II. HISTORY

Magyar conquest.

When Arpad, the semi-mythical founder of the Magyar monarchy, at the end

of A.D. 895 led his savage hordes through the Vereczka pass into the

regions of the Upper Theiss, the land, now called Hungary, was, for the

most part, in the possession of Slavs or semi-Slavs. From the

Riesengebirge to the Vistula, and from the Moldau to the Drave, extended

the shadowy empire of Moravia, founded by Moimir and Svatopluk (c.

850-890), which collapsed so completely at the first impact of the

Magyars that, ten years after their arrival, not a trace of it remained.

The Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats and Avars in the southern provinces were

subdued with equal ease. Details are wanting, but the traditional

decisive battle was fought at Alpar on the Theiss, whereupon the victors

pressed on to Orsova, and the conquest was completed by Arpad about the

year 906. This forcible intrusion of a non-Aryan race altered the whole

history of Europe; but its peculiar significance lay in the fact that it

permanently divided the northern from the southern and the eastern from

the western Slavs. The inevitable consequence of this rupture was the

Teutonizing of the western branch of the great Slav family, which, no

longer able to stand alone, and cut off from both Rome and

Constantinople, was forced, in self-defence, to take Christianity, and

civilization along with it, from Germany.

During the following seventy years we know next to nothing of the

internal history of the Magyars. Arpad died in 907, and his immediate

successors, Zsolt (907-947) and Taksony (947-972), are little more than

chronological landmarks. This was the period of those devastating raids

which made the savage Magyar horsemen the scourge and the terror of

Europe. We have an interesting description of their tactics from the pen

of the emperor Leo VI., whose account of them is confirmed by the

contemporary Russian annals. Trained riders, archers and

javelin-throwers from infancy, they advanced to the attack in numerous

companies following hard upon each other, avoiding close quarters, but

wearing out their antagonists by the persistency of their onslaughts.

Scarce a corner of Europe was safe from them. First (908-910) they

ravaged Thuringia, Swabia and Bavaria, and defeated the Germans on the

Lechfeld, whereupon the German king Henry I. bought them off for nine

years, employing the respite in reorganizing his army and training

cavalry, which henceforth became the principal military arm of the

Empire. In 933 the war was resumed, and Henry, at the head of what was

really the first national German army, defeated the Magyars at Gotha and

at Ried (933). The only effect of these reverses was to divert them

elsewhere. Already, in 926, they had crossed the Rhine and ravaged

Lotharingia. In 934 and 942 they raided the Eastern Empire, and were

bought off under the very walls of Constantinople. In 943 Taksony led

them into Italy, when they penetrated as far as Otranto. In 955 they

ravaged Burgundy. The same year the emperor Otto I. proclaimed them the

enemies of God and humanity, refused to receive their ambassadors, and

finally, at the famous battle of the Lechfeld, overwhelmed them on the

very scene of their first victory, near Augsburg, which they were

besieging (Aug. 10, 955). Only seven of the Magyars escaped, and these

were sold as slaves on their return home.

Acceptance of Christianity.

The catastrophe of the Lechfeld convinced the leading Magyars of the

necessity of accommodating themselves as far as possible to the Empire,

especially in the matter of religion. Christianity had already begun to

percolate Hungary. A large proportion of the captives of the Magyars

had been settled all over the country to teach their conquerors the arts

of peace, and close contact with this civilizing element was of itself

an enlightenment. The moral superiority of Christianity to paganism was

speedily obvious. The only question was which form of Christianity were

the Magyars to adopt, the Eastern or the Western? Constantinople was the

first in the field. The splendour of the imperial city profoundly

impressed all the northern barbarians, and the Magyars, during the 10th

century, saw a great deal of the Greeks. One Transylvanian raider,

Gyula, brought back with him from Constantinople a Greek monk, Hierothus

(c. 950), who was consecrated "first bishop of Turkia." Simultaneously a

brisk border trade was springing up between the Greeks and the Magyars,

and the Greek chapmen brought with them their religion as well as their

wares. Everything at first tended to favour the propaganda of the Greek

Church. But ultimately political prevailed over religious

considerations. Alarmed at the sudden revival of the Eastern Empire,

which under the Macedonian dynasty extended once more to the Danube, and

thus became the immediate neighbour of Hungary, Duke Geza, who succeeded

Taksony in 972, shrewdly resolved to accept Christianity from the more

distant and therefore less dangerous emperor of the West. Accordingly an

embassy was sent to Otto II. at Quedlinburg in 973, and in 975 Geza and

his whole family were baptized. During his reign, however, Hungarian

Christianity did not extend much beyond the limits of his court. The

nation at large was resolutely pagan, and Geza, for his own sake, was

obliged to act warily. Moreover, by accepting Christianity from Germany,

he ran the risk of imperilling the independence of Hungary. Hence his

cautious, dilatory tactics: the encouragement of Italian propagandists,

who were few, the discouragement of German propagandists, who were many.

Geza, in short, regarded the whole matter from a statesman's point of

view, and was content to leave the solution to time and his successor.

Stephen I.

That successor, Stephen I. (q.v.), was one of the great constructive

statesmen of history. His long and strenuous reign (997-1038) resulted

in the firm establishment of the Hungarian church and the Hungarian

state. The great work may be said to have begun in 1001, when Pope

Silvester II. recognized Magyar nationality by endowing the young Magyar

prince with a kingly crown. Less fortunate than his great exemplar,

Charlemagne, Stephen had to depend entirely upon foreigners--men like

the Saxon Asztrik[13] (c. 976-1010), the first Hungarian primate; the

Lombard St Gellert (c. 977-1046); the Bosomanns, a German family, better

known under the Magyarized form of their name Pazmany, and many others

who came to Hungary in the suite of his enlightened consort Gisela of

Bavaria. By these men Hungary was divided into dioceses, with a

metropolitan see at Esztergom (Gran), a city originally founded by Geza,

but richly embellished by Stephen, whose Italian architects built for

him there the first Hungarian cathedral dedicated to St Adalbert. Towns,

most of them also the sees of bishops, now sprang up everywhere,

including Szekesfehervar (Stuhlweissenburg), Veszprem, Pecs

(Funfkirchen) and Gyor (Raab). Esztergom, Stephen's favourite residence,

was the capital, and continued to be so for the next two centuries. But

the Benedictines, whose settlement in Hungary dates from the

establishment of their monastery at Pannonhalma (c. 1001), were the

chief pioneers. Every monastery erected in the Magyar wildernesses was

not only a centre of religion, but a focus of civilization. The monks

cleared the forests, cultivated the recovered land, and built villages

for the colonists who flocked to them, teaching the people western

methods of agriculture and western arts and handicrafts. But conversion,

after all, was the chief aim of these devoted missionaries, and when

some Venetian priests had invented a Latin alphabet for the Magyar

language a great step had been taken towards its accomplishment.

The monks were soon followed by foreign husbandmen, artificers and

handicraftsmen, who were encouraged to come to Hungary by reports of the

abundance of good land there and the promise of privileges. This

immigration was also stimulated by the terrible condition of western

Europe between 987 and 1060, when it was visited by an endless

succession of bad harvests and epidemics.[14] Hungary, now better known

to Europe, came to be regarded as a Promised Land, and, by the end of

Stephen's reign, Catholics of all nationalities, Greeks, Pagans, Jews

and Mahommedans were living securely together within her borders. For,

inexorable as Stephen ever was towards fanatical pagans, renegades and

rebels, he was too good a statesman to inquire too closely into the

private religious opinions of useful and quiet citizens.

The county system.

In endeavouring, with the aid of the church, to establish his kingship

on the Western model Stephen had the immense advantage of building on

unencumbered ground, the greater part of the soil of the country being

at his absolute disposal. His authority, too, was absolute, being

tempered only by the shadowy right of the Magyar nation to meet in

general assembly; and this authority he was careful not to compromise by

any slavish imitation of that feudal polity by which in the West the

royal power was becoming obscured. Although he broke off the Magyar

tribal system, encouraged the private ownership of land, and even made

grants of land on condition of military service--in order to secure an

armed force independent of the national levy--he based his new principle

of government, not on feudalism, but on the organization of the Frankish

empire, which he adapted to suit the peculiar exigencies of his realm.

Of the institutions thus borrowed and adapted the most notable was the

famous county system which still plays so conspicuous a part in

Hungarian national life. Central and western Hungary (the south and

north-east still being desolate) were divided into forty-six counties

(_varmegyek_, Lat. _comitatus_). At the head of each county was placed a

count, or lord-lieutenant[15] (_Foispan_, Lat. _comes_), who nominated

his subordinate officials: the castellan (_varnagy_), chief captain

(_hadnagy_) and "hundredor" (_szazados_, Lat. _centurio_). The

lord-lieutenant was nominated by the king, whom he was bound to follow

to battle at the first summons. Two-thirds of the revenue of the county

went into the royal treasury, the remaining third the lord-lieutenant

retained for administrative purposes. In the county system were included

all the inhabitants of the country save two classes: the still numerous

pagan clans, and those nobles who were attached to the king's person,

from whom he selected his chief officers of state and the members of his

council, of which we now hear for the first time.

It is significant for the whole future of Hungary that no effort was or

could be made by Stephen to weld the heterogeneous races under his crown

into a united nation. The body politic consisted, after as before, of

the king and the whole mass of Magyar freemen or nobles, descendants of

Arpad's warriors, theoretically all equal in spite of growing

inequalities of wealth and power, who constituted the _populus_;

privileges were granted by the king to foreign immigrants in the cities,

and the rights of nobility were granted to non-Magyars for special

services; but, in general, the non-Magyars were ruled by the royal

governors as subject races, forming--in contradistinction to the

"nobles"--the mass of the peasants, the _misera contribuens plebs_ upon

whom until 1848 nearly the whole burden of taxation fell. The right, not

often exercised, of the Magyar nobles to meet in general assembly and

the elective character of the crown Stephen also did not venture to

touch. On the other hand, his example in manumitting most of his slaves,

together with the precepts of the church, practically put an end to

slavery in the course of the 13th century, the slaves becoming for the

most part serfs, who differed from the free peasants only in the fact

that they were attached to the soil (_adscripti glebae_).

At this time all the conditions of life in Hungary were simple and

primitive. The court itself was perambulatory. In summer the king

dispensed justice in the open air, under a large tree. Only in the short

winter months did he dwell in the house built for him at Esztergom by

his Italian architects. The most valuable part of his property still

consisted of flocks and herds, or the products of the labours of his

serfs, a large proportion of whom were bee-keepers, hunters and fishers

employed in and around the interminable virgin-forests of the rough-hewn

young monarchy.

Geza I.

A troubled forty years (1038-1077) divides the age of St Stephen from

the age of St Ladislaus. Of the six kings who reigned in Hungary during

that period three died violent deaths, and the other three were fighting

incessantly against foreign and domestic foes. In 1046, and again in

1061, two dangerous pagan risings shook the very foundations of the

infant church and state; the western provinces were in constant danger

from the attacks of the acquisitive emperors, and from the south and

south-east two separate hordes of fierce barbarians (the Petchenegs in

1067-1068, and the Kumanians in 1071-1072) burst over the land. It was

the general opinion abroad that the Magyars would either relapse into

heathendom, or become the vassals of the Holy Roman Empire, and this

opinion was reflected in the increasingly hostile attitude of the popes

towards the Arpad kings. The political independence of Hungary was

ultimately secured by the outbreak of the quarrel about investiture

(1076), when Geza I. (1074-1077) shrewdly applied to Pope Gregory VII.

for assistance, and submitted to accept his kingdom from him as a fief

of the Holy See. The immediate result of the papal alliance was to

enable Hungary, under both Ladislaus and his capable successor Coloman

[Kalman] (1095-1116), to hold her own against all her enemies, and

extend her dominion abroad by conquering Croatia and a portion of the

Dalmatian coast. As an incipient great power, she was beginning to feel

the need of a seaboard.

Ladislaus I. and Coloman.

In the internal administration both Ladislaus I. and Coloman approved

themselves worthy followers of St Stephen. Ladislaus planted large

Petcheneg colonies in Transylvania and the trans-Dravian provinces, and

established military cordons along the constantly threatened

south-eastern boundary, the germs of the future banates[16] (_bansagok_)

which were to play such an important part in the national defence in the

following century. Law and order were enforced with the utmost rigour.

In that rough age crimes of violence predominated, and the king's

justiciars regularly perambulated the land in search of offenders, and

decimated every village which refused to surrender fugitive criminals.

On the other hand, both the Jews and the "Ishmaelites" (Mahommedans)

enjoyed complete civil and religious liberty in Hungary, where, indeed,

they were too valuable to be persecuted. The Ishmaelites, the financial

experts of the day, were the official mint-masters, treasurers and

bankers. The clergy, the only other educated class, supplied the king

with his lawyers, secretaries and ambassadors. The Magyar clergy was

still a married clergy, and their connubial privileges were solemnly

confirmed by the synod of Szabolcs, presided over by the king, in 1092.

So firmly rooted in the land was this practice, that Coloman, much as he

needed the assistance of the Holy See in his foreign policy, was only

with the utmost difficulty induced, in 1106, to bring the Hungarian

church into line with the rest of the Catholic world by enforcing

clerical celibacy. Coloman was especially remarkable as an

administrative reformer, and Hungary, during his reign, is said to have

been the best-governed state in Europe. He regulated and simplified the

whole system of taxation, encouraged agriculture by differential duties

in favour of the farmers, and promoted trade by a systematic improvement

of the ways of communication. The _Magna via Colomanni Regis_ was in use

for centuries after his death. Another important reform was the law

permitting the free disposal of landed estate, which gave the holders an

increased interest in their property, and an inducement to improve it.

During the reign of Coloman, moreover, the number of freemen was

increased by the frequent manumission of serfs. The lot of the slaves

was also somewhat ameliorated by the law forbidding their exportation.

Rivalry with the Eastern Empire.

Throughout the greater part of the 12th century the chief impediment in

the way of the external development of the Hungarian monarchy was the

Eastern Empire, which, under the first three princes of the Comnenian

dynasty, dominated south-eastern Europe. During the earlier part of that

period the Magyars competed on fairly equal terms with their imperial

rivals for the possession of Dalmatia, Rascia (the original home of the

Servians, situated between Bosnia, Dalmatia and Albania) and Rama or

northern Bosnia (acquired by Hungary in 1135); but on the accession of

Manuel Comnenus in 1143 the struggle became acute. As the grandson of St

Ladislaus, Manuel had Hungarian blood in his veins; his court was the

ready and constant refuge of the numerous Magyar malcontents, and he

aimed not so much at the conquest as at the suzerainty of Hungary, by

placing one of his Magyar kinsmen on the throne of St Stephen. He

successfully supported the claims of no fewer than three pretenders to

the Magyar throne, and finally made Bela III. (1173-1196) king of

Hungary, on condition that he left him, Manuel, a free hand in Dalmatia.

The intervention of the Greek emperors had important consequences for

Hungary. Politically it increased the power of the nobility at the

expense of the crown, every competing pretender naturally endeavouring

to win adherents by distributing largesse in the shape of crown-lands.

Ecclesiastically it weakened the influence of the Catholic Church in

Hungary, the Greek Orthodox Church, which permitted a married clergy and

did not impose the detested tithe (the principal cause of nearly every

pagan revolt) attracting thousands of adherents even among the higher

clergy. At one time, indeed, a Magyar archbishop and four or five

bishops openly joined the Orthodox communion and willingly crowned

Manuel's nominees despite the anathemas of their Catholic brethren.

Bela III.

The Eastern Empire ceased to be formidable on the death of Manuel

(1080), and Hungary was free once more to pursue a policy of

aggrandizement. In Dalmatia the Venetians were too strong for her; but

she helped materially to break up the Byzantine rule in the Balkan

peninsula by assisting Stephen Nemanya to establish an independent

Servian kingdom, originally under nominal Hungarian suzerainty. Bela

endeavoured to strengthen his own monarchy by introducing the hereditary

principle, crowning his infant son Emerich, as his successor during his

own lifetime, a practice followed by most of the later Arpads; he also

held a brilliant court on the Byzantine model, and replenished the

treasury by his wise economies.

Andrew II.

Unfortunately the fruits of his diligence and foresight were dissipated

by the follies of his two immediate successors, Emerich (1196-1204) and

Andrew II. (q.v.), who weakened the royal power in attempting to win

support by lavish grants of the crown domains on the already

over-influential magnates, a policy from which dates the supremacy of

the semi-savage Magyar oligarchs, that insolent and self-seeking class

which would obey no superior and trampled ruthlessly on every inferior.

The most conspicuous event of Andrew's reign was the promulgation in

1222 of the so-called Golden Bull, which has aptly been called the Magna

Carta of Hungary, and is in some of its provisions strikingly

reminiscent of that signed seven years previously by the English king

John.

The Golden Bull has been described as consecrating the humiliation of

the crown by the great barons, whose usurpations it legalized; the

more usually accepted view, however, is that it was directed not so

much to weakening as to strengthening the crown by uniting its

interests with those of the mass of the Magyar nobility, equally

threatened by the encroachments of the great barons.[17] The preamble,

indeed, speaks of the curtailment of the liberties of the nobles by

the power of certain of the kings, and at the end the right of armed

resistance to any attempt to infringe the charter is conceded to "the

bishops and the higher and lower nobles" of the realm; but, for the

rest, its contents clearly show that it was intended to strengthen the

monarchy by ensuring "that the momentary folly or weakness of the

king should not endanger the institution itself." This is especially

clear from clause xvi., which decrees that the title and estates of

the lords-lieutenant of counties should not be hereditary, thus

attacking feudalism at its very roots, while clause xiv. provides for

the degradation of any lord-lieutenant who should abuse his office. On

the other hand, the principle of the exemption of all the nobles from

taxation is confirmed, as well as their right to refuse military

service abroad, the defence of the realm being their sole obligation.

All nobles were also to have the right to appear at the court which

was to be held once a year at Szekesfehervar, by the king, or in his

absence by the palatine,[18] for the purpose of hearing causes. A

clause also guarantees all nobles against arbitrary arrest and

punishment at the instance of any powerful person.

This famous charter, which was amplified, under the influence of the

clergy, in 1231, when its articles were placed under the guardianship of

the archbishop of Esztergom (who was authorized to punish their

violation by the king with excommunication), is generally regarded as

the foundation of Hungarian constitutional liberty, though like Magna

Carta it purported only to confirm immemorial rights; and as such it was

expressly ratified as a whole in the coronation oaths of all the

Habsburg kings from Ferdinand to Leopold I. Its actual effect in the

period succeeding its issue was, however, practically nugatory; if

indeed it did not actually give a new handle to the subversive claims of

the powerful barons.

Bela IV.

Stephen V. and Ladislaus IV.

End of the Arpad Dynasty.

Bela IV. (1235-1270), the last man of genius whom the Arpads produced,

did something to curb the aristocratic misrule which was to be one of

the determining causes of the collapse of his dynasty. But he is best

known as the regenerator of the realm after the cataclysm of 1241-1242

(see BELA IV.). On his return from exile, after the subsidence of the

Tatar deluge, he found his kingdom in ashes; and his two great remedies,

wholesale immigration and castle-building, only sowed the seeds of fresh

disasters. Thus the Kumanian colonists, mostly pagans, whom he settled

in vast numbers on the waste lands, threatened to overwhelm the

Christian population; while the numerous strongholds, which he

encouraged his nobles to build as a protection against future Tatar

invasions, subsequently became so many centres of disloyalty. To bind

the Kumanian still more closely to his dynasty, Bela married his son

Stephen V. (1270-1272) to a Kumanian girl, and during the reign of her

son Ladislaus IV. (1272-1290) the court was certainly more pagan than

Christian. Valiant and enterprising as both these princes were (Stephen

successfully resisted the aggressions of the brilliant "golden King,"

Ottakar II. of Bohemia, and Ladislaus materially contributed to his

utter overthrow at Durnkrut in 1278), neither of them was strong enough

to make head against the disintegrating influences all around them.

Stephen contrived to hold his own by adroitly contracting an alliance

with the powerful Neapolitan Angevins who had the ear of the pope; but

Ladislaus (q.v.) was so completely caught in the toils of the Kumanians,

that the Holy See, the suzerain of Hungary, was forced to intervene to

prevent the relapse of the kingdom into barbarism, and the unfortunate

Ladislaus perished in the crusade that was preached against him. An

attempt of a patriotic party to keep the last Arpad, Andrew III.

(1290-1301), on the throne was only temporarily successful, and after a

horrible eight years' civil war (1301-1308) the crown of St Stephen

finally passed into the capable hands of Charles Robert of Naples.

During the four hundred years of the Arpad dominion the nomadic Magyar

race had established itself permanently in central Europe, adopted

western Christianity and founded a national monarchy on the western

model. Hastily and violently converted, driven like a wedge between the

Eastern and the Western Empires, the young kingdom was exposed from the

first to extraordinary perils. But, under the guidance of a series of

eminent rulers, it successfully asserted itself alike against pagan

reaction from within, and aggressive pressure from without, and, as it

grew in strength and skill, expanded territorially at the expense of all

its neighbours. These triumphs were achieved while the monarchy was

absolute, and thus able to concentrate in its hands all the resources of

the state, but towards the end of the period a political revolution

began. The weakness and prodigality of the later Arpads, the

depopulation of the realm during the Tatar invasion, the infiltration of

western feudalism and, finally, the endless civil discords of the 13th

century, brought to the front a powerful and predacious class of barons

who ultimately overshadowed the throne. The ancient county system was

gradually absorbed by this new governing element. The ancient royal

tenants became the feudatories of the great nobles, and fell naturally

into two classes, the _nobiles bene possessionati_, and the _nobiles

unius sessionis_, in other words the richer and the poorer gentry. We

cannot trace the gradations of this political revolution, but we know

that it met with determined opposition from the crown, which resulted in

the utter destruction of the Arpads, who, while retaining to the last

their splendid physical qualities, now exhibited unmistakeable signs of

moral deterioration, partly due perhaps to their too frequent marriages

with semi-Oriental Greeks and semi-savage Kumanians. On the other hand

the great nobles were the only class who won for themselves a recognized

political position. The tendency towards a representative system of

government had begun, but the almost uninterrupted anarchy which marked

the last thirty years of the Arpad rule was no favourable time for

constitutional development. The kings were fighting for their lives, the

great nobles were indistinguishable from brigands and the whole nation

seemed to be relapsing into savagery.

House of Anjou.

Reforms of Louis I.

It was reserved for the two great princes of the house of Anjou, Charles

I. (1310-1342) and Louis I. (1342-1382), to rebuild the Hungarian state,

and lead the Magyars back to civilization. Both by character and

education they were eminently fitted for the task, and all the

circumstances were in their favour. They brought from their native Italy

a thorough knowledge of the science of government as the middle ages

understood it, and the decimation of the Hungarian magnates during the

civil wars enabled them to re-create the noble hierarchy on a feudal

basis, in which full allowance was made for Magyar idiosyncracies. Both

these monarchs were absolute. The national assembly (Orszaggyules) was

still summoned occasionally, but at very irregular intervals, the real

business of the state being transacted in the royal council, where able

men of the middle class, principally Italians, held confidential

positions. The lesser gentry were protected against the tyranny of the

magnates, encouraged to appear at court and taxed for military service

by the royal treasury direct--so as to draw them closer to the crown.

Scores of towns, too, owe their origin and enlargement to the care of

the Angevin princes, who were lavish of privileges and charters, and saw

to it that the high-roads were clear of robbers. Charles, moreover, was

a born financier, and his reform of the currency and of the whole fiscal

system greatly contributed to enrich both the merchant class and the

treasury. Louis encouraged the cities to surround themselves with strong

walls. He himself erected a whole cordon of forts round the flourishing

mining towns of northern Hungary. He also appointed Hungarian consuls in

foreign trade centres, and established a system of protective tariffs.

More important in its ulterior consequences to Hungary was the law of

1351 which, while confirming the Golden Bull in general, abrogated the

clause (iv.) by which the nobles had the right to alienate their lands.

Henceforward their possessions were to descend directly and as of right

to their brothers and their issue, whose claim was to be absolute. This

"principle of aviticity" (_osiseg, aviticum_), which survived till 1848,

was intended to preserve the large feudal estates as part of the new

military system, but its ultimate effect was to hamper the development

of the country by preventing the alienation, and therefore the

mortgaging of lands, so long as any, however distant, scion of the

original owning family survived.[19] Louis's efforts to increase the

national wealth were also largely frustrated by the Black Death, which

ravaged Hungary from 1347 to 1360, and again during 1380-1381, carrying

off at least one-fourth of the population.

Externally Hungary, under the Angevin kings, occupied a commanding

position. Both Charles and Louis were diplomatists as well as soldiers,

and their foreign policy, largely based on family alliances, was almost

invariably successful. Charles married Elizabeth, the sister of Casimir

the Great of Poland, with whom he was connected by ties of close

friendship, and Louis, by virtue of a compact made by his father

thirty-one years previously, added the Polish crown to that of Hungary

in 1370. Thus, during the last twelve years of his reign, the dominions

of Louis the Great included the greater part of central Europe, from

Pomerania to the Danube, and from the Adriatic to the steppes of the

Dnieper.

Turkish invasions.

The Vlachs.

The Angevins were less successful towards the south, where the first

signs were appearing of that storm which ultimately swept away the

Hungarian monarchy. In 1353 the Ottoman Turks crossed the Hellespont

from Asia Minor and began that career of conquest which made them the

terror of Europe for the next three centuries. In 1360 they conquered

southern Bulgaria. In 1365 they transferred their capital from Brusa to

Adrianople. In 1371 they overwhelmed the Servian tsar Vukashin at the

battle of Taenarus and penetrated to the heart of old Servia. In 1380

they threatened Croatia and Dalmatia. Hungary herself was now directly

menaced, and the very circumstances which had facilitated the advance of

the Turks, enfeebled the potential resistance of the Magyars. The Arpad

kings had succeeded in encircling their whole southern frontier with

half a dozen military colonies or banates, comprising, roughly speaking,

Little Walachia,[20] and the northern parts of Bulgaria, Servia and

Bosnia. But during this period a redistribution of territory had

occurred in these parts, which converted most of the old banates into

semi-independent and violently anti-Magyar principalities. This was due

partly to the excessive proselytizing energy of the Angevins, which

provoked rebellion on the part of their Greek-Orthodox subjects, partly

to the natural dynastic competition of the Servian and Bulgarian tsars,

and partly to the emergence of a new nationality, the Walachian.

Previously to 1320, what is now called Walachia was regarded by the

Magyars as part of the banate of Szoreny. The base of the very mixed and

ever-shifting population in these parts were the Vlachs (Rumanians),

perhaps the descendants of Trajan's colonists, who, under their voivode,

Bazarad, led King Charles into an ambuscade from which he barely escaped

with his life (Nov. 9-12, 1330). From this disaster are to be dated the

beginnings of Walachia as an independent state. Moldavia, again, ever

since the 11th century, had been claimed by the Magyars as forming,

along with Bessarabia and the Bukowina, a portion of the semi-mythical

Etelkoz, the original seat of the Magyars before they occupied modern

Hungary. This desolate region was subsequently peopled by Vlachs, whom

the religious persecutions of Louis the Great had driven thither from

other parts of his domains, and, between 1350 and 1360, their voivode

Bogdan threw off the Hungarian yoke altogether. In Bosnia the persistent

attempts of the Magyar princes to root out the stubborn, crazy and

poisonous sect of the Bogomils had alienated the originally amicable

Bosnians, and in 1353 Louis was compelled to buy the friendship of their

Bar Tvrtko by acknowledging him as king of Bosnia. Both Servia and

Bulgaria were by this time split up into half a dozen principalities

which, as much for religious as for political reasons, preferred paying

tribute to the Turks to acknowledging the hegemony of Hungary. Thus,

towards the end of his reign, Louis found himself cut off from the Greek

emperor, his sole ally in the Balkans, by a chain of bitterly hostile

Greek-Orthodox states, extending from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. The

commercial greed of the Venetians, who refused to aid him with a fleet

to cut off the Turks in Europe from the Turks in Asia Minor, nullified

Louis' last practical endeavour to cope with a danger which from the

first he had estimated at its true value.

Louis the Great left two infant daughters: Maria, who was to share the

throne of Poland with her betrothed, Sigismund of Pomerania, and Hedwig,

better known by her Polish name of Jadwiga, who was to reign over

Hungary with her young bridegroom, William of Austria. This plan was

upset by the queen-dowager Elizabeth, who determined to rule both

kingdoms during the minority of her children. Maria, her favourite, with

whom she refused to part, was crowned queen of Hungary a week after her

father's death (Sept. 17, 1382). Two years later Jadwiga, reluctantly

transferred to the Poles instead of her sister, was crowned queen of

Poland at Cracow (Oct. 15, 1384) and subsequently compelled to marry

Jagiello, grand-duke of Lithuania. In Hungary, meanwhile, impatience at

the rule of women induced the great family of the Horvathys to offer the

crown of St Stephen to Charles III. of Naples, who, despite the oath of

loyalty he had sworn to his benefactor, Louis the Great, accepted the

offer, landed in Dalmatia with a small Italian army, and, after

occupying Buda, was crowned king of Hungary on the 31st of December,

1385, as Charles II. His reign lasted thirty-eight days. On the 7th of

February, 1386, he was treacherously attacked in the queen-dowager's own

apartments, at her instigation, and died of his injuries a few days

later. But Elizabeth did not profit long by this atrocity. In July the

same year, while on a pleasure trip with her daughter, she was captured

by the Horvathys, and tortured to death in her daughter's presence.

Maria herself would doubtless have shared the same fate, but for the

speedy intervention of her _fiance_, whom a diet, by the advice of the

Venetians, had elected to rule the headless realm on the 31st of March

1387. He married Maria in June the same year, and she shared the sceptre

with him till her sudden death by accident on the 17th of May 1395.

Sigismund.

During the long reign of Sigismund (1387-1437) Hungary was brought face

to face with the Turkish peril in its most threatening shape, and all

the efforts of the king were directed towards combating or averting it.

However sorry a figure Sigismund may have cut as emperor in Germany, as

king of Hungary he claims our respect, and as king of Hungary he should

be judged, for he ruled her, not unsuccessfully, for fifty years during

one of the most difficult crises of her history, whereas his connexion

with Germany was at best but casual and transient.[21] From the first he

recognized that his chief duty was to drive the Turks from Europe, or,

at least, keep them out of Hungary, and this noble ambition was the

pivot of his whole policy. A domestic rebellion (1387-1395) prevented

him at the outset from executing his design till 1396, and if the hopes

of Christendom were shattered at Nicopolis, the failure was due to no

fault of his, but to the haughty insubordination of the feudal levies.

Again, his inaction during those memorable twelve years (1401-1413) when

the Turkish empire, after the collapse at Angora (1402), seemed about to

be swallowed up by "the great wolf" Tamerlane, was due entirely to the

malice of the Holy See, which, enraged at his endeavours to maintain the

independence of the Magyar church against papal aggression (the diet of

1404, on Sigismund's initiative, had declared bulls bestowing Magyar

benefices on foreigners, without the royal consent, pernicious and

illegal), saddled him with a fresh rebellion and two wars with Venice,

resulting ultimately in the total loss of Dalmatia (c. 1430). Not till

1409 could Sigismund be said to be king in his own realm, yet in 1413 we

find him traversing Europe in his endeavour to terminate the Great

Schism, as the first step towards uniting Christendom once more against

the Turk. Hence the council of Constance to depose three rival popes;

hence the council of Basel to pacify the Hussites, and promote another

anti-Moslem league. But by this time the Turkish empire had been raised

again from its ruins by Mahommed I. (1402-1421), and resumed its

triumphal progress under Murad II. (1421-1451). Yet even now Sigismund,

at the head of his Magyars, thrice (1422-1424, 1426-1427, and 1430-1431)

encountered the Turks, not ingloriously, in the open field, till,

recognizing that Hungary must thenceforth rely entirely on her own

resources in any future struggle with Islam, he elaborately fortified

the whole southern frontier, and converted the little fort of

Nandorfehervar, later Belgrade, at the junction of the Danube and Save,

into an enormous first-class fortress, which proved strong enough to

repel all the attacks of the Turks for more than a century. It argued no

ordinary foresight thus to recognize that Hungary's strategy in her

contest with the Turks must be strictly defensive, and the wisdom of

Sigismund was justified by the disasters which almost invariably

overcame the later Magyar kings whenever they ventured upon aggressive

warfare with the sultans.

Feudal system.

Hussites.

A monarch so overburdened with cares was naturally always in need of

money,[22] and thus obliged to lean heavily upon the support of the

estates of the realm. The importance and influence of the diet increased

proportionately. It met every year, sometimes twice a year, during

Sigismund's reign, and was no longer, as in the days of Louis the Great,

merely a consultative council, but a legislative body in partnership

with the king. It was still, however, essentially an assembly of

notables, lay and clerical, at which the gentry, though technically

eligible, do not seem to have been directly represented. At Sigismund's

first diet (1397) it was declared that the king might choose his

counsellors where he listed, and at the diet of 1397 he invited the free

and royal towns to send their deputies to the parliament. Subsequently

this privilege was apparently erected into a statute, but how far it was

acted upon we know not. Sigismund, more fortunate than the Polish kings,

seems to have had little trouble with his diets. This was largely due to

his friendly intimacy with the majority of the Magyar notables, from

among whom he chose his chief counsellors. The estates loyally supported

him against the attempted exactions of the popes, and do not seem to

have objected to any of his reforms, chief among which was the

army-reform project of 1435, to provide for the better defence of the

land against the Turks. This measure obliged all the great dignitaries,

and the principal towns also, according to their means, to maintain a

_banderium_ of five hundred horsemen, or a proportional part thereof,

and hold it ready, at the first summons, thus supplying the crown with a

standing army 76,875 strong. In addition to this, a reserve force called

the _telekkatonasag_ was recruited from among the lesser gentry

according to their _teleks_ or holdings, every thirty-three _teleks_

being held responsible for a mounted and fully equipped archer.

Moreover, river fleets, built by Genoese masters and manned by Servians,

were constructed to patrol and defend the great rivers of Hungary,

especially on the Turkish frontier. Much as he owed to them, however,

Sigismund was no mere nobles' king. His care for the common people was

sincere and constant, but his beneficial efforts in this direction were

thwarted by the curious interaction of two totally dissimilar social

factors, feudalism and Hussitism. In Sigismund's reign the feudal

system, for the first time, became deeply rooted in Magyar soil, and it

is a lamentable fact that in 15th-century Hungary it is to be seen at

its very worst, especially in those wild tracts, and they were many, in

which the king's writ could hardly be said to run. Simultaneously from

the west came the Hussite propagandists teaching that all men were

equal, and that all property should be held in common. The suffering

Magyar multitudes eagerly responded to these seductive teachings, and

the result was a series of dangerous popular risings (the worst in 1433

and 1436) in which heresy and communism were inextricably intermingled.

With the aid of inquisitors from Rome, the evil was literally burnt out,

but not before provinces, especially in the south and south-east, had

been utterly depopulated. They were repeopled by Vlachs.

Yet despite the interminable wars and rebellions which darken the

history of Hungary in the reign of Sigismund, the country, on the whole,

was progressing. Its ready response to the king's heavy demands for the

purpose of the national defence points to the existence of a healthy and

self-sacrificing public spirit, and the eagerness with which the youth

of all classes now began to flock to the foreign universities is another

satisfactory feature of the age. Between 1362 and 1450 no fewer than

4151 Magyar students frequented the university of Vienna, nearly as many

went by preference to Prague, and this, too, despite the fact that there

were now two universities in Hungary itself, the old foundation of Louis

the Great at Pecs, and a new one established at Buda by Sigismund.

Like Louis the Great before him, Sigismund had failed to found a

dynasty, but, fifteen years before his death, he had succeeded in

providing his only daughter Elizabeth with a consort apparently well

able to protect both her and her inheritance in the person of Albert V.,

duke of Austria. Albert, a sturdy soldier, who had given brilliant

proofs of valour and generalship in the Hussite wars, was crowned king

of Hungary at Szekesfehervar (Stuhlweissenburg) on the 1st of January

1438, elected king of the Romans at Frankfort on the 18th of March 1438,

and crowned king of Bohemia at Prague on the 29th of June 1438. On

returning to Buda in 1439, he at once plunged into a war with the Turks,

who had, in the meantime, captured the important Servian fortress of

Semendria and subjugated the greater part of Bosnia. But the king got no

farther than Servia, and was carried off by dysentery (Oct. 27, 1439),

in the forty-second year of his age, in the course of the campaign.

Albert left behind him two infant daughters only, but his consort was

big with child, and, in the event of that child proving to be an heir

male, his father's will bequeathed to him the kingdoms of Hungary and

Bohemia, under the regency of his mother. Thus, with the succession

uncertain, with the Turk at the very door, with the prospect, dismal at

the best, of a long minority, the political outlook was both

embarrassing and perilous. Obviously a warrior-king was preferable to a

regimen of women and children, and the eyes of the wiser Magyars turned

involuntarily towards Wladislaus III. of Poland, who, though only in his

nineteenth year, was already renowned for his martial disposition.

Wladislaus accepted the proffered throne from the Magyar delegates at

Cracow on the 8th of March 1440; but in the meantime (Feb. 22) the

queen-widow gave birth to a son who, six weeks later, as Ladislaus V.

(q.v.) was crowned king of Hungary (May 15) at Szekesfehervar. On the

22nd of May the Polish monarch appeared at Buda, was unanimously elected

king of Hungary under the title of Wladislaus I. (June 24) and crowned

on the 17th of July. This duoregnum proved even more injurious to

Hungary than the dreaded interregnum. Queen Elizabeth, aided by her

kinsmen, the emperor Frederick III. and the counts of Cilli, flooded

northern and western Hungary with Hussite mercenaries, one of whom, Jan

Giszkra, she made her captain-general, while Wladislaus held the central

and south-eastern parts of the realm. The resulting civil war was

terminated only by the death of Elizabeth on the 13th of December 1443.

John Hunyadi.

All this time the pressure of the Turks upon the southern provinces of

Hungary had been continuous, but fortunately all their efforts had so

far been frustrated by the valour and generalship of the ban of Szoreny,

John Hunyadi, the fame of whose victories, notably in 1442 and 1443,

encouraged the Holy See to place Hungary for the third time at the head

of a general crusade against the infidel. The experienced diplomatist

Cardinal Cesarini was accordingly sent to Hungary to reconcile

Wladislaus with the emperor. The king, who had just returned from the

famous "long campaign" of 1443, willingly accepted the leadership of the

Christian League. At the diet of Buda, early in 1444, supplies were

voted for the enterprise, and Wladislaus was on the point of quitting

his camp at Szeged for the seat of war, when envoys from Sultan Murad

arrived with the offer of a ten years' truce on such favourable

conditions (they included the relinquishment of Servia, Walachia and

Moldavia, and the payment of an indemnity) that Hunyadi persuaded the

king to conclude (in July) a peace which gave him more than could

reasonably be anticipated from the most successful campaign.

Unfortunately, two days later, Cardinal Cesarini absolved the king from

the oath whereby he had sworn to observe the peace of Szeged, and was

thus mainly responsible for the catastrophe of Varna, when four months

later (Nov. 10) the young monarch and the flower of the Magyar chivalry

were overwhelmed by fourfold odds on Turkish soil. (See HUNYADI, JANOS;

and WLADISLAUS III.)

The next fourteen years form one of the most interesting and pregnant

periods of Hungarian history. It marks the dawn of a public spirit as

represented by the gentry, who, alarmed at the national peril and justly

suspicious of the ruling magnates, unhesitatingly placed their destinies

in the hands of Hunyadi, the one honest man who by sheer merit had risen

within the last ten years from the humble position of a country squire

to a leading position in the state. This feeling of confidence found due

expression at the diet of 1446, which deliberately passing over the

palatine Laszlo Garai elected Hunyadi governor of Hungary, and passed a

whole series of popular measures intended to be remedial, e.g. the

decree ordering the demolition of the new castles, most of them little

better than robber-strongholds; the decree compelling the great officers

of state to suspend their functions during the session of the diet; the

decree declaring illegal the new fashion of forming confederations on

the Polish model, all of which measures were obviously directed against

the tyranny and the lawlessness of the oligarchy. Unfortunately this

salutary legislation remained a dead letter. It was as much as the

governor could do to save the state from destruction, let alone reform

it. At this very time northern Hungary, including the wealthy mining

towns, was in the possession of the Hussite mercenary Jan Giszkra, who

held them nominally for the infant king Ladislaus V., still detained at

Vienna by his kinsman the emperor. The western provinces were held by

Frederick himself. Invaluable time was wasted in negotiating with these

intruders before the governor could safely devote himself to the task of

expelling the Turk from the southern provinces. He had to be content

with armistices, reconciliations and matrimonial contracts, because the

great dignitaries of the state, men like the palatine Laszlo Garai,

Count Ulrich of Cilli, and the voivode of Transylvania, Mihaly Ujlaky,

thwarted in every way the _novus homo_ whom they hated and envied. From

them, the official guardians of Hungary's safety, he received no help,

either during his governorship (1446-1453), or when, in 1454, on the eve

of his departure for his last and most glorious campaign, the diet

commanded a _levee en masse_ of the whole population in his support. At

that critical hour it was at his own expense that Hunyadi fortified

Belgrade, now the sole obstacle between Hungary and destruction, with

the sole assistance of the Franciscan friar Giovanni da Capistrano,

equipped the fleet and the army which relieved the beleaguered fortress

and overthrew Mahommed II. But the nation at least was grateful, and

after his death (Aug. 11, 1456) it freely transferred its allegiance to

his family as represented by his two sons, Laszlo, now in his 23rd, and

Matthias, now in his 16th year. The judicial murder of Laszlo Hunyadi

(q.v.) by the enemies of his house (March 16, 1457) was therefore a

stupid blunder as well as the foulest of crimes, and on the death of his

chief assassin, Ladislaus V., six months later (Nov. 23, 1457), the diet

which assembled on the banks of the Rakos, in defiance of the magnates

and all foreign competitors, unanimously and enthusiastically elected

Matthias Hunyadi king of Hungary (Jan. 24, 1458).

Matthias I.

In less than three years the young king had justified their confidence,

and delivered his country from its worst embarrassments. (See MATTHIAS

I., king of Hungary.) This prodigy was accomplished in the face of every

conceivable obstacle. His first diet grudgingly granted him supplies

and soldiers for the Turkish war, on condition that under no

circumstances whatever should they henceforth be called upon to

contribute towards the national defence, and he was practically deprived

of the control of the _banderia_ or mounted militia. It was with a small

force of mercenaries, raised at his own expense, that the young king won

his first Turkish victories, and expelled the Czechs from his northern

and the Habsburgs from his western provinces. But his limited resources,

and, above all, the proved incapacity of the militia in the field,

compelled him instantly to take in hand the vital question of army

reform. In the second year of his reign he undertook personally the

gigantic task of providing Hungary with an army adequate to her various

needs on the model of the best military science of the day. The landless

younger sons of the gentry and the Servian and Vlach immigrants provided

him with excellent and practically inexhaustible military material. The

old feudal levies he put aside. Brave enough personally, as soldiers

they were distinctly inferior both to the Janissaries and the Hussites,

with both of whom Matthias had constantly to contend. It was a trained

regular army in his pay and consequently at his disposal that he wanted.

The nucleus of the new army he found in the Czech mercenaries, seasoned

veterans who readily transferred their services to the best payer. This

force, formed in 1459, was generally known as the _Fekete Sereg_, or

"Black Brigade," from the colour of its armour. From 1465 the pick of

the Magyars and Croatians were enlisted in the same way every year,

till, towards the end of his reign, Matthias could count upon 20,000

horse and 8000 foot, besides 6000 black brigaders. The cavalry consisted

of the famous Hussars, or light horse, of which he may be said to have

been the creator, and the heavily armed mounted musketeers on the

Czech-German model. The infantry, in like manner, was divided into light

and heavy. This army was provided with a regular commissariat,

cannon[23] and ballistic machines, and, being constantly on active

service, was always in a high state of efficiency. The land forces were

supported by a river fleet consisting (in 1479) of 360 vessels, mostly

sloops and corvettes, manned by 2600 sailors, generally Croats, and

carrying 10,000 soldiers. Eight large military stations were also built

at the chief strategic points on the Danube, Save and Theiss. These

armaments, which cost Matthias 1,000,000 florins per annum, equivalent

to L200,000, did not include the auxiliary troops of the hospodars of

Walachia and Moldavia, or the feudal levies of the barons and prelates.

The army of Matthias was not only a military machine of first-rate

efficiency, but an indispensable civilizing medium. It enabled the king

to curb the lawlessness of the Magyar nobility, and explains why none of

the numerous rebellions against him ever succeeded. Again and again,

during his absence on the public service, the barons and prelates would

assemble to compass his ruin or dispose of his crown, when, suddenly,

"like a tempest," from the depths of Silesia or of Bosnia, he would

himself appear among them, confounding and scattering them, often

without resistance, always without bloodshed. He also frequently

employed his soldiers in collecting the taxes from the estates of those

magnates who refused to contribute to the public burdens, in protecting

the towns from the depredations of the robber barons, or in convoying

the caravans of the merchants. In fact, they were a police force as well

as an army.

Despite the enormous expense of maintaining the army, Matthias, after

the first ten years of his reign, was never in want of money. This

miracle was achieved by tact and management. No Hungarian king had so

little trouble with the turbulent diet as Matthias. By this time the

gentry, as well as the barons and prelates, took part in the

legislature. But attendance at the diet was regarded by the bulk of the

poorer deputies as an intolerable burden, and they frequently agreed to

grant the taxes for two or three years in advance, so as to be saved the

expense of attending every year. Moreover, to promote their own

convenience, they readily allowed the king to assess as well as to

collect the taxes, which consequently tended to become regular and

permanent, while Matthias' reform of the treasury, which was now

administered by specialists with separate functions, was economically of

great benefit to the state. Yet Matthias never dispensed with the diet.

During the thirty-two years of his reign he held at least fifteen

diets,[24] at which no fewer than 450 statutes were passed. He

re-codified the Hungarian common law; strictly defined the jurisdiction

of the whole official hierarchy from the palatine to the humblest

village judge; cheapened and accelerated legal procedure, and in an age

when might was right did his utmost to protect the weak from the strong.

There is not a single branch of the law which he did not simplify and

amend, and the iron firmness with which he caused justice to be

administered, irrespective of persons, if it exposed him to the charge

of tyranny from the nobles, also won for him from the common people the

epithet of "the Just." To Matthias is also due the credit of creating an

efficient official class. Merit was with him the sole qualification for

advancement. One of his best generals, Pal Kinizsy, was a miller's son,

and his capable chancellor, Peter Varady, whom he made archbishop of

Kalocsa, came of a family of small squires. For education so scholarly a

monarch as Matthias naturally did what he could. He founded the

university of Pressburg (Academia Istropolitana, 1467), revived the

declining university of Pecs, and, at the time of his death, was

meditating the establishment of a third university at Buda.

Unfortunately the civilizing efforts of Matthias made but little

impression on society at large. The bulk of the Magyar nobility was

still semi-barbaric. Immensely wealthy (it is estimated that most of the

land, at this time, was in the hands of 25 great families, the Zapolyas

alone holding an eighth of it), it was a point of honour with them to

appear in public in costly raiment ablaze with silver, gold and precious

stones, followed at every step by armies of retainers scarcely less

gorgeous. At the same time their ignorance was profound. Many of the

highest dignitaries of state did not know their alphabet. Signatures to

documents of the period are rare; seals served instead of signatures,

because most of the nobles were unable to sign their names. Learning,

indeed, was often ridiculed as pedantry in a gentleman of good family.

The clergy, the chief official class, were naturally less ignorant than

the gentry. Some of the prelates--notably Janos Csezmeczey, better known

as Janus Pannonius (1433-1472)--had a European reputation for learning.

The primate Cardinal, Janos Vitez (1408-1472), at the beginning, and the

primate, Cardinal Tamas Bakocz (q.v.), at the end of the reign were men

of eminent ability and the highest culture. But the moral tone of the

Magyar church at this period was very low. The bishops prided themselves

on being great statesmen, great scholars, great financiers, great

diplomatists--anything, in fact, but good Christians. Most of them,

except when actually celebrating mass, were indistinguishable alike in

costume and conduct from the temporal magnates. Of twelve of them it is

said that foreigners took them at first for independent temporal

princes, so vast were their estates, so splendid their courts, so

numerous their armed retainers. Under such guides as these the lower

clergy erred deplorably, and drunkenness, gross immorality, brawling and

manslaughter were common occurrences in the lives of the parish priests.

The regular clergy were if possible worse than the secular, with the

exception of the Paulicians, the sole religious order which steadily

resisted the general corruption, of whose abbot, the saintly Gregory,

was the personal friend of Matthias.

What little culture there was outside the court, the capital and the

palaces of a few prelates, was to be found in the towns, most of them of

German origin. Matthias laboured strenuously to develop and protect the

towns, multiplied municipal charters, and materially improved the means

of communication, especially in Transylvania. His Silesian and Austrian

acquisitions were also very beneficial to trade, throwing open as they

did the western markets to Hungarian produce. Wine and meat were the

chief exports. The wines of Hungary were already renowned throughout

Europe, and cattle breeding was conducted on a great scale. Of

agricultural produce there was barely sufficient for home consumption,

but the mining industries had reached a very high level of excellence,

and iron, tin and copper were very largely exported from the northern

counties to Danzig and other Baltic ports. So highly developed indeed

were the Magyar methods of smelting, that Louis XI. of France took the

Hungarian mining system as the model for his metallurgical reforms, and

Hungarian master-miners were also in great demand at the court of Ivan

the Terrible. Moreover, the keen artistic instincts of Matthias led him

to embellish his cities as well as fortify them. Debreczen was

practically rebuilt by him, and dates its prosperity from his reign.

Breslau, his favourite town, he endowed with many fine public buildings.

Buda he endeavoured to make the worthy capital of a great realm, and the

palace which he built there was pronounced by the papal legates to be

superior to any in Italy.

Power in Europe.

Politically Matthias raised Hungary to the rank of the greatest power in

central Europe, her influence extending into Asia and Africa. Poland was

restrained by his alliances with the Teutonic Knights and the tsardom of

Muscovy, and his envoys appeared in Persia and in Egypt to combat the

diplomacy of the Porte. He never, indeed, jeopardized the position of

the Moslems in Europe as his father had done, and thus the peace of

Szeged (1444), which regained the line of the Danube and drove the Turk

behind the Balkans, must always be reckoned as the high-water mark of

Hungary's Turkish triumphs. But Matthias at least taught the sultan to

respect the territorial integrity of Hungary, and throughout his reign

the Eastern Question, though often vexatious, was never acute. Only

after his death did the Ottoman empire become a menace to Christendom.

Besides, his hands were tied by the unappeasable enmity of the emperor

and the emperor's allies, and he could never count upon any material

help from the West against the East. The age of the crusades had gone.

Throughout his reign the Czechs and the Germans were every whit as

dangerous to Hungary as the Turks, and the political necessity which

finally compelled Matthias to partition Austria and Bohemia, in order to

secure Hungary, committed him to a policy of extreme circumspection. He

has sometimes been blamed for not crushing his incurably disloyal and

rebellious nobles, instead of cajoling them, after the example of his

contemporary, Louis XI., who laid the foundations of the greatness of

France on the ruin of the vassals. But Louis XI. had a relatively

civilized and politically developed middle class behind him, whereas

Matthias had not. It was as much as Matthias could do to keep the civic

life of Hungary from expiring altogether, and nine-tenths of his

burgesses were foreigners with no political interest in the country of

their adoption. Never was any dominion so purely personal, and therefore

so artificial as his. His astounding energy and resource curbed all his

enemies during his lifetime, but they were content to wait patiently for

his death, well aware that the collapse of his empire would immediately

follow.

Period of decline.

Wladislaus II.

All that human foresight could devise for the consolidation and

perpetuation of the newly established Hungarian empire had been done by

Matthias in the last years of his reign. He had designated as his

successor his natural son, the highly gifted Janos (John) Corvinus, a

youth of seventeen. He had raised him to princely rank, endowed him with

property which made him the greatest territorial magnate in the kingdom,

placed in his hands the sacred crown and half-a-dozen of the strongest

fortresses, and won over to his cause the majority of the royal council.

How Janos was cajoled out of an almost impregnable position, and

gradually reduced to insignificance, is told elsewhere (see CORVINUS,

JANOS). The nobles and prelates, who detested the severe and strenuous

Matthian system, desired, as they expressed it, "a king whose beard they

could hold in their fists," and they found a monarch after their own

heart in Wladislaus Jagiello, since 1471 king of Bohemia, who as

Wladislaus II. was elected unanimously king of Hungary on the 15th of

July 1490. Wladislaus was the personification of helpless inertia. His

Bohemian subjects had long since dubbed him "King All Right" because he

said yes to everything. As king of Hungary he was, from first to last,

the puppet of the Magyar oligarchs, who proceeded to abolish all the

royal prerogatives and safeguards which had galled them under Matthias.

By the compact of Farkashida (1490) Wladislaus not only confirmed all

the Matthian privileges, but also repealed all the Matthian novelties,

including the system of taxation which had enabled his predecessor to

keep on foot an adequate national army. The virtual suppression of

Wladislaus was completed at the diet of 1492, when "King All Right"

consented to live on the receipts of the treasury, which were barely

sufficient to maintain his court, and engaged never to impose any new

taxes on his Magyar subjects. The dissolution of the standing army,

including the Black Brigade, was the immediate result of these decrees.

Thus, at the very time when the modernization of the means of national

defence had become the first principle, in every other part of Europe,

of the strongly centralized monarchies which were rising on the ruins of

feudalism, the Hungarian magnates deliberately plunged their country

back into the chaos of medievalism. The same diet which destroyed the

national armaments and depleted the exchequer confirmed the disgraceful

peace of Pressburg, concluded between Wladislaus and the emperor

Maximilian on the 7th of November 1491, whereby Hungary retroceded all

the Austrian conquests of Matthias, together with a long strip of Magyar

territory, and paid a war indemnity equivalent to L200,000.

The thirty-six years which elapsed between the accession of Wladislaus

II. and the battle of Mohacs is the most melancholy and discreditable

period of Hungarian history. Like Poland two centuries later, Hungary

had ceased to be a civilized autonomous state because her prelates and

her magnates, uncontrolled by any higher authority, and too ignorant or

corrupt to look beyond their own immediate interests, abandoned

themselves to the exclusive enjoyment of their inordinate privileges,

while openly repudiating their primal obligation of defending the state

against extraneous enemies. During these miserable years everything like

patriotism or public spirit seems to have died out of the hearts of the

Hungarian aristocracy. The great officers of state acted habitually on

the principle that might is right. Stephen Bathory, voivode of

Transylvania and count of the Szeklers, for instance, ruled Transylvania

like a Turkish pasha, and threatened to behead all who dared to complain

of his exactions; "Stinking carrion," he said, was better than living

Szeklers. Thousands of Transylvanian gentlemen emigrated to Turkey to

get out of his reach. Other great nobles were at perpetual feud with the

towns whose wealth they coveted. Thus the Zapolyas, in 1500 and again in

1507, burnt a large part of Breznobanya and Beszterczebanya, two of the

chief industrial towns of north Hungary. Kronstadt, now the sole

flourishing trade centre in the kingdom, defended itself with hired

mercenaries against the robber barons. Everywhere the civic communities

were declining; even Buda and Pressburg were half in ruins. In their

misery the cities frequently appealed for protection to the emperor and

other foreign potentates, as no redress was attainable at home. Compared

even with the contemporary Polish diet the Hungarian national assembly

was a tumultuous mob. The diet of 1497 passed most of its time in

constructing, and then battering to pieces with axes and hammers, a huge

wooden image representing the ministers of the crown, who were corrupt

enough, but immovable, since they regularly appeared at the diet with

thousands of retainers armed to the teeth, and openly derided the

reforming endeavours of the lower gentry, who perceived that something

was seriously wrong, yet were powerless to remedy it. All that the

gentry could do was to depress the lower orders, and this they did at

every opportunity. Thus, many of the towns, notably Visegrad, were

deprived of the charters granted to them by Matthias, and a whole series

of anti-civic ordinances were passed. Noblemen dwelling within the walls

of the towns were especially exempted from all civic burdens, while

every burgess who bought an extra-mural estate was made to pay double

for the privilege.[25] Every nobleman had the right to engage in trade

toll-free, to the great detriment of their competitors the burgesses.

The peasant class suffered most of all. In 1496 Varady, archbishop of

Kalocsa, one of the few good prelates, declared that their lot was worse

than that of brute beasts. The whole burden of taxation rested on their

shoulders, and so ground down were they by ingeniously multiplied

exactions, that thousands of them were reduced to literal beggary.

Yet, despite this inward rottenness, Hungary, for nearly twenty years

after the death of Matthias, enjoyed an undeserved prestige abroad, due

entirely to the reputation which that great monarch had won for her.

Circumstances, indeed, were especially favourable. The emperor

Maximilian was so absorbed by German affairs, that he could do her

little harm, and under Bayezid II. and Selim I. the Turkish menace gave

little anxiety to the court of Buda, Bayezid being no warrior, while

Selim's energies were claimed exclusively by the East, so that he was

glad to renew the triennial truce with Hungary as often as it expired.

Hungary, therefore, for almost the first time in her history, was free

to choose a foreign policy of her own, and had she been guided by a

patriot, she might now have easily regained Dalmatia, and acquired

besides a considerable seaboard. Unfortunately Tamas Bakocz, her leading

diplomatist from 1499 to 1521, was as much an egotist as the other

magnates, and he sacrificed the political interests of Hungary entirely

to personal considerations. Primate of Hungary since 1497, he coveted

the popedom--and the red hat as the first step thereto above all

things,--and looked mainly to Venetian influence for both. He therefore

supported Venice against her enemies, refused to enter the League of

Cambray in 1508, and concluded a ten years' alliance with the Signoria,

which obliged Hungary to defend Venetian territory without any

equivalent gain. Less reprehensible, though equally self-seeking, were

his dealings with the emperor, which aimed at a family alliance between

the Jagiellos and the Habsburgs on the basis of a double marriage

between the son and daughter of Wladislaus, Louis and Anne, and an

Austrian archduke and archduchess; this was concluded by the family

congress at Vienna, July 22, 1515, to which Sigismund I. of Poland, the

brother of Wladislaus, acceded. The Hungarian diet frantically opposed

every Austrian alliance as endangering the national independence, but to

any unprejudiced observer a union with the house of Habsburg, even with

the contingent probability of a Habsburg king, was infinitely preferable

to the condition into which Hungary, under native aristocratic misrule,

was swiftly drifting. The diet itself had become as much a nullity as

the king, and its decrees were systematically disregarded. Still more

pitiable was the condition of the court. The penury of Wladislaus II.

was by this time so extreme, that he owed his very meals to the charity

of his servants. The diet, indeed, voted him aids and subsidies, but the

great nobles either forbade their collection within their estates, or

confiscated the amount collected. Under the circumstances, we cannot

wonder if the frontier fortresses fell to pieces, and the border troops,

unpaid for years, took to brigandage.

Peasant Rising, 1514.

The Tripartitum.

The last reserves of the national wealth and strength were dissipated by

the terrible peasant rising of Gyorgy Dozsa (q.v.) in 1514, of which the

enslavement of the Hungarian peasantry was the immediate consequence.

The "Savage Diet" which assembled on the 18th of October the same year,

to punish the rebels and restore order, well deserved its name.

Sixty-two of its seventy-one enactments were directed against the

peasants, who were henceforth bound to the soil and committed absolutely

into the hands of "their natural lords." To this vindictive legislation,

which converted the labouring population into a sullenly hostile force

within the state, it is mainly due that a healthy political life in

Hungary became henceforth impossible. The same spirit of hostility to

the peasantry breathed through the famous condification of the Hungarian

customary law known as the _Tripartitum_, which, though never actually

formally passed into law, continued until 1845 to be the only document

defining the relations of king and people, of nobles and their peasants,

and of Hungary and her dependent states.[26]

Subjection by the Turks.

Wladislaus II. died on the 13th of March 1516, two years after the

"Savage Diet," the ferocity of whose decrees he had feebly endeavoured

to mitigate, leaving his two kingdoms to his son Louis, a child of ten,

who was pronounced of age in order that his foreign guardians, the

emperor Maximilian and Sigismund of Poland, might be dispensed with. The

government remained in the hands of Cardinal Bakocz till his death in

1521, when the supreme authority at court was disputed between the lame

palatine Istvan Bathory, and his rival, the eminent jurist and orator

Istvan Verboczy (q.v.),--both of them incompetent, unprincipled

place-hunters,--while, in the background lurked Janos Zapolya (see JOHN

(ZAPOLYA), KING OF HUNGARY), voivode of Transylvania, patiently waiting

till the death of the feeble and childless king (who, in 1522, married

Maria of Austria) should open for him a way to the throne. Every one

felt that a catastrophe was approaching. "Things cannot go on like this

much longer," wrote the Venetian ambassador to his government. The war

of each against all continued; no taxes could be collected; the holders

of the royal domains refused to surrender them at the command of the

diet; and the boy king had very often neither clothes to wear nor food

to eat. The whole atmosphere of society was one of rapine and

corruption, and only on the frontier a few self-sacrificing patriots

like the ban-bishop, Peter Biriszlo, the last of Matthias's veterans,

and his successor the saintly Pal Tomori, archbishop of Kalocsa, showed,

in their ceaseless war against the predatory Turkish bands, that the

ancient Magyar valour was not yet wholly extinct. But the number of the

righteous men was too few to save the state. The first blow fell in

1521, when Sultan Suleiman appeared before the southern fortresses of

Sabac and Belgrade, both of which fell into his hands during the course

of the year. After this Venice openly declared that Hungary was no

longer worth the saving. Yet the _coup de grace_ was postponed for

another five years, during which time Suleiman was occupied with the

conquest of Egypt and the siege of Rhodes. The Magyars fancied they were

safe from attack, because the final assault was suspended; and

everything went on in the old haphazard way. Every obstacle was opposed

to the collection of the taxes which had been voted to put the kingdom

in a state of defence. "If this realm could be saved at the expense of

three florins," exclaimed the papal envoy, Antonio Burgio, "there is not

a man here willing to make the sacrifice." Only on the southern frontier

did Archbishop Tomori painfully assemble a fresh army and fleet, and

succeed, by incredible efforts, in constructing at Peterwardein, on the

right bank of the Danube, a new fortress which served him as a refuge

and sally post in his interminable guerilla war with the Turks.

In the spring of 1526 came the tidings that Sultan Suleiman had quitted

Constantinople, at the head of a countless host, to conquer Hungary. On

the 28th of July Peterwardein, after a valiant resistance, was blown

into the air. The diet, which met at Buda in hot haste, proclaimed the

young king[27] dictator, granted him unlimited subsidies which there

was no time to collect, and ordered a _levee en masse_ of the entire

male population, which could not possibly assemble within the given

time. Louis at once formed a camp at Tolna, whence he issued despairing

summonses to the lieges, and, by the middle of August, some 25,000

ill-equipped gentlemen had gathered around him. With these he marched

southwards to the plain of Mohacs, where, on the 29th of August, the

Hungarians, after a two hours' fight, were annihilated, the king, both

the archbishops, five bishops and 24,000 men perishing on the field. The

sultan refused to believe that the pitiful array he had so easily

overcome could be the national army of Hungary. Advancing with extreme

caution, he occupied Buda on the 12th of September, but speedily

returned to his own dominions, carrying off with him 105,000 captives,

and an amount of spoil which filled the bazaars of the East for months

to come. By the end of October the last Turkish regular had quitted

Magyar soil, and, to use the words of a contemporary observer, one

quarter of Hungary was as utterly destroyed as if a flood had passed

over it.

John Zapolya elected King.

Ferdinand of Austria elected.

Rival kings.

Partition of Hungary.

The Turks had no sooner quitted the land than John Zapolya, voivode of

Transylvania, assembled a diet at Tokaj (Oct. 14, 1526) at which the

towns were represented as well as the counties. The tone of the assembly

being violently anti-German, and John being the only conceivable

national candidate, his election was a matter of course; but his

misgivings were so great that it was not till the beginning of November

that he very reluctantly allowed himself to be crowned at a second diet,

held at Szekesfehervar. By this time a competitor had entered the field.

This was the archduke Ferdinand, who claimed the Hungarian crown by

right of inheritance in the name of his wife, Anne, sister of the late

king. Ferdinand was elected (Dec. 16) by a scratch assembly consisting

of deputies from Croatia and the towns of Pressburg and Sopron; but he

speedily improved his position in the course of 1527, by driving King

John first from Buda and then from Hungary. In November the same year he

was elected and crowned by a properly constituted diet at Szekesfehervar

(Stuhlweissenburg). In 1529 Zapolya was reinstated in Buda by Suleiman

the Magnificent in person, who, at this period, preferred setting up a

rival to "the king of Vienna" to conquering Hungary outright. Thus the

Magyars were saddled with two rival kings with equally valid titles,

which proved an even worse disaster than the Mohacs catastrophe; for in

most of the counties of the unhappy kingdom desperadoes of every

description plundered the estates of the gentry, and oppressed the

common people, under the pretext that they were fighting the battles of

the contending monarchs. The determination of Ferdinand to partition

Hungary rather than drive the Turks out, which he might easily have done

after Suleiman's unsuccessful attempts on Vienna in 1529-1530, led to a

prolongation of the struggle till the 24th of February 1538, when, by

the secret peace of Nagyvarad,[28] Hungary was divided between the two

competitors. By this treaty Ferdinand retained Croatia-Slavonia and the

five western counties with Pressburg and Esztergom (Gran), while Zapolya

kept the remaining two-thirds with the royal title. He was indeed the

last national king of Hungary till modern times. His court at Buda was

maintained according to the ancient traditions, and his _gyules_, at

which 67 of the 73 counties were generally represented, was the true

national diet, the phantom assembly occasionally convened at Pressburg

by Ferdinand scarcely deserving the title. Indeed, Ferdinand regarded

his narrow strip of Hungarian territory as simply a barrier behind which

he could better defend the hereditary states. During the last six years

(1534-1540) of John's reign, his kingdom, beneath the guidance of the

Paulician monk, Frater Gyorgy, or George Martinuzzi (q.v.), the last

great statesman of old Hungary, enjoyed a stability and prosperity

marvellous in the difficult circumstances of the period, Martinuzzi

holding the balance exactly between the emperor and the Porte with

astounding diplomatic dexterity, and at the same time introducing

several important domestic reforms. Zapolya died on the 18th of July

1540, whereupon the estates of Hungary elected his baby son John

Sigismund king, in direct violation of the peace of Grosswardein which

had formally acknowledged Ferdinand as John's successor, whether he left

male issue or not. Ferdinand at once asserted his rights by force of

arms, and attacked Buda in May 1541, despite the urgent remonstrances of

Martinuzzi, who knew that the Turk would never suffer the emperor to

reign at Buda. His fears were instantly justified. In August 1541,

Suleiman, at the head of a vast army, invaded Hungary, and on the 30th

of August, Buda was in his hands. During the six following years the

sultan still further improved his position, capturing, amongst many

other places, Pecs, and the primatial city of Esztergom; but, in 1547,

the exigencies of the Persian war induced him to sell a truce of five

years to Ferdinand for L100,000, on a _uti possidetis_ basis, Ferdinand

holding thirty-five counties (including Croatia and Slavonia) for which

he was to pay an annual tribute of L60,000; John Sigismund retaining

Transylvania and sixteen adjacent counties with the title of prince,

while the rest of the land, comprising most of the central counties, was

annexed to the Turkish empire. Thus the ancient kingdom was divided into

three separate states with divergent aims and interests, a condition of

things which, with frequent rearrangements, continued for more than 150

years.

Siege of Szigetvar.

A period of infinite confusion and extreme misery now ensued, of which

only the salient points can here be noted. The attempts of the Habsburgs

to conquer Transylvania drew down upon them two fresh Turkish invasions,

the first in 1552, when the sultan's generals captured Temesvar and

fifty-four lesser forts or fortresses, and the second in 1566, memorable

as Suleiman's last descent upon Hungary, and also for the heroic defence

of Szigetvar by Miklos Zrinyi (q.v.), one of the classical sieges of

history. The truce of Adrianople in 1568, nominally for eight years, but

prolonged from time to time till 1593, finally suspended regular

hostilities, and introduced the epoch known as "The Long Peace," though,

throughout these twenty-five years, the guerilla warfare on the frontier

never ceased for more than a few months at a time, and the relations

between the Habsburgs and Transylvania were persistently hostile.

Probably no other country ever suffered so much from its rulers as

Hungary suffered during the second half of the 16th century. This was

due partly to political and partly to religious causes. To begin with,

there can be no doubt that from 1558, when the German imperial crown was

transferred from the Spanish to the Austrian branch of the Habsburg

family, royal Hungary[29] was regarded by the emperors as an

insignificant barrier province yielding far more trouble than profit.

The visible signs of this contemptuous point of view were (1) the

suspension of the august dignity of palatine, which, after the death of

Tamas Nadasdy, "the great palatine," in 1562, was left vacant for many

years; (2) the abolition or attenuation of all the ancient Hungarian

court dignitaries; (3) the degradation of the capital, Pressburg, into a

mere provincial town; and (4) the more and more openly expressed

determination to govern Hungary from Vienna by means of foreigners,

principally German or Czech. During the reign of Ferdinand, whose

consort, Anne, was a Hungarian princess, things were at least tolerable;

but under Maximilian (1564-1576) and Rudolph (1576-1612) the antagonism

of the Habsburgs towards their Magyar subjects was only too apparent.

The diet, which had the power of the purse, could not be absolutely

dispensed with; but it was summoned as seldom as possible, the king

often preferring to forego his subsidies rather than listen to the

unanswerable remonstrances of the estates against the illegalities of

his government. In the days of the semi-insane recluse Rudolph things

went from bad to worse. The Magyar nobles were now systematically

spoliated on trumped-up charges of treason; hundreds of them were

ruined. At last they either durst not attend the diet, or "sat like dumb

dogs" during its session, allowing the king to alter and interpret the

statutes at his good pleasure. Presently religious was superadded to

political persecution.

Effect of Reformation.

The Reformation had at first produced little effect on Hungary. Except

in the towns, mostly of German origin, it was generally detested, just

because it came from Germany. The battle of Mohacs, however, severely

shook the faith of the Hungarians. "Where are the old Magyar saints? Why

do they not defend the realm against the Turks?" was the general cry.

Moreover, the corrupt church had lost its hold on the affections of the

people. Zapolya, a devout Catholic, is lauded by Archbishop Frangipan in

1533 for arresting the spread of the new doctrines, though he would not

allow Martinuzzi to take the extreme step of burning perverts at the

stake. These perverts were mostly to be found among nobles desirous of

amassing church property, or among those of the clergy who clamoured for

communion in both kinds. So long, however, as the old national kingdom

survived, the majority of the people still clung to the old faith. Under

Ferdinand the parochial clergy were tempted to become Lutherans by the

prospect of matrimony, and, in reply to the remonstrances of their

bishops, declared that they would rather give up their cures than their

wives. In Transylvania matters were at first ordered more peaceably. In

1552 the new doctrines obtained complete recognition there, the diet of

Torda (1557) going so far as to permit every one to worship in his own

way so long as he did not molest his neighbour. Yet, in the following

year, the whole of the property of the Catholic Church there was

diverted to secular uses, and the Calvinists were simultaneously

banished, though they regained complete tolerance in 1564, a privilege

at the same time extended to the Unitarians, who were now very

influential at court and converted Prince John Sigismund to their views.

In Turkish Hungary all the confessions enjoyed liberty of worship,

though the Catholics, as possible partisans of the "king of Vienna,"

were liked the least. It was only when the Jesuits obtained a footing

both at Prague[30] and Klausenburg that persecution began, but then it

was very violent. In Transylvania the princes of the Bathory family

(1571-1604) were ardent disciples of the Jesuit fathers, and Sigismund

Bathory in particular persecuted fiercely, his fury being especially

directed against the queer judaizing sect known as the Sabbatarians,

whose tenets were adopted by the Szeklers, the most savage of "the three

nations" of Transylvania, many thousands of whom were, after a bloody

struggle, forced to emigrate. In royal Hungary also the Jesuits were the

chief persecutors. The extirpation of Protestantism was a deliberate

prearranged programme, and as Protestantism was by this time identical

with Magyarism[31] the extirpation of the one was tantamount to the

extirpation of the other. The method generally adopted was to deprive

the preachers in the towns of their churches by force, Italian

mercenaries being preferably employed for the purpose. It was assumed

that the Protestant nobles' jealousy of the burgesses would prevent them

from interfering; but religious sympathy proved stronger than caste

prejudice, and the diets protested against the persecution of their

fellow citizens so vehemently that religious matters were withdrawn from

their jurisdiction.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Hudson River" to "Hurstmonceaux" Volume 13, Slice 8 · 第 15 / 27 题