DETERMINISM AND WILL POWER
Determinism is the doctrine that all things, including the will, are
determined by causes. It is the antithesis of the doctrine of free
will. In its complete form, it holds that the individual has no direct
and voluntary control over his thoughts and actions but that every
thought and action is inevitably the result of a large number of
previous thoughts and actions which have gone before.
There is a very large amount of evidence, and indeed, whether we admit
it or not, the evidence is quite irrefutable, that in regard to the
majority of our actions the doctrine of determinism holds good. But the
evidence is by no means sufficient to enable us to conclude that we
have no free will.
[3]Freud in his book on the “Psychopathology of Everyday Life” and in
other works gives many convincing examples that much in our character,
that many of our actions, evil and good, are quite beyond our control
at any given moment. But there is one thing that appears to have been
overlooked, and that is, _that in all the examples given one could
not conceivably utilise free will in any case_. If I ask you to think
of a number what opportunity do you get of using your will power?
If you put the wrong latch-key into the door by accident, have you
made any effort to use will power? When a patient is suffering from
hysteria due to repressions of various kinds, in that particular matter
_the will power has already been lost_. When a chronic alcoholic is
unable to cease from drinking his will power in reference to this has
disappeared, therefore determinism holds the field completely. The
will has no opportunity of working then. In all the examples which
Freud gives one discovers on careful investigation that for some reason
or another there is no opportunity for the use of free will. Such
evidence as we have certainly does not prove the nonexistence of free
will, but merely shows that in a very large number of our thoughts and
actions we do not use any will at all, and that in other cases we are
unable to use our will effectively.[4] When determinism does rule we
may liken it physically to this: a patient sits down and crosses one
leg over the other and leaves the one leg hanging free. On tapping
it smartly beneath the patella the foot will kick; the knee jerk has
been elicited. If this be done fifty times the result will be the
same fifty times. There is movement of the leg, but this movement is
predetermined. On the other hand this does not prove that no other
movement of the leg is possible. Under the conditions just given the
man’s will, or the freedom of the leg, is merely _eliminated during
that period_. Or again, we may liken it to a locomotive standing at the
top of a hill; if the brake be taken off, the locomotive will run down
the hill, and will do it every time; but this will not prove that did
somebody happen to put the brake on half-way down the hill the engine
would still go on running. However, all actions which we may ascribe to
our will are no doubt strictly limited by other determined conditions.
The man on the engine may run it backwards or forwards, but only within
_the very much prescribed limits which the rails allow_. We may safely
accept this much determinism, that although the will exists, its
capabilities are strictly circumscribed by determinism.
It is rather in his general direction than in any specific act that
a man has most control. We certainly have not the amount of free
will which we like to believe we have. For example, the reader of
this chapter may have returned home to-night and have said, “I will
not have a meal to-night, it is too hot.” What are the factors (or
determinants, as they are called) in this case? Perhaps external heat,
producing langour by various physiological processes, combined with
lack of appetite, in its turn produced by several causes, and added to
this, depression, produced by a bad business deal, and in its turn the
result of many other determinants outside the reader’s control. There
is no desire to eat, and these various determinants, added together,
prove stronger than the habit of eating the evening meal. Having,
however, read this chapter as far as this point, the reader desiring to
disprove my unpleasant suggestion, immediately says, “Ah! I will prove
that I have free will. I will eat my meal in spite of not wanting it.”
Alas! this does not _prove_ free will, new determinants have merely
been added on the other side, and desire to prove strength of mind has
now out-weighed accumulated efforts which prevented you from eating.
Since it has been shown that a man’s control is constantly being
limited by other determinants, it follows that the criminal whose
environment and determinants, conscious and unconscious, have been
manufactured for him from evil sources, yet who, on the whole, is
progressing upwards in spite of these, may be forming a far better
character than the arch-bishop whose environment from the beginning has
been such as never to give him criminal characteristics, yet whose
growth has been, on the whole, towards a more selfish position, even
though this be not noticeable to the eyes of others.
_Now many of the determinants forming our characters lie in the
unconscious. They are unknown to us and only the results of their
activities are visible. Herein lies the difficulty of controlling
ourselves. How can we efficiently control that of which we do not know
the existence? Herein, also, lies the value of psycho-analysis, for it
brings many of these determinants to light, and we are thus able to
control them consciously._ Only a part of all this can be accomplished
by such self-analysis as may be indicated in this book. Yet even so, a
much greater degree of self-control may be obtained.
§2
Let us now consider briefly why persons who have not previously been
irritable, should suddenly become irritable; who have not previously
been hysterical, should suddenly become hysterical; who have not
previously been in the habit of weeping, should at some time after
reaching adult life, revert to that infantile habit.
The explanation of mental troubles of various kinds involves two
factors. In the first place, any individual is capable of bearing a
certain amount of conflict and a certain amount of repression. It is
only when the accumulated force is more than he can control, _that is
when new determinants are added_, that the symptoms begin to appear. He
is like a steam engine in which as long as the steam is being used up
in doing work, or as long as the safety valve is working efficiently
when work is not being done, the boiler stands a pressure of 100lbs.
very comfortably. If the safety valve gets jammed, and the energy
cannot be transferred from the steam to the work, the pressure in the
boiler rises higher and higher until it bursts from the joints and
rivet-holes.
The second factor which determines the mode of expression of this
out-burst of repressed energy is known as the _law of regression_.
This means that if the adult outlet of energy becomes dammed up or is
insufficient, _the energy will flow through an earlier channel which
has once been used_. The individual will, in fact, revert to some
method which he was wont to use in earlier years, or in infancy. It
is true that this may be disguised and not recognised as an infantile
mode of expression until it is looked into more closely. This question
of regression, however, need not be more than touched upon here. It
will be much more fully dealt with when we come to actual examples at a
later stage.
FOOTNOTES:
[3] “The Elements of Practical Psycho-Analysis,” by Paul Bousfield.
[4] The doctrines of determinism and free-will respectively can be
brought entirely into line with one another if we include freewill
itself as one of the determinants. Thus, if in the formula
S = a + b + c + d + etc.
where S is the resultant action, and a, b, c, d, etc., are the several
determinants, it happens that d = 0. The presence of d does not
invalidate the formula. _But if_ d _does not happen to be zero, the
absence of_ d _would invalidate the formula_. If d represents the
“will” component there may be plenty, even a majority of cases in which
d = 0, but there may be cases in which the omission of d will render
the result erroneous.