“Your Majesty has been gracious enough to send me Herr von Gruner’s
communication of the 28th ultimo, and to observe that it reproduces
the views adopted by your Majesty. Herr von Gruner’s opinions are
based on the same general principles as those of Herr von Vincke
and Herr von Roggenbach, and the latter have found expression in
the letter of H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Baden. These gentlemen, in
addressing their proposals to your Majesty, doubtless proceed on the
assumption that if your Majesty were to accept their advice another
Ministry would be summoned to office. Other influences are also
being set in motion for this purpose even outside _public_ life,
to which Herr von Schleinitz and other persons closely connected
with the Court have either voluntarily or involuntarily devoted
their services. When I entered into the Ministry I ventured to
explain to your Majesty that I did not regard my position as that
of a Constitutional Minister in the usual sense of the word, but
considered myself rather as your Majesty’s servant, and that in the
last resort I would obey your Majesty’s commands even if contrary to
my own views. I still maintain that standpoint, but this should not
deter me from explaining my views with the candour I owe to your
Majesty and to the interests of the country. Speaking in this sense,
I must first declare that I consider it would be of advantage for
your Majesty’s service, in carrying out a policy consonant with the
views of Herr von Gruner, to select another Ministry, or at least
another Minister for Foreign Affairs, who would enjoy in a higher
degree the confidence of those upon whose support such a policy must
mainly rely. Count Goltz has as yet had no occasion to come into
conflict with those elements, and owing to his other qualifications
may be regarded as best suited to take over the conduct of affairs.”
From a letter of the Crown Prince to Bismarck, dated Headquarters,
Flensburg, April 17th, 1864: “I thank you heartily for your two
letters of the 11th and 12th of April. I found the communication
of the 11th very interesting; but I could not gather from it such
a view of the objects of our policy as would enable me, from my
standpoint, to support any particular measure with conviction. I do
not agree that it is too early to come forward openly with a positive
programme, and I fear that we shall gain _nothing_ by protracting
the solution of the question, but, on the contrary, thereby increase
European complications. However that may be, we should at least have
a positive programme _for ourselves_, the realisation of which it
is true would still remain dependent upon circumstances. Instead
of this, however, I find in your communication only the programme
‘to act according to circumstances,’ unless I am to infer from some
isolated suggestions certain secret views which are ascribed to
you, and which certainly appear to tally with many of your former
utterances, particularly at the last Council which I attended before
my departure for the army. With regard to any such _arrière-pensées_
of Prussian aggrandisement, I may state briefly my opinion, namely,
that to pursue them would entirely falsify our whole German policy,
and would probably lead to our defeat by Europe. It would not be the
first time that Prussia sought to outwit the world, with the result
that she ultimately fell between two stools.”
A letter from Bismarck to the King, dated April 3rd, 1866: “Your
Majesty has deigned to command me, through Abeken, to express
my opinion whether the letter from the Duke of Coburg, which I
respectfully return herewith, should be answered.
“I take the liberty to recall the fact that the Duke of Coburg has
during the past four years shared in every intrigue against your
Majesty’s internal and foreign policy. His Highness has largely
contributed to the return of democratic representatives in Prussia
through his money and influence; he has associated himself with
societies for arming the people (Büchsen-Groschen Vereine), and has
adopted such an attitude towards the monarchy that your Majesty made
strong representations to him on the subject in a long letter, and
declined a visit from him on account of the bad impression it would
make on the army. The Duke, together with his officials, Samwer and
Francke, is the leader of the anti-Prussian Augustenburg movement;
and but for him the hereditary Prince would have listened to reason.
The Duke brought about the recall of Lord Napier, a diplomatist who
was regarded as too Prussophil. I respectfully take the liberty of
indicating the influence of the Duke upon H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
I certainly do not go too far when I describe his Highness as one
of the most irreconcilable opponents of your Majesty’s policy, and
state that no devotion to your Majesty’s honour and interest is to be
expected from him. The present letter from the Duke, and that from
Count Mensdorff, which was obviously ordered for the special purpose
of being communicated to your Majesty, and which is utterly untrue,
betray their connection with the communications from Queen Victoria
which have reached your Majesty through H.R.H. the Crown Prince;
and it is certain that similar insinuations will have been made to
your Majesty in other quarters. There can be no doubt that all these
steps are based upon a well-laid plan, according to which the open
and secret opponents of your Majesty endeavour to persuade your
Majesty to yield to Austria, and thus to pave the way for another
policy, your Majesty’s present Ministry and myself in particular
being for this purpose represented in the first place as the root of
all evil. Your Majesty is certainly convinced without any assurance
from me that even if my health had remained unaffected during the
past few years, I would at any moment willingly, and with lifelong
gratitude to your Majesty for the many favours which I have enjoyed,
retire into private life even if my continuance in office involved
_no_ detriment to your Majesty. How much more willingly would I do
so, therefore, if my retirement could be of any benefit to my King
and country. I see, however, no possibility of another Minister of
your Majesty being able honestly to recommend a policy different to
that which has hitherto been followed, and which was sanctioned in
the Council of the 28th of February; for this policy is independent
of all partisan tendencies, is enjoined solely by the interests of
Prussia, and is rendered inevitable by the situation. If the Duke of
Coburg recommends another policy, such as would be in agreement with
what Vienna prescribes, I beg respectfully to point out that the same
gentleman has for the last four years recommended _everything_ that
was opposed to monarchical interests, and in particular to those of
the Prussian Monarchy. Notwithstanding this your Majesty has done
him the honour of answering his letter of the 22nd. If your Majesty
were to answer the present letter, with its offensive and untruthful
enclosure, that would be an encouragement to your opponents and
a discouragement to your servants. My most humble advice is that
your Majesty should leave the letter of the Duke unanswered, and
not conceal from his aide-de-camp that you have been disagreeably
affected by the enclosure. If the aide-de-camp is a person to whom
such a communication might be properly made, it would perhaps be well
to signify to him verbally that your Majesty has clearly seen through
the intention underlying the whole manœuvre with the Mensdorff
letter, and that the tone of the latter is not to your liking.”
Letter from the King to Bismarck, dated April 8th, 1866: “Numbers
78 and 79 of the _Kreuzzeitung_ have just been laid before me
by an unknown hand (as I have not taken in this paper since
1861--Coronation article in June) on account of the abusive article
against the Duke of Coburg. It is most unpleasant to me, as only
you, the Queen and the Crown Prince had a knowledge of the Duke’s
letters to me, and therefore the source of the article is immediately
betrayed. Although you have always told me that the Government has
no influence upon the _Kreuzzeitung_, this appears to be an instance
which contradicts that statement. The manner in which I replied to
the Duke, and the fact that on the second occasion I sent no reply,
showed him that I did not desire to continue the correspondence. But
articles like that in question must render him still more hostile to
us. From a political point of view this is not right, and on that
account I request you to put a stop to these improper proceedings of
the _Kreuzzeitung_ towards the Duke.
“William.”
In reply to this Bismarck wrote as follows: “I humbly beg your
Majesty’s pardon if I have called down upon myself your Majesty’s
dissatisfaction through the article on the intervention of the Duke
of Coburg, which was based, not on his letter, but upon a number of
other newspaper reports on this intervention. I would never venture
to deceive your Majesty, and I frankly confess that the main part of
this article was written at my instance, as I--like every one of my
colleagues--while having indeed no influence over the _Kreuzzeitung_
to prevent the insertion of matters to which I object, have yet
enough to secure the insertion of what is not directly opposed to its
own tendencies. The same connection exists with the _Spenersche_, the
_National Zeitung_ and many others, and I believe I have never denied
the existence of influence of this description.
“It appeared to me as if your Majesty were yourself indignant at the
insincerity of the Duke and of Count Mensdorff; but your Majesty
generously pardons the disrespect manifested in such conduct, as also
the former hostility of the Duke, who has done more harm to your
Majesty and the Prussian State through the favour which he has shown
to the democracy, and the disturbance of the relations with England,
than he can ever make good through a military convention, and who
gave evidence of his real sentiments towards your Majesty at the time
of the Congress of Princes. Your Majesty, while entertaining no doubt
as to my devotion and obedience, will not expect me to be superior
to every human weakness and to preserve my composure at all times
when I see how my heavy, and I may fairly say exhausting, duties are
intentionally rendered more difficult by the displeasure of such
highly placed personages, in whose hearts the success of Prussian
policy and the renown of your Majesty and of the Royal House should
naturally be expected to hold a first place. And why am I subjected
to this implacable displeasure and forced into this struggle with
powerful influences which I have to meet at every step I take? Merely
because I will not consent to serve two masters, nor carry out
another policy than your Majesty’s, nor reckon with other influences
than your Majesty’s commands. My offence is that I was ready to serve
your Majesty according to your own will when others declined to do
so, and that I did not hesitate to obey your Majesty at the risk of
drawing down upon myself the displeasure of those who stand nearest
to your Majesty. I could have peace if, like many of my predecessors,
I were prepared to submit to your Majesty as my own convictions what
was suggested to me in other quarters; and if, in particular, I were
to advise you to give way in matters of internal policy and military
organisation, as of course nothing is really being done in foreign
affairs except what was formerly desired by those who now oppose me.
I beg your Majesty to forgive me if in this struggle, owing to the
feeling that I have been unjustly attacked for the sole reason that I
have tried to do my duty towards your Majesty without looking to the
right or to the left, I have lost that composure which I myself am
desirous of preserving.”
A letter from Bismarck to the King on the 1st of May, 1866: “I submit
the enclosure to your Majesty in support of my urgent and respectful
plea that your Majesty’s kingdom be no longer left exposed to the
danger which, in my most humble opinion, at present threatens it
from the warlike preparations of Austria, whose forces are already
superior to ours and are being daily increased notwithstanding all
pacific assurances. The Minister of War will to-morrow submit to your
Majesty a report of the Ministry of State and proposals for further
precautionary measures. If your Majesty will give me credit for not
being easily accessible to unfounded apprehensions I may venture to
hope that your Majesty will graciously consider my request that the
measures to be taken as a result of my legitimate anxiety may be
speedily carried out.”
Letter from Bismarck to the King, dated 2nd May, 1866: “I
respectfully submit to your Majesty the communication which has just
been received from Vienna. It vouchsafes no prospect that Austria
will disarm, but seems to indicate that she merely wants to put
us off for a few days in order to complete her armaments before
adopting another tone towards your Majesty, in the belief that she
will then have secured a start of us which we could no longer make
up. Information reaches me from the Bourse that it is intended to
adopt financial measures of a ruinous character (forced loans?)
and that the trading community here, including its representative
bodies, regard the inactivity of the Royal House in presence of the
superior armaments of Austria, as inconceivable, and in the highest
degree alarming and detrimental to the country. This feeling, which
has prevailed among your Majesty’s Ministers before to-day, has now
become general in the city since the facts which were previously
known to the Government have found their way into publicity. This
feeling would certainly find violent expression should the event
show, which God forbid, that there had been any actual negligence in
providing for the protection of the country.”
On Friday at lunch the Chief asked me: “What is your opinion, Busch,
of Goethe’s tragedies, and of his dramas altogether?” I replied that
he was less of a dramatist than a lyric poet, but that “Faust,”
setting aside the second part, was after all a most wonderful
production. “Yes, certainly,” he said, “and ‘Götz’ too, but ‘Egmont,’
the man in ‘Stella,’ Tasso, and the leading characters in the others,
are all Weislingens--weak soft, sentimental creatures--not men as in
Shakespeare, always repetitions of himself, for he too had something
feminine in him, and could only realise and portray the feelings of
women.” I finally recommended Victor Hehn’s “Gedanken über Goethe,”
and referred him in particular to the first and second chapters.
Towards evening another long walk with Rottenburg, while the Prince
went to Schwarzenbeck and the Princess to Hamburg, probably to
make purchases in view of the Emperor’s visit. Both were back for
dinner, at which the Ranger or Chief Ranger of Schleswig-Holstein,
and the Head Forester Lange were also present. The conversation at
table turned chiefly on forestry, the various species of trees,
and other wooden subjects. A further selection from the Chief’s
papers, the arrangement of which will be complete in four or five
days. A letter of the 5th of January, 1876, from the Crown Prince
introduces Professor Geffcken, who has been to see him, and with
whom he has been speaking about his book, _Staat und Kirche_ (State
and Church), as a man “of ripe thought and great experience.” The
Chief replied on the 8th: “Dr. Geffcken belongs to that party in
the Evangelical Church which, like President von Gerlach and some
other Protestants, is in alliance with the Centre party and the
Jesuits, and which has been and still is hostile to every phase of
the German Empire’s development.” The letter goes on to say that his
book is a superficial compilation; that his criticism of the Falk
laws gives evidence of audacious presumption rather than of impartial
consideration; and that his Augustenburg and Hanseatic Particularism
has not been overcome by the restoration of the Empire, whose
interests he opposes in Alsace. “If I were to see him without the
presence of witnesses (which the Crown Prince seemed from his letter
to desire) I should have reason to apprehend that my intercourse with
such a tool of sectarian intrigue would arouse the mistrust of my
colleagues and of public opinion.”
The Crown Prince thinks otherwise. He replied on the 12th of January:
“During the many years of my acquaintance with Dr. Geffcken I have
never seen any leaning on his part to Catholicism, nor any opposition
to Prussia as a matter of principle. On the contrary I could see from
his whole attitude, as well as from the statements frequently made by
him, that there is as little reason to doubt his ardent Protestantism
as there is to question his patriotism.”
In a letter of the 12th of May, 1876, H.R.H. cannot too strongly urge
the Chancellor to give Friedberg the Imperial Secretaryship of State
for Justice, which it was proposed to establish. He at the same time
tried to meet the objections which Bismarck supposed the Emperor to
entertain. According to a letter of the 30th of June from the Crown
Prince to Bismarck Friedberg had acquired a claim upon his gratitude
by his long service, which frequently involved difficulties and
sacrifices, but was always marked with the same devotion.
On the 13th of June, 1878, the Crown Prince writing to the Chief
on the death of King George of Hanover, says _inter alia_: “I am of
opinion that now, the unfortunate Prince being dead, we must above
all things adopt a generous attitude towards his relatives.”
The Crown Prince now writes to the Chancellor more frequently than
before. From the 6th of July, 1879, onwards, the project of marrying
Prince William to the daughter of the Augustenburger was repeatedly
mentioned, Bismarck being asked to promote it. Bismarck submitted
his opinion of the scheme. (Professor Schulz prepared a similar
statement, in which he proved the Augustenburger’s equality of birth,
which had been strongly questioned.) In this opinion the Chief
recommends as indispensable a previous renunciation by Duke Frederick.
CORRESPONDENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS RESPECTING THE
GERMAN ALLIANCE WITH AUSTRIA.
Andrassy writes to Bismarck (neat handwriting in Latin characters):
“Schönbrunn, 1st September, 1879. Honoured Prince! Before leaving
Gastein I communicated _in nuce_ by telegraph to my most gracious
master, who went direct from Prague to Bruck, the tendency and the
result so far of our conferences. I laid special stress on the fact
that in view of the warlike preparations and the threatening language
which was heard alternately, both in Vienna and in Germany, the
question we had to deal with was that of a defensive understanding,
a sort of guarantee of insurance, between our two sovereigns, in
the sense that any attack upon either of the two empires should
be repelled by their united forces, and that the _casus fœderis_
should also arise in the event of an attack upon either by a third
Power with the co-operation of Russia. I afterwards emphasised the
circumstance that I was strongly in favour of this combination, but
nevertheless had not in any way pledged his Majesty. Hereupon I
received on my arrival a telegram from Prague, in which the Emperor
declares that he approves of the tendency and present results of
our meeting from the _fullest conviction_, and invites me to go
to see him in camp at Bruck. I was at Bruck yesterday, and had
an opportunity of submitting a detailed report on the subject. I
found the Emperor so fully convinced of the usefulness and, indeed,
necessity of such an arrangement, that further argument in its favour
proved to be superfluous. His Majesty sees therein not only no
departure from the determination to maintain peace between the three
empires, but the only possible way at the present moment of removing
the sword of Damocles which constantly hangs over our relations, and
of securing peace for the benefit of both States, and, indeed, for
the welfare of the _third_. As a matter of course, my Emperor is
always glad to see you here, and will be particularly glad to do so
on the present occasion. In the meantime, I am authorised as soon
as you are in a position to inform me that you have obtained the
approval in principle of the Emperor William to receive your draft
text and to prepare one myself. I am to remain in office until this
matter is completed, my successor only taking over the conduct of
affairs after the understanding has been concluded. Besides, I have
initiated him into the question, and he is in perfect agreement.
“Thus far as to what concerns his Majesty. The following is personal
and quite confidential. I have not ceased to think over the matter
for myself from all points of view, and my conviction has thereby
been strengthened. If immediately after a war for which no one in
Russia will to-day accept the responsibility and which has weakened
the Empire both from a financial and military standpoint, and at a
time when the Nihilist movement is momentarily suppressed and there
is nothing to force the Government to seek a diversion abroad,
Germany is to be threatened with France, and ourselves with an
increase of the army, and that in connection with such questions
as Merkovitch and the post offices of Eastern Rumelia, what is
to be expected when the wounds of war are healed, when internal
difficulties again make themselves felt, and when a foreign diversion
may seem the only means of escape?
“I must confess that I can have no ease of mind so long as I do
not see the torch extinguished which the Emperor Alexander half
unconsciously swings about over the European powder barrel, and
while I know the peace of Europe to rest in the hands of a Milutin,
a Jomini, and doubtless presently of an Ignatieff. I believe that
to-day every State (although our own less than others) has enough to
do to protect its authority against the subversive elements in its
midst. How is that to be done, however, and who will be able to do
it if the State is constantly obliged to devote half its power and
attention to dangers which are not of an internal but of a foreign
character, and which come not from below but from above? I entertain
no doubt as to the personal intentions of the Emperor Alexander. I
am convinced that he does not wish for war at present. But as the
Minister of a neighbouring State I cannot forget that he had also no
desire for the war just concluded, and that from the beginning to the
end of it he was trying to master the movement which had originated
in his immediate _entourage_. I consider it a European necessity to
provide in some way against this danger, and however difficult I
find it now to postpone my retirement which is already widely known
to be impending, it would be an immense gratification to me, as a
servant of my Emperor and country, to be able to join with you,
honoured Prince, in signing this guarantee for the future of our two
realms. Austria once committed the mistake of declining the overtures
of Germany which would have secured our mutual interests. It is a
satisfaction to me to be able to state that the same mistake will not
be committed by us this time.
“In sincere friendship and genuine respect,
“Your most devoted,
“Andrassy.”
To this Bismarck replied on the 3rd of September: “Honoured
Count,--Yesterday evening I received your letter of the 1st instant,
which is a source of much pleasure and satisfaction to me. I hasten
to send you a provisional answer. And, first, I beg you to convey to
his Majesty the Emperor my respectful thanks for the gracious manner
in which he has referred to my intention to come to Vienna. I am
pleased to see from your letter that his Majesty (unser Herr) has
one foot in the stirrup, and do not doubt that our united efforts
will succeed in placing him firmly in the saddle. Unfortunately, from
the nature of things, geographical and political, my task cannot be
so speedily completed as yours. A verbal report has not only the
advantage of saving time, but also that of confining the replies to
such questions as are actually raised in the most exalted quarter.
In a written report I must, as a measure of precaution, discuss
all the misunderstandings of which I may apprehend the possibility.
It has, therefore, come to pass that I have been obliged to dictate
to my son (who, with your kind permission, also writes this letter)
sixty pages, the contents of which I was further obliged to expand
in detail by telegraphic and other additions. Nevertheless, I have
not succeeded, in spite of all my pains, in entirely removing the
apprehension that our peaceful scheme may conceal some secret views
of an aggressive character. This idea is unwelcome to a gentleman
of over eighty-two years of age, but I hope I may be able to dispel
it altogether, even if it costs me a somewhat lengthy postscript to
those sixty pages. My master’s disinclination to a speedy acceptance
of new situations, which is a feature of his character, offers less
scope for my activity. For his Majesty, the attitude recently adopted
by the Emperor Alexander has for the first time illuminated, as with
a lightning flash, a situation which I have been repeatedly obliged
to recognise during the past few years. It will be a matter of
extreme difficulty for his Majesty to find himself forced into making
a choice between the two neighbouring empires, and he will therefore
close his mind as long as possible to the conviction that the moment
has come for such a course. In our Royal House habit exercises an
enormous power, and the instinct of persistence grows stronger with
age, and resists the recognition of undoubted changes in the outer
world. Besides, the Emperor Alexander (I do not know whether it be
due to the influence of others, or to his own determination) now
endeavours to force the Jupiter Tonans into the background by a
rapid transition to sunshine. In this sense the last threatening
utterances were followed within a week by a friendly invitation to
send a Prussian officer to Warsaw. This was accepted by my Emperor,
who announced the despatch of Field-Marshal Manteuffel and suite,
without my previous knowledge of this step, as a military measure.
Baron Manteuffel met at Warsaw with very considerable readiness to
make advances, in the sincerity and permanence of which however,
after all that has passed, I cannot place any confidence. I am not
as yet aware whether the meeting which is to take place to-day at
Alexandrowo, was suggested by him or by the Russians. The objections
on this side against a meeting on Russian soil have been disposed of
by a reference to the difficulty of taking with equal promptitude
outside of Russia the necessary precautions for the safety of the
Emperor Alexander. So far as I know this meeting takes place to-day,
our Emperor being accompanied by an aide-de-camp. According to a
report of Minister von Bülow it is mainly inspired by a desire to
obtain from the Emperor Alexander an explanation of his threatening
attitude. Before this has taken place I cannot expect an answer to
my report, which was first communicated to the Emperor on the 2nd,
and to which I have up to the present only received a telegraphic
reply through Bülow. From Bülow’s telegram, however, it appears
that even now the Emperor approves of my re-opening at Vienna the
conferences with you, upon which I have already reported to him (--At
first he was opposed even to Bismarck’s returning home by way of
Vienna--), but that nothing must be settled without his approval.
Of course that goes without saying and you will not be impatient if
my master requires before coming to a decision the time which his
years, his habits, and the novelty of the outlook demand. There is
also a further circumstance which indeed is favourable to our plans,
namely that H.R.H. the Crown Prince was consulted, and therefore
that an exchange of ideas must have taken place between the exalted
gentlemen. From my experience of my Sovereign for years past I had
hardly hoped that, within twenty-four hours after taking cognisance
for the first time of such a comprehensive and novel statement of
the situation, he would without more ado agree to the continuation
of our conferences. As I shall not remain inactive in the meantime I
hope before I leave Gastein to obtain fuller powers. Like you, every
day’s further consideration confirms my conviction of the usefulness
and necessity of the work which we have undertaken, and I trust God
will grant us to secure for our two great States the guarantee of
external and internal peace towards which our efforts are directed.
I have considered it my duty to inform you of the stage at which I
have arrived in my work, and I shall continue to do so as soon as I
receive the more detailed expression of my master’s views which has
been promised. Should his Majesty commit this to paper at Königsberg
on the 4th it would come to my hands on the 7th or at latest the 8th
instant. I was greatly tempted after your departure to go personally
to Berlin in order to plead our cause verbally, but the state of my
health and strength was too indifferent to permit of such a strain.
Moreover, experience has taught me that in explaining important
and difficult matters to my master I attain my object, not more
rapidly, it is true, but more certainly, by writing than in verbal
intercourse, as, in the latter, difficulties occasionally arise which
have no real connection with the matter under consideration. I hope
to complete my cure here by the 15th or 16th, and to be then once
more equal to the demands of the coming winter. Trusting that we
shall soon meet again, I remain, with friendly and cordial respect,
“Your most devoted,
“Bismarck.”
Stolberg writes to Bismarck from Berlin on the 17th of September:
“In continuation of my official communication of to-day, I have the
honour dutifully to inform your Serene Highness of the following.
As the Emperor was almost on the point of giving his approval he
suddenly became embarrassed, and said there was still another
obstacle, which he had mentioned to you in his last letter, and
which obliged him to attach importance to the exclusion of every
possibility of our being placed under an obligation to support
Austria in a war of aggression against Russia. After some hesitation
his Majesty made me pledge my word that, with the exception of your
Serene Highness, I would speak to no one on the subject, and then
referred to an understanding entered into by the two Emperors at St.
Petersburg in 1873 (with your previous knowledge, but without your
counter-signature), by which each was bound to render assistance
to the other in certain circumstances. This has obviously been the
chief stumbling-block, and has given rise to the notion of treachery
towards the Emperor Alexander to which Herr von Bülow alluded from
Stettin. Although this statement was too vague for me, in ignorance
of the matter in question, to thoroughly appreciate the weight of
the objection, I considered it my duty, in view of the approaching
decision, to seize hold of the statement made by the Emperor, namely,
that if the possibility above mentioned were excluded, his objection
would cease, and therefore to propose the addition.
“Although this objection would be thus obviated, his Majesty
nevertheless wishes to hear what your Serene Highness has to say upon
that point, and desires me to inform you to that effect. After giving
his sanction the Emperor was somewhat affected, and told me that
this decision had cost him a great effort. He believed, however,
that he ought to follow the advice of a tried counsellor like your
Serene Highness.--I am, with the profoundest respect, &c.”
Stolberg’s suggested addition ran as follows:--
“The sanction of the Emperor William to the signature of the treaty
with Austria would be obtained on condition that the Emperor might
write to the Emperor Alexander: ‘His Majesty is satisfied with
the assurances given in Berlin by Saburoff as to Russia’s love of
peace, and desires, as an evidence of his loyalty and frankness,
to communicate the fact that he _was on the point_ (underlined in
pencil by Bismarck) of concluding a treaty with Austria, in which
the careful cultivation of good relations was promised, and mutual
assistance was only provided for in cases of attack.’”
The letter from the Emperor to Bismarck, which Stolberg refers to in
the above communication, is dated Stettin, September 15th, and runs
as follows: “After I had completed my last letter to you, which you
will have received to-day, Field-Marshal Manteuffel forwarded to me
your telegram to him of the 7th instant, with which I am greatly
pleased, as I can see from it that it will be possible to bring about
an understanding between us. Fortunately this opinion is confirmed
by your fourth report, which reached me yesterday. But an important
point has occurred to me in connection with the pourparlers which you
will hold in Vienna. That is the Convention dated St. Petersburg,
1873, which was only signed by the two Field-Marshals, Moltke and
Barjatinsky, and was ratified by the Emperor Alexander and myself,
while you declined to sign. A circumstance which goes to confirm the
---- (illegible) which you then and so often raised against _binding_
Conventions, in circumstances where there was as yet no positive
object in view, for which reason I found much difficulty in making up
my mind to sign the St. Petersburg Convention. How can you now desire
to enter into a convention without giving notice of withdrawal from
that concluded at St. Petersburg? Both are intended to be defensive
conventions. Now, that of St. Petersburg binds Prussia and Russia to
render each other _assistance_ in case either should be attacked. The
projected Convention is to contain the same stipulation, but against
Russia. How are these two to be reconciled? It therefore appears to
me that Bülow’s idea (?) of leaving out the ‘against Russia’ would
afford us an opportunity of drawing Russia into the new Convention,
and thereby fulfilling that of St. Petersburg. As I do not believe
Bülow junior to be initiated into the secret of the St. Petersburg
Convention, I have not been able to speak of it to him, all the more
so as from his silence on the subject when stating his views he
seemed to have no knowledge of it.
“William.”
To this was added a postscript of no particular importance: review of
troops, inspection of fleet, patriotic reception, &c.
Bismarck to Andrassy from Gastein, on the 20th of September:
“Honoured Count,--In continuation of my humble communication of the
3rd instant, I have the honour now to complete the answer therein
begun to your Excellency’s kind letter of the 1st instant. I have,
in accordance with our conferences here, sent repeated and detailed
reports on the situation to the Emperor, my most gracious master.
The conformity between my views, which are known to your Excellency,
and those of my colleagues who represent me, have made it possible
for me to overcome the difficulties which were created by distance
and opposing influences from other quarters in so far that I am
now in a position to state that the Emperor agrees in principle
with the views by which I was guided at our recent conferences.
According to an official communication from my substitute, Count
Stolberg-Wernigerode, the Emperor is prepared to sanction an
agreement under which both Powers mutually undertake to continue to
promote the maintenance of peace, and in particular to cultivate
peaceful relations between both States and Russia, but, in the event
of either of them being attacked by one or more Powers, to jointly
repel such attack with their entire united strength. According
to this I am empowered by my most gracious master to propose an
unconditional defensive alliance between Austria-Hungary and the
German Empire, either with or without a limit of time. I humbly beg
your Excellency to enter upon a verbal discussion of this proposal.
I shall have to submit the result of our negotiations to my most
gracious master for approval. I entertain no doubt as to my being
able to obtain this sanction, if your Excellency be in a position
to agree in the name of the Emperor Francis Joseph to the proposal
made on our side, in the same simple and general terms in which it
is submitted. In any case I shall consider myself fortunate if our
conferences lead to this or other results calculated to promote the
mutual interests of both Empires and the peace of Europe.
“With friendly and cordial respect,
“I remain your most devoted,
“v. Bismarck.”
Letter from the King to Bismarck, dated Baden-Baden, October 2nd,
1879: “I regret to see from your letter of the 24th ultimo, as
also from the memorandum enclosed therewith, from the protocols of
your negotiations in Vienna, and from the draft treaty which has
been based upon them, that my views with regard to the latter have
not found acceptance on any side. As I expressed these views in
my letters from Danzig and Stettin of the 10th and 12th ultimo as
clearly as it was possible for me to do, you can see for yourself
how far they differ from the results arrived at, so that there is no
necessity for me to repeat them. Notwithstanding this circumstance,
however, I return herewith your letter of the 24th in order that you
may form an idea from my marginal notes (which, I regret to say, are
only in pencil) of the impression which it has made upon me.
“Germany and Austria are desirous of attaining the same end--security
against unprovoked attacks by foreign foes. But owing to the special
mention of Russia as the foe in question, I cannot agree to the
present proposals nor to the immediate conclusion of a treaty. After
again extending the hand in friendship to the Emperor Alexander
after the removal of misunderstandings (at Alexandrowo), am I now to
conclude an alliance against him, even of a defensive character, in
which he alone is referred to as the presumable aggressor, and keep
this intention a secret from him? I cannot be guilty of such an act
of disloyalty. In mitigation of this objection it has been urged
that, _le cas échéant_, Russia would be informed of the existence
of an alliance, if indications of a war against us became evident.
This very uncertain expression is so elastic that the notice would
either come too late or would only cause still greater irritation.
It was further argued that in the state of ferment now prevailing
in the internal affairs of Russia the knowledge of the alliance in
question would give her the leverage and self-command necessary to
master that ferment. But surely for that purpose official knowledge
of that honourable intention is necessary. And yet it is of course
impossible to give official knowledge of the fact that Russia is
regarded as the sole enemy. Therefore in order that it may be
possible to communicate the treaty to Russia, the reference to her
must be omitted from it, and the enemy be only described in general
terms, while it must be incidentally mentioned that in entering upon
it the parties have this honourable intention in view. That is what
I desire. I am opposed to an immediate ratification of the treaty,
because there is at the present moment absolutely nothing which
could lead to a war against Germany and Austria, and it is notorious
that binding treaties entered into without urgent necessity are
double-edged weapons. Austria urges the immediate ratification on
the ground that the favourable situation which for the moment exists
in France may be endangered, and that the intimacy between Austria
and England may cool down. I cannot conceive how such far-reaching
political combinations can possibly be made to depend upon the hazard
of a Minister of the French Republic who is on the point of being
overthrown. The Anglo-Austrian intimacy must after all be very shaky
if it depends upon the date of the ratification of a treaty. In view
of the consideration shown by Austria for the susceptibilities of
France and her apprehensions as to a coolness with England, Milutin’s
opinion as to the possibility of a Triple Alliance may after all not
be entirely unfounded.
“Now, another circumstance has arisen which may open a way out of
the dilemma in which I find myself between my conscience and honour
so far as Russia is concerned, and the objections raised to my views
on the Austrian side. In reply to my telegraphic inquiry, you have
informed me by wire of what Saburoff told you under instructions
from the Emperor. You infer from these communications that Russia
has already got wind of our Austrian negotiations (as is quite
natural), and you wish to conclude from the defensive attitude,
which, according to Saburoff’s assurance, Russia intends in future
to maintain that this assurance must have been a consequence of
the knowledge obtained respecting our negotiations. In these
circumstances it might be possible to immediately carry out the
suggestion made by me on page 3 as to the manner of communicating
our proposed arrangement with Austria, and to give the treaty a
general character, not only by omitting the name of Russia, but
by inviting her to join in the treaty. You yourself have said to
Saburoff that you are thoroughly in favour of the maintenance of the
Three Emperors’ Alliance; and the same idea occurs in the memorandum,
the protocol, and the treaty. What, then, could be simpler than to
confirm in a real written treaty the Drei Kaiser Bündniss which has
hitherto been merely verbal, or, at most, only had a written basis in
the St. Petersburg-Vienna arrangement? You yourself have further told
Saburoff that you would not be able to co-operate in any policy by
which Austria would be endangered. It is as right as it is important
that Russia should thus receive the first official intimation of
that of which it has already got wind. Inasmuch as our Ambassador at
St. Petersburg will have informed Minister Giers of your interview
with Saburoff, I would ask whether his assurance that Russia would
henceforth only pursue a defensive policy based on the Treaty of
Berlin is authentic, and whether it signifies a defensive policy as
against Germany and Austria. If a satisfactory answer were received,
and this were immediately communicated to Austria, there would be no
further obstacle in the way of ourselves and Austria acquainting the
Emperor Alexander in the manner above mentioned (page 3) with the
projected treaty, and inviting his adhesion.
“This would render necessary a modification of section 1; section 2
would drop out entirely; section 4 would be redrafted in accordance
with my marginal notes, should it be considered desirable that the
draft itself should constitute the first invitation to Russia to
join in the treaty, as the whole treaty would be submitted as an
instrument affecting so far only Germany and Austria. I consider
the omission of section 2 to be necessary, because it is directed
exclusively against Russia; and furthermore because it is specially
stated in your letter of the 24th ultimo that in case of an attack by
France upon Germany, Austria would be dispensed from supporting the
latter, and only bound to observe a benevolent neutrality. That is as
much as to say that we should support Austria against Russia with our
whole power (section 1), while Austria is dispensed from rendering a
like service if France should attack us. But the latter eventuality
is unquestionably more possible and indeed more probable than a
Russian attack, at least up to the present, since there the desire
for the _revanche_ is only slumbering, has never been abandoned, and
will show itself again directly a suitable opportunity arises. With
regard to our--Germany’s--position in a war with France I differ from
Field-Marshal Moltke, inasmuch as I cannot endorse his view that our
forces are sufficient to enable us to carry on such a war without
allies. In that event we should find ourselves in presence of an army
entirely different to that of 1870, as the progress which it has made
is undeniable. Besides, there is a further consideration, namely, the
almost hermetically sealed French frontier, extending from the Swiss
to the Belgian frontiers, a continuous line of fortresses and forts,
which--even if broken through--would render it impossible to send
reinforcements to the front, and would, moreover, enormously hamper
the strategic advance of our forces. It is on this restricted field
that, according to Field-Marshal Moltke, we are to deliver battle. If
we are victorious we cannot pursue the defeated enemy as we did in
1870, being stopped by this girdle of fortresses, to which, instead
of engaging in a pursuit, we should immediately have to lay siege.
Months might pass before we could capture any of them, and this would
give the defeated army time to refit at its leisure behind this line
and to meet us well prepared in the event of our breaking through it
at the risk of our communications with our base. But if the German
army is defeated in the first battle then the left bank of the Rhine
is immediately lost and we must withdraw across the river.
“For this reason Austria ought not to remain neutral in such a war,
but, on the contrary, must be bound by treaty to support us with her
whole power, in the same way as the treaty binds us to do with regard
to Russia.”
Continuation of this Imperial communication to the Chancellor, dated
Baden, October 4th: “I had not finished the enclosed letter to you
yesterday when your long telegram arrived, so that I had still to
add the last three-quarters of a page. The standpoint taken by me
in this letter has not been affected by my resolve to approve
_conditionally_ of the Vienna proposal. But I again ask you what are
we to reply if, in reference to the Memorandum to be communicated
to him, the Emperor Alexander should ask: ‘What, then, have you
decided to do in connection with this Memorandum? most probably
concluded an agreement? Until I am acquainted with it, I can come to
no decision, therefore show me this agreement.’ But as the agreement
in its present form cannot be shown to Russia, we must decline to
produce it; and what impression must this refusal make upon the
Emperor Alexander? Certainly the very worst. The wording of section
2 is, to my mind, so very strange that I merely wanted to sum up the
enclosure by proposing that the neutrality of Austria in case of our
being attacked by France be struck out, and Austria be called upon to
assume the same obligation to stand by us with her entire strength
that we undertake towards Austria in section 1, in case of a Russian
attack. Otherwise the conditions are not equal. Strongly impress this
upon Andrassy once more.
“William.”
Letter from Andrassy to Bismarck, dated 3rd October, 1879: “I have
received your much esteemed letter of the 29th of September, for
which I return my warmest thanks. I have since then received through
Prince Reuss some communications referring to the position of the
negotiations. I enclose them herewith in the form in which they were
written down by Prince Reuss himself. I am in a position to declare
myself in agreement with the intention manifested in this proposal,
but I have nevertheless some scruples as to two points. The first is
that a treaty is spoken of, and the second that the conclusion of the
treaty is described as impending _in the future_. My objection to
the first is that, if the intention to conclude a treaty is expressly
emphasised in the letter of his Majesty the Emperor William,
it follows necessarily that they will ask for the text at St.
Petersburg, and this will afford the Russian Cabinet, before things
are settled between us, an opportunity to commence negotiations _à
trois_ from which I do not anticipate a satisfactory result for any
of the parties. For this reason I venture to submit a counter, or,
more correctly, a parallel proposal, the adoption of which would, it
seems to me, be of advantage to both sides. This is:--
“_After having sanctioned the signature of the Treaty_ (underlined by
Bismarck in pencil) his Majesty the Emperor William can _communicate
the entire contents_ (underlined in pencil by Bismarck) of the
Memorandum agreed upon and signed by us, which, of course, implies
an agreement, adding on his own part the explanation that this
agreement at the same time involves a tacit understanding by both
Governments that an attack upon either Empire will be regarded as
directed against both, and will also be construed by his Majesty
in that sense. His Majesty, satisfied with the statement made by
Saburoff, respecting Russia’s love of peace, makes this communication
as a proof of his loyalty and frankness. His Majesty may, perhaps,
add that this understanding is of an entirely defensive character,
and that there is nothing to prevent Russia from removing any
antagonistic tendency by herself adhering to the principles laid down
in the Memorandum. (Pencil-marked in the margin by Bismarck.) By this
means the object of the Emperor William would be fully attained,
namely, to communicate the significance of our understanding, while,
on the other hand, no mention would be made of the existence
of a more precise agreement, and, therefore, the necessity of
communicating it would be avoided.
“Such a communication of the text would have among other things the
disadvantage, first, that the adhesion of Russia to this text is
inconceivable; secondly, that the passage in it referring to France
and Italy would become known there almost immediately, and would, at
the present time, give rise to quite unnecessary combinations; and,
thirdly, that the affair might transpire in Parliament, and lead to
undesirable discussions. These considerations commend my proposal.
Should you not be able to secure its acceptance in the competent
quarter, I could agree to any other method, including the suggestion
made by Stolberg, my most gracious master having before his departure
declared that he would not make a _conditio sine quâ non_ of
preserving secrecy as to the Treaty _after signature_.
“There is, on the other hand, one point which I would regard as
entirely out of the question, namely, any communication of the
existence and contents of the Treaty before the sanction of his
Majesty, the Emperor William, is actually given or is assured.
(Bismarck added in pencil: ‘Quite right.’) Without desiring to
forestall the decision upon this point of my most gracious master,
I should prefer to _renounce altogether the conclusion of an
agreement_, and in any case I should be obliged to forego for my own
part any further share in the negotiations upon such basis. Pray
excuse, dear Prince, the somewhat abrupt tone of this statement, but
as the matter appeared to me to be pressing, I desired to let Prince
Reuss have the letter to-day. Begging you to present my respects to
the Princess, I remain, with unalterable and cordial respect,
“Your sincerely devoted,
“Andrassy.”
The Crown Prince writes to Bismarck (quite confidentially) from
Baden-Baden, on the 4th of October, 1879: “Count Stolberg will
have already informed you prior to the receipt of these lines of
the course of affairs up to the signing of the draft Treaty by the
Emperor. I therefore say nothing more about this very exciting
crisis, the result of which I confidently anticipate will be of
far-reaching importance for the position of Germany. I must point
out, however, that his Majesty is quite miserable, and keeps on
repeating that he has dishonoured himself by his decision, and has
been disloyal to his friend the Tsar; so that one clearly sees how
fearfully difficult the decision was for him, with his extreme
conscientiousness.”
Draft (dated Varzin, October 30th, 1879) of a verbal answer to be
made to the Emperor Alexander in reply to any question which he might
ultimately put: “An institution which arose under the influence of
Alexander I. and which preserved the peace of central Europe for half
a century, had to be sacrificed in 1866 to irresistible necessity.
The German Confederation was an excessive burden to us Prussians,
while it did not satisfy the aspirations of the other Germans. The
discontent thus created was utilised by the revolutionary party, for
the purpose of threatening every German Prince. It was necessary to
deprive them of this weapon, and to satisfy the national sentiment.
This was done at the expense of the security which the Confederation
afforded, almost without cost, to its weaker members.
“That the breach caused by the secession of Austria, which extended
from the Carpathians to the Lake of Constance, would have to be
filled up was recognised even in the _Paulskirche_. Later on, after
the war of 1866, attempts were unceasingly made to bind Austria to
the States, with which it had been formerly united in the German
Confederation, so as to prevent her from allying herself with
France against them. This object has now been attained without
any obligation on our part to defend Trient, Trieste, or, indeed,
Bosnia, against Italians, or Turks, or Southern Slavs. Our agreement
with Austria no more involves anything in the nature of a threat
to our neighbours than would do the erection of a fortress on the
frontier, which, of course, has never been regarded in that light,
and it is even less of a menace for instance, than the construction
of strategic railways. It has, indeed, the character of a mutual
assurance society, which every one having similar interests is at
liberty to join.”
Report of the Emperor William to Bismarck of his interview at
Alexandrowo, from a copy made for the Crown Prince:--
1. _September 5th._--“The Emperor Alexander began the conversation
by an explanation of his letter to me. Nobody knew anything of it.”
(Marginal note by Bismarck: “Gortschakoff revised it.”) (1) He
had shown it to no one _before_ it was despatched, and _after_ it
had been sent he only communicated it verbally without naming the
persons. If, therefore, I had found anything offensive in the letter,
as he saw from my answer, he alone was to blame, and he recognised
that it was possible for me to have misunderstood him. (2) He was
_very sorry_ for that, and since it had had such a serious result as
to cause me personal offence, he wished it to be regarded as if it
had never been written. Nothing was farther from his intention than
the idea of a threat. He had only wished to call my attention to the
fact, which was perfectly true, that if the press of both countries
continued to rail at each other it must lead in the course of time to
a feeling of hostility between the two States, and his sole object
was to avoid that. (3) He considered that the preservation of the
peace of Europe was only possible in the future, as it had been in
the past, so long as good relations between Prussia and Russia were
maintained under all circumstances. (3A) The votes given, mostly
against Russia, by my Commissioners in the proceedings of the
European Commissions in the East had betrayed a hostile attitude on
the part of Germany towards Russia, which had caused great irritation
in the latter country, and gave rise to the excited comments of the
press. (4) In these Commissions Russia was pursuing the object which
she had had exclusively in view during the war, namely, to improve
and render more assured the fate of the Christian populations, but
not to make conquests. If opposition were now offered thereto in
the delimitation of the frontier, and more or more Christians were
restored against his wish to Turkish sovereignty, the Commissioners
must have received instructions to that effect. (5) The German
votes had already produced a bad effect in Turkey also, inasmuch as
the disagreement which was there seen to exist between Germany and
Russia rendered the Turks more obstinate, and caused work to drag
on interminably. (6) Prince Bismarck, whom he had hitherto known
only as the friend of the Russo-Prussian relations, seemed unable
to forget Prince Gortschakoff’s--stupid--circular of 1875. _He_ had
strongly advised Prince Gortschakoff _against sending this circular_,
and pointed out to him the evil consequences (of his vanity, _en
parenthese_) because if there actually were anything to smooth over,
that was not the way to set about it. Prince Gortschakoff had his
way, however. Bismarck’s grudge, and his inability to forget, which
began with this irritation against Gortschakoff, appeared to him to
have been transferred to Russia, and it was to this that he referred
in his letter to me when he said that he could not reconcile such
conduct with the character of so eminent a statesman. This expression
of his in the letter to me did not refer to the instructions given
to the Commissioners with respect to Eastern affairs. Moreover
(7), Prince Gortschakoff is a man who has outlived his usefulness,
and whom he hardly ever consults now. “In reply to No. 1, I said I
could not deny that I had been painfully affected by his letter,
particularly because I had considered that his remarks referred only
to the votes in question, and they seemed to me a matter of such
slight consequence that I could not understand his irritation on that
score. It was only through his declaration to the effect that his
expression referred to the subject dealt with in No. 7 (doubtless
No. 6 is meant) that I now for the first time understood it. I
could assure him that Prince Bismarck still regards the relations
between Prussia, Germany, and Russia as he always did, but that he
saw a feeling gaining ground in Russia, chiefly owing to the press,
which he could not understand, in view of the existing laws there,
especially as semi-official organs contributed to this detrimental
state of feeling. I added that I was prepared to admit that our
press was also guilty of similar excesses, but, after all, these
were mainly in self-defence against the Russian attacks. We are
so tied by our press laws that we can only intervene in the way of
personal _appeal_ to the editors of the newspapers, but not legally
unless a state of siege were proclaimed in certain districts. Nos. 2
and 3. If the words in question were to be understood as containing
no threat I should feel reassured, as the interpretation which the
Emperor gave to this passage of his letter was in perfect accord
with my own convictions. As his Government had quite recently
issued a serious reprimand with regard to improper articles in the
newspapers, it was to be expected and hoped, from the power with
which the Governor-General was invested, that energetic action would
be taken. I, on my part, had caused certain _advice_ to be given to
the editors, the law did not _permit_ any more. 3A. Our instructions
to the Commissioners in question had remained the same from the very
beginning: if Russia and Austria were in agreement always to vote
with them; when points arose where that was not the case to vote
with the majority, where the Russian proposal was not flagrantly
untenable. That had been the case in the matter of Silistria, where
I was entirely in favour of the Russian proposal to appoint a
Commission to inquire into the question of the bridge on the spot,
and also with regard to the military road through Eastern Rumelia. 4.
This view was quite new to me, as nothing of the kind had previously
been brought to my notice. At the same time, these little frontier
details were after all so trifling that they could hardly affect the
question of the Christians to any important extent. Unfortunately,
the Greek frontier question had only been mentioned at the Congress
as the expression of a desire, and not as a _demand_, and I foresaw,
from the first, how it would be, _mais pendant le congrès je n’avais
pas voix au chapitre_. I regarded in the same way the Jewish
question in Rumania, the broader solution desired being, to my mind,
impracticable, and therefore I wished to see the Greek modification
adopted.”
Continuation of this report, dated September 12th, 1879:--
“Nos. 6 and 7. I had never noticed that Prince Bismarck was inspired
by particularly hostile feelings towards Prince Gortschakoff on
account of the latter’s circular of 1875. My opinion and his upon
that note was exactly the same as that of the Emperor Alexander
himself; but at the Berlin Congress the same view with regard to
Prince Gortschakoff was manifested as was expressed above by the
Emperor, and I therefore understood the peculiar position which was
now assigned to him. I believe that in my answer to the Emperor I
adequately emphasised how little change there has been in Prince
Bismarck’s political views so far as Russia is concerned. He had
always agreed with me that, remembering the attitude adopted by
Russia towards us in 1870, we for two whole years, 1876 and 1877,
tried to manifest our gratitude to the Emperor by our _neutralité
bienveillante_, and actually succeeded in preventing a coalition of
the Western Powers, including Austria. This seemed to me to disprove
the suspicion of the Emperor that Prince Bismarck had out of spite
against Prince Gortschakoff changed his political views, and on that
account had adopted towards Russia an attitude to which expression
had been given in such trifling questions. Up to the present Prince
Bismarck’s sentiments towards Russia remained unaltered.
“On the forenoon of the 4th the Emperor came to see me again in order
to take leave of me after lunch. He had received a telegram from
Jugenheim, from the Empress Marie, who desired to be remembered to
me, and was very pleased at our meeting at Alexandrowo. He added:
‘C’est à elle que j’ai communiqué la première ma lettre à Vous dont
le brouillon était par differentes correctures presque illisible. I
afterwards showed my letter and your answer to Adlerberg, Milutin and
Giers; they know exactly what my political opinions are concerning
Prussia and Germany, and being in perfect agreement with me on
this subject, they are pleased that erroneous impressions will be
dispelled by our meeting.’ The Emperor then read me a letter from the
Russian envoy reporting a conversation which he had had at Kissingen
with Prince Bismarck on the political situation; and a great deal had
in particular been said about Prussia and Russia acting together. The
envoy found that Prince Bismarck’s former view of the Three Emperors’
Alliance had remained entirely unchanged. The Emperor repeated,
_en aperçu_, the views which we had exchanged, and was heartily
glad the misunderstandings had been cleared up and that the old
friendship would be maintained between the two States in association
with Austria. As to the latter, he now added for the first time:
‘Certainly I had reason to be dissatisfied with her, as her attitude
towards me during the war was _louche_ as usual. Without firing a
shot she occupied two Turkish provinces, of course never to surrender
them again, as the English will never give up Cyprus, respecting
which they entered into a separate treaty during the Congress without
making any communication to the Great Powers.’ I interrupted him
here, saying I believed there had been negotiations at Reichstadt
respecting the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. ‘Yes,’ said
the Emperor, ‘but under quite different conditions, that Austria
should take part in the war in some way or other. All the same, the
main point is that we should hold together _à trois_.’ Of course I
could only confirm that view as my own conviction.
“On the same morning I spoke to General Count Adlerberg, Minister
Giers, and Minister of War Milutin, one after the other. The first
two spoke with equal warmth in favour of the old relations. They were
aware of the Emperor’s letter and of my answer, which I mentioned as
_entrée de conversation_, and they were at one with the Emperor in
his satisfaction at the removal of the misunderstandings which they
would have thought to be impossible, knowing, as they did, exactly
the views to which the Emperor desired to give expression in his
letter. I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of these sentiments.
I nevertheless told them quite plainly that it was the press that
led to an estrangement between our countries. As a strongly worded
rescript had now been issued in Russia decidedly disapproving of the
hostile attitude adopted by the press towards Germany, an improvement
was to be anticipated, that is, if the Governors by whom a state of
siege had been proclaimed throughout almost all Russia--a measure to
which I could only wish every success--made use of their power to
immediately seize all newspapers, pamphlets, &c., which published
inflammatory matter. If that were not done the dangerous consequences
which the Emperor had foreseen would certainly follow, namely,
discord between the two States. In dealing with our own free press,
my hands were tied by the law and our representative Constitution,
and hence the defensive attitude against the Russian press taken up
in our newspaper articles. I had, however, given orders that the
editors should be advised to exercise greater restraint themselves,
should an improvement take place in the Russian press. The gentlemen
in question agreed with me in all this, and hoped for an improvement.
“The conversation with General Milutin began with the subject
described above. I then expressed my appreciation of the new
organisation introduced during the war, and said I could not
understand where the money was found for it. But all Europe had
been alarmed at seeing the efforts and the monetary sacrifices made
for carrying on the war suddenly retained on a peace footing. He
replied: ‘It was precisely the war which proved that the Russian
army was not strong enough even to overcome the power of Turkey, its
enormous forces being dispersed over the whole empire from Siberia to
the Vistula. Therefore a nucleus must be maintained which shall be
equal to European requirements. This cost can be met out of Russian
resources that are unknown to other countries. We have war frontiers
against China, against the countries on the Indian border, against
Persia and against Turkey. We have received news that a coalition
is being formed between Austria, England, and perhaps France. That
points to a new conflict in the East. England is organising and
arming Asia Minor, which is being inundated with State officials,
generals, and officers in the guise of consuls, a sure indication of
hostile intentions upon our position in the Caucasus. The Eastern
conflict is near at hand.’ I demurred to the latter statement, and
asserted that if once the decisions of the Berlin Congress were
carried out in their entirety, no fresh war was to be anticipated
there, as Turkey required peace above everything else.
“(Signed) William, 9/9/79.”
“While the Emperor was with me on the 4th a telegram from London was
brought to him, according to which England declared that, although
not in favour of the appointment of a technical commission _ad hoc_
for the settlement of the bridge question at Silistria, she would
be pleased to see the Servian Frontier Commission entrusted with
that task. The Emperor said he could agree to that, and that only
technical members should be appointed to the Commission.”
These papers also include the letter from the Emperor William to
Bismarck, dated 10/9/79, which accompanied the foregoing report:
“Herewith I send you the conclusion of the notes of my conversation
with the Emperor Alexander. My letter from Berlin, which crossed
your memorandum No. 1, showed you that your views, which you now
repeat with more detail in No. 2, are in contradiction--first in
principle, and then that an answer could not be given until I had
spoken with the Emperor Alexander. Your premises in the memoranda
could be transformed into truth for me only after I had spoken to the
Emperor, and--as I wrote you through Minister von Bülow--after light
had been thrown upon the correspondence. Up to that time I regarded
your memoranda _comme non avenus_. For me my notes have brought this
light. The Emperor regrets having written the letter, as it has
given rise to misunderstandings; as the words ‘ce qui doit avoir des
suites fâcheuses et dangereuses’ should absolutely not be regarded as
threatening a rupture, but only as directing my attention to the fact
that if some restraint were not placed upon the press, ill feeling
might arise between our two countries, which neither of us desired,
and therefore that measures should be taken accordingly. That being
as true as anything in this world can be, I could only express my
complete approval, all the more so as the Russian Government had
already taken such steps, and I had ordered similar measures prior to
my departure. As you will see from the notes, I corrected the view
taken by the Emperor Alexander of the votes given by my Commissioners
in the East, and he fully understood this, although he stated that he
had already received news of the unfavourable consequences of these
votes, which was quite new to me, but which explained the Emperor’s
dissatisfaction on that score. You will also read how I defended you
against the passage in the Emperor’s letter. He fully agreed that
our policy during the war in the East was of the greatest benefit to
Russia, which involves the highest recognition for yourself. I could
assure him that _till now_ you had maintained your old sentiments
towards Russia, as was sufficiently proved in 1877 and 1878. On this
occasion the Emperor expressed his conviction that peace could only
be preserved for Europe by our holding together _à trois_, as we had
done since the meeting in Berlin in 1872. Having hitherto held the
same conviction myself, I could only agree with him. As the three
persons, Adlerberg, Giers, and Milutin, spoke in exactly the same
sense, the light which I looked for at this meeting at Alexandrowo
respecting the sentiments of the Emperor and those persons who
stand highest in his confidence has been forthcoming _so far as I
am concerned_. None of them has the slightest wish to wage war upon
us. The great additions to the Russian army which were raised as a
reserve during the Turkish war, are retained as a permanent increase
because they believe themselves to be threatened by a European
coalition, and therefore must be in a state of preparation which
would enable them to meet this _alone_.
“Since therefore, for me, the premises in your memoranda fall
to the ground, namely, that owing to the danger threatened from
Russia we should give up the policy we have hitherto pursued in our
relations with that country and not only seek but actually conclude
a European coalition of a defensive nature against Russia, I cannot
lend myself to this project in its present extension. In view of
the explanation given by the Emperor Alexander of his letter to me,
which _I_ originally did not regard as a threat but only as a desire
to see the existing good relations between our States maintained by
means of restrictions upon the press, it could _only be a source
of satisfaction to me_ to see the milder tone which prevailed in
your answer sent by me to the Emperor, the moderate pressure and
the truths which it contained being sufficiently intelligible _and
also understood_. The words ‘une entente séculaire, les legs de
nos pères de glorieuse mémoire’ were written according to my own
heart, and went to the heart of the Emperor, so that he repeated
them to me twice. I could not therefore understand your hostility to
Russia, which increases with each memorandum, nor could I see how the
expressions quoted above could be interpreted as a mere empty phrase!
I was just as deeply affected by the words that we should outwardly
maintain a friendly attitude towards Russia while at the same time
concluding a coalition against her with Austria, with England, and
perhaps with France. And you have its conclusion already so fixedly
in view that you have not only communicated your whole project to
Count Andrassy, but have also permitted him to speak of it to his
Emperor (seinem Kaiser), who also immediately accepts it. Then you
invite me to send you instructions, on your way back through Vienna,
to conclude a defensive alliance there with Austria against Russia,
which would be followed by the larger coalition. Put yourself in my
place for a moment. I am in presence of a personal friend, a near
relative and an ally, in order to come to an understanding as to
some hasty and indeed misunderstood passages in a letter, and our
interview leads to a satisfactory result. Shall I now at the same
time join a hostile coalition against this sovereign, that is to say,
act behind his back in a manner contrary to that in which I spoke to
him?
“I will not absolutely deny that the dangers set forth in your
memoranda may arise one day, particularly on a change of rulers in
St. Petersburg. I am, however, utterly unable to see that there is
any imminent danger. How often have you warned me against treaties
with other Powers, which tied one’s hands, when there is no positive
object in view, and there is only room for conjecture as to an
uncertain future. My brother and Minister Manteuffel in particular
burnt their fingers over the Three Years’ Treaty with Austria which
was concluded after Olmütz, and impatiently awaited the expiry of
that term. The present case is quite similar. It is against my
political convictions and my conscience to bind my hands for the sake
of a _possible eventuality_.
“At the same time, I must not disavow you and the steps which you
have already taken in dealing with Andrassy and his master. Therefore
in Vienna, whither all the newspapers already say you are going, you
may speak of the _eventuality_ of disagreement with Russia developing
into a possible breach, and enter into _pourparlers_ respecting the
joint measures to be then taken with Austria. But, following my
conscience, I do not authorise you to conclude a convention, to say
nothing of a treaty.
“In this way I hope our views will again agree. If it be God’s will
that this should be the case, I can look forward with confidence to
the future, which would otherwise for me be very dark, and anticipate
a genuine continuance of the relations with Russia, which are growing
more friendly. I cannot tell you how painful the episode has been to
me, when it seemed, for the first time in seventeen years, as if we
could not come to an understanding. I impatiently await your answer
to the above authorisation, and am convinced that we shall be able to
come to an agreement. God grant that it may be so!
“Your faithful and devoted,
“William.
“Finished at Stettin, 12/9/79.”
“As Herr von Bülow, after taking a copy of my additions to the
Alexandrowo notes, had the original immediately despatched to you,
there is a corresponding change in the opening words of this letter.”
Letter from Bismarck to Prince Reuss, dated Varzin, 28th January
1880 (on the left top corner, the note: “Copied a second time in the
interest of history”--doubtless in Holstein’s handwriting):--
“In connection with your report, No. 11 of the 10th, I take the
liberty to send your Serene Highness a few words confidentially, and
only for your personal information, on the relations between Austria
and Italy.
“I consider it natural that Baron Haymerle should have made no
official complaint respecting Urezzana, and furthermore, that he
was tactically right in taking that course. I should not regard
it as good policy however to adopt a purely passive attitude
towards similar permanent threats. Such a course would, I fear,
only encourage Italian Chauvinism, and the semi-complicity of the
Government therewith. According to my political convictions a
purely defensive attitude, _i.e._, one of mere complaint, is not an
effective weapon against such permanent threats or incitement. It is
open to Austria to parry such attacks, by assuming the offensive,
on similar lines to the Italian demonstrations. It is not the
Italian Government which adopts a threatening attitude. It only
suffers Italian subjects to do so. Now I am convinced that there are
elements and movements in Austria that favour the restoration of
the Papal States, and of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, just as
the Irredentists work for the acquisition of the Trentino. If these
elements in the press and public life of Austria were to come or to
be drawn into greater prominence, that would involve a counteraction
against the Irredenta, which would compel the Italians to fall
back upon the defensive, without being able to make any complaint.
Even the plea that Austria, in view of such threatening movements,
requires a better line of defence than that which she now possesses
would be quite as legitimate as a craving for the Trentino, Trieste,
and Dalmatia. Italy by herself would scarcely venture to attack
Austria, but her present attitude is a constant encouragement to
the war party in Russia. For about twelve months I have had the
impression that Italy is inclined to place herself at the disposal of
a Russian policy of war if in return she were offered an accession
of territory and a stretch of the Adriatic coast. The relations
which it has been sought to establish between the two armies, the
Italian and the Russian, and the shifting of the centre of gravity
of the Italian army towards the north support this impression, not
less than the indications furnished by various votes which the Great
Powers have respectively given. This whole attitude shows that Italy
must not be numbered to-day among the peace-loving and conservative
Powers, who must reckon with this fact. I beg your Serene Highness
also to think over this matter for yourself, and to kindly send me
your views in an autograph private letter. Of course any initiative
in opening up this subject must be carefully avoided, but Baron
Haymerle, or Count Andrassy when he comes to Vienna, can hardly fail
to bring it up in conversation with your Serene Highness, and thus
give you an opportunity of introducing observations in the sense of
the foregoing remarks, not as the expression of German policy, but as
your own opinion in the character of a friendly expert. In certain
circumstances the Nuncio also might afford an opportunity for an
expression of opinion in this sense which would excite no suspicion.
It would in any case be of interest to assure one’s self of the
present feelings of the Italian Prelacy with regard to strategic
moves of this description.
“I cannot deny that, to my mind, the Italy of to-day offers Germany
small prospect of useful co-operation with us in the possible crises
of the future. On the contrary, we have much more ground to fear that
Italy will join our adversaries than to hope that she will unite
with us, seeing that we have no more inducements to offer her. Every
encouragement to Italian policy to join the bellicose and predatory
Powers in Europe is contrary to _German_ interests, and in the
present instance still more contrary to those of Austria. For the
protection of the latter it would, I think, be useful to call the
attention of the English Cabinet to the encouragement to breaches of
the peace which the attitude of Italy involves. Perhaps your Serene
Highness can ascertain whether anything has been done or is intended
in this direction.
“Bismarck.”
The Emperor William to the Imperial Chancellor, Berlin, November
13th, 1885: “Enclosed I return you _brevi manu_, your two extremely
important and interesting letters, with my observations. I beg you to
excuse me for selecting this method of answering them, but you know
how badly I write long explanations, and from the marginal notes you
will see my complete agreement with your views, so that I believe I
may adopt this shorter form of answer. I may mention to you at the
same time that I consider the moment has now come to lay before my
son the views with which it was all along intended to acquaint him,
as to the utter inexpediency, now no less than formerly, of the
marriage in question, which, of course, he himself has also always
held to be impossible. Now, however, that Prince Alexander has come
forward as a rebel against the peace of Paris (doubtless Berlin was
meant), and the signatories thereto, whether he remains in Bulgaria
or not, a marriage of this kind has become more than ever impossible.
Your political explanations are quite to the point.
“Your grateful
“William.”
I left for Hamburg at 12.20 on the 29th of October, shortly after
the Emperor passed through that city. On the evening of the 30th I
returned to Friedrichsruh, where I arrived about 5.30 P.M. At dinner,
the Prince, who was in excellent spirits, said that the most gracious
Master had in all taken up five hours of his time. Afterwards, over
our coffee, he observed to me: “This afternoon he let me talk to him
for three hours on end. I stood as if in the pulpit, and I am tired
out.” Everybody said that the Emperor was extremely unaffected and
amiable, and the Princess noticed in particular that he could laugh
most heartily. I heard that Minister Mittnacht would arrive next day.
By 12 o’clock on the day of my journey to Hamburg I had read through
the last of the Bismarck papers, which went as far as the year 1887
and concluded with No. 735. Among the most recent of the papers are
three letters of the year 1880 from King Lewis of Bavaria, full of
recognition for Bismarck, the second expressing regret at his wish
to retire, and the hope that he would remain. A letter from the
Emperor William to the Chief dated May 31, 1886, on the “horrifying
news from Munich,” says towards the close that there is little to be
hoped from Prince Luitpold, while King Lewis is credited with having
“shown more good will ... for the German cause.” Then two autograph
letters from the Crown Princess (the present Dowager Empress). One is
dated December 23, 1885, and accompanied a present of Moselle wine
which he had liked at her table; while the other, dated from Villa
Zivio, November 22, 1887, deals with the illness of her consort,
and reports the unanimous opinion of the German doctors. Finally,
a letter of November 23, 1887, from the Emperor William, which is
very illegibly written and runs somewhat as follows: “Enclosed I
send you the nomination of your son as _Wirklicher Geheimrath_ with
the title of Excellency, in order that you may hand it to him, a
pleasure which I would not deny you. I imagine that this pleasure
will be threefold, for yourself, for your son, and for me! I take
this opportunity (to explain) to you the silence which I have
observed up to the present respecting your proposal, in view of the
sad condition of health of my son the Crown Prince, to initiate my
grandson, Prince William, more fully into State affairs. In principle
I entirely agree with you that this must be done, but it is a very
difficult matter to carry into execution. You will of course know
that the very natural decision, which I took on your advice, that,
in case of my being prevented, my grandson William should sign the
current Cabinet rescripts in civil and military affairs with the
superscription ‘By Order of his Majesty’ greatly irritated the Crown
Prince, as if, in Berlin, a substitute were already being thought
of. On considering the matter quietly my son will doubtless have
reassured himself. But such reflection would be more difficult if
he ascertained that his son were allowed a still greater insight
into State affairs, and were even given a Civil aide-de-camp as I
used to call my _Vortragende Räthe_. Things were, however, quite
(different) then. As there was nothing that could induce my Royal
father to appoint a substitute for the then Crown Prince (although my
succession to the throne could be anticipated long beforehand), my
introduction to State affairs was put off till I was forty-four years
old, when my brother suddenly nominated me a member of the Ministry
of State with the title of Prince of Prussia. It was necessary in
this position that an experienced man of business should be appointed
to prepare me for each sitting of the Council of Ministers. At the
same time I received the diplomatic despatches every day, after
they had passed through four, five, or six hands--according to the
seals! A mere _conversation_, such as you propose, the appointment
of a statesman in attendance on my grandson, would not have the
character of a preparation, as in my case, for a _specific object_,
and would certainly still further irritate my son, a thing which must
absolutely be avoided. I would therefore suggest that the course of
occupation hitherto followed--learning the manner of dealing with
State affairs--should be continued, that is to say that (my grandson)
should be attached to single Ministries or perhaps to two at a time,
as during this winter, when my grandson was attached in a voluntary
capacity to the Foreign Office as well as to the Ministry of Finance.
This voluntary course should cease with the New Year, and perhaps
(be replaced) by the Ministry of the Interior, my grandson being
permitted in special cases to obtain information at the Foreign
Office. This _continuation_ of the course hitherto followed may
cause my son less irritation, although you will remember that he was
strongly opposed even to this. I therefore beg you to let me have
your opinion on the matter. Wishing you all a pleasant festival,
“Your grateful
“William.”[18]
On Thursday, November 1st, I told the Prince, at lunch, that I would
either immediately or next morning return him the papers, sorted
and arranged. He replied, however, that he had found some more
which belonged to the collection. He took me with him to his study,
and handed them to me for arrangement, adding that there were very
many more at Varzin, a whole box full, including private letters of
historic significance. I should also go through these later on, and
put them into chronological order.
On the morning of Friday, the 2nd of November, I read, sorted,
and numbered new documents, which were afterwards put into a fresh
envelope. Among these was the announcement of March, 1877, by the
Emperor William, that he had appointed Bismarck Hereditary Grand
Huntsman of Pomerania, reports respecting the illness of the Crown
Prince, afterwards Emperor Frederick, from San Remo, Charlottenburg,
and Potsdam, a letter from the Emperor William II. to Bismarck,
transferring him to the second regiment of Guards, a telegram from
the same, dated October 21, 1888, expressing his satisfaction at
his journey to South Germany, Vienna, and Rome, whence he had just
returned, and his thanks for the Chief’s counsels, which had been
justified by his experience while away, and, finally, the letter
already alluded to from the Empress Augusta. Nothing of importance
among them.
At midday, before lunch, I personally handed over to the Chief the
envelopes containing the papers. He appeared to have looked through
them in the afternoon, as, when he was passing by in the evening,
before dinner, as usual, with his two dogs, he gave me his hand and
thanked me, expressing his surprise that I had been able to deal with
such a mass of letters and papers in so short a time. I said if he
wished to have those at Varzin also arranged, and could find no more
suitable person to do it, I should be glad if he would let me know
when he was next going to his estate in Further Pomerania, so that I
might come there and complete my task. I should be delighted to serve
him and learn something for myself at the same time. Rottenburg was
absent from dinner. He had gone to Hamburg to meet some relatives.
During dinner there was some talk of a Herr von Bülow, who had been
the Chief’s guest at lunch. I ascertained that in this gentleman I
had had before me the famous leader of the Lauenburg nobility, to
whom Bismarck had clearly explained his standpoint, first on the
Ratzeburg Lake, and again on taking the oath of allegiance in the
church there. He is much more harmless than I had fancied him. The
Chief said: “I should have invited him to remain to dinner, and he
doubtless expected it, but he is so tedious that I did not know what
to do with him during the five hours before dinner.” Then, after
referring to the letters of the Crown Prince in 1863, which I had
arranged, and to his own pencil notes, he came to speak of the Crown
Prince himself. I said: “Absalom! And from what you wrote on the back
you doubtless wrote him in reply that you did not intend to be ever
included among his Ministers.” “Yes,” he rejoined, and the quotation
_Leicht fertig ist die Jugend mit dem Wort_! (Youth is hasty in its
judgments). He then gave a survey of the various phases of the Crown
Prince’s attitude towards himself in the course of his life. “First,
in 1848 or 1849. At that time he was still very thin and lanky. He
showed great attachment to me, and, when they forbade him to do so
at Potsdam, he used to try to meet me in the dusk of the evening and
shake hands with me. Then the rude letter of 1863; afterwards, since
1864, in Flensburg, better. Then again Liberal counsels, Augustenburg
sympathies, the Geffcken and Friedberg introductions, and his siding
with Cumberland.” I said: “The Englishwoman, the Guelph.” We then
spoke of the latter, also over our coffee, when the Princess said she
could be very amiable when she liked, as she herself had experienced;
a statement which the Chief also confirmed from his own experience.
(...)
On Saturday I took leave of the Prince and Princess in the
dining-room, after I had fulfilled my promise to the little Rantzaus
to go with them to see a “house” that they had begun to build on
the roadside leading to Dassendorf. I suggested some architectural
improvements, and the eldest one, with childlike politeness, thanked
me for the “good advice I had given them,” and hoped I would soon
come back again. A prospect of doing so was held out to me on my
taking leave at the house. The Chief said, as he was shaking hands:
“Adieu, Büschlein, perhaps we shall resume our business soon at
Varzin. But I must first return to Berlin.” The Princess asked me
to present her compliments to Bucher, and the Countess came down to
accompany me to the station with her children. But first she showed
me the handsome clock and writing-table presented to her father by
the German manufacturers, and gave me a porcelain penholder from one
of the drawers as a souvenir.
On Sunday, the 10th of February, 1889, I received through a Chancery
attendant an appointment to call upon the Chief at 3 P.M. I appeared
punctually at the hour named, in his antechamber. Minister Bötticher
was called into the Prince before me, and I talked to Rottenburg
until my turn came. On entering the room I found the Prince in
uniform. He asked about my health, and I inquired as to his. He
complained of insomnia, and said he could no longer get any sleep
without artificial means. On his then asking me what I had been
doing in the interval, I mentioned the _Grenzboten_ article on his
attitude and that of the Crown Prince at the Versailles negotiations
with the Bavarians, and he expressed a wish to see it, and said: “I
should like you to add something to it, and to return to Geffcken’s
extracts from the diary of the Crown Prince, or more correctly from
one of the three or four diaries of the war, and of later years. A
diary is a series of daily notes in which one writes down immediately
afterwards what he has ascertained and experienced, just as a tourist
does; and that too is the character of the first original diary. It
is short, and as was natural enough in war time, it deals mainly with
military affairs, and contains scarcely any political considerations.
The others are interpolated later, from conversations which he had
with good friends, or those whom he considered to be such--Geffcken,
Roggenbach, &c. Thus he imagined that he had thought of all these
things himself, as far back as 1870. English letters and influences
will also have affected him. I say he imagined that and believed it,
because he was a man who was very devoted to the truth. The good
friends were malcontents, ambitious place hunters, and intriguers,
people who felt that they had a vocation for great things, who
knew more and could do better than the Government, and who would
very willingly have lent a hand if they had only been allowed to
do so. They were men of unappreciated talent, the wallflowers, the
pettifogging attorneys and quacks of politics. He showed them the
diary, and they made their observations upon it, which he then
inserted. They found that in this shape it would come in usefully
in the future. That accounts for the various transformations it
underwent. The Crown Prince, like all mediocrities, liked copying,
and other occupations of the same sort, such as sealing letters, &c.
And he had time enough for it, as the King kept him apart from almost
all political work, seldom or never spoke to him on such matters,
and would not allow me to make any communication to him on subjects
of the kind. From 1863 onward there was an uninterrupted struggle
between the two, in the course of which there were several violent
scenes when the Crown Prince was pulled up sharply, and he (imitating
the gesture) cast up his eyes and raised his hands in despair. It
was the same at Versailles in connection with the Emperor question,
where the most gracious Master would not at first hear a word of our
proposals, and got so angry on one occasion that he brought down
his fist violently upon the table and the inkstand nearly flew out
of the window. And here you may supplement the report in the diary
as to this incident. Fragmentary and incomplete in every respect,
it leaves out the first act in the negotiations, in which I had to
wean the Crown Prince of the notion, which doubtless originated at
Baden, that the Emperor idea was un-German and would damage the
country. He was thinking only of the mediæval emperors, the Roman
expeditions, and Charles V. For that reason he wished to have only
a King of Germany or of the Germans, while the other three kings
were to resume the title of Dukes--Duke of Bavaria, of Suabia and
of Saxony. And to this he added the idea of coercion--they should
be invited to Versailles and once we had got him there it was to be
a case of needs must when the devil drives (_jetzt friss Vogel oder
stirb_). I replied to him that that would be treacherous, disloyal
and ungrateful, and that I would not lend myself to it, as, moreover,
it would have no permanency. No friendly persuasion could possibly
induce the Kings to submit to this degradation. I then pointed out
to him the advantages of the Emperor idea, somewhat in the same way
as I did afterwards in my letter to the King of Bavaria. The Kings
would prefer to subordinate themselves to a fellow-countryman, who
bore the title of German Emperor and to grant him certain rights
in war and peace, than to a King of Prussia, who would only be a
somewhat more powerful neighbour. Among the people, however, the
Emperors had left a deeper impression than had the few princes, who,
after the time of Charlemagne, called themselves, like Henry the
Fowler, German Kings. In the restoration of the Empire they looked
forward to the Emperor as the keystone of the arch. The Emperor still
sits enthroned in Kyffhäuser in North Germany, and in the South
German Untersberge. This idea should not be connected with that of
a Roman Emperor, Roman expeditions or any pretensions to universal
sovereignty would be against the true interests of the nation. It
was, on the contrary, a purely national idea which the Emperor would
represent and which we also had in view, the idea of unification
after discord and decay, of new power and security through unity, of
the concentration of the whole people upon the same objects. As far
back as 1818 such ideas were held by the students’ associations, and
in 1848 they found expression in the _Paulskirche_. In 1863 Austria
had something similar in view with her draft constitution to be
laid before the Congress of Princes, only her first thought was for
her own interests.” “Later, on the foundation of the North German
Confederation there was some talk of an Emperor of the Confederation,
and the idea was only dropped because it would have led to a
division and because in such circumstances Bavaria and Würtemberg
would certainly not have joined us then, nor probably later on. For
similar reasons I declined Lasker’s suggestion, in February, 1870, to
admit Baden into the Confederation, because that would have been an
attempt to exercise pressure upon her South German neighbours. The
excessive number of Kings gradually convinced him, and he was then
in favour of the Emperor idea. In the diary he has forgotten this
whole first act. He writes as if he had discovered the idea and had
been the first to put it forward, while it had long been kept alive,
as a hope among the people, and he himself at first would not hear
of it. Then came the second act, when it is true we acted together
at the Prefecture in order to win over the old Master to our view.
He at first vehemently rejected our proposal, and fell into a rage
when we insisted. I asked if he wished to remain a neuter for ever.
‘What do you mean?’ he said crossly, ‘what sort of a neuter?’ ‘Why,
the Presidency’ (_Nun das Präsidium_), I replied. But that also was
of no avail. Then he agreed to it up to a certain point, if he were
allowed to bear the title of Emperor of Germany. I explained to
him that this would be opposed to the treaties, and would express
territorial sovereignty over all Germany. He said the Tsar called
himself Emperor of Russia. I denied this, and stated that his title
was Russian Emperor. (He quoted the Russian term.) He maintained
his opinion, however, until he asked Schneider, who was obliged to
acknowledge that I was right.” On one occasion he mentioned in a
report that Schleinitz had been present at these negotiations. I now
asked: “What was he doing there? In what capacity was he present, as
Minister of the Household, or as former chief of the Foreign Office,
or in what other capacity?” He smiled and said: “As confidant of the
Queen, who had sent him to oppose the bombardment and to persuade the
King against it. He had nothing to do with the Emperor question. He
had always been Augusta’s favourite, and while he was still a poor
man she had on several occasions sent him money, 300 thalers, in
order to enable him to visit her at Coblenz. It was solely through
her favour that he became Minister.”
We then spoke of Sybel’s “Die deutsche Nation und das Kaiserreich”
(The German Nation and the Empire), which he gave me; of Morier’s
rude letter to Count Herbert, which was quite uncalled for, as there
had been no charge made against that gentleman of having given direct
information to Bazaine respecting the movements of the German troops;
then of the wretched attitude of the German Liberal press, which in
this--as in the Mackenzie, Geffcken, and other questions--took the
side of every enemy of Germany and of German interests, whose hand
was against him too; and finally about Samoa, in which connection
the Chief censured the arbitrary conduct of the German Consul
there. The conversation had lasted for about half an hour, and the
Chancellor said as I was leaving that he would now try to get a
little sleep. The article desired by him was written in the course of
the following week, and was to appear in No. 8 of the _Grenzboten_
under the title “The Emperor Question and Geffcken’s Diary Extracts.”
I, however, first submitted a proof to the Chancellor for revision,
and he made a number of alterations which Rottenburg dictated to
me in his bureau in order that I might reproduce them in my copy.
Thereupon I despatched the latter to Grunow (Saturday, February
16th), but a few hours later Rottenburg, with whom I had dined at
Professor Scheibler’s, came back there with a message from the Chief
requesting me to telegraph that the article should be returned for
the present. Even after it had been toned down it was too dangerous
for publication.
At noon on Sunday, the 17th of February, a Chancery attendant brought
me a note from Rottenburg (begging me to call upon him at 3 o’clock
at the Imperial Chancellerie. He had important instructions to give
me).
On my going to see him at 3 o’clock he told me that the Chief now
wished to have the article printed, but with a further slight change.
We therefore telegraphed to Grunow to forward me that evening the
proofs I had sent him, which I would return to him immediately. They
arrived at 10 o’clock, when I at once took them to Rottenburg. We
then inserted the last alterations of the Chief, and sent back the
proofs to Grunow in a registered letter so that the article should
appear in No. 8. _Per tot discrimina rerum._