A programme approved of by all the members of the committee was drawn
up, and on the 3rd of November 1903, Count Istvan Tisza was appointed
minister president to carry it out. Thus, out of respect for the wishes
of the nation, the king had voluntarily thrown open to public discussion
the hitherto strictly closed and jealously guarded domain of the army.
Tisza, a statesman of singular probity and tenacity, seemed to be the
one person capable of carrying out the programme of the king and the
majority. The irreconcilable minority, recognizing this, exhausted all
the resources of "technical obstruction" in order to reduce the
government to impotence, a task made easy by the absurd standing-rules
of the House which enabled any single member to block a measure. These
tactics soon rendered legislation impossible, and a modification of the
rule of procedure became absolutely necessary if any business at all was
to be done. The Modification of the Standing-orders Bill was accordingly
introduced by the deputy Gabor Daniel (Nov. 18, 1904); but the
opposition, to which the National party had attached itself, denounced
it as "a gagging order" inspired at Vienna, and shouted it down so
vehemently that no debate could be held; whereupon the president
declared the bill carried and adjourned the House till the 13th of
December 1904. This was at once followed by an anti-ministerial fusion
of the extremists of all parties, including seceders from the government
(known as the Constitutional party); and when the diet reassembled, the
opposition broke into the House by force and wrecked all the furniture,
so that a session was physically impossible (Jan. 5, 1905). Tisza now
appealed to the country, but was utterly defeated. The opposition
thereupon proceeded to annul the Lex Daniel (April 7) and stubbornly to
clamour for the adoption of the Magyar word of command in the Hungarian
part of the common army. To this demand the king as stubbornly refused
to accede;[49] and as the result of the consequent dead-lock, Tisza, who
had courageously continued in office at the king's request, after every
other leading politician had refused to form a ministry, was finally
dismissed on the 17th of June. (R. N. B.; W. A. P.)
Fejervary Government.
Long negotiations between the crown and the leaders of the Coalition
having failed to give any promise of a _modus vivendi_, the king-emperor
at last determined to appoint an extra-parliamentary ministry, and on
the 21st of June Baron Fejervary, an officer in the royal bodyguard, was
nominated minister president with a cabinet consisting of little-known
permanent officials. Instead of presenting the usual programme, the new
premier read to the parliament a royal autograph letter stating the
reasons which had actuated the king in taking this course, and giving as
the task of the new ministry the continuance of negotiations with the
Coalition on the basis of the exclusion of the language question. The
parliament was at the same time prorogued. A period followed of
arbitrary government on the one hand and of stubborn passive resistance
on the other. Three times the parliament was again prorogued--from the
15th of September to the 10th of October, from this date to the 19th of
December, and from this yet again to the 1st of March 1906--in spite of
the protests of both Houses. To the repressive measures of the
government--press censorship, curtailment of the right of public
meeting, dismissal of recalcitrant officials, and dragooning of
disaffected county assemblies and municipalities--the Magyar nation
opposed a sturdy refusal to pay taxes, to supply recruits or to carry on
the machinery of administration.
Kristoffy's Universal Suffrage proposal.
Had this attitude represented the temper of the whole Hungarian people,
it would have been impossible for the crown to have coped with it. But
the Coalition represented, in fact, not the mass of the people, but only
a small dominant minority,[50] and for years past this minority had
neglected the social and economic needs of the mass of the people in the
eager pursuit of party advantage and the effort to impose, by coercion
and corruption failing other means, the Magyar language and Magyar
culture on the non-Magyar races. In this supreme crisis, then, it is not
surprising that the masses listened with sullen indifference to the
fiery eloquence of the Coalition leaders. Moreover, by refusing the
royal terms, the Coalition had forced the crown into an alliance with
the extreme democratic elements in the state. Universal suffrage had
already been adopted in the Cis-leithan half of the monarchy; it was an
obvious policy to propose it for Hungary also, and thus, by an appeal to
the non-Magyar majority, to reduce the irreconcilable Magyar minority to
reason. Universal suffrage, then, was the first and most important of
the proposals put forward by Mr Joszef Kristoffy, the minister of the
interior, in the programme issued by him on the 26th of November 1905.
Other proposals were: the maintenance of the system of the joint army as
established in 1867, but with the concession that all Hungarian recruits
were to receive their education in Magyar; the maintenance till 1917 of
the actual customs convention with Austria; a reform of the land laws,
with a view to assisting the poorer proprietors; complete religious
equality; universal and compulsory primary education.
The issue of a programme so liberal, and notably the inclusion in it of
the idea of universal suffrage, entirely checkmated the opposition
parties. Their official organs, indeed, continued to fulminate against
the "unconstitutional" government, but the enthusiasm with which the
programme had been received in the country showed the Coalition leaders
the danger of their position, and henceforth, though they continued
their denunciations of Austria, they entered into secret negotiations
with the king-emperor, in order, by coming to terms with him, to ward
off the fatal consequences of Kristoffy's proposals.
Coalition Ministry, 1906.
On the 19th of February 1906 the parliament was dissolved, without writs
being issued for a new election, a fact accepted by the country with an
equanimity highly disconcerting to patriots. Meanwhile the negotiations
continued, so secretly that when, on the 9th of April, the appointment
of a Coalition cabinet[51] under Dr Sandor Wekerle was announced, the
world was taken completely by surprise. The agreement with the crown
which had made this course possible included the postponement of the
military questions that had evoked the crisis, and the acceptance of the
principle of Universal Suffrage by the Coalition leaders, who announced
that their main tasks would be to repair the mischief wrought by the
"unconstitutional" Fejervary cabinet, and then to introduce a measure of
franchise reform so wide that it would be possible to ascertain the will
of the whole people on the questions at issue between themselves and the
crown.[52] In the general elections that followed the Liberal party was
practically wiped out, its leader, Count Istvan Tisza, retiring into
private life.
Andrassy's Universal Suffrage Bill.
For two years and a half the Coalition ministry continued in office
without showing any signs that they intended to carry out the most
important item of their programme. The old abuses continued: the
muzzling of the press in the interests of Magyar nationalism, the
imprisonment of non-Magyar deputies for "incitement against Magyar
nationality," the persecution of Socialists and of the subordinate
races. That this condition of things could not be allowed to continue
was, indeed, recognized by all parties; the fundamental difference of
opinion was as to the method by which it was to be ended. The dominant
Magyar parties were committed to the principle of franchise reform; but
they were determined that this reform should be of such a nature as not
to imperil their own hegemony. What this would mean was pointed out by
Mr Kristoffy in an address delivered at Budapest on the 14th of March
1907. "If the work of social reform," he said, "is scamped by a measure
calculated to falsify the essence of reform, the struggle will be
continued in the Chamber until full electoral liberty is attained. Till
then there can be no social peace in Hungary."[53] The postponement of
the question was, indeed, already producing ugly symptoms of popular
indignation. On the 10th of October 1907 there was a great and orderly
demonstration at Budapest, organized by the socialists, in favour of
reform. About 100,000 people assembled, and a deputation handed to Mr
Justh, the president of the Chamber, a monster petition in favour of
universal suffrage. The reception it met with was not calculated to
encourage constitutional methods. The Socialist deputy, Mr Mezoffy, who
wished to move an interpellation on the question, was howled down by the
Independents with shouts of "Away with him! Down with him!"[54] Four
days later, in answer to a question by the same deputy, Count Andrassy
said that the Franchise Bill would be introduced shortly, but that it
would be of such a nature that "the Magyar State idea would remain
intact and suffer no diminution."[55] Yet more than a year was to pass
before the promised bill was introduced, and meanwhile the feeling in
the country had grown more intense, culminating in serious riots at
Budapest on the 13th of March 1908.
At last (November 11, 1908) Count Andrassy introduced the long-promised
bill. How far it was from satisfying the demands of the Hungarian
peoples was at once apparent. It granted manhood suffrage, it is true,
but hedged with so many qualifying conditions and complicated with so
elaborate a system of plural voting as to make its effect nugatory.
Every male Hungarian citizen, able to read and write, was to receive the
vote at the beginning of his twenty-fifth year, subject to a residential
qualification of twelve months. Illiterate citizens were to choose one
elector for every ten of their number. All electors not having the
qualifications for the plural franchise were to have one vote. Electors
who, e.g., had passed four standards of a secondary school, or paid 16s.
8d. in direct taxation, were to have two votes. Electors who had passed
five standards, or who paid L4, 3s. 4d. in direct taxes, were to have
three votes. Voting was to be public, as before, on the ground,
according to the Preamble, that "the secret ballot protects electors in
dependent positions only in so far as they break their promises under
the veil of secrecy."
It was at once seen that this elaborate scheme was intended to preserve
"the Magyar State idea intact." Its result, had it passed, would have
been to strengthen the representation of the Magyar and German elements,
to reduce that of the Slovaks, and almost to destroy that of the Rumans
and other non-Magyar races whose educational status was low.[56] On the
other hand, according to the _Neue Freie Presse_, it would have
increased the number of electors from some million odd to 2,600,000, and
the number of _votes_ to 4,000,000; incidentally it would have largely
increased the working-class representation.
This proposal was at once recognized by public opinion--to use the
language of the _Journal des Debats_ (May 21, 1909)--as "an instrument
of domination" rather than as an attempt to carry out the spirit of the
compact under which the Coalition government had been summoned to power.
It was not, indeed, simply a reactionary or undemocratic measure; it
was, as _The Times_ correspondent pointed out, "a measure _sui generis_,
designed to defeat the objects of the universal suffrage movement that
compelled the Coalition to take office in April 1906, and framed in
accordance with Magyar needs as understood by one of the foremost Magyar
noblemen." Under this bill culture was to be the gate to a share in
political power, and in Hungary culture must necessarily be Magyar.
The crisis, 1909-1910.
Demand for separate Hungarian Bank.
Plainly, this bill was not destined to settle the Hungarian problem, and
other questions soon arose which showed that the crisis, so far from
being near a settlement, was destined to become more acute than ever. In
December 1908 it was clear that the Coalition Ministry was falling to
pieces. Those ministers who belonged to the constitutional and popular
parties, i.e. the Liberals and Clericals, desired to maintain the
compact with the crown; their colleagues of the Independence party were
eager to advance the cause they have at heart by pressing on the
question of a separate Hungarian bank. So early as March 1908 Mr Hallo
had laid a formal proposal before the House that the charter of the
Austro-Hungarian bank, which was to expire on the 31st of December 1910,
should not be renewed; that negotiations should be opened with the
Austrian government with a view to a convention between the banks of
Austria and Hungary; and that, in the event of these negotiations
failing, an entirely separate Hungarian bank should be established. The
Balkan crisis threw this question into the background during the winter;
but, with the settlement of the international questions raised by the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it once more came to the front.
The ministry was divided on the issue, Count Andrassy opposing and Mr
Ferencz Kossuth supporting the proposal for a separate bank. Finally,
the prime minister, Dr Wekerle, mainly owing to the pressure put upon
him by Mr Justh, the president of the Chamber, yielded to the
importunity of the Independence party, and, in the name of the Hungarian
government, laid the proposals for a separate bank before the
king-emperor and the Austrian government.
The result was a foregone conclusion. The conference at Vienna revealed
the irreconcilable difference within the ministry; but it revealed also
something more--the determination of the emperor Francis Joseph, if
pressed beyond the limits of his patience, to appeal again to the
non-Magyar Hungarians against the Magyar chauvinists. He admitted that
under the Compromise of 1867 Hungary might have a separate bank, while
urging the expediency of such an arrangement from the point of view of
the international position of the Dual Monarchy. But he pointed out also
that the question of a separate bank did not actually figure in the act
of 1867, and that it could not be introduced into it, _more especially
since the capital article of the ministerial programme_, i.e. _electoral
reform, was not realized, nor near being realized_. On the 27th of
April, in consequence of this rebuff, Dr Wekerle tendered his
resignation, but consented to hold office pending the completion of the
difficult task of forming another government.
This task was destined to prove one of almost insuperable difficulty.
Had the issues involved been purely Hungarian and constitutional, the
natural course would have been for the king to have sent for Mr Kossuth,
who commanded the strongest party in the parliament, and to have
entrusted him with the formation of a government. But the issues
involved affected the stability of the Dual Monarchy and its position in
Europe; and neither the king-emperor nor his Austrian advisers, their
position strengthened by the success of Baron Aehrenthal's diplomatic
victory in the Balkans, were prepared to make any substantial
concessions to the party of Independence. In these circumstances the
king sent for Dr Laszlo Lukacs, once finance minister in the Fejervary
cabinet, whose task was, acting as a _homo regius_ apart from parties,
to construct a government out of any elements that might be persuaded to
co-operate with him. But Lukacs had no choice but to apply in the first
instance to Mr Kossuth and his friends, and these, suspecting an
intention of crushing their party by entrapping them into unpopular
engagements, rejected his overtures. Nothing now remained but for the
king to request Dr Wekerle to remain "for the present" in office with
his colleagues, thus postponing the settlement of the crisis (July 4).
This procrastinating policy played into the hands of the extremists; for
supplies had not been voted, and the question of the credits for the
expenditure incurred in connexion with the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, increasingly urgent, placed a powerful weapon in the hands
of the Magyars, and made it certain that in the autumn the crisis would
assume an even more acute form. By the middle of September affairs had
again reached an _impasse_. On the 14th Dr Wekerle, at the ministerial
conference assembled at Vienna for the purpose of discussing the
estimates to be laid before the delegations, announced that the
dissensions among his colleagues made the continuance of the Coalition
government impossible. The burning points of controversy were the
magyarization of the Hungarian regiments and the question of the
separate state bank. On the first of these Wekerle, Andrassy and Apponyi
were prepared to accept moderate concessions; as to the second, they
were opposed to the question being raised at all. Kossuth and Justh, on
the other hand, competitors for the leadership of the Independence
party, declared themselves not prepared to accept anything short of the
full rights of the Magyars in those matters. The matter was urgent; for
parliament was to meet on the 28th, and it was important that a new
cabinet, acceptable to it, should be appointed before that date, or that
the Houses should be prorogued pending such appointment; otherwise the
delegations would be postponed and no credits would be voted for the
cost of the new Austro-Hungarian "Dreadnoughts" and of the annexation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the event, neither of these courses proved
possible, and on the 28th Dr Wekerle once more announced his resignation
to the parliament.
The prime minister was not, however, as yet to be relieved of an
impossible responsibility. After a period of wavering Mr Kossuth had
consented to shelve for the time the question of the separate bank, and
on the strength of this Dr Wekerle advised the crown to entrust to him
the formation of a government. The position thus created raised a
twofold question: Would the crown accept? In that event, would he be
able to carry his party with him in support of his modified programme?
The answer to the first question, in effect, depended on that given by
events to the second; and this was not long in declaring itself. The
plan, concerted by Kossuth and Apponyi, with the approval of Baron
Aehrenthal, was to carry on a modified coalition government with the aid
of the Andrassy Liberals, the National party, the Clerical People's
party[57] and the Independence party, on a basis of suffrage reform with
plural franchise, the prolongation of the charter of the joint bank,
and certain concessions to Magyar demands in the matter of the army. It
was soon clear, however, that in this Kossuth would not carry his party
with him. A trial of strength took place between him and Mr de Justh,
the champion of the extreme demands in the matter of Hungarian financial
and economic autonomy; on the 7th of November rival banquets were held,
one at Mako, Justh's constituency, over which he presided, one at
Budapest with Kossuth in the chair; the attendance at each foreshadowed
the outcome of the general meeting of the party held at Budapest on the
11th, when Kossuth found himself in a minority of 46. The Independence
party was now split into two groups: the "Independence and 1848 party,"
and the "Independence, 1848 and Kossuth party."
On the 12th Mr de Justh resigned the presidency of the Lower House and
sought re-election, so as to test the relative strength of parties. He
was defeated by a combination of the Kossuthists, Andrassy Liberals and
Clerical People's party, the 30 Croatian deputies, whose vote might have
turned the election, abstaining on Dr Wekerle promising them to deliver
Croatia from the oppressive rule of the ban, Baron Rauch. A majority was
thus secured for the Kossuthist programme of compromise, but a majority
so obviously precarious that the king-emperor, influenced also--it was
rumoured--by the views of the heir-apparent, in an interview with Count
Andrassy and Mr Kossuth on the 15th, refused to make any concessions to
the Magyar national demands. Hereupon Kossuth publicly declared (Nov.
22) to a deputation of his constituents from Czegled that he himself was
in favour of an independent bank, but that the king opposed it, and that
in the event of no concessions being made he would join the opposition.
How desperate the situation had now become was shown by the fact that on
the 27th the king sent for Count Tisza, on the recommendation of the
very Coalition ministry which had been formed to overthrow him. This
also proved abortive, and affairs rapidly tended to revert to the
_ex-lex_ situation. On the 23rd of December Dr Lukacs was again sent
for. On the previous day the Hungarian parliament had adopted a proposal
in favour of an address to the crown asking for a separate state bank.
Against this Dr Wekerle had protested, as opposed to general Hungarian
opinion and ruinous to the national credit, pointing out that whenever
it was a question of raising a loan, the maintenance of the financial
community between Hungary and Austria was always postulated as a
preliminary condition. Point was given to this argument by the fact that
the premier had just concluded the preliminaries for the negotiation of
a loan of L20,000,000 in France, and that the money--which could not be
raised in the Austrian market, already glutted with Hungarian
securities--was urgently needed to pay for the Hungarian share in the
expenses of the annexation policy, for public works (notably the new
railway scheme), and for the redemption in 1910 of treasury bonds. It
was hoped that, in the circumstances, Dr Lukacs, a financier of
experience, might be able to come to terms with Mr de Justh, on the
basis of dropping the bank question for the time, or, failing that, to
patch together out of the rival parties some sort of a working majority.
On the 28th the Hungarian parliament adjourned _sine die_, pending the
settlement of the crisis, without having voted the estimates for 1910,
and without there being any prospect of a meeting of the delegations. On
the two following days Dr Lukacs and Mr de Justh had audiences of the
king, but without result; and on the 31st Hungary once more entered on a
period of extra-constitutional government.
Khuen Hedervary Government.
After much negotiation a new cabinet was finally constituted on the 17th
of January 1910. At its head was Count Khuen Hedervary, who in addition
to the premiership, was minister of the interior, minister for Croatia,
and minister in waiting on the crown. Other ministers were Mr Karoly de
Hieronymi (commerce), Dr Lukacs (finance), Ferencz de Szekely (justice,
education, public worship), Bela Serenyi (agriculture) and General Hazay
(national defence). The two main items in the published programme of the
new government were the introduction of universal suffrage and--even
more revolutionary from the Magyar point of view--the substitution of
state-appointed for elected officials in the counties. The real
programme was to secure, by hook or by crook, a majority at the polls.
Meanwhile, the immediate necessities of the government were provided for
by the issue through Messrs Rothschild of L2,000,000 fresh treasury
bills. These were to be redeemed in December 1910, together with the
L9,000,000 worth issued in 1909, out of the L20,000,000 loan agreed on
in principle with the French government; but in view of the opposition
in Paris to the idea of advancing money to a member of the Triple
Alliance, it was doubtful whether the loan would ever be floated.
The overwhelming victory of the government in June at the polls produced
a lull in a crisis which at the beginning of the year had threatened the
stability of the Dual Monarchy and the peace of Europe; but, in view of
the methods by which the victory had been won, not the most sanguine
could assert that the crisis was overpassed. Its deep underlying causes
can only be understood in the light of the whole of Hungarian history.
It is easy to denounce the dominant Magyar classes as a selfish
oligarchy, and to criticize the methods by which they have sought to
maintain their power. But a nation that for a thousand years had
maintained its individuality in the midst of hostile and rival races
could not be expected to allow itself without a struggle to be
sacrificed to the force of mere numbers, and the less so if it were
justified in its claim that it stood for a higher ideal of culture and
civilization. The Magyars had certainly done much to justify their claim
to a special measure of enlightenment. In their efforts to establish
Hungarian independence on the firm basis of national efficiency they had
succeeded in changing their country from one of very backward economic
conditions into one which promised to be in a position to hold its own
on equal terms with any in the world. (W. A. P.)
BIBLIOGRAPHY.--(a) Sources. The earliest important collection of
sources of Hungarian history was Johann Georg Schrandtner's
_Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum_ (4th ed., Vienna, 1766-1768). _The
Codex diplomaticus_ of Gyorgy Fejer (40 vols., Buda, 1829-1844),
though full of errors, remains an inexhaustible storehouse of
materials. In 1849 Stephen Ladislaus Endlicher (1804-1849), better
known as a botanist than as a historian, published a collection of
documents, _Rerum hungaricarum monumenta Arpadiana_. This was followed
by Gustav Wenzel's _Codex diplomaticus arpadianus continuens_ (12
vols., Pest, 1857) and A. Theiner's _Vet. monumenta hist. Hungariam
sacram illustrantia_ (2 vols., Rome, 1859, &c.). Later collections are
_Documents of the Angevin Period_, ed. by G. Wenzel and Imre Nagy (8
vols., _ib._ 1874-1876); _Diplomatic Records of the Time of King
Matthias_ (Mag. and Lat.), ed. by Ivan Nagy (_ib._ 1875-1878);
_National Documents_ (Mag. and Lat.), ed. by Farkas Deak and others
(Pest, 1878-1891); _Monumenta Vaticana historiam regni Hungariae
illustrantia_ (8 vols., Budapest, 1885-1891), a valuable collection of
materials from the Vatican archives, edited under the auspices of the
Hungarian bishops; _Principal Sources for the Magyar Conquest_ (Mag.),
by Gyula Pauler and Sandor Szilagyi (_ib._ 1900). Numerous documents
have also been issued in the various publications of the Hungarian
Academy and the Hungarian Historical Society. Of these the most
important is the _Monumenta Hungariae Historica_, published by the
Academy. This falls into three main groups: _Diplomata_ (30 vols.);
_Scriptores_ (40 vols.); _Monumenta Comitialia_ (records of the
Hungarian and Transylvanian diets, 12 vols. and 21 vols.). With these
are associated the _Turkish-Hungarian Records_ (9 vols.), _Turkish
Historians_ (2 vols. pubd.), and the _Archives of the Hungarian
subordinate countries_ (2 vols. pubd.).
On the sources see Hendrik Marczali, _Ungarns Geschichtsquellen im
Zeitalter des Arpaden_ (Berlin, 1882); Kaindl, _Studien zu den
ungarischen Geschichtsquellen_ (Vienna, 1894-1902); and, for a general
appreciation, Mangold, _Pragmatic History of the Hungarians_ (in Mag.,
5th ed., Budapest, 1907).
(b) Works: The modern literature of Hungary is very rich in historical
monographs, of which a long list will be found in the Subject Index of
the London Library. Here it is only possible to give some of the more
important general histories, together with such special works as are
most readily accessible to English readers. Of the earlier Hungarian
historians two are still of some value: Katona, _Hist. critica regum
Hungariae_ (42 vols., Pest, 1779-1810), and Pray, _Annales regum
Hungariae_ (5 vols., Vienna, 1764-1770). Of modern histories written
in Magyar the most imposing is the _History of the Hungarian Nation_
(10 vols., Budapest, 1898), issued to commemorate the celebration of
the millennium of the foundation of the monarchy, by Sandor Szilagyi
and numerous collaborators. Of importance, too, is Ignacz Acsady's
_History of the Magyar Empire_ (2 vols., Budapest, 1904), though its
author is too often ultra-chauvinistic in tone.
To those who do not read Magyar the following books on the general
history of Hungary may be recommended: Armin Vambery, _Hungary in
Ancient and Modern Times_ (London, 1897); R. Chelard, _La Hongrie
millenaire_ (Paris, 1896); Mor Gelleri, _Aus der Vergangenheit und
Gegenwart des tausendjahrigen Ungarn_ (Budapest, 1896); Jozsef
Jekelfalussy, _The Millennium of Hungary_ (Budapest, 1897); E. Sayous,
_Histoire generale des Hongrois_ (2 vols., Budapest, 1st ed., 1876,
2nd ed., _ib._ 1900); Janos Majlath, _Geschichte der Magyaren_ (5
vols., 3rd ed., Regensburg, 1852-1853)--somewhat out of date (it first
appeared in 1828), but useful for those who like a little more detail;
Count Julius Andrassy, _The Development of Hungarian Constitutional
Liberty_, translated by C. Arthur and Ilona Ginever (London, 1908),
containing an interesting comparison with English constitutional
development; C. M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, _The Political Evolution of
the Hungarian Nation_ (2 vols., London, 1908), strongly Magyar in
sympathy; R. W. Seton-Watson (Scotus Viator), _Racial Problems in
Hungary_ (London, 1908), a strong criticism of the Magyar attitude
towards the Slav subject races, especially the Slovaks, with documents
and a full bibliography.
(c) Constitutional: Anton von Virozsil, _Das Staatsrecht des
Konigreichs Ungarn_ (3 vols., Pest, 1865); S. Rado-Rothfeld, _Die
ungarische Verfassung_ (Berlin, 1898) and, based on this, A. de
Bertha, _La Constitution Hongroise_ (Paris, 1898), both supporting the
policy of Magyarization; Akos von Timon, _Ungarische Verfassungs- und
Rechisgeschichte_ (Berlin, 1904); Knatchbull-Hugessen, _op. cit._
(d) Biographical: In Magyar, the great serial entitled _Hungarian
Historical Biographies_ (Budapest, 1884, &c.), edited by Sandor
Szilagyi, is a collection of lives of famous Hungarian men and women
from the earliest times by many scholars of note, finely illustrated.
For works on special periods see the separate articles on the
sovereigns and other notabilities of Hungary. For works on the
Compromise of 1867 and the relations of Austria and Hungary generally,
see the bibliography to the article AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.