General Chlapowski arrives at Keydany, having ordered general
Dembinski to Wilkomierz.--The position of the two forces and their
line of operations.--Examination of these arrangements.--Neglect of
the important position of Kowno.--General Chlapowski, at Keydany,
proposes to form a provisional government, and obtain a levy of
troops.--Dispositions of the Lithuanians, as effected by the
mismanagement of our leaders.--Advantages offered to the enemy by the
delay at Keydany.--Brave defence of Kowno, by the small force left
there.--Skirmish at Wilkomierz.--The opportunity of concentrating all
the forces at Keydany, and repassing the Niemen, is neglected.--The
enemy presses his pursuit.--Battle of Rosseyny.--Attack on
Szawla.--Loss of the ammunition and baggage of the corps.--The corps
retreats in order to Kurzany, protected by a rear guard of cavalry
and light artillery.--At Kurzany the corps is subdivided into three
parts.--Destination and strength of each.--Examination of this plan.
General Chlapowski, whom we shall hereafter name as having the chief
command of the Lithuanian force, arrived on the night of the 22d of
June at Keydany, having sent orders to general Dembinski to withdraw
with his corps, and to march to Wilkomierz. (10) [_Plan_ XXXIV.] The
corps of general Dembinski arrived, on the 21st, at Szerwinty, and on
the 22d, at Wilkomierz. On quitting Podbrzeze, general Dembinski left a
small detachment in the environs of Myszogola, to act as partizans.
The position of our corps was then as follows;--The larger force
was at Keydany (2). The corps of Dembinski was at Wilkomierz, and a
small corps (_c_) under the command of general Szymanowski was in the
environs of Szawla. Our line of operations was on the river Swienta (S)
and along the Wiliia (W), for a short distance below the junction of
the former river with it. To defend the passage of those rivers against
the enemy, the following detachments were designated. Kowno (11) was
occupied by two battalions of Lithuanian infantry, recently levied,
under the command of colonel Kikiernicki, and a squadron of the 11th
regiment of lancers, also Lithuanian, and recently formed.
At Janow (12) was a battalion of infantry and a squadron of the 11th
lancers, under the command of colonel Piwecki. At Wieprz were three
squadrons of the 10th lancers.
This separation of our forces in Lithuania, and, above all, this
designation of the most recently organized troops for the defence of
the passage of the two rivers, with a full knowledge of the great
strength of the enemy, was a gross error. To leave the defence of
Kowno, a place of so much importance, to three battalions of infantry
and a squadron of cavalry, all of them newly formed troops, and that,
too, without ammunition, (for they had barely three rounds each,) was
a course perfectly inexplicable. Besides all this, the river Swienta
was so shallow as to be fordable by both infantry and cavalry, and in
some places even by artillery. Why then was that river defended? It was
owing, in fact, to good fortune that all these detachments were not cut
off.
On the arrival of the two corps at Keydany and Wilkomierz, the
organization of a provisional government for the province, was
commenced. Diets were convoked at these two places, to organize
an administration, and to procure levies of forces. Although these
arrangements were all proper in themselves, yet it was a late hour to
undertake them, and no place could have been so well adapted for them
as Wilno. Had the corps of Saken been pursued and broken up, Wilno
would have been ours; and all such arrangements could have been made
there under the most favorable circumstances. In that event, the brave
Lithuanians would have come in from all sides and crowded our ranks,
without waiting for any appeal to be made to them. But at present,
a new crisis had arrived. We had fought the battle of Wilno with a
disastrous result. The enemy had become acquainted with the inferiority
of our forces, and had begun to understand the errors of our commander,
and was prepared to take advantage of them. In fine, the Lithuanians
themselves, witnessing all this gross mismanagement, became disgusted,
and after having once so cheerfully tendered their co-operation, began,
at length, to discover that they were sacrificing themselves in vain,
and that the fate of the inhabitants of Wilno would await them. This
people, as we have already stated, had commenced their insurrection two
months before they had hopes of any assistance from our forces, and
badly armed as they were, they had maintained a partizan warfare during
this period with uniform success. We can, therefore, have no reason
to reproach them, if after the misconduct which was exhibited before
their eyes, they began to be reluctant to join their forces to our
own, and chose to reserve the sacrifice of their exertions and their
lives for some other occasion, when there might be some hope of useful
results.
The six or seven days which we passed thus at Keydany and Wilkomierz,
seemed as if designed to invite the enemy to pursue his advantages,
and to lead him to the idea of surrounding our forces. The enemy,
fortunately for us, did not improve the opportunity which we presented
him, but remained inactive. This inactivity, whether it arose from the
imbecility of his commanders, or whatever other cause, afforded us an
opportunity of changing our plans, and of extricating ourselves from
the dangerous position in which we were placed. But instead of this,
we awaited his attack. On the 29th, the enemy commenced an attack upon
every point, at Wilkomierz, Wieprz, Janow, and Kowno, with his whole
force.
A corps of 4,000 Russians, with 16 cannon, commenced the attack on
Kowno, defended, as we have said, by 2,000 new troops. From morning
until night, the defence was sustained with great courage. The contest
was for the first half of the day in the town itself, and the rest
of the day was spent in disputing the passage of the bridge over the
Wiliia. The Russians occupying all the houses upon the banks of the
river, and the neighboring heights, commenced a terrible fire of
artillery and musquetry upon the bridge, which was defended by a
body of infantry, almost without ammunition. At nightfall, colonel
Kikiernicki, seeing that the Russian cavalry had found means of fording
the river, ordered a retreat, but remained himself at the head of a
single company, defending the bridge, until he learnt that the rest of
the corps had passed the town of Sloboda, and had gained the heights
which are behind the town. Upon that bridge, fell the captain of this
company, Zabiello, a Lithuanian. He was shot in the act of cutting
away the bridge with his own hands. This company, after having thus
sustained their post at the bridge with the greatest bravery, commenced
their retreat. The Russian cavalry, having succeeded in fording the
river, had already commenced acting in their rear. At the same time,
the Russian columns of infantry were debouching upon the bridge.
Colonel Kikiernicki, perceiving his situation, animated his little
corps to make the desperate effort of breaking through the Russian
cavalry, and of gaining Sloboda. His spirit was seconded by his brave
followers, and this company of one hundred men, raising the hurrah,
forced a passage through the enemy's cavalry, gained Sloboda, and,
under cover of night, succeeded in joining their comrades.[76] In this
effort, colonel Kikiernicki fell wounded, and was made prisoner by the
enemy.
The detachment, having lost one half of their numbers in the sanguinary
attack to which the mismanagement of our general had exposed them,
took the road to Janow. In this manner ended the attack on Kowno, and
the Russians took possession of that important post, which might be
regarded as the key to all our communications with Poland.
There can be no excuse for not having fortified Kowno. It is a
town, containing ten or twelve thousand inhabitants, of which one
half, perhaps, were Jews, but they could have been employed in the
construction of the works. It was also most favorably situated for
defence, being surrounded by heights on every side.
On the same day, sanguinary skirmishes took place at Janow, Wieprz,
and Wilkomierz. The two first towns were abandoned. In the attack on
Wilkomierz, which was successfully repelled, an action took place, in
which the lancers of Poznan and Plock threw themselves upon the flank
of Russian cavalry, and, after causing severe loss, took about eighty
prisoners, consisting of Circassians. General Dembinski, on the night
of the 29th, learning that our positions of Janow and Wieprz were
abandoned, quitted Wilkomierz on the next day, and took the road to
Szawla. [_Plan_ XXXIV, (13)]. Although the occupation, by the enemy, of
the town of Kowno, and the interruption of our whole line of operations
on the Swienta and Wiliia, made our situation very perilous; yet it was
still possible to avoid the disasters which followed, and to effect
a return to Poland. By concentrating all our forces at Keydany, we
could have effected a passage of the Niemen, in the same manner as we
had already done in the direction of Gielgudyszki, which would have
left the enemy in our rear; while on the other side of the Niemen, the
enemy were not in force enough to prevent our passage. But, instead of
doing this, as if to insure our ruin, a small detachment, consisting
of four squadrons of cavalry, and the sappers, under the command of
colonel Koss, were sent to make a bridge over the Niemen! This measure
is perfectly inexplicable. Scarcely had this detachment arrived at
the river, and commenced the erection of the bridge, when they were
attacked on two sides, by the cuirassiers and the artillery of the
enemy. They were saved only by the judicious conduct of colonel Koss,
who threw himself into the protection of the neighboring forest, and
succeeded in rejoining the corps. The loss which we incurred by this
expedition, of all our implements for the construction of bridges, was
irreparable.
From this time, the enemy did not for a moment lose sight of us;
and throwing his superior forces upon the great road which leads
from Keydany, through Rosseyny (14), to Szawla, forced us to take
that direction which was the most dangerous for us, as the field
of operation for our forces was continually becoming more and more
contracted.
COMBAT OF ROSSEYNY.
The cause of this action, which it would have been most desirable to
have avoided, was a strong attack by the enemy upon the rear-guard of
general Chlapowski which was marching on the road to Szawla. To avoid
exposing the rear-guard to a great loss, or even to the chance of it,
the command was given, to take position, and the corps was placed
in order of battle. The battle of Rosseyny, which lasted scarcely
four hours, was very sanguinary, and highly honorable to the Polish
arms. The object of the enemy on this occasion was to surround our
left wing. As soon as he perceived that our corps had taken position
and was arranged in order of battle, the enemy brought forward his
artillery, consisting of 24 pieces of cannon, and commenced a heavy
fire upon our centre. This fire did not cause a great loss, for, our
position being elevated, the shot struck too low to be effective. A few
moments after this fire of artillery was commenced, a strong column
of Russian cavalry showed itself on our right wing. This column had
with it a body of light artillery, which commenced fire also. On our
left wing, which was supported upon a marsh, and, for that reason, in
little expectation of an attack, but a small force was collected. This
wing was composed of a battalion of infantry and the 1st regiment of
lancers. These troops had been placed on this wing to repose from the
combats and fatigues of the day and night preceding, in which they had
acted as rear-guard. The brave lancers, however, at the first sight of
the enemy, demanded of the general to be permitted to make a charge.
This permission being given, at the first discharge of the Russian
artillery, our soldiers threw themselves with impetuosity upon both the
cavalry and the artillery of the enemy. The capture of sixty prisoners
and the spiking of three cannon were the fruits of this brilliant
attack. It was the last charge of that brave regiment.
Our centre was not less fortunate than our left wing. Our artillery
being better placed than that of the enemy, several of his pieces were
dismounted, and his fire began to slacken. For some hours a light fire
of tirailleurs was continued on both sides, when our generals, seeing
that the enemy did not renew the attack, gave orders to evacuate the
position, and to resume the march for Szawla.
On the same night, the corps arrived at Cytowiany. There our forces
were joined by the corps of general Rohland, which had had a bloody
skirmish at Beysagola, [_Plan_ XXXIV, (15)] on the same day on which
general Dembinski was also attacked at Poniewieze. The corps of general
Chlapowski left the next day for the attack of Szawla, which was
occupied by a Russian garrison. The corps of general Dembinski, which
as we have already stated, was marching by another route upon Szawla,
arrived there at mid-day on the 7th. That general, considering the
smallness of the Russian garrison in this town, consisting only of
four battalions of infantry, and six pieces of cannon, after waiting
a short time for the arrival of the corps of general Chlapowski,
concluded to send a summons, by colonel Miroszewski, to the Russian
commandant, proposing to him to surrender, and save a useless effusion
of blood. The Russian colonel Kurow would not accept of these friendly
propositions, and compelled general Dembinski to order an attack; a
very moderate one, however, as he was in hopes that the arrival of
our superior forces would soon convince the Russian commander that a
defence would be useless. In fact, the corps of general Chlapowski
arrived at about 5, P.M. at a village about four miles from Szawla,
where he was met by an officer, sent by general Dembinski, with a
report of the circumstances which had taken place. Indeed, the sound
of the cannon and musquetry, ought already to have satisfied general
Chlapowski that general Dembinski was engaged in the attack; but
instead of hastening to his assistance he went into camp, and thus
remained until two hours past midnight. At two o'clock then, of the
morning of the 8th, the corps took up the march, and arrived by
day-break before Szawla.
ATTACK ON SZAWLA.
On examining the plan of this battle, and considering the smallness
of the Russian garrison in Szawla, we cannot but be satisfied that
the town ought to have been taken at the first assault, and it will
seem almost incredible that after having occupied four hours in an
unsuccessful attack, we should have at last quitted our position.
On arriving on the plain before Szawla, the two corps were placed in
order of battle. The force of general Dembinski changed its position,
and formed our left wing. We commenced a fire of artillery from the
right wing and the centre, at the same time throwing forward our
skirmishers. The enemy had made an entrenchment round the whole town,
behind which his infantry was concealed; and upon the right of the town
he had constructed a redoubt. On the sides of the town against which
the right wing and centre were posted, a general fire of musquetry and
artillery was commenced, under the cover of which our light troops
endeavored to take possession of the ramparts.
General Szymanowski and colonel Pientka, who were the only general
officers who were actively engaged in this battle, seeing that this
attack of the light troops upon the Russian infantry, thus safely
entrenched, was very destructive to us, and would prolong the attack,
ordered two battalions of infantry, under colonel Jeroma and Piwecki,
to make an assault, protected by two pieces of cannon and a squadron of
the 3d regiment of lancers. This order was executed with the greatest
determination. Our artillery having fired two rounds of grape, the two
battalions of infantry entered the city at the charge, and regardless
of the terrible fire from the windows of the houses, they reached the
market-place of the town.[77] The enemy was in consternation, and the
taking of a hundred prisoners by us, showed the disorder into which
he had already fallen. If but two other battalions had been sent to
support those which had entered the town, the attack would have ended
here. But this was neglected, and the latter were remaining in their
dangerous situation, while the rest of our forces were uselessly
engaged, and received no orders. The bold idea of the brave colonel
Pientka, of forcing the attack, was no where seconded. The corps of
general Dembinski remained wholly inactive, although officers were
occasionally sent by him to general Chlapowski for orders. By this
fault the battalions who had entered the city were exposed to the
superior forces of the enemy, who, falling upon them from all sides,
forced them to quit the city, leaving among their dead the brave
colonels Jeroma and Piwecki, and nearly one half of their whole
number.[78] With the retreat of these brave battalions, all our forces
commenced evacuating their position,--we cannot tell for what reason.
The enemy did not attack us; on the contrary, he was well satisfied
with the cessation of hostilities on our part. At 9 o'clock our corps
recommenced its march.
These are the details of the battle, or rather the attack, of Szawla,
which town we quitted, after investing it for nearly five hours, and
after having sustained a severe loss in men and officers, a sacrifice
which was owing to our most defective and ill-judged arrangements.
On this same day, we were again unfortunate, in the loss of all our
baggage and several wagons of ammunition, which were sent forward by
a road on our right, and fell into the hands of the light Circassian
cavalry of the enemy.
This battle discovered an extreme of negligence in our commander in
chief. With the knowledge that the enemy was pursuing us in the rear,
and on each side, we remained uselessly encamped during the night
of the 7th, which we ought to have employed in the attack. The true
course should have been to have set fire to the place, which would
have required only the agency of a few bold men. This town, indeed,
deserved no better fate; for it was inhabited almost exclusively by
hostile Jews. When the general welfare is at risk, there should be no
hesitation in sacrificing the convenience of individuals. If we compare
the consequences of having burnt this town, and of having attacked it,
we shall see that, by the former course, we should have compelled the
Jews to fly with their effects, and the Russian garrison to surrender,
without any effusion of blood, while, by attacking it, we lost nearly
one thousand men, without any advantage whatever.
In regard to the attack, the surrounding of the town was a great fault;
for neither the fire of the artillery nor of the light troops could
be effective, as the Russian artillery was in a dominant position,
and was concealed within the city, as their infantry was behind their
entrenchments. The skirmishers, in approaching the city, fell, without
having harmed the enemy. The plan of colonel Pientka, of masking the
attack on one side, and forcing the attack upon the other, at a single
point, was well conceived, but failed, as we have seen, by the want of
support.
At about ten o'clock the flanking parties of the Russian cavalry began
to show themselves on each side of us, upon the road to Wilkomierz, and
on that of Cytowiany. Our corps was already on the march for Kurszany.
The 1st regiment of lancers and the light artillery were designated
as a rear-guard. This rear-guard, taking advantage of a small defile,
which presented a favorable position, took post there, and sustained
themselves for some hours against an attack from the Russian advanced
guard; thus protecting the march of our main body, which was executed
with the greatest order. The lancers and light artillery then evacuated
their position, by a retreat at full speed, which, by taking advantage
of the windings of the road, and the vicinity of the forests, they were
able to effect with inconsiderable loss. On the evening of the same
day, we arrived at Kurszany. On the next day we remained some hours
in that place, to hold a council of war. General Chlapowski proposed
to divide our forces into three corps, each to act independently.
This arrangement was carried into effect, and our forces were thus
distributed.
The 1st corps, under general Chlapowski, with which general Gielgud
remained, consisted of five battalions of infantry, amounting to 1,500
men; four squadrons of the 1st regiment of lancers, and two squadrons
of Kaliszian cavalry; in all, 450 horse, and an artillery consisting of
13 pieces of cannon.
This corps received the destination, to march for Rosseyny, leaving the
enemy on the right, and from thence directly for Kowno, and, by this
unsuspected march, to surprise the last important position. By that
means, the communication between us and Poland would be re-opened; and
to protect this communication was to be the principal employment of
that corps.
The 2d corps, under the command of generals Rohland and Szymanowski,
was composed of eight battalions of infantry, amounting to about 3,000
men; all the cavalry which was recently formed in Lithuania, consisting
of nearly 1,000 horse; and an artillery, commanded by the brave colonel
Pientka, consisting of 12 pieces of cannon.
This corps was directed to march upon Polonga, a port on the Baltic.
It had been rumored that two French vessels with arms, funds, and
ammunition, together with a small body of volunteers, were cruising
near that port. After they should have received these expected
supplies, the corps was directed to march towards the Dwina, and, by
following along the banks of that river, to observe and interrupt the
communications between the forces of the enemy in Lithuania, and the
province of Courland.
The 3d corps, under general Dembinski, was composed of three battalions
of infantry of the 18th regiment, recently formed, consisting of about
1,000 men; two squadrons of the lancers of Poznan, two squadrons of
the lancers of Plock, and one squadron of the 3d regiment of Hulans,
in all, about 500 cavalry; and seven pieces of artillery. This corps
received orders to march for the environs of Szawla, traversing the
forests, and leaving the enemy on the right; from thence to take a
direction to Wilkomierz, and thence to the environs of Wilno, and to
attack that city, if circumstances might allow of it; and then to
manoeuvre in the department of Minsk, and in the forests of Bialystok,
acting there in support of the insurrection, and collecting the forces
of the insurgents. An important object of this corps was to support
a communication with the corps of general Chlapowski. This plan, the
reader will observe, was, in many of its points, the same with that
suggested by colonel Valentin.
A proper reflection upon all these arrangements would convince any one
that much more loss than advantage was to be anticipated from them.
This subdivision of the force was, in fact, a visionary scheme. Many
officers openly declared their opinions to this effect, and urged that
in our critical situation, almost surrounded as we were by a hostile
force, so superior to our own, we ought not to form any new projects,
but, profiting by the concentration of our forces, to redouble the
rapidity of our march, and, taking advantage of the forests and covered
roads, to reach Poland as soon as possible. This would, indeed, be
attended with difficulties; but it would still be much easier of
execution, and much more proper to be attempted, than the plan which
we have detailed. Such views, however, were not regarded. The project
was highly colored, and the most brilliant successes were promised to
follow it. The separation of the corps was accordingly ordered, and our
fate was sealed.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 76: With this company was the countess Plater, and her
aid-de-camp M'lle Rasynowiecz.]
[Footnote 77: The Jewish inhabitants of the city even fired upon our
soldiers. Many of them were taken with pistols in their hands, and
afterwards executed.]
[Footnote 78: In this affair we ought to make particular mention of the
estimable Laga, a priest, who was at the head of the squadron in this
attack, having the cross in one hand and the sabre in the other.]