CHAPTER XXXII. AUGUSTINIAN CREEDS AND THEOLOGIANS CONTRADICT THE COMMON‐

SENSE SYSTEM, AND THUS, ALSO, CONTRADICT THEMSELVES.

The preceding chapter shows the agreement of distinguished Augustinian

theologians with the leading points of the common‐sense system. We next

are to notice the particulars in which these theologians and the

Augustinian creeds contradict the common‐sense system, and thus, also,

contradict themselves.

The grand point, which involves these contradictions, is the dogma that

all mankind have a _depraved nature_ consequent on the sin of Adam, which

makes it certain that every voluntary act of every human mind is “sin, and

only sin,” until this depravity of nature is more or less rectified by the

Spirit of God. The opposite of this is the common‐sense doctrine that all

men have a _perfect nature_, created by God, which is unchanged and not in

any way depraved by the sin of Adam.

As involved in this common‐sense view, _true virtue_ consists in the

_right action_ of a perfect nature, as it now is. In opposition,

Augustinianism teaches that true virtue consists in the right action of a

depraved nature _after_ it has been more or less renewed by the Spirit of

God.

Common sense claims that the indispensable requisites to secure right

voluntary action are, _knowledge_, _training_ and _motives_, for which we

are dependent on God, on man, and on self, conjointly. In opposition,

Augustinianism claims that knowledge, training and motives are of no avail

to secure true virtue, until the damage done by Adam’s sin to the nature

of every human mind, is more or less rectified, and that for this we are

entirely dependent on the Spirit of God.

Common sense claims that man, at birth and through life, is entirely

unable to obey many of the physical, social and moral laws of God, for

want of adequate knowledge, training and motives; but that he is fully

able to obey these laws as fast as he has the appropriate knowledge,

training and motives, and that before regeneration he does perform truly

virtuous acts. Augustinianism, in opposition, claims that man never obeys

the laws of God acceptably until the Spirit of God more or less rectifies

the depraved nature consequent on Adam’s sin, and that previous to this

influence of the Spirit, every voluntary act is “sin, and only sin.”(14)

Common sense teaches that the commencement of “a new life” consists, not

in the change of the nature of man, but in the commencement of a _ruling

purpose_ to obey all the laws of God, which purpose may be an unconscious,

gradual process by educational training, or it may be an instantaneous and

conscious act. Augustinianism teaches that “regeneration” or the “new

birth” consists in the re‐creation or change of the nature of mind, so as,

more or less, to remedy the depravity consequent on Adam’s sin.

Common sense teaches that every volition of every mind, which in act and

intention is conformed to the laws of rectitude, is truly virtuous in

every proper use of the term, without any reference to the question either

of a ruling purpose or a change of nature. Augustinianism teaches that

every volition of every mind is sin, and only sin, previous to the act of

regeneration accomplished by the Spirit of God.(15)

To illustrate the above by examples, suppose that a child is trained to

deny itself, to relieve suffering, or to make others happy. In its earlier

efforts this is very difficult, though by practice the principle of habit

renders it more and more easy. Common sense teaches that the first act of

self‐denial for the best good of others, in which the aim or intention is

to do right, is truly virtuous. For the thing done is right, and the

motive or intention is right. But Augustinianism says no; such an act is

“sin, and only sin,” previous to regeneration, though it is true virtue

after regeneration.

Again, a young man is trained to abhor meanness and deceit and to suffer

any thing rather than to violate his plighted faith. He is brought into an

extremity where, by a false statement, he can escape poverty and disgrace

to himself and his family. He sacrifices all rather than to violate his

word and honor.

If he is not a regenerate man, Augustinianism says this act is not truly

virtuous, but is “sin, and only sin.” Common sense says, it is a virtuous

act in every sense of the term as used among men.

We have shown by quotations that Augustinian theologians teach that man’s

nature is the only guide to the nature of God, and, as his work and image,

is perfect in construction. At the same time they teach that man’s nature

is so totally depraved that it never acts morally right, in a single

instance, until it is regenerated by God, and that all sin is the natural

result of this depravity of nature.

In consequence of this contradictory starting‐point, they proceed to other

contradictory instruction. For example, in the education of very young

children most theologians, of whatever school, teach them that to speak

the truth, to obey parents, to deny one’s self for the good of others, is

right, good and virtuous. They teach that when little children act thus,

before regeneration, they not only act virtuously, but that God approves

and loves them for it. In doing this, they use the words _good_, _right_

and _virtuous_, in the ordinary sense in which men understand these terms.

But at the same time, the same theologians are teaching from the pulpit

and the press, that every voluntary act of every child is “sin, and only

sin,” previous to regeneration; that there is no good, right and virtuous

act in an unregenerated mind, and that God feels no approbation or

complacency in such acts or the unregenerated as the above, which are

called virtuous, but are really sin.

It is manifest that the educational training of the young must be

radically diverse just in proportion as one or the other of these two

systems prevails.

On the Augustinian theory, there is no hope of any right moral action, or

truly virtuous conduct, until the depraved nature transmitted from Adam is

regenerated. On the common‐sense theory, every attempt of a parent or

educator, and every effort of a child to secure what is best and right

with the intention thus to secure it, is truly virtuous, and every

repetition is valuable as tending to secure virtuous habits and character.

On the Augustinian theory, religious instruction is only an appointed mode

by which God chooses to regenerate a depraved nature. It is a process for

securing a new nature from God. On the common‐sense theory, religious

training is a process for securing the development and right action of

mind by the influences of knowledge, training and motives, and without any

change of its nature.

It is also clear that these two systems must be very diverse in reference

to the interpretations of the Creator’s will as gained by reason or by

revelations from God.

On the Augustinian theory, mind is so totally depraved as to be incapable

of interpreting correctly, either the natural teachings of reason and

experience, or the recorded revelations from God. Owing to this,

_authorized interpreters_ of God’s will are indispensable. This makes the

whole human race dependent on a class of men authorized by God to

interpret his natural laws and revealed will.

On the contrary, the common‐sense theory claims that every mind, in

proportion as its powers are cultivated and developed, has the means of

discovering the end for which all things are created, and of interpreting

the teachings of reason and experience, and also of interpreting any

revealed records of God’s will.

It thus appears that theologians and creeds that adopt the Augustinian

theory contradict themselves mainly in these two points:

First, they teach that man’s nature _is_ depraved and that it is _not_

depraved.

Next, that previous to regeneration, men do not perform any truly virtuous

acts, and yet that while unregenerated they do perform such acts.

The quotation from creeds and theologians, in preceding chapters, is proof

that they teach that man’s nature is thus depraved, and that previous to

regeneration he never performs a single truly virtuous act. This and the

preceding chapter present some of the evidence that they teach the

opposite.

The following is submitted as still further evidence of such

contradictions.

In the first place, it is allowed by all, that the Augustinian creeds and

theologians teach that man, as _a race_, including every individual, has a

depraved _nature_. The question, then, all turns on the meaning of the

word _nature_, and whether they affirm its depravity _in the same sense_

as they affirm that in nature man is the living image of the living God

and our only guide to a knowledge of him.

It is claimed that they do use the word _nature_ in one and the same sense

when they affirm that man’s nature _is_ and _is not_ depraved. In proof of

this we must resort to our lexicographers who have collected the various

senses in which mankind use the word _nature_. And here we must again

recognize the fact that the true meaning of every word is settled simply

by ascertaining _what meaning men attach to it when they use it_.

In examining our dictionaries, we shall find that the word _nature_ is

used sometimes to signify every thing that God has created; as when it is

said, “all nature speaks its Maker’s praise.” Sometimes, by a figurative

use, the Author of all things is called Nature, as when it is said that

“Nature paints the flowers and spreads her repasts.”

No one will claim that either of these is the sense in which the word is

used in reference to the nature of the mind of man as a race.

The leading and primary signification of the word _nature_ is that which

is intended and understood when we say that “the _nature_ of a design or

construction is proof of the character and intention of the author.” It is

in this sense that men use the word when they speak of the nature of

animals, the nature of trees, and the nature of the soul.

In this use, it has but one signification, and that is, _those qualities,

powers and faculties which are discovered by experience and observation_.

Or in other words, when we discover the qualities of a thing, how it acts,

and how it is acted upon, we learn its _nature_.

In regard to all other existences except mind, the only mode of

discovering _their nature_ is to ascertain by experience and observation

how they _invariably_ appear and act. Thus we decide that it is the nature

of water to run down hill by finding that it _invariably_ does so; and

that it is the nature of smoke to rise in the atmosphere by observing that

it _invariably_ ascends.

Owing to this, mankind often use the word _nature_ as signifying _that

which is according to ordinary experience_. That is to say, the same word

is used to express the _qualities and powers_ of things, and also to

express that _invariable experience_ by which we learn these qualities and

powers. What is according to our ordinary experience we say is according

to nature, and what is contrary to ordinary experience is contrary to

nature.

Thus it is according to nature for water to run down hill, and it is

contrary to nature for it to run up hill.

It is mind, in distinction from matter, which has the power of _willing_,

and this is a power which never is exercised _invariably_ one way or

another.

But theologians have practiced this fallacy on themselves and others. They

first assume, what is contrary to fact, that mind _invariably_ chooses one

way, and that is _wrong_, from birth to regeneration. This being assumed

without proof, they claim that the _nature_ of the human mind is thus

proved to be depraved, and totally so.

Having thus, as they imagine, established its depraved voluntary nature,

they claim that, like all other things, the mind _must act according to

its nature_, which, being wholly depraved, all its moral acts are

consequently depraved.

This is what logicians call _arguing in a circle_; _i.e._, they prove that

it acts _invariably_ wrong because it is totally depraved, and it is

totally depraved because it acts _invariably_ wrong.

But common sense denies the starting assumption; _i.e._, the _invariably_

wrong volitions of every mind from birth to regeneration. On the contrary,

it is claimed that every choice which secures enjoyment without violating

law, is right, and that whenever a mind chooses what is right, with the

intention to act right, the choice is a truly virtuous act, and that all

men make such choices very often before regeneration.

Whatever is according to ordinary experience in the qualities and action

of mind, is said to be according to its nature. It is according to the

nature of mind, then, sometimes to choose what is good, right and

virtuous, and at other times to choose what is evil and wrong, according

to its knowledge, temptations and habits. Such a case never was known as a

mind that _invariably_ chose wrong.

In view of the preceding, it is maintained that the word _nature_, as

applied to mind, as settled by lexicographers, is always used to signify

the same as its _constitutional powers and faculties_, and that this is

the sense in which it is employed when we say “the _nature_ of a

construction or design is proof of the character and intention of the

author.”

We are now prepared to show that theologians use the word nature in this

same sense when they affirm that it is totally depraved, and when, at the

same time, they teach that it is the image of God, and our only guide to

his nature and character.

We shall first present the evidence that they use the word in this sense,

when they teach that every human mind is so depraved in nature that from

birth to regeneration every moral act is sin, and only sin.

The first item of evidence is the fact that all the other meanings of the

word, in our dictionaries, except this, can be shown to be _not_ the ones

in which theologians use the word in reference to men as a race, so that

this use is the only one remaining. They must use it in this sense, as the

only one left, all others being necessarily excluded.

Again, the mode by which they attempt to _prove_ that man has a depraved

nature, shows that they use the word in this sense. For they exhibit the

_wrong action_, or sinful feelings and conduct of the race, as the chief

proof. Their argument is this: the _nature_ of a thing is proved by its

qualities, how it acts, and how it is acted upon. The human mind

_invariably_ acts depraved, therefore its nature is depraved. No one will

deny that theologians always present the wicked feelings and conduct of

children and of men as the proofs of a depraved nature.

It is true, that in doing this they misstate facts, and maintain that

_all_ the actions of men are sin, and only sin. This contradicts

experience and common sense, which affirm that the human mind sometimes

acts right and sometimes wrong, from the first; showing that the nature of

mind is such that it naturally acts right as well as wrong. But this

attempt proves that they used the word in the sense here stated.

Again: that theologians use the word in this sense, is manifest from their

attempts to relieve the character of God from the charge of being “the

author of sin.” They can not deny that the nature of a contrivance proves

the character and intention of the author, and that, if God is the author

of man’s depravity by a wrong _construction_ or _nature_ of mind, it would

be proof that he is the author of all the sin resulting from it, and thus

a depraved character.

Instead of denying this use of the term, they allow it, and then try to

make man himself the author of this depraved nature, either _by_, or _in_,

or _before_ Adam. That is, they allow that man’s mind _is_ wrong in

construction, but claim that he himself is the author of this wrong.

Again: that theologians use the word nature in this sense, is proved by

their description of the depravity intended by them. When they are urged

to point out what the depraved nature of man consists in, they always

state something which shows it to be wrong in _construction_, and which is

exhibited in the wrong _action_ of mind.

There are these following methods of describing this depravity, viz.:

1. It is called a _bias_, _propensity_, or _inclination_ to sin.

2. It is called an _unbalanced_ state of the faculties.

3. It is called a _habit_ of sinning formed in a pre‐existent state.

4. It is called a wrong _combination_, or _proportion_, in the mental

faculties.

5. It is called a state resulting from the _deprivation_ of God’s Spirit.

It will now be shown that each and all of these equally involve the idea

of that malformation or wrong construction which proves its author

depraved.

The first is the most common method. On this view, it is claimed that the

minds of angels and of Adam were constructed with such a _bias_ or

tendency to good as secured their perfect action for a given period. The

mind of man, on the contrary, begins existence here so constructed that it

has a contrary _bias_ to evil; so that it never, in a single instance,

chooses right till regenerated.

The angels and Adam had a _holy nature_, meaning a _bias_, which God

created. Mankind have a contrary bias, which is a _depraved nature_, and

of this, man is the author, either _in_, or _by_, or _before_ Adam. And

they all allow, that if God had created this depraved bias, or depraved

nature, he would be “the author of sin.”

The second mode is, the claim that man’s depravity consists in an

_unbalanced state_ of his faculties or propensities. The angels and Adam

were created by God with the proper balance, and this is the holy nature

made by God. Man is born with an unbalanced state of the faculties, and

this was created by man himself, either _by_, or _in_, or _before_ Adam.

Now the balance of the faculties is as much a part of the construction of

mind as any thing else, and if God created this depraved, he is proved to

be depraved.

The third mode is, the claim that the depravity of man’s mind consists in

a _habit of sinning_. On this view, God created man’s mind aright, in all

respects, in a preëxistent state. In this normal condition of mind, every

propensity was toward not only _good_, but to the _best_ good, while there

was sufficient _knowledge_ of right created also, to save from all

mistakes of judgment as to what is best and right. In this perfect state

_some_ minds began to sin, and thus formed a habit of sinning, and were

then sent into this world to be reformed.

Here it is plain, that the depravity intended is depravity of

construction. For _habit_, as men use the term, expresses the fact that

repetition in the use of any faculty _increases its power_. It is a change

in the constitutional _construction_ of mind induced by use. For example,

a child has little constitutional power of mind to reason or to calculate

figures. By use, this deficiency of construction is modified.

_Habit_, then, modifies the constitutional organization of mind.

This mode of describing the depravity of mind teaches the misconstruction

of constitutional organization as much as all the others, but it furnishes

another mode by which it was induced, so as to make man the author in a

way that is comprehensible, and not absurd.(16)

The fourth mode is the claim that the depravity of the human mind consists

in the _disparities, or varieties, of constitutional organization_.

It has been shown that such disparities, as parts of a vast system in

which the best good of the whole is the best good of each part, are

indispensable to the perfect construction of mind in relation to that

system.

But the depravity claimed is, that which is common to _every_ mind, and is

so total that not a single mind, however highly endowed, ever, even in one

case, acts virtuously till regenerated. Thus the best in mental

construction are as totally depraved as the worst. At the same time, it is

clear that it is constitutional malformation that is taught, and nothing

else.

The fifth mode of describing the depravity of mind is that it consists in

the _deprivation_ of God’s Spirit.

The result of this deprivation is thus described by Dr. Hodge, of the

Princeton Calvinist school of divines:

“In consequence of this withdrawal we begin to exist in moral

darkness, _destitute of a disposition_ to delight in God.”

Arminius, the chief theologian of the Methodists, describes it thus:

“The will of man, with respect to the _true good_, is not only

wounded, bruised, inferior, crooked and attenuated, but is

likewise captivated, destroyed and lost; and has _no powers

whatever_, except such as are excited by grace.”

Thus the presence of God’s Spirit in Adam’s mind, according to Dr. Hodge,

insured a “disposition” to delight in God, which was lost by its

withdrawal. According to Arminius, this withdrawal so affected the whole

race, that “in respect to the _true good_” the will of man has _no powers

whatever_, except such as are excited by grace—that is, by a measured

return of God’s Spirit, withdrawn for Adam’s sin, which return was

purchased by Christ’s death.

It is clear, that it is the powers and faculties of mind that are meant

here, in this explanation of the depravity of man’s nature.

Thus it is shown that every attempt to explain what depravity consists in,

by theologians, results in their teaching a _constitutional malformation_,

which proves the author of the construction to be depraved.

We will now present the evidence, that theologians contradict themselves,

and deny that they use the word _nature_ in the sense of constitutional

organization or construction, and maintain that they use it in some other

sense.

In all creeds and all theological teachings, the authors expressly

disclaim that they maintain any thing which makes God “the author of sin.”

And they allow, that making God the creator of a depraved nature, would

make him the author of sin. Therefore, to escape the difficulty, they

claim that God is the author of one nature, which is perfect and in his

own image, and that there is _another_ nature which man himself made,

either _by_, or _in_, or _before_ Adam, which is depraved. Then when they

are driven to identify the nature that God made and the nature that man

made, they are again at fault. Man really has but one nature, and that is

the nature which is discovered by his qualities and actions, as learned by

experience. There is no other nature conceivable, and no other idea that

men ever attach to the word when applied to the mind or soul of man.

Therefore, theologians really do use it in the sense which they deny, for

there is no other.

Again, theologians deny that they teach “physical depravity” and “physical

regeneration,” and the only intelligible sense of this disclaimer is, that

they do not teach depravity of construction and the reformation of this

depravity of construction. But, as before shown, when they describe the

depravity and regeneration, they make out what actually is physical

depravity and physical regeneration, and nothing else.

Again, when they attempt to describe what they mean, one class of

theologians—_i.e._, new school Calvinists—teach that the whole depravity

consists in a want of “_right willing_.” And this is exactly what the

common‐sense system teaches—_i.e._, that the depravity of man is in the

wrong _action_ and not in the wrong _construction_ of mind. And yet when

they are charged with holding the Pelagian doctrine of perfect mental

construction, they deny it, and say they teach depravity of nature.

As an example of this, is presented the following extract from the

writings of Dr. Bennet Tyler, the president of a theological seminary

established to sustain the New England theology of the President Edwards’

type, in opposition to the supposed Pelagian innovations of the New Haven

theologians:

“God has endowed you with understanding to perceive the rule of

duty, with conscience to feel obligation, and with _will_ to

choose between good and evil. Possessing these powers, you are

complete moral agents, and have _all_ the ability to obey the

commands of God that you ever will have, or ever _can_ have—we do

not mean that all the powers and faculties of his (man’s) soul are

so impaired that he _could not_ do his duty if he would, but that

he _will_ not do his duty when he can.”

In reading the above, one would suppose that there was nothing wrong at

all in the construction of the human mind, and that the whole difficulty

consisted in _not willing_ aright—that is, that the depravity is not in a

wrong _nature_, but in the wrong _action_ of a perfect nature. And yet, at

the time of this writing, the author was the leader of an effort to oppose

this very doctrine, which was supposed to be taught by the New Haven

divines.

In a recent work by the chief theological teacher of the leading Baptist

Seminary,(17) we find similar contradictory statements. He thus writes:

“_Regeneration_ is not only characterized by the sacred writers as

a _creative act_, by which the subject of it becomes a new

creature in Christ Jesus, and a generation from above, by which

the soul is brought into new spiritual life; but also a washing, a

bathing, effected by the Holy Ghost, by which the polluted soul is

cleansed; as an illumination, by which it is filled with the

knowledge of God, and qualified to appreciate spiritual things.

The eye of conscience is cleared, the desires and affections are

renewed and flow into new channels, and the selfish views,

prejudices and motives, which formerly reigned in the soul, are

superseded by faith, love and hope, resting in Christ, and leading

to every good work. The _entire spirit_ is readjusted morally, its

aspirations, tendencies and relations to God are rectified, and it

enters, so to speak, upon a new life.”

In this passage, regeneration is called “a creative act” changing the

_conscience_, the _desires_, the _views_, the _prejudices_ and the

_motives_—so that “_the entire spirit_ is _readjusted_,” and all its

“aspirations, tendencies and relations to God are rectified.” It is not in

the power of language to express _a change_ in the _faculties_ and

_constitutional elements of mind_ more entirely than this; and yet the

very next paragraph reads thus:

“But all this pertains to the moral condition of the soul,

affording _no evidence that its essence has been changed; that any

faculty or constitutive element has been added, any fresh vigor or

new principle of existence infused_.”

But the most remarkable illustration of self‐contradiction among

theologians, involved in every attempt to maintain a depraved nature

consequent on Adam’s sin, is found in the teachings of Dr. Taylor, the

leader of the New Haven school of divines.

In his _Concio ad Clerum_, in 1828, one aim probably was, to meet the

charges against himself, of teaching the Pelagian tenet, that man’s

depravity consists, not in nature, but in action. In reference to this he

writes thus:

“Men are entirely depraved by _nature_. I do not thereby mean that

their nature is itself sinful, nor that their nature is the

physical or efficient cause of their sinning; but I mean that

their nature is the _occasion_ or _reason_ of their sinning—that

such is their nature, that in all the appropriate circumstances of

their being they will _sin_ and _only sin_.”

Again—

“It is important to say that sin is by nature, owing to

propensities to inferior good, with a difference between Adam’s

mind and ours—though we can not assert that, in which this

difference may consist;—that our propensities are the same in

_kind_, though different in _degree_ from those of Adam; that

perhaps this distinction may consist in mental differences, or in

superior tendencies, compared with Adam’s to natural good, and

less tendency to the highest good.”

In the above extract, it is as clear as language can make it, that Dr.

Taylor taught, in 1828, that in men sin _by nature_ is owing to

propensities to inferior good, which are “different from Adam’s,” who was

created perfect, and that this is “the occasion or reason” of their

sinning, and that “such is _their nature_, that in all appropriate

circumstances of their being, they _will sin, and only sin_.” This must

mean the _construction_ of mind. He does not claim to describe, certainly,

what this difference is between the nature of Adam and that of his

descendants; but he maintains that while Adam’s nature was not so created

by God at first, the nature of _all_ his descendants is so depraved, that,

as the result, they “sin, and only sin,” till regenerated.

But, in contradiction to this, is presented the extract below, sent by Dr.

Taylor to the author, in a letter in which he was attempting to show that

he did not teach the depravity of man in his _constitutional_ faculties.

And he claims that what he thus writes is what he has “_always_ taught:”

“I have _always taught_ that man, after the fall of Adam, was as

truly created in God’s image as was Adam; that Christ was tempted

in _all_ points like as we are; that the stronger are our inferior

propensities, if we govern them, as we can, by the morally right

act of the will, the greater is the moral excellence of the act. I

_do not_ maintain that man has full power to _change_ his depraved

nature without divine aid—for I have never supposed that he has a

depraved nature in ANY sense, or a corrupt nature, much less a

sinful nature, _to be_ changed; but rather, that _in nature_ he is

like God. In discussions I have always opposed the use of language

by your father and Mr. Barnes, of a _corrupt nature not sinful_.”

Now it is not possible to make these two extracts any thing other than

exact contradictions. For in one he teaches that men are so totally

depraved _in nature_, that “in all the appropriate circumstances of their

being they will _sin, and only sin_.”

In the other, he says of man, “I have never supposed that he has a

depraved nature, _in any sense_, or a corrupt nature, much less a sinful

nature, to be changed; but rather that _in nature_ he is like God.”

If it is asked, “How is it possible that a man, at once so honest and so

acute, can thus contradict himself and not perceive it?” it may be

replied, that he has done it no more than does every other theologian and

every creed that teaches at once, that the _nature_ of man is so depraved

at birth that every moral act is sin, and only sin, till regeneration—and

yet, that God, the Creator of all minds, is not the author of the sin

resulting from such a depraved nature.

And theologians are not peculiar in self‐contradictions. _Every error is a

contradiction to some principle of common sense._ Thus it is a fact, that,

as all men believe and maintain, by a necessity of nature, the principles

of common sense, every _false_ principle or error which they defend, is a

flat contradiction to some of their other declarations on other occasions.

Meantime, it is the great mission of all free and fair _discussion_ to

bring men to see their own inconsistencies, and to forsake all which are

shown to be _contrary to reason and common sense_.

An Appeal to the People in Behalf of Their Rights as Authorized Interpreters of the Bible · 第 32 / 53 章