
eye-witness, and actor in the affair, “in advancing to it; and in order
completely to hem the Burmahs in, the flotilla was sent up the river,
beyond the works, so as to prevent their escaping by water; whilst the
land force proceeded through the jungle. The left of our line rested on
the river, and the right was moving round the north of the stockade; thus
completing a semicircle; when it was discovered that, in addition to the
main work, two smaller ones existed further up, which it was impossible
for us with our force to surround; a space of two hundred yards was
therefore unavoidably left between our right and the river, it being
exposed to the fire of both stockades. Night had already approached; the
rain began to pour without intermission, and neither men nor officers
were sheltered from it, or had any cover, not even of great coats. The
night we passed in this situation was such as may easily be imagined....
The shouts of the Burmahs had a curious effect, much heightened by the
wild scenery of the dark, gloomy forest which surrounded us; first,
a low murmur might be heard, rising as it were gradually in tone, and
followed by the wild and loud huzza of thousands of voices; then, again,
all was silence, save now and then a straggling shot or challenge from
our own sentries; and soon after, another peal of voices would resound
through the trees. This they continued all night; but towards morning
the yells became fainter and fainter, and at daybreak they totally
ceased.”[293]
In the morning, operations were resumed; and on the storming parties
advancing to the capture, they found, to their astonishment, that the
enemy had decamped! Possession was immediately taken, and a regiment left
in garrison, while the rest returned to cantonments, very much irritated
by the loss of their opponents. Five pieces of cannon were found in the
inclosure, and numbers of jinjals. Outside the upper gate lay a gilt
chattah or umbrella of rank, and some distance beyond, the body of the
elder chief, who had visited the English camp.
Major Wahab and Brigadier McCreagh returned from Cheduba and Negrais
about this time, having accomplished the purpose for which they were
detached. The capture of these places had not been completed without some
loss and considerable slaughter. Cheduba was expected to have proved of
some use, but it was found that, with the exception of a few buffaloes,
the supplies were not of any utility. About this time also, the force was
augmented by the 89th British regiment from Madras.
The effects of heavy work in the swamps now began to be seen in the fatal
form of disease among the Anglo-Indian troops. “Constantly exposed to
the vicissitudes of a tropical climate, and exhausted by the necessity
of unintermitted exertion, it need not be a matter of surprise that
sickness now began to thin the ranks and impair the energies of the
invaders. No rank was exempt from the operation of these causes; and many
officers, amongst whom were the senior naval officer, Captain Marryat;
the political commissioner, Major Canning; and the Commander-in-Chief
himself, were attacked with fever, during the month of June. Amongst the
privates, the Europeans especially, the sickness incident to fatigue
and exposure was aggravated by the defective quantity and quality of
the provisions which had been supplied for their use. Relying upon the
reported facility of obtaining cattle and vegetables at Rangoon, it had
not been thought necessary to embark stores for protracted consumption
on board the transports from Calcutta, and the Madras troops landed with
a still more limited stock. As soon as the deficiency was ascertained,
arrangements were made to remedy it; but in the mean time, before
supplies could reach Rangoon, the troops were dependent for food upon
salt meat, much of which was in a state of putrescence, and biscuit, in
an equally repulsive condition, under the decomposing influence of heat
and moisture. The want of sufficient and wholesome food enhanced the evil
effects of the damp soil and atmosphere, and of the malaria from the
decaying vegetable matter of the surrounding forests, and the hospitals
were rapidly filled with sick, beyond the means available of medical
treatment. Fever and dysentery were the principal maladies, and were no
more than the ordinary consequences of local causes; but the scurvy and
hospital gangrene, which also made their appearance, were ascribable as
much to depraved habits and inadequate nourishment as to fatigue and
exposure. They were also latterly, in some degree, the consequences of
extreme exhaustion, forming a peculiar feature of the prevailing fever,
which bore an epidemic type, and which had been felt with equal severity
in Bengal. The fatal operation of these causes was enhanced by their
continuance; and towards the end of the rainy season, scarcely three
thousand men were fit for active duty. The arrival of adequate supplies,
and more especially the change in the monsoon, restored the troops to a
more healthy condition.”[294]
It is, however, worthy of especial notice, that though the army wanted
provisions, health, and strength, their natural energy did not fail. In
the midst of a crowd of foes, whose numerous force and equipments were
alike unknown to the English soldier, his constitutional dominance of
will flagged not at all, but seemed rather to become stronger, the more
great the odds grew against it. Indeed, one of the authorities I have
quoted tells us, that there went a feeling abroad among the Burmese, that
it was of no use to contend with an English soldier; for, if the arm
he had grasped the top of the stockade with were chopped, he never was
disconcerted, but immediately applied the other; even then they were at
disadvantage, for the skill of the British doctors was so great, that
they could replace the severed limbs upon the trunk; and for this reason
diligent search was always made on the field after the battle, for these
legs and arms!