Plan of general Skrzynecki to act upon the isolated corps of Rosen
and Giesmar.--Battle of Wawr.--Various detachments of the enemy are
taken after that battle, and a great number of prisoners.--Battle of
Dembe-Wielke.--Destructive pursuit of the enemy by our cavalry.--View
of the Russian losses in the preceding days.--Marshal Diebitsch
abandons his plan of crossing the Vistula, and marches to the rescue
of the remains of the corps of Rosen and Giesmar, and the Imperial
Guard.--View of the position of the two armies, after the second
repulse of the enemy from before Warsaw.--Operations of general
Dwernicki.--Successes of a reconnoissance under colonel Russyian at
Uscilog.--Effect of Dwernicki's victories on the inhabitants of the
provinces.--Acknowledgment of general Dwernicki's services by the
National Government.--The instructions for his future operations.
The news of this prompt and sudden evacuation of Ostrolenka by the
Russian guard, and the evident intention of the Grand Duke Michael to
discontinue his operations in the palatinate of Plock, and to make a
junction with the grand army, as well as other certain intelligence
that marshal Diebitsch had withdrawn the main body of his forces,
[_See_ (A) _Plan_ XVI,] and had left only a corps of observation,
composed of the two corps of Rosen and Giesmar (B), in the environs
of Wawr and Milosna, determined our generalissimo to hasten to the
execution of the plan, for a long time decided upon, which was to throw
himself with his whole force upon the nearest Russian corps, and to
crush them before marshal Diebitsch could come to their succor.
On the 29th and 30th, our general in chief made a review of the greater
part of the army. All the troops received him with expressions of the
greatest enthusiasm. He could not but be delighted at the sight of
that fine and energetic force, and be confident of the most brilliant
successes. All the troops defiled before the general, carrying with
them the trophies which they had taken from the enemy; and each
platoon, as they passed, hailed him with some patriotic exclamation,
and pledged themselves that they would never return without having
satisfied his orders to the utmost. On the night of that day, the
commanders of the several divisions received the order to hold
themselves in readiness to march at a moment's warning.
BATTLE OF WAWR. [_See Plan_ XVII.]
On the evening of the 30th, the two divisions of infantry under
Rybinski and Gielgud, and the brigade of cavalry under Kicki, received
orders to pass from Warsaw to Praga. That force quitted Warsaw at ten
o'clock, P.M.
[Illustration:
_XVI. p. 264._]
[Illustration:
_XVII. p. 266._]
Whilst the division of Gielgud and the cavalry of Kicki were to occupy
the great road (_g_) leading to Grochow, the 1st division under
Rybinski was to march upon the right wing of the enemy at Kawenczyn
(K). This last division was to drive the enemy from his position in
as short a time as possible. If the enemy's forces at Kawenczyn were
found to be greatly superior to his own, general Rybinski was directed
to continue his fire, and await a reinforcement, which should be
immediately sent to him. If he should be so fortunate as to take
Kawenczyn, general Rybinski was to send, by a small road (_l_) leading
from this place, through the forest, to Milosna, a few battalions (_m_)
to that village. Other battalions (_d_) were to be dispersed in the
forest, between that small road and the main road. Having made those
arrangements, the position of Kawenczyn was to be vigorously defended,
in order to baffle every effort of the enemy to retake it. The accurate
and prompt execution of this plan was expected to effect the cutting
off of all the enemy's forces, which were to be found upon the field
of Wawr. In regard to the division of Gielgud upon the main road, the
instructions given were that it should not commence its fire until
apprised of general Rybinski's having gained possession of Kawenczyn.
This division was till then to limit its attention to the object of
retaining the enemy in his position near Praga, long enough to give
time for the corps of general Rybinski to occupy the above mentioned
forest, and to operate in the enemy's rear. The moment for the advance
of the 2d division, was to be, when the fire of the light troops of
Rybinski should be heard in the forest.
All these dispositions were executed with the greatest exactitude under
the protection of a thick fog. The division of general Rybinski having
quitted Praga at midnight, arrived as far as the environs of Kawenczyn,
without being in the least disturbed by the enemy. This skilful
general had the precaution not to attack the enemy until an hour before
day-break; in the interval, while resting in the woody ground near
Kawenczyn, he sent forward a patrol, with directions to approach near
enough to ascertain, as far as practicable, the position, the strength,
and the nature of the force of the enemy, and sent another patrol in
the direction of the forest of elders to reconnoitre the enemy there.
Those patrols returned with the intelligence that the enemy's force
could not be great, as they could perceive no large detachments placed
as advanced posts. It was between five and six in the morning, when
the first fire of general Rybinski, at Kawenczyn, gave notice to the
2d division of Gielgud, at Praga, that it was the time to advance. The
brigade of cavalry under Kicki, (_b_), with the 2d and 7th regiments
of lancers, having with them three pieces of cannon, spread out their
flankers, and advanced slowly, directed continually by the fire of
general Rybinski, who in the mean time had pushed two battalions at the
charge, supported by a few pieces of artillery, and had carried the
enemy's position by storm, and taken possession of Kawenczyn. The enemy
were instantly routed by this impetuous attack, and lost three pieces
of cannon. The division passed through Kawenczyn, sent two battalions
(_m_) to Milosna, occupied the forest (A) in the rear of the enemy's
principal force, and commenced a fire. When this fire was heard by our
forces (B) upon the main road, they pushed forward, and a general and
rapid advance was commenced under cover of the thick fog. Two regiments
of cossack cavalry, (_h_), who were posted in columns near the Obelisk
of Iron, were borne down before them. A great number of prisoners were
taken on the spot. Our brave lancers, under Kicki, animated by this
success, did not halt in their attack. They fell upon an advanced post
of Russian artillery of three pieces (_f_) near Grochow, and took them
before they had time to fire. By seven or eight o'clock, the enemy was
entirely surrounded, and his retreat by Milosna was wholly cut off. It
was with the dissipation of the fog that we witnessed the confusion
into which had been thrown the whole advanced guard of Giesmar,
composed of four regiments or sixteen battalions of infantry (_a_),
eight squadrons of cavalry (_h_), and twenty-four pieces of cannon
(_f_). The disorder of this advanced guard was such, that the Russian
battalions had actually been firing against each other, and that fire
ceased only with the clearing up of the fog. The 95th and 96th Russian
regiments, amounting to 5,000 men, with all their officers and colors,
were taken in a body, and with them the brigadier general Lewandowski.
If the fog had continued half an hour longer, so that we could have
occupied the road to Karczew, the whole of this advanced guard would
have been taken; for what remained of them saved themselves only by
flying along that road.
This attack, which was the business of a few hours, forced the enemy
to quit his advantageous position in the commanding forest, between
Wawr and Milosna, which he had occupied for a month, and on which he
had constructed considerable fortifications. Driven from this important
position, he could only expect to be subjected to still greater losses.
At Milosna (3), three battalions of the enemy, with four pieces of
cannon, placed as an isolated detachment, were dispersed, and their
cannon taken. Another isolated detachment of cavalry of hussars and
cossacks of Czarno-morskie, posted at Janowek, met the same fate, and
prisoners were taken in every direction. Our two divisions pursued
the enemy with unremitted celerity, and, followed by our main forces,
reached Dembe-Wielke, at which place was the corps of general Rosen,
composed of about 30,000 men and 40 pieces of cannon.
BATTLE OF DEMBE-WIELKE. [_See Plate_ XVIII.]
As the enemy occupied the heights (D) of Dembe-Wielke, on the side of
the marsh opposite to our forces, which, to attack him, would have had
to traverse the dyke (_k_) constructed over this marsh,--the commanders
of the two divisions considered it expedient to await the arrival of
our whole force, which approached some hours after. General Skrzynecki,
satisfied that an attack made, over the dyke, upon the commanding
position of the enemy on the other side, in broad day, would cost too
great a sacrifice of men, determined to amuse him by a constant fire
of our skirmishers (_a_), who advanced as far as the marshy ground
which divided the two armies would permit. A little before night, the
general in chief ordered all the cavalry (_b_) to be brought together,
and formed in columns of attack, with the two squadrons of carbiniers,
under the brave colonel Sznayder, at their head. At the approach of
twilight, he ordered these columns to pass the dyke on a trot, and to
throw themselves upon the enemy on the right and left, attacking with
the sabre.
While the cavalry was passing the dyke, the artillery (_c_) was to open
a general fire, ceasing, however, when the passage of the dyke should
be effected.
The order was given, and this mass of cavalry, under the fire of the
artillery, raised the hurrah, and passed the dyke with the rapidity of
lightning, followed by our infantry, having at their head the brave
4th regiment. The enemy was in such consternation that he was not
in a state to make a defence, and his whole battery was overthrown.
Full three thousand prisoners were taken, together with the entire
battery, consisting of twelve pieces of cannon of large calibre,
some fifty voitures of different kinds, as caissons of ammunition,
baggage-wagons, &c, and a great number of horses.[49] In a word, the
corps of general Rosen was completely broken up; the coming on of
night, and the forests, alone saved them from total ruin. General Rosen
himself, with his suite, was pursued and was near being taken. All
his equipage, consisting of three voitures, fell into our hands. Thus
ended the glorious 30th of March. The generalissimo, who was always
in the advance, and who had personally arranged all the details of
that day's operations, particularly at Dembe, justified well the high
opinion which the general officers and the army had entertained of him.
The 30th of March placed his name high on the roll of distinguished
leaders. On that memorable day, two Russian corps, those of Giesmar and
Rosen, were completely broken up. It cost the enemy, in dead, wounded
and prisoners, full 10,000 men and 22 pieces of cannon. On our side
the loss was not more than 500 killed and wounded. For the successes
of that day general Skrzynecki received from the government the
order of the great Cross of Military Merit. The general in chief was
accompanied, during the actions, by prince Adam Czartoriski, and the
members of the National Government, Berzykowski, and Malachowski.
[Illustration:
_XVIII. p. 200_]
[Illustration:
_XIX. p. 202_]
To follow up the pursuit [_See Plan_ XIX] of the fragments of the two
Russian corps, general Skrzynecki designated the division of cavalry
(A) under general Lubinski, with a battery of light artillery. This
detachment set out during the night, sending reconnoissances to the
right and left, to see that the enemy did not prepare ambuscades.
The army followed this advanced guard, which soon overtook the enemy
(B), who was still in great disorder. Infantry, cavalry, artillery,
and vehicles, were mingled together, pressing their retreat. At each
step, our cavalry took up prisoners. Upon some positions the enemy
attempted to make a stand, but every such attempt was thwarted, and he
was carried along before our troops. This was the case in the position
of Minsk and of Jendrzeiow, where two regiments of Russian cavalry
were routed by the second regiment of chasseurs. It was the same case
in the forest of Kaluszyn, where our artillery approached the Russian
rear-guard, and poured upon them a fire of grape, which scattered death
among their ranks. The Russians, being no longer in a state to make any
stand whatever, fell into a panic, and commenced a general flight. They
were pursued by general Lubinski as far as Kaluszyn, where night closed
upon the scene of destruction.
This day cost the enemy nearly as much as the preceding. Besides their
loss in dead and wounded, 3,000 prisoners fell into our hands, with
three standards, four pieces of cannon, and a hundred vehicles of
baggage, ammunition, &c,--in fact, the whole baggage of the corps. But
the most agreeable success of our army, on that day, was the taking
possession of the hospitals of Minsk and Jendrzeiow, in which as many
as two hundred of our comrades were lying wounded. To witness the joy
of those brave sufferers was recompense enough for all our fatigues.
The impetuosity of our attack was such, that the enemy had not time
to burn the magazines of Milosna, Minsk, and Kaluszyn, which fell
into our hands. To make a recapitulation of the loss of the enemy on
those two days--it was as follows:--Two of their generals, Lewandowski
and Szuszerin, taken prisoners, with as many as sixty officers, of
different grades, 15,000 soldiers in killed, wounded and prisoners; 26
pieces of cannon, seven standards, 1,500 horses, a great quantity of
different kinds of arms and implements, and as many as 100 vehicles of
various kinds.
The disasters of these two Russian corps were the cause of the
abandonment of the plan which had been adopted by marshal Diebitsch, of
passing the Vistula between Pulawy and Maceiowice, opposite Kozienice,
with the greater part of his army; and to execute which he had left
his position on the latter days of March, and had reached the environs
of Ryk. [_See Plan_ XVI.] The fear of losing those two corps, together
with the guard, had led him to return in the direction of the town of
Kock, to afford them succor.
After these days, so fortunate for us, in which the Russian forces
were again driven from before the walls of Warsaw, the position of
their army was as follows. Their right wing, formed of the remains of
the corps of Giesmar and Rosen, was at Boimie; detachments being also
placed in the environs of Wengrow. The main body, under Diebitsch,
was at Kock. His advanced posts extended to Wodynie, Seroczyn, and
Zelechow. The Russian guard, which, as we have said, had formed the
plan of joining their main body, and had left Ostrolenka by the road
through Wengrow, was obliged, in consequence of the successes of our
army, to abandon that plan, and to retire again to the environs of
Ostrolenka, where they now were posted. In the palatinate of Lublin was
the Russian corps under general Witt.
The position of our army was as follows. Our left wing was opposite
Boimie. It sent out its reconnoissances along the river Kostrzyn, as
far as Grombkow, Zimna-woda, and even beyond. The head-quarters of the
general in chief were with the main body, at Latowicz. Our right wing
was at Siennica. Its reconnoissances were sent out as far as Zelechow,
at which place was a detached corps, under the command of general Pac.
In this manner, the marshy rivers, Kostrzyn and Swider, covered our
front. [_Refer to Plan_ VI.] General Uminski, with his detached corps,
was at Rozany, in the palatinate of Plock, opposed to the Russian
guard. In the environs of the fortress of Zamosc in the palatinate of
Lublin, opposed to the Russian corps of general Witt, was the corps
of general Dwernicki. Besides this, a small corps was placed in the
environs of the town of Granica, upon the left bank of the Vistula,
under the command of general Sierawski.
While the main forces were acting with such success, the two detached
corps, under generals Uminski and Dwernicki, had also fought
gloriously, and gained important advantages. The corps of general
Dwernicki spread terror in its vicinity, and the Russians were
compelled to send a new corps against him, under the command of general
Kreutz; so that the combined Russian forces opposed to him amounted
to 20,000 men. Greatly superior as this force was, they did not dare
to attack general Dwernicki, who, reinforced every day by volunteers
coming from Galicia and Volhynia, soon found himself at the head of
4500 men, and 20 pieces of cannon. This corps, in concert with the
garrison of Zamosc, was sufficient to hold in check all the operations
of the enemy in that quarter.
On the 25th of March, general Dwernicki sent a reconnoissance as far
as the environs of Uscilug, at which place a new Russian corps, coming
from Turkey, was expected to arrive. This reconnoissance was composed
of two battalions of infantry, one company of Galician volunteers,
three squadrons of cavalry, and four pieces of cannon. The commander
of this force was the brave colonel Russyian. The detachment arrived
at the above place, and received intelligence of the approach of
an advanced guard of the corps of general Rudiger, composed of two
regiments or six battalions of infantry, one regiment of cossacks, and
eight pieces of cannon. Colonel Russyian did not stay for the approach
of this guard. He took possession of the different batteaux which were
prepared for, and were waiting the arrival of the Russian force at the
distance of a league from the town. Passing the river Bug, with his
corps, in these boats, he suddenly attacked the Russian advanced guard
with such success, that he took two thousand prisoners, and six pieces
of cannon, and several hundred horses. With these trophies he returned
and joined the corps, to their astonishment, for they had received but
a single report from him, and had no expectation of such results. The
rumor of the continual successes of this corps of general Dwernicki,
spread along the borders of the Dnieper, reached the distant regions of
our brethren in the Ukraine, and awakened in them an ardent desire to
unite themselves to our cause.
For the continued and glorious advantages of this corps, which
commenced its operations with 3,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, and three
pieces of cannon, and had nearly destroyed two Russian corps, those of
Kreutz and Wirtemberg, taking 10,000 prisoners, and thirty pieces of
cannon, the national government promoted its brave commander to the
rank of full general of cavalry, and honored him with the surname of
the famous Czarnecki, the ancient polish chief.[50]
The general in chief communicated to general Dwernicki his promotion,
with the sincere thanks of the national government; and at the same
time sent him instructions and advice in regard to the operations
which he was then to follow. The corps of general Dwernicki was to
manoeuvre in such a manner as to menace continually the left wing
of the Russian grand army. Keeping this object in view, he was not,
unless with the expectation of some very extraordinary advantages,
to remove himself very far from the fortress of Zamosc. This place
was to serve as a _point d'appui_ in every case of sudden danger.
About this point he was to manoeuvre, and from thence he was to push
himself, as circumstances might allow, into the environs of Lublin and
Wlodawa, to trouble incessantly the above mentioned wing, and even
the rear of the Russian grand army. In this instruction of keeping
himself near the fortress of Zamosc, and in the palatinate of Lublin
generally, another advantage was contemplated: viz. that he might
receive daily accessions of volunteers from Volhynia and Podolia. Our
brethren, in those provinces, would hasten to join themselves to his
victorious eagles, (of which disposition, indeed, he received continual
evidence,) and, in this manner his corps would be gradually increased
by such aid from those provinces, without attracting the attention
of the enemy. As the provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, from their
geographical character, having no large forests, were not in a state
to carry on a partizan warfare, as was quite practicable in Lithuania
and Samogitia, and also as the Russians had several corps upon the
frontiers of Turkey, which, by being concentrated in that open country,
might be dangerous to our small forces, general Skrzynecki was of the
opinion that general Dwernicki, by keeping near the frontiers of the
above mentioned provinces, should rather act by a moral influence upon
their inhabitants, than hazard certain advantages by entering them.
The river Wieprz was to be the leaning point of his left wing, and
the river Bug of his right. Between those two rivers, in a woody and
marshy region, he would find many strong natural positions. Of such
he would take advantage, and endeavor to strengthen them by different
fortifications. General Dwernicki, in receiving these instructions,
was also invested with full powers, by the national government, to
institute a provisional administration over the above provinces, (in
case that circumstances should lead him to establish a footing there,)
similar to that of the kingdom in general, and to bring them into a
state to act with effect in concert with the rest of the kingdom.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 49: The horses taken on that day, and at the battle of Wawr,
were employed to mount the entire new regiment of the Lancers of
Augustow.]
[Footnote 50: General Dwernicki, who received, among other titles,
that also of the 'Provider of cannon,' used his cavalry so constantly
in the charge upon artillery, that if the artillery of the enemy began
its fire, and the charge was not ordered, our cavalry were always
disappointed. This was the case at the battle of Kurow, on the 2d
of March. As the enemy in that battle had placed his artillery in a
commanding position, and as general Dwernicki was awaiting the arrival
of detachments under colonel Lagowski, in the direction of Belzge, he
was not disposed then to give the order for a charge, but preferred
to amuse the enemy by various manoeuvres of his cavalry. Passing
down the front of his lancers, he observed that they wore a look of
dissatisfaction. On noticing this, he was astonished, and demanded an
explanation. 'What does this mean, my dear comrades?' said he; 'you are
sad at a moment when, after so many victories, you ought to be joyful.'
The lancers replied--'Dear general, it is an hour since the enemy's
artillery commenced their fire, and you do not allow us to charge upon
them.' The general, smiling, answered, 'Make yourselves content; you
shall soon have that satisfaction;'--and in a short time, as the reader
will remember, general Dwernicki, seeing the detachment of colonel
Lagowski approaching, gave the order for an attack upon the enemy's
artillery, and in a moment they were driven from their position,
sabred, and ten pieces of their cannon taken. The Russians, to whom the
name of Dwernicki was a terror, would speak of him in the following
manner: 'What can we make of such a general? He performs no manoeuvres,
and never permits our artillery to fire. His generalship appears to lie
only in taking possession at once of our cannon!']