METHODS OF REFUTATION
A complete argument consists of two kinds of proof: constructive proof
and refutation. Constructive proof is that part of an argument which
sets forth direct reasons for belief in a certain proposition;
refutation is that part which destroys the reasons for belief in the
opposite side.
In general, each of these divisions is of about equal importance, at
times the value of one predominating and at times the value of the
other. If one is addressing an audience unacquainted with his views or
hostile towards them, he is not likely to make much progress in
getting his own beliefs accepted until he has, at least in part,
shattered the opinion already existing. If, however, the audience is
predisposed or even willing to accept the doctrine advocated, very
little but constructive proof may be necessary.
In debate, the side that has the burden of proof will usually have
more use for constructive argument, and the opposite side will have
more use for refutation. This statement will not always hold true,
however, for the rule will vary under different circumstances; a
debater must, therefore, hold himself in readiness to meet whatever
contingencies arise. Debate may be likened to the play of two boys
building houses with blocks; each boy builds the best house he can,
and at times attempts to overthrow the work of his playmate. The one
that has the better structure when the game ends comes off victorious.
Thus it is in debate; each debater must do his best both to build up
his own argument and to destroy his opponent's.
To handle refutation successfully, either in written argument or in
debate, one must know what to refute and what to leave alone. The
general rule governing this matter is: _Refute only those arguments
which are essential to the proof of the other side_. All trivial
ideas, even all misstatements which if refuted would not destroy any
fundamental process of an opponent's proof, should pass unnoticed. To
mention them means waste of time and effort. It is not uncommon for a
debater to make trivial errors intentionally, in the hope that his
opponent will consume valuable time in refuting them and thus allow
his main argument to go unscathed. When this stratagem succeeds, the
one who made the mistakes can acknowledge that he was wrong in those
unimportant details, and yet show that his fundamental arguments have
not been overthrown. While arguing on a political question, an
intercollegiate debater once laid considerable stress on an opinion
expressed by Woodrow Wilson, "President," as he stated, "of Harvard
University." His opponent, of course, might have held this statement
up to ridicule, but such an exposure would have been impolitic, in
that it would have in no wise impaired the value of Mr. Wilson's
opinion as evidence. Another debater, not so wise, once spent
considerable time in correcting an opponent who had said that the
Steel Trust was formed in 1891 instead of in 1901, as was the case. As
these dates had no vital bearing on the question at issue, the error
should have been allowed to pass. The temptation to point out the
flaws that are most obvious is always great, but unless by so doing
one can knock out the props on which an opponent's proof rests, such
an attack accomplishes nothing.
Another common error in refutation consists in "answering one's self."
A person is guilty of this fault whenever he misstates an opponent's
argument, either because he does not understand it or through design,
and then refutes this misstatement. The folly of such procedure is
made apparent by merely calling attention to the fact that the
original argument has been garbled but in no wise refuted, An opponent
can convict the one who has "answered himself" either of unpardonable
ignorance about the subject or of downright dishonesty.
To guard against these errors of refuting unimportant details and of
"answering one's self," it is always well to reduce an opponent's
argument to the form of a brief. If the argument is in print, this
task is comparatively simple; if the argument is oral, the task will
be harder but will still present no serious difficulties to one who is
used to drawing briefs. When all the ideas have been arranged in the
form of headings and subheadings, and the relation between the ideas
has been indicated by means of numbers and letters, then the arguer
can quickly decide what points he ought to refute and what ones he can
refute.
It goes without saying that the headings marked with the Roman
numerals contain the most important ideas, and should, therefore, be
overthrown as far as possible. There are three ways of disposing of
them: one way is to state that the headings are false and then bring
on new proof to show their falsity; the second way is to call
attention to the subheadings with which the opponent has bolstered up
the main headings, and then, by proving these subheads false, allow
the main heads to fall to the ground; the third way is to admit that
the subheads are true and then show that the inferences drawn from
them are unwarranted.
To illustrate: A part of an argument on the affirmative side of the
proposition, "_Resolved_, That students in American colleges
should be excused from final examinations in all subjects in which
they have attained a daily grade of at least eighty-five per cent.,"
might be reduced to the following brief form:--
I. This rule would be of great intellectual benefit to college
students, for
A. They would master their work more thoroughly, because
1. They would study harder during the term.
The first method of overthrowing the heading indicated by (I) would be
to attack it directly. This attack might consist of opinions of
prominent educators who, on theoretical grounds, do not believe an
intellectual benefit would result from the adoption of such a rule; of
the opinions of educators who have tried the rule and declare that it
is an intellectual detriment; and of a course of reasoning which would
show that this system would rob the students exempted of the great
intellectual benefit that is derived from the preparation for an
examination and from the taking of an examination.
The second method would be to show that (1) is not true; therefore (A)
would be false, and (I) would be left entirely unsupported.
Under the third method the arguer would admit the truth of (1), but
would deny that the truth of (A) is established by it; therefore (I)
would be unsupported.
Whenever a subheading is attacked, it is always very essential to show
that the attack is made simply because this subheading serves as a
foundation for the main heading. In this particular argument,
refutation according to the second and third methods might read about
as follows: "The contention of the affirmative that the eighty-five
per cent. rule should be adopted because it would result in an
intellectual improvement among college students, rests on the
supposition that students would study harder during the term, and for
that reason would more thoroughly master their subjects. This
reasoning is erroneous because, in the first place, as I will show,
but very few students, if any, would study harder during the term;
and, in the second place, even if they did, those exempted would not
have mastered their work so completely at the end of the year as they
would have if they had taken an examination."
From the preceding, it is apparent that refutation consists of
discrediting evidence and attacking reasoning. The ways to overthrow
evidence will be considered first.
EVIDENCE.
It is taken for granted that the evidence mustered by the opponent is
sufficient, if not overthrown, to establish his side of the
discussion. Of course, if enough evidence for this purpose is lacking,
one has only to call attention to this fundamental weakness in order
to overthrow the argument then and there. The rules, therefore, for
testing evidence assume that the opponent has cited facts that, if not
combated, will establish his case.
These tests are the same as those given in Chapter VI; a hasty review
of them, however, may be serviceable at this point.
I. Tests of the sources of evidence.
A. Is the witness competent to give a trustworthy account of
the matter?
B. Is the witness willing to give an accurate account?
1. Does he have any personal interest in the case?
C. Is the witness prejudiced?
D. Does the witness have a good reputation for honesty and
accuracy?
II. Internal tests of evidence.
A. Is the evidence consistent (a) with itself, (b) with known
facts, (c) with human experience?
B. Is it first-hand evidence?
C. Can the evidence be classed as especially valuable?
1. Does it consist of hurtful admissions?
2. Is it undesigned evidence?
3. Is it negative evidence?
III. Test of argument from authority.
A. Is the witness an acknowledged authority on the subject about
which he testifies?
To overthrow or weaken argument from authority, one may either
discredit its source or bring to light some inconsistency in the
statement itself. Usually the former method alone is possible. To
accomplish this result, one may show that the witness spoke from
insufficient knowledge of the matter, or was prejudiced, or had some
personal interest in the case. Counter authority will also be of
assistance. The following quotation taken from a college debate
furnishes the student a good example of how to handle this sort of
refutation.
"The argument has been advanced that the South does not need the
foreign laborer, and this argument has been supported by the words of
Mr. Prescott F. Hall. We would call the attention of the audience and
the judges to the fact that since Prescott F. Hall is Secretary of the
Immigration Restriction League, it would be to his interest to make
this assertion. Why do not our opponents refer to impartial and
unprejudiced men, men like Dr. Allen McLaughlin, a United States
immigration official, who makes just the opposite statement?"
REASONING.
I. Induction.
A. Have enough instances of the class under consideration been
investigated to establish the existence of a general law?
B. Have enough instances been investigated to establish the
probable existence of a general law?
II. Deduction.
A. Are both premises true?
B. Is the fact stated in the minor premise an instance of the
general law expressed in the major premise?
III. Antecedent probability.
A. Is the assigned cause of sufficient strength to produce the
alleged effect?
B. May some other cause intervene and prevent the action of the
assigned cause?
IV. Sign.
A. Argument from effect to cause.
1. Is the assigned cause adequate to produce the observed
effect?
2. Could the observed effect have resulted from any other
cause than the one assigned?
B. Argument from effect to effect.
1. Do the combined tests of argument from effect to cause and
from cause to effect hold?
V. Example.
A. Is there any fundamental difference between the case in hand
and the case cited as an example?
FALLACIES.
A fallacy is an error in reasoning. The preceding part of this chapter
has already suggested tests that will expose many such faults, but
there are a few errors which, because of their frequency or their
inadaptability to other classification, demand separate treatment.
This book follows the plan of most other texts on argumentation, and
treats these errors under a separate head marked fallacies. To detect
a fallacy in another's argument is to weaken, if not to destroy, his
case; to avoid making a fallacy in one's own argument means escape
from humiliation and defeat. Hence, a knowledge of fallacies is one of
the most essential parts of a debater's equipment.
The classification given here does not pretend to be exhaustive; it
does, however, consider the most common and insidious breaches of
reasoning that are likely to occur, and the following pages should be
studied with great care.
I. BEGGING THE QUESTION. (PETITIO PRINCIPII.)
1. MERE ASSUMPTION. Begging the question means assuming the truth of
that which needs proof. This fallacy is found in its simplest form in
epithets and appellations. The lawyer who speaks of "the criminal on
trial for his life," begs the question in that he assumes the prisoner
to be a criminal before the court has rendered a verdict. Those
writers who have recently discussed "the brutal game of football"
without having first adduced a particle of proof to show that the game
is brutal, fall into the same error. An unpardonable instance of
question-begging lies in the following introduction, once given by a
debater who was attacking the proposition, "_Resolved_, That the
federal government should own and operate the railroads in the United
States":--
"We of the negative will show that the efficient and highly beneficial
system of private ownership should be maintained, and that the
impracticable system of government ownership can never succeed in the
United States or in any similarly governed country."
Private ownership and government ownership may possess these qualities
attributed to them, but the debater has no right to make such an
assumption; he must _prove_ that they have these qualities.
2. ASSUMPTION USED AS PROOF. Such barefaced assumptions as the
preceding usually do little damage except to the one who makes them.
They are not likely to lead astray an audience of average
intelligence; on the other hand, they do stamp the arguer as
prejudiced and illogical. But when assumptions are used as proof,
hidden in the midst of quantities of other material, they may produce
an unwarranted effect upon one who is not a clear thinker, or who is
off his guard. If, without showing that football is brutal, one calls
it an extremely brutal game, and then urges its abolishment on the
ground of its brutality, he has used an assumption as proof, and has,
therefore, begged the question. The debater who stated, without
proving, that vast numbers of unskilled laborers were needed in the
United States, and then urged this as a reason why no educational test
should be applied to immigrants coming to this country, furnished an
example of the same fallacy.
3. UNWARRANTED ASSUMPTION OF THE TRUTH OF A SUPPRESSED PREMISE. The
student is already familiar with the enthymeme. The enthymeme
constitutes a valid form of reasoning only when the suppressed premise
is recognized as true. Therefore, whenever an arguer makes use of the
enthymeme without attempting to establish a suppressed premise whose
truth is not admitted, he has argued fallaciously. This is a third
method of begging the question. To illustrate: In advocating the
abolishment of football from the list of college athletic sports, one
might reason, "Football should be abolished because it obviously
exposes a player to possible injury." The suppressed premise in this
case would be: All sports which expose a player to possible injury
should be abolished. Failure to prove the truth of this unadmitted
statement constitutes the fallacy.
4. ASSUMPTION EQUIVALENT TO THE PROPOSITION TO BE PROVED. It is not
surprising that a man carried away with excitement or prejudice should
make assumptions that he does not even try to substantiate, but that
anyone should assume the truth of the very conclusion that he has set
out to establish seems incredible. Such a form of begging the
question, however, does frequently occur. Sometimes the fallacy is so
hidden in a mass of illustration and rhetorical embellishment that at
first it is not apparent; but stripped of its verbal finery, it stands
out very plainly. The following passage written on the affirmative
side of the proposition, "_Resolved_, That the college course
should be shortened to three years," will serve as a particularly
flagrant illustration:--
It is a well-known fact that in the world of to-day time is an
essential factor in the race for success. No young man can afford to
dawdle for four long years in acquiring a so-called "higher"
education. Three-fourths of that time is, if anything, more than
sufficient in which to attain all the graces and culture that the
progressive man needs.
It is evident that the "argument" in this case consists of nothing
more than a repetition of the proposition.
5. ARGUING IN A CIRCLE. Another phase of begging the question consists
of using an assumption as proof of a proposition and of then quoting
the proposition as proof of the assumption. Two assertions are made,
neither of which is substantiated by any real proof, but each of which
is used to prove the other. This fallacy probably occurs most
frequently in conversation. Consider the following :--
A. "The proposed system of taxation is an excellent one."
B. "What makes you think so?"
A. "Because it will be adopted by the legislature."
B. "How do you know it will?"
A. "Because it is a good system and our legislators are men of sense."
This fallacy occurs when one proves the authority of the church from
the testimony of the scriptures, and then establishes the authenticity
of the scriptures by the testimony of the church. A similar fallacy
has been pointed out in the works of Plato. In _Phaedo_, he
demonstrates the immortality of the soul from its simplicity, and in
the _Republic_, he demonstrates the simplicity of the soul from
its immortality. The following fragment of a brief argues in a
circle:--
I. This principle is in accordance with the principles of the
Democratic party, since
A. The leader of the Democratic party believes in it, for
1. As the leader of the party, he naturally believes in
Democratic principles.
II. AMBIGOUS TERMS. (EQUIVOCATION; CONFUSION OF TERMS.)
The fallacy of ambiguous terms consists of using the same term in two
distinct senses in the same argument. Thus if one were to argue that
"no designing person ought to be trusted; engravers are by profession
designers; therefore they ought not to be trusted," it is quite
apparent that the term "design" means totally different things in the
two premises. The same fallacy occurs in the argument, "Since the
American people believe in a republican form of government, they
should vote the Republican ticket." Again:--
"Interference with another man's business is illegal;
"Underselling interferes with another man's business;
"Therefore underselling is illegal."
J. S. Mill in his _System of Logic_ discusses the fallacy of
ambiguous terms with great care. In part he says:--
The mercantile public are frequently led into this fallacy by the
phrase "scarcity of money." In the language of commerce, "money" has
two meanings: _currency,_ or the circulating medium; and
_capital seeking investment,_ especially investment on loan. In
this last sense, the word is used when the "money market" is spoken
of, and when the "value of money" is said to be high or low, the rate
of interest being meant. The consequence of this ambiguity is, that as
soon as scarcity of money in the latter of these senses begins to be
felt,--as soon as there is difficulty of obtaining loans, and the rate
of interest is high,--it is concluded that this must arise from causes
acting upon the quantity of money in the other and more popular sense;
that the circulating medium must have diminished in quantity, or ought
to be increased. I am aware that, independently of the double meaning
of the term, there are in the facts themselves some peculiarities,
giving an apparent support to this error; but the ambiguity of the
language stands on the very threshold of the subject, and intercepts
all attempts to throw light upon it.
As countless words and expressions have several meanings, there is
almost no limit to the confusion which this fallacy can cause. Some of
the most common terms that are used ambiguously are _right_,
_liberty_, _law_, _representative_, _theory_, _church_, _state_,
_student_.
By carefully defining all terms that have more than one meaning and by
insisting on a rigid adherence to the one meaning wherever the term is
used, a debater can easily avoid fallacies of this sort in his own
argument and expose those of his opponent.
III. FALSE CAUSE.
The fallacy of false cause occurs whenever that which could in no way
bring about the effect that is being established is urged as its
cause. This fallacy in its most obvious form is found only in the
arguments of careless and illogical thinkers. Some college students
occasionally draw briefs that contain such reasoning as the
following:--
I. The Panama canal should be of the sea-level rather than of the
lock type, because
A. The Panama canal will do away with the long voyage around the
Horn.
I. Southerners are justified in keeping the franchise away from the
negro, for
A. Negroes should never have been brought to America.
B. The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution ought not to have
been passed.
The error of such plainly absurd reasoning as occurs in the preceding
illustrations needs no explanation. There is one form of the fallacy
of false cause, however, that is much more common and insidious and
therefore deserves special treatment.
POST HOC ERGO PROPTER HOC. (After this, therefore, on account of
this.) This phase of the fallacy consists of the assumption that since
cause precedes effect what has preceded an event has caused it. The
most frequent occurrence of the error is to be found in superstitions.
If some one meets with an accident while taking a journey that began
on Friday, many people will argue that the accident is the effect of
the unlucky day. Some farmers believe their crops will not prosper
unless the planting is done when the moon is in a certain quarter;
sailors often refuse to embark in a renamed vessel. Because in the
past, one event has been known to follow another, it is argued that
the first event was the cause of the second, and that the second event
will invariably follow the first.
But this fallacy does not find its only expression in superstitions.
To _post hoc_ reasoning is due much of the popularity of patent
medicines. Political beliefs, even, are often generated in the same
way; prosperity follows the passing of a certain law, and people jump
to the conclusion that this one law has caused the "good times." Some
demagogues go so far as to say that education among the Indians is
responsible for the increased death rate of many of the tribes.
A slightly different phase of the _post hoc_ fallacy consists in
attributing the existence of a certain condition to a single preceding
event, when at the most this event could have been only a partial
cause of what followed, and may not have been a cause at all. A
medicine that could not have effected a cure may have been of some
slight benefit. A law that could not possibly have been the sole cause
of "good times" may have had a beneficial effect. To avoid this
fallacy, one must be sure not only that the assigned cause is
operative, but that it is also adequate.
In the following passage, _Harpers Weekly_, for March 5, 1894,
points out the error in the reasoning made by several college
presidents who, after compiling statistics, stated that a college
education increased a man's chance of success from one in ten thousand
to one in forty:--
Not many persons doubt any longer that an American college education
is an advantage to most youths who can get it, but in these attempts
to estimate statistically what college education does for men there is
a good deal of confusing of _post hoc_ and _propter hoc_.
Define success as you will, a much larger proportion of American
college men win it than of men who don't go to college, but how much
college training does for those successful men is still debatable.
Remember that they are a picked lot, the likeliest children of parents
whose ability or desire to send their children to college is evidence
of better fortune, or at least of higher aspirations than the average.
And because their parents are, as a rule, more or less prosperous and
well educated, they get and would get, whether they went to college or
not, a better than average start in life....
If one boy out of a family of four goes to college, it is the clever
one. The boys who might go to college and don't are commonly the lazy
ones who won't study. The colleges get nowadays a large proportion of
the best boys of the strongest families. The best boys of the
strongest families would win far more than their proportionate share
of success even if there were no colleges.
An exposure of similarly fallacious reasoning is made by Edward M.
Shepard in _The Atlantic Monthly_ for October, 1904.
The Republican argument is that the whole edifice of our prosperity
depends upon high protective or prohibitive duties, and that to them
is due our industrial progress. Is it not, indeed, a disparagement of
the self-depending faculties of the American people thus to affirm
that, in spite of their marvelous advantages, they would have failed
in industrial life unless by force of law they could have prevented
the competition with them of other peoples? It is only by the
sophistry to which I have referred that this disparagement is
justified. It is that old argument of veritable folly that, because
event Z follows event W, as it follows events A and B and many besides
A, therefore W is the sole cause of Z. Theory or no theory, the
Republican says that we have in fact grown rich by protection, because
in our country prosperity and protective duties have existed together.
They ignore every inconvenient fact. They would have us forget that
each of the industrial depressions of 1873-78 and 1893-96 followed
long operation of a high protective tariff. They ignore the
contribution of soil and climate to our prosperity, the vast increase
which modern inventions and improved carrying facilities have, the
world over, brought to the productivity of labor, and here in the
United States have brought more than anywhere else. They ignore the
superior skill and alertness of the American workman and the wonderful
extent to which he has been stimulated by the conditions and ideals of
our democracy. They ignore the freedom of trade, which, since 1789,
the Federal Constitution has made operative over our entire country,--
by far the most important area of free trade ever known,--and which
everyone to-day knows to be a prime condition of the prosperity of our
forty-five commonwealths.
From what has been said it is obvious that it is never safe to account
for an occurrence or a condition by merely referring to something that
accompanies it or precedes it. There must be a connection between the
alleged cause and the effect, and this connection must be causal;
otherwise, both may be the result of the same cause. The cause must
also be adequate; and it must, moreover, be evident that the result
has not been produced, wholly or partially, by some other cause or
causes.
IV. COMPOSITION AND DIVISION.
COMPOSITION. The fallacy of composition consists of attributing to a
whole that which has been proved only of a part. To condemn or to
approve of a fraternity because of the conduct of only a few of its
members, to say that what is advantageous for certain states in the
Union would therefore be beneficial for the United States as a whole,
to reason from the existence of a few millionaires that the English
nation is wealthy, would be to fall into this fallacy. Furthermore, it
is fallacious to think that because something is true of each member
of a class taken _distributively_, the same thing holds true of
the class taken _collectively_. It is not logical to argue that
because each member of a jury is very likely to judge erroneously, the
jury as a whole is also very likely to judge erroneously. Because each
witness to an event is liable to give false or incorrect evidence, it
is unreasonable to think that no confidence can be placed in the
concurrent testimony of a number of witnesses.
DIVISION. The fallacy of division is the converse of the fallacy of
composition. It consists of attributing to a part that which has been
proved of the whole. For instance, Lancaster county is the most
fertile county in Pennsylvania, but that fact by itself does not
warrant the statement that any one particular farm is exceptionally
fertile. Because the people of a country are suffering from famine, it
does not follow that one particular person is thus afflicted. Again,
it would be fallacious to say: It is admitted that the judges of the
court of appeal cannot misinterpret the law; Richard Rowe is a judge
of the court of appeal; therefore he cannot misinterpret the law.
V. IGNORING THE QUESTION. (IGNORATIO ELENCHI.)
An arguer is said to ignore the question, or to argue beside the
point, whenever he attempts to prove or disprove anything except the
proposition under discussion. This fallacy may arise through
carelessness or trickery. An unskilled debater will often
unconsciously wander away from his subject; and an unscrupulous
debater, when unable to defend his position, will sometimes cunningly
shift his ground and argue upon a totally new proposition, which is,
however, so similar to the original one that in the heat of
controversy the change is hardly noticeable. A discussion on the
subject, "The boycott is a legitimate means of securing concessions
from employers," which attempted to show the effectiveness of the
boycott, would ignore the question. Likewise, in a discussion on the
proposition, "The average college student could do in three years the
work now done in four," any proof showing the desirability of such a
crowding together of college work would be _beside the point_.
In the following passage Macaulay holds up to scorn certain arguments
which contain this fallacy:--
The advocates of Charles, like the advocates of other malefactors
against whom overwhelming evidence is produced, generally decline all
controversy about facts, and content themselves with calling testimony
to character.
We charge him with having broken his coronation oath; and we are told
that he kept his marriage vow! We accuse him of having given up his
people to the merciless inflictions of the most hot-headed and hard-
hearted of prelates; and the defence is, that he took his little son
on his knees and kissed him! We censure him for having violated the
articles of the Petition of Rights, after having, for good and
valuable consideration, promised to obey them; and we are informed
that he was accustomed to hear prayers at six o'clock in the morning!
Whenever an arguer avoids the question at issue and makes an attack
upon the character, principles, or former beliefs or personal
peculiarities of his opponent, he commits the special form of this
fallacy known as _argumentum ad hominem_. It is obviously
fallacious to reason that a principle is unsound because it is upheld
by an untrustworthy advocate, or because it is inconsistent with the
advocate's former beliefs and practices. Honesty is a worthy
principle, even though advocated by a thief. The duty of industry is
no less binding because it is advocated by an idler. Lawyers often
commit this error by seeking to discredit the opposing attorney.
Campaign speakers frequently attempt to overthrow the opposing party's
platform by showing that it is inconsistent with the party's previous
measures and declarations. To bring in such irrelevant matter is to
ignore the question.
Closely allied to _argumentum ad hominem_ is another phase of
ignoring the question called _argumentum ad populum_. This
fallacy consists of using before a certain audience statements which
will strongly appeal to their prejudices and partisan views, but which
are not generally accepted facts and which would undoubtedly meet with
strong opposition elsewhere. A speaker who brings in this kind of
argument makes use neither of reasoning nor of legitimate persuasion.
He neglects his proposition and attempts to excite the feelings of his
audience to such an extent as to render them incapable of forming a
dispassionate judgment upon the matter in hand.
In general, it is necessary only to point out a fallacy to weaken an
argument. Sometimes, however, the error is so involved and so hidden
that, though it is apparent to one who is arguing, yet it is not
easily made apparent to the audience. In overcoming this difficulty,
arguers often resort to certain peculiar devices of arranging and
presenting the material for refutation. Long experience has shown that
the two methods given here are of inestimable value.
VI. REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM. (REDUCING TO AN ABSURDITY.)
The method of refuting an argument by _reductio ad absurdum_
consists of showing that the argument to be refuted, if true, proves
not only the conclusion given, but also other conclusions which are
manifestly absurd. For example, a debater once contended that colleges
should not seek to root out professionalism in athletic sports,
because, by coming in contact with college life, professional players
receive considerable benefit. His opponent answered him by showing
that the same argument carried out to its logical conclusion would
prove that a college should encourage the attendance of criminals and
degenerates on the ground that they will be benefited thereby. Thus he
reduced the argument to a manifest absurdity.
At one time the officers of a national bank permitted their
institution to be wrecked by certifying, and thereby practically
guaranteeing, the checks of a firm of stock-holders when the brokers
did not have the money represented by the checks deposited in the
bank. This was distinctly a criminal offense. The brokers failed, and,
the bank having closed its doors in consequence, the president of the
bank was brought to trial. _The Atlantic Monthly_ reduces to an
absurdity the chief argument used for the defense.
A jury having been empaneled to try him, he pleaded guilty, his
counsel urging, as a reason for clemency, that the violation of this
statute was a habit of the New York banks in the Wall Street district,
and that if the wrecked bank had not followed this law-breaking custom
of its competitors the stock brokers would have withdrawn their
account. The plea was successful, and the officer escaped with a small
fine. Imagine a burglar or a pickpocket urging a plea for clemency
based on the general business habits and customs of his criminal
confrères! [Footnote: The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 94, p. 173.]
Mr. E. A. Freeman, the historian, once made the statement that English
literature cannot be taught. His course of reasoning was to the effect
that it is impossible to teach a subject in which one cannot be
examined; and he maintained that it is impossible to hold satisfactory
examinations in English literature, since this is a subject which is
studied for the purpose of cultivating the taste, educating the
sympathies, and enlarging the mind. If this reasoning proves anything,
it has been pointed out, it proves too much. What Mr. Freeman says of
English literature may equally well be said of Latin, Greek, and every
other kind of literature. But as Latin and Greek literature have been
successfully taught for hundreds of years, Mr. Freeman's argument is
absurd.
College students are continually urging as a defense of
professionalism in their own athletic teams the argument that since
other colleges employ professional players it is necessary for them to
do likewise. By carrying this argument a step farther, one could show,
with equal reason, that since drinking, stealing and cheating are
prevalent in other colleges, these same practices should also be
indulged in at the college in question. In the same way one may refute
by _reductio ad absurdum_ all such arguments as, "Custom has
rendered the spoils system desirable"; "The prevalency of the high
license law shows its superiority to prohibition"; and "Since in the
past all college students were required to study Latin and Greek,
these subjects should be required at the present time."
II. THE DILEMMA.
Another device an arguer will often find useful in refuting an
opponent's statement is the _dilemma_. In the dilemma the arguer
shows that the statement he wishes to disprove can be true only
through the truth of at least one of several possibilities. He then
proves that these possibilities are untenable, and therefore the
original statement is false. To represent the dilemma with letters:
The truth of A rests upon the truth of either x or y; but as x and y
are both false, A is false. Once when it was believed in certain
quarters that Japan was about to undertake a war against the United
States, many people maintained that if Japan desired to go to war she
was amply able to finance such an undertaking. In reply to this
contention, a certain newspaper, making use of the dilemma, said that
since Japan had no money in the treasury she could meet the expenses
of war in only three ways: either by contracting a large debt, or by
increasing taxation, or by indemnifying herself at the expense of the
enemy. The paper then went on to prove that Japan was not in a
position to float a large loan, that taxes in Japan were already as
heavy as the people could bear, and that she could not hope, at least
for a long time, to secure any indemnity from the enemy. Therefore
Japan was not in a financial position to enter upon a war with the
United States.
In attempting to show that municipalities do not have the moral right
to own and operate public utilities, T. Carpenter Smith uses the
dilemma. He says:--
"Any commercial business is carried on either at a profit, or at a
loss, or in such a way that the expenses equal the income. If the city
business of gas or electric lighting is to be carried on at a profit,
then those citizens who use gas or electric light will be charged a
high price for that light, in order to pay the profit, not only to
themselves, but also to those who do not use it. If the works are to
be carried on at a loss, then the citizens who do not use the gas or
electric light will pay taxes to furnish a convenience or economy to
those citizens who do use it. If the works are to be operated exactly
at cost, then the city will carry on a business from which it will get
nothing, but in which it will have to take the labor and risk incident
to such a business in order to benefit only some of its citizens,
furnishing a commodity not desired by all."
In conversation and debate, the dilemma is frequently introduced by
means of a question. The debater, wishing to trap his opponent, asks
him a pertinent question which previous investigation has shown can
possibly be answered in only two or three ways, and which the opponent
cannot afford to answer at all. A good illustration of this device
occurs in the New Testament.
And it came to pass, on one of the days, as he was teaching the people
in the temple, and preaching the gospel, there came upon him the chief
priests and the scribes with the elders; and they spake, saying unto
him, Tell us: By what authority doest thou these things? or who is he
that gave thee this authority? And he answered and said unto them, I
also will ask you a question; and tell me: The baptism of John, was it
from heaven, or from men? And they reasoned with themselves, saying,
If we shall say, From heaven; he will say, Why did ye not believe him?
But if we shall say, From men; all the people will stone us: for they
be persuaded that John was a prophet. And they answered, that they
knew not whence _it was_. And Jesus said unto them, Neither tell
I you by what authority I do these things. [Footnote: Luke xx, 1-8.]
During the Lincoln-Douglas debates in 1858, when both men were seeking
the United States senatorship from Illinois, Lincoln, wishing either
to kill Douglas's senatorial prospects or to head him off from the
presidency two years later, asked him a question which put him in a
dilemma. Ida M. Tarbell describes the question as follows:--
"Can the people of a United States territory in any lawful way,
against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery
from its limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution?"
Lincoln had seen the irreconcilableness of Douglas's own measure of
popular sovereignty, which declared that the people of a territory
should be left to regulate their domestic concerns in their own way
subject only to the Constitution, and the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Dred Scott case that slaves, being property, could not
under the Constitution be excluded from a territory. He knew that if
Douglas said _no_ to this question, his Illinois constituents
would never return him to the Senate. He believed that if he said
_yes,_ the people of the South would never vote for him for
President of the United States.
In the last example, Lincoln, by forcing Douglas to answer this
question, sought to destroy, and, as history shows, did destroy, the
popular conception of Douglas's fitness for public office.
Before one can safely use the dilemma he must carefully investigate
every phase of the statement that he wishes to refute. If he is to use
the dilemma directly, he must consider every possibility--commonly
called the horns of the dilemma--upon which the truth of the statement
may rest. If there is a single possibility which he is not ready to
meet and overthrow, his whole effort is fruitless. For instance, a
debater, in attempting to rebut the statement that college
fraternities are harmful, said that his opponent must show that
fraternities are either morally, socially, financially or
intellectually detrimental to their members; he then proved as best he
could that in these respects fraternities are beneficial rather than
harmful, and sat down thinking that he had gone a long way toward
winning the debate. His opponent then arose and admitting nearly
everything that had been said, based his argument on the idea that
fraternities were harmful _to the college as a whole_. The first
speaker had not considered every alternative. If an arguer is to
approach a dilemma through the medium of a question, he must be sure
that he knows every reasonable answer that his opponent can make. When
one has satisfied these conditions, he can use the dilemma with great
effect.
By way of summary it may be said that the successful arguer must both
build up his own proof and destroy his opponent's. To accomplish the
latter one has to know what to refute and what to leave alone; he must
distinguish between the important and the unessential, and he must
take care not to "refute himself." Since proof consists of evidence
and reasoning, the first step for him to take in refuting an argument
is to apply the tests for each, and if possible show where his
opponent has erred. In the next place, he should see whether he can
discover and point out any of the more important fallacies; the ones
mentioned here are _begging the question_, _ambiguous terms_,
_false cause_, _composition and division_, and _ignoring the question_.
Should the arguer find any of these fundamental weaknesses, it is
ordinarily sufficient merely to call attention to them; for the sake
of emphasis, however, one may make use of two especially effective
methods of refutation, _reductio ad absurdum_ and the _dilemma_.
EXERCISES.
A. Criticize the following arguments and point out the fallacies they
contain:--
1. Four thousand men have taken examinations at Princeton under the
honor system, and only six of these were found guilty of "cribbing."
This record shows conclusively that the honor system restrains
dishonest work in examinations.
2. Athletics do not injure a man's scholarship; one of the best
players on last year's football team attained such a high grade that
he was awarded a fellowship.
3. During the decade from 1870 to 1880, illiteracy among the negroes
decreased ten per cent., but the race grew more criminal by twenty-
five per cent.; from 1880 to 1890, illiteracy decreased eighteen per
cent., but criminality increased thirty-three and one-third per cent.
Who can now say that education does not injure the negro?
4. Since the honor system failed at Franklin and Marshall, it will
fail at ---- College.
5. Frequent athletic games benefit a college because they tend to take
the students' attention away from their studies.
6. The fixed curriculum of studies is effective in making a
specialist, because the specialist takes up only one kind of work.
7. Southerners are justified in keeping the franchise from the negro,
because the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution ought never to
have been passed.
8. Since the negro's devotion to the church is as great as that of
most white people, he is of as high moral standing as the average
unintelligent white.
9. Ireland is idle and therefore she starves; she starves and
therefore she rebels.
10. Every one desires virtue, because every one desires happiness.
11. The present term of four years is so short a time that the
President does not have opportunity to become acquainted with his
duties, for just as he is becoming acquainted with them he has to step
out of office.
12. This doctrine cannot be proved from the Gospels, nor from the Acts
of the Apostles, nor from the Epistles, nor from the Revelation of St.
John; therefore it cannot be proved from the New Testament.
13. Crime is a violation of the laws of our country; piracy is a
crime; this man belongs to a band of lawless men, and this band has
been taken in the very deed of piracy. Therefore he has violated the
laws of our country.
14. Since all presuming men are contemptible, and since this man
presumes to believe his opinions are correct, he is not worthy of our
consideration.
15. To prove to you that our standing army should be permanently
enlarged, I will show that every nation of any prominence whatsoever
keeps a standing army.
16. The elective system of studies is preferable to the prescribed
system, because
A. The student can elect those studies which will do him the most
good, for
1. He can elect what he pleases.
17. Strikes benefit the working man, because
A. They benefit him financially, for
1. If they did not, he would not strike.
18. When thirteen sit at table together, one of them always dies
within the year.
19. To decide whether or not strikes are justifiable it is necessary
to see if they have for the most part been successful in the past.
20. All the trees in the park make a thick shade; this is one of them,
therefore this tree makes a thick shade.
21. Italy is a Catholic country and abounds in beggars; France is also
a Catholic country, and therefore abounds in beggars.
22. Pitt was not a great and useful minister; for though he would have
been so had he carried out Adam Smith's doctrines of free trade, he
did not carry out those doctrines.
23. All criminal actions ought to be punished by law. Prosecutions for
theft are criminal actions, and therefore ought to be punished by law.
24. Books are a source both of instruction and of amusement; a table
of logarithms is a book; therefore it is a source both of instruction
and of amusement.
B. On each of the following arguments from authority write a paragraph
that will weaken its effect:--
1. "The Senate for more than a century has demonstrated the wisdom of
the mode of its constitution." Senator G. F. Hoar.
2. "Mine disasters are largely due to the intoxication of miners, or
to carelessness caused by the after effects of a 'spree,'" says Dr.
Jesse K. Johnson, superintendent of one of the largest mines in the
Pittsburg district.
3. Both Mark Hanna and Grover Cleveland have stated that a six year
Presidential term would be of great benefit to the United States.
4. Senator La Follet, who has made a thorough study of many of the
principal monopolies in the country, states that the Standard Oil
trust charges exorbitant rates.
5. Mr. Francis Walker, in the Political Science Quarterly, Volume
twenty, page fourteen, says that legislation against trusts has
improved conditions, and would therefore improve conditions in the
United States.
6. President Hadley, of Yale University, has said that the subsidizing
of ships on a large scale has been detrimental to France.
7. "The Indian who is not obliged to labor for his maintenance becomes
a lazy vagabond." Lyman Abbott.
C. Put the following article into the form of a brief and show exactly
what methods of refutation are used:--
THE OLD FRIGATE "CONSTITUTION."
The pretexts for removal of "Old Ironsides" from the waters in which
that historic ship had her birth are now reduced to two.
One of these is that the old boat takes up room at the Navy Yard which
is needed for the work of that establishment.
The other is that since the money expended in the restoration of the
frigate--less than $200,000--came out of the Federal Treasury, the
people of distant States ought to have the pleasure of seeing what
their money paid for without coming to Boston in order to enjoy it.
As for crowding the Navy Yard, that is an absurdity. His Excellency
Curtis Guild, Jr., in his letter to the Navy Department protesting
against the removal, quoted the officers in command at the Navy Yard
as declaring that "the ship in no way interferes with the work of the
yard, taking up no space that is needed for other purposes." The
Governor would not make such a statement in an official communication
without the clearest authority. "Indeed," he adds as his own opinion,
"the strip of wharf occupied is but a trivial portion of the long
water front controlled by the government."
There is the other pretext, namely, that because the "Constitution"
has been repaired at national cost, therefore any special claim that
Massachusetts may have upon this relic of Massachusetts patriotism is
removed. This idea has found crude and unmannerly expression in the
words of one of the committee of Congress looking over our navy yards.
"The agitation to keep the ship in Boston seems selfish," he is quoted
as saying. "It was the money of the whole people of the United States
that paid for its repair, and the people in other sections are as
justly entitled to see the ship as in Boston."
Coming from a representative of the State of Kansas, this is almost
amusing. His proposition to tow the ship around from place to place,
as it may be wanted for a show, suggests the practicability of a
canal, say, to Topeka, or to Fort Hayes.
The alternative proposition, namely, that Massachusetts shall repay to
the general government the cost of the repairs of the "Constitution,"
would have some standing were it a commercial affair. Massachusetts
has expended many times the cost of the repairs of "Old Ironsides" in
preserving for the nation the revolutionary sites and monuments upon
our soil. Payment for the repair and restoration of "Old Ironsides"
would be a bagatelle if the people of the United States were to demand
that this monument also shall be purchased by the people of
Massachusetts under threat of its removal.
But it is not a question of money; that is a contemptible suggestion.
Nor is it a question of bureaucracy. It is a simple, reasonable,
entirely practical demand of the historic sentiment of patriotism
which still warms the hearts and inspires the souls of Massachusetts
men.