Effect of the news of the Lithuanian disasters on the minds of the
people.--Distrust of the National Government.--The Russian army
resumes the offensive under general Paszkewicz.--He decides to
pass the Vistula.--Examination of the merits of this plan.--Plan
of general Skrzynecki to act on the different detached corps of
the enemy.--Advantages of general Chrzanowski over the corps
of Rudiger.--The Russian forces execute the passage of the
Vistula.--General Skrzynecki crosses the Vistula at Warsaw to operate
against the enemy on the left bank.--An inquiry into the conduct
of general Skrzynecki, and the appointment of a Council of War is
demanded by the nation.--Arrival of the corps of general Dembinski at
Warsaw.
While the nation was afflicted by the treasons at Warsaw, their hopes
had been still kept alive by looking towards Lithuania. What, then, can
express the disheartening effect produced by the intelligence that the
Lithuanian corps existed no longer;--that that pillar, so essential to
the support of the fabric we had been rearing, had fallen; and that
this disaster had been brought on by the gross negligence, if not
the treason, of those to whom that all-important expedition had been
entrusted. They felt that this was an almost mortal blow. They saw a
horrible future opening upon them, prepared by parricidal hands. After
such renewed outrages, the people fell into the greatest exasperation.
That people, whose confidence had been so basely abused, whose holiest
purposes had been so shamelessly sported with, seemed at last to
have changed their nature. So often betrayed, they lost confidence
in all, and seemed to see in every one a traitor. If, in the frenzy
of indignation, which such an experience had justified, they allowed
themselves to be carried away by their feelings, and to be guilty of
acts of severity, it can scarcely be wondered at.
Immediately after the arrival of the sad news from Lithuania, the
nation demanded explanations of the generalissimo. They demanded to
know how he could have given the command of so important an expedition
to a man like Gielgud, one who had never been esteemed by the nation or
the army, and who had not even the reputation of a general of talent.
How could an expedition which demanded the very highest talents,
and the most undoubted patriotism, have been confided to a man like
him? With him had been associated general Chlapowski, who was the
brother-in-law of the Grand Duke Constantine. That circumstance alone,
they justly considered, should have been enough to suggest suspicion,
and to have at least indicated the expediency of keeping him near the
eye of the commander in chief, and subject to his constant observation.
Such were the complaints of the people, and they went to the heart of
the commander in chief, and the president of the National Government;
for they were conscious, but too late, of their justice.[81]
The Russian army, the command of which, on the death of general
Diebitsch, was taken by general count Paszkewicz, and the main body of
which remained in a state of inaction at Ostrolenka, having no longer
any apprehensions from Lithuania, could now act with freedom, and the
offensive was recommenced under the command of its new chief, who
decided to pass the Vistula, and to act upon the left bank.
I may be allowed to detain the attention of the reader a moment upon
this passage of the Vistula by Paszkewicz, a manoeuvre of which so
much boast has been made, and to consider whether it is really to be
regarded as a great and bold step, or one of necessity. What was the
state of the Russian army after the battle of Ostrolenka?--A month
had passed, and that army had not made a single movement, but was
kept there merely to be fed by Prussia. Was not this inactivity an
infallible evidence of weakness? Does it not show that, alarmed by the
prospects in Lithuania, it was in a state of hesitation, not daring to
advance into the kingdom, and holding itself in readiness to evacuate
it on an occasion of necessity, which indeed seemed near at hand? In
this period of hesitation, the new general arrives from the regions of
the Caucasus. He must do something. The question presents itself to
him,--what course is best to be taken? His army, now reinforced by the
corps which had been in Lithuania, amounted to perhaps near one hundred
and fifty thousand men. Although this force was considerable, yet to
attack the fortifications of Praga, which, as is known to the reader,
had been augmented, and which the Russian army in their primitive and
unimpaired strength had never had the temerity to attack, was out of
the question. What other course could he take, unless he could submit
to continue in this state of inactivity, but to pass the Vistula, and
under the assistance of Prussia, to make his attempts against Warsaw
on the other side, a step, however, which he never would have dared to
have taken without that assistance. This is the natural explanation of
that boasted plan, in which we can see nothing but an almost necessary
movement, encouraged by a reliance on Prussia.
In the first days of the month of June the Russian army began to
approach the Vistula, in order to execute the passage. Their march
was in three principal columns, and was arranged in the following
manner:--general Witt, commanding the columns of the left wing, took
the direction of Sochoczyn. The centre, under marshal Paszkewicz, left
for Sonk and Luberacz, passing the river Wkra at Maluszyn. The column
of the right, consisting of the imperial guard, under the command of
the grand duke Michael, marched from Makow, by Ciechanow and Racionz.
General Pablen commanded the advanced guard. A considerable train of
ammunition, with provisions for twenty days, and a park of artillery
of reserve, formed the fourth column, and followed the imperial guard.
Detached posts towards Modlin and Serock, covered this march on the
left. One regiment of dragoons remained at Pultusk. This combined force
consisted of 80,000 men and three hundred pieces of cannon. Besides
these forces, there were in the kingdom, the corps of general Rudiger
at Kaluszyn, and that of general Rott at Zamosc. Those two corps might
now number about 20,000 men, and some thirty pieces of cannon. Opposed
to these forces, we had an army of 40,000 men, a hundred and twenty
pieces of cannon, not counting the national guard of Warsaw, and the
garrisons of the two fortresses of Modlin and Zamosc.
The plan of our generalissimo was to throw himself upon the detached
corps of the enemy, under Rott and Rudiger, and afterwards to act upon
his main body. For this end an attack was ordered upon the corps of
Rudiger, which was beaten in the environs of Minsk by the corps of
general Chrzanowski, in successive actions, on the 14th, 15th, and
16th of July. A third part of his corps being destroyed, a thousand
prisoners, four pieces of cannon and all his baggage taken, he was
forced to retire behind Kaluszyn. After these new advantages, the
general in chief prepared to act upon the rear of the Russian main
army, and to attack them while engaged in the passage of the Vistula,
which he supposed they would attempt either at Plock, or between Plock
and Modlin. But as he was afterwards apprized that the Russians were
to attempt the passage at a much more distant point from Warsaw, and
beyond his reach while on the right bank, he thought it most expedient
to pass the Vistula at Warsaw, and to operate against the enemy on the
other side. The Russian army thus passed the Vistula without being
intercepted, between the 12th and the 20th of July. Having reached the
left bank, the enemy took the direction of Lowicz, where, on the 27th,
the head-quarters of general Paszkewicz were established, and whither
our army marched to meet him.
At this important moment, when the operations of the enemy had taken a
new face, and seemed, in the eyes of the people, by his near approach
to Warsaw, to menace the utmost danger--made more threatening in their
imaginations by the recent discovery of the conspiracy of Jankowski and
the news of the misfortunes in Lithuania;--at this anxious moment, the
nation demanded a council of war, and called on the National Government
to make an inquisition into the conduct of the general in chief, to
demand of him full explanations of his purposes, and a submission of
all his plans of operation to the examination of such a council. Such
a council of war was instituted by the government and directed to be
attached to the person of the general, and to be initiated into all
his designs, in order to be enabled to tranquillize and re-assure the
minds of the nation, which had so naturally become distrustful and
suspicious, after the events which had taken place.
The council having been organized, and having taken an oath of secrecy,
general Skrzynecki laid before them all the plans of operation that he
had hitherto followed, as well as those which he had in contemplation,
and gave a full exposition of the reasons for each. This council then
published to the nation an address, announcing their entire confidence
in the patriotic intentions of the general in chief, and assuring them
that the crisis was by no means as dangerous as they apprehended. By
these proceedings the minds of the people were much tranquillized, and
this tranquillity was increased by the arrival of the corps of general
Dembinski from Lithuania after its glorious retreat; which arrival not
only cheered them by the addition which it brought to our forces, but
by the more encouraging accounts than had before been received, which
it gave of the state of Lithuania, authorizing some hope of a renewal
of the insurrection in that province at a more propitious hour.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 81: A few details of the history of the two generals who
were the cause of these fatal disasters, may gratify the curiosity of
the reader. General Gielgud was born in Lithuania, at Gielgudyszki,
(the place at which he crossed the Niemen in 1831). Passing over
his early life, which presents nothing noticeable, he commenced his
military career in 1812, when Napoleon entered Lithuania. In a moment
of patriotic fervor, he formed a small detachment at his own expense,
and joined the ranks of the supposed deliverer of Poland; and this
perhaps was the most praise-worthy act of his life. During the campaign
of 1812, 13, and 14, he was in no way distinguished either for good or
bad conduct. At the end of the Russian campaign, in 1815, he was made
colonel. As during that year, Poland came under the Russian government,
our army was subjected to a change of organization, and as many
officers of high rank, who were in independent circumstances, gave up
their commands, Gielgud then obtained the rank of general, at about the
age of thirty. This rapid advancement, as was natural to a man of weak
character, inspired him with an extreme of arrogance and pretension;
qualities which were encouraged in his intercourse with the Russian
generals, with whom he was much associated. It was this arrogance which
uniformly lost him the esteem of those under his command.
When the revolution broke out, general Gielgud was at the town of
Radom, and his life was in great danger from the suspicions of which he
was naturally the object, but he was protected by some of the patriots,
on the assurances which he gave of his patriotic dispositions. Still,
however, the military demanded his removal from his post, and, in fact,
for some weeks he was without command. The dictator, Chlopicki, whose
modes of action were, as the reader knows, too often inexplicable,
restored him to his command, persuading himself that he was one of the
best of patriots, and that if his exterior was offensive, he was right
at heart. In the war,--having first commanded a brigade, and afterwards
a division,--while he was attached to the grand army, his conduct was
not marked by any very great faults; indeed, in the battle of Minsk he
performed his part well. It was such occasional exhibitions of good
conduct which kept him in some consideration.
After having taken command of the corps of Lithuania, and when he was
removed from the observation of the army, he exhibited himself in his
true character. He was giddy with the distinction, and feeling himself
the absolute master of his own conduct, he gave himself up to all the
suggestions of his vanity.
His first act of folly was to surround himself with a numerous suite,
(it was in number four times that of the commander in chief,) in which
suite those individuals were held in greatest esteem, who were most
fertile in resources for amusement. It was to this love of personal
gratification that we can attribute those delays which were sacrificing
the cause of the country. At Gielgudyszki the general gave a _fête_
to his officers; and it is not impossible that it was a motive of
mere personal ostentation which induced him to make the passage of
the Niemen, at that place, by which two days' march were given to the
retreating enemy, time was allowed him to concentrate his forces in
Wilno, and that capital was lost to us!
This general was never seen to share the privations, fatigues, and
exposure of his subalterns. In his personal deportment he neglected the
true means of gaining the confidence and attachment of his troops. On
the eve of a battle, in moments of danger and anxiety, it is cheering
to the soldier to see the face of his commander, and to hear from him a
few words of encouragement. These are apparent trifles, but they are in
reality of most serious consequence. They are the secret keys by which
every thing can be obtained from the soldier. The personal attachment
of the soldier to his commander, is worth more than the finest
combinations in strategy and tactics. The commander, who succeeds in
gaining the affection of the soldier, inspires him with a new impulse
for exertion. To his other motives is added the dread of forfeiting
the confidence and esteem of a friend; and perhaps, with the mass of
an army, such a motive would yield to no other in efficiency. To the
modes of conduct which would have secured this result, general Gielgud
was an entire stranger. Instead of freely approaching the soldier
and endeavoring to gain his attachment, he treated him with uniform
coldness and reserve. It is on the whole a matter of just surprise,
that a man with such glaring faults of character should have been
appointed to so responsible a trust.
General Chlapowski commenced his military career also in 1812. In the
Russian war he advanced to the rank of officer, and was made aid-de
camp of prince Poniatowski. While in this situation he advanced to
the rank of a staff officer, in which rank he left the army in 1815,
and retired to his estates in the grand duchy of Pozen, where he
married the sister of the princess of Lowicz, the wife of the Grand
Duke Constantine. The entrance of this general into the revolutionary
ranks excited considerable surprise. But as he joined himself to
the squadrons of Pozen, which were formed of the bravest and most
patriotic materials, there was no distrust felt of him. His successes
in traversing the department of Bialystok, entitled him to the highest
praise. It was this fine expedition which gained him the confidence
of the Lithuanian corps, and after the battle of Wilno, they were
unanimous in inviting him to take the chief command. The nominal
command, as we have related, he declined, but took a post which gave
him the superintendence of all the operations. While he was thus in
the direction of affairs, the greatest faults, as we have seen, were
committed, for which no adequate explanation can be given. We will
recapitulate some of them.--They were, 1. The sending of the sappers to
build the bridge over the Niemen. 2. The ill-arranged attack on Szawla.
3. His not succoring general Rohland in the combat of Powenduny. 4. The
inexplicable secrecy which he kept upon his intention of passing the
Prussian frontier; having left Kurszany for that object, whilst all
his officers were given to understand that the separation of the corps
at that place was with the view of marching to act in the environs of
Kowno. These are points upon which this officer has yet to answer at
the bar of his country. Chlapowski was a more dangerous person even
than Gielgud, for Gielgud was a man of such undisguised arrogance,
that he repelled the confidence of others; but Chlapowski, with all
the faults of Gielgud, had an exterior of dissimulation which won
insensibly upon those who had not thoroughly studied his character. But
none who had observed and known him well, could ever yield him their
esteem.]