Those susceptibilities of pleasure and pain which are affected by the
conduct of ourselves or others, in reference to rules of _right_ and
_wrong_, are called the _moral sense_, or the _moral susceptibilities_.
In order to a more clear view of this part of the subject, it is important
to inquire as to the manner in which the ideas of _right_ and _wrong_ seem
to originate.
The young child first notices that certain actions of its own are regarded
with smiles and tones of love and approval, while other acts occasion
frowns and tones of displeasure.
Next, it perceives that whatever gives pleasure to itself is called _good_
and _right_, while whatever causes unpleasant feelings is called _bad_ and
_wrong_. Moreover, it notices that there is a right and wrong way to hold
its spoon, to use its playthings, to put on its clothes, and to do
multitudes of other things. It thus perceives, more and more, that there
are _rules_ to regulate the use and action of all things, both animate and
inanimate, and that such rules always have reference to some plan or
design.
As its faculties develop and its observation enlarges, the general
impression is secured that _all_ plans and contrivances of men are
designed to promote enjoyment or to prevent discomfort, and are called
good and right just so far as this is done. At the same time, all that
tend to discomfort or pain are called bad and wrong.
In all the works of nature around, too, every thing that promotes
enjoyment is called good and right, and the opposite is called evil and
wrong.
At last there is a resulting feeling that the great design of all things
is to secure good and prevent evil, and that whatever is opposed to this
is wrong, and unfitted to the object for which all things exist. The
question whether this impression is owing solely to observation or partly
to mental constitution is waived, as of little practical consequence.
In the experience of infancy and childhood, the _law of sacrifice_ is
speedily developed. It is perceived that much of the good to be gained, if
sought to excess, occasions pain, so that there must be a certain amount
of self‐denial practiced, which, to the young novice, sometimes involves
disappointment and discomfort. It is also seen that frequently two or more
enjoyments are offered which are incompatible, so that one must be
relinquished to gain the other. It is perceived, also, that there is a
constant calculation going on as to which will be the _best_—that is,
which will secure _the most good with the least evil_. And the child is
constantly instructed that it must avoid excess, and must give up what is
of less value to secure the greater good. All this training involves
_sacrifices_ which are more or less painful, so that a young child will
sometimes cry as it voluntarily gives up one kind of pleasure as the only
mode of securing what is best.
It is perceived, also, that there is a constant _balancing_ of good and
evil, so that a given amount of enjoyment cancels or repays for a certain
amount of evil. When a great amount of enjoyment is purchased by a small
degree of labor or trouble, the _compound result_ is deemed a good, and
called right; on the contrary, when the evil involved exceeds a given
amount in comparison to the good, the compound result is called evil and
wrong.
Thus is generated the impression that there is a law of sacrifice
instituted requiring the greatest possible good with the least possible
evil, and that this is the great design of all things.
The impression is, not merely that we are to seek enjoyment and avoid
pain, but that we are to seek the _greatest possible_ good with the _least
possible_ evil, and that in doing this we are to obey the law of
sacrifice, by which the greatest good _is to be bought_ by a certain
amount of evil _voluntarily_ assumed.
Moreover, the child is thus gradually trained to understand that _good_
and _evil_ are to be regarded in two relations. Any thing and every thing
is called _good_ when it in any way gives enjoyment to any being.
But if the good can be secured only by sacrificing a greater good or by
inflicting a greater evil, then, in this relation, the good is called evil
and wrong. Thus, in one relation eating a delicious fruit is a good,
because it gives enjoyment. But if such is the state of a child’s stomach,
that sickness and suffering will follow the act, then it is evil and
wrong.
The early training of infancy introduces the first part of the great _law
of sacrifice_ in regard to _self_ alone. But as the intellect develops,
the existence of other minds is learned, and their happiness or suffering
become subjects of attention. Here the calculations of the _balance_ of
good and evil become more and more complicated. And the _two relations_
also become more definite and extensive. Whatever gives pleasure is always
called _good_ and _right_, until some evil is discovered as connected with
it, not alone or chiefly to self, but to others also. Then the compound
result is sought for, and if it is seen that, _on the whole_, what by
itself would be good and right if dissevered from its connected evil, does
involve _more_ evil than good, then it is called evil and wrong. But if
the balance shows so great an amount of good as pays for certain
incidental evils, then the result is called good and right.
The child also very early learns that the _character_ of those around is
estimated by their reference to this mode of regarding good and evil,
right and wrong. If a child simply seeks good to itself without any regard
to the amount of evil involved as a consequence, he is called a bad child.
On the contrary, those who make sacrifice of their wishes and plans to
avoid what would bring evil on others, are called good, generous, lovely
and virtuous. The youngest child soon perceives that its mother and other
friends are constantly making sacrifices for its own good, and bearing
inconveniences and trouble for the good of those around. And those who
perform such acts of benevolent self‐sacrifice are praised, and their
conduct is called good and right.
Thus arises a conviction or belief that the design or end for which every
thing exists is to make _the most_ happiness possible, and that those who
conform to this design are acting right, while those who do not are acting
wrong. Eventually there is established this conviction, also, that the
_voluntary sacrifice of self‐enjoyment_ to promote the _best_ good of all,
is the _highest_ kind of right action, and that those who practice this
_the most_ are the _best in character_.
The first feature of our moral sense, then, is, _that impression of the
great design of all things_ which enables us to judge of the right and
wrong in voluntary action. This also may be placed as one of the
principles of common sense. God has so formed our minds and their
circumstances, that the result is a universal _belief_ in every rational
mind that whatever secures the _most_ happiness with the least evil is
_right_, and whatever does not is _wrong_. The wanton and needless
destruction of happiness also men believe to be wrong. Their only
diversities of opinion are in regard to what will be _best_ and what will
not.
The second feature of our moral constitution is what is ordinarily called
the _sense of justice_. It is that susceptibility which is excited at the
view of the conduct of others as _voluntary_ causes of good or evil.
In all cases where free agents act to promote happiness, an emotion of
approval arises, together with a desire of reward to the author of the
good. On the contrary, when there is a voluntary destruction of happiness,
there is an emotion of disapproval, and a desire for retributive pain on
the author of the wrong.
These emotions are instinctive, and not at all regulated by reason in
their inception. When an evil is done, an instant desire is felt _to
discover the cause_; and when it is found, an instant desire is felt _to
inflict some penalty_. So irrational is this impulse, that children will
exhibit anger and deal blows on inanimate objects that cause pain. Even
mature minds are sometimes conscious of this impulse.
That this impulse is an implanted part of our constitution, and not the
result of instruction, is seen in the delight manifested by young children
in the narration of the nursery tale where the cruel uncle who murdered
the Babes in the Wood receives the retributions of Heaven.
It is the office of the intellect to judge whether the deed was a
voluntary one, whether the agent intended the mischief, and whether a
penalty will be of any use. The impulse to punish is never preceded by any
such calculations.
Another feature in this sense of justice is the _proportion_ demanded
between the evil done and the penalty inflicted. That this also is
instinctive, and not the result of instruction, is seen in the nursery,
where children will approve of slight penalties for slight offenses, and
severe ones for great ones, but will revolt from any very great
disproportion between the wrong act and its penalty. As a general rule,
both in the nursery and in mature minds, the greater the wrong done, the
stronger the desire for a penalty, and the more severe the punishment
demanded.
Another very important point of consideration is the universal feeling of
mankind that the _natural penalties_ for wrong‐doing are _not sufficient_,
and that it is an act of love as well as of justice to add to these
penalties. Thus the parent who forbids his child to eat green fruit will
not trust to the results of the natural penalty, but will restrain by the
fear of the immediate and more easily conceived penalty of chastisement.
So, in the great family of man, the natural penalties for theft are not
deemed sufficient, but severe penalties for the protection of property are
added.
This particular is the foundation of certain distinctions that are of
great importance, which will now be pointed out.
We find the terms “_reward_ and _punishment_” used in two different
relations. In the first and widest sense they signify not only the
penalties of human law, but those _natural consequences_ which, by the
constitution of nature, inevitably follow certain courses of conduct.
Thus an indolent man is said to receive poverty as a punishment, and it is
in this sense that his children are said to be punished for the faults of
their father.
The violations of natural law are punished without any reference to the
question whether the evil‐doer intended the wrong, or whether he sinned in
ignorance, or whether this ignorance was involuntary and unavoidable. The
question of the justice or injustice of such natural penalties involves
the great question of the right and wrong of the system of the universe.
Is it just and right for the Creator to make a system in which all free
agents shall be thus led to obedience to its laws by penalties as well as
rewards, by fear as well as by hope? This question will not be discussed
here.
Most discussions as to _just_ rewards and penalties ordinarily relate to
the _added_ penalties by which parents, teachers and magistrates enforce
obedience to natural or to statute law.
In these questions reference is always had to the _probable results_ of
such rewards and penalties in securing obedience. If experience has shown
that certain penalties do secure obedience to wise and good laws, either
of nature or of human enactment, then they are considered just. If they do
not, they are counted unwise and unjust.
So, if certain penalties are needlessly severe—that is to say, if a less
penalty will secure equal obedience, then this also decides so severe a
penalty to be unjust.
In deciding on the rectitude of the penalties of human enactments, it is
always assumed to be unjust to punish for any lack of knowledge and
obedience when the subject had _no power_ to know and to obey. If _a
choice to obey_ will not secure the act required of a free agent, then a
penalty inflicted for disobedience is always regarded as unjust. The only
seeming exception to this is the case where a person, by voluntary means,
has deprived himself of ability to obey. But in such cases the punishment
is felt to be right, not because he does not obey when he has no power,
but because he has voluntarily deprived himself of this power. And he is
punished for destroying his ability to obey, and not for violating the
law.
These things in human laws, then, are always demanded to make a penalty
appear _just_ to the moral sense of mankind, namely, that the subject have
power to obey, and that he has opportunity to know the law, and is not
ignorant by any voluntary and improper neglect.
In all questions of justice, therefore, it is important to discriminate
between those penalties that are inherent as a part of the great system of
the universe, and for which the Creator alone is responsible, and those
additional penalties which result from voluntary institutions of which men
are the authors.
The next feature in our moral constitution is the susceptibility which is
excited by the intellectual judgment of our own feelings and conduct as
either right or wrong.
In case we decide them to be right, we experience an emotion of self‐
approval which is very delightful; but if we decide that they are wrong,
we experience an immediate penalty in a painful emotion called _remorse_.
This emotion is always proportioned to the amount of evil done, and the
consciousness that it was done knowingly and intentionally. No suffering
is more keen than the highest emotions of this kind, while their pangs are
often enduring and unappeasable. Sometimes there is an attending desire to
inflict retribution on one’s self as a mode of alleviating this distress.
This susceptibility is usually denominated _conscience_. Sometimes this
word is used to include both the intellectual judgment of our conduct as
right or wrong, and the consequent emotions of approval or remorse;
sometimes it refers to the susceptibility alone. Either use is correct, as
in the connection in which it is employed the distinction can ordinarily
be easily made.
This analysis of our moral constitution furnishes means for a clear
definition of such terms as _obligated_, _ought_, _ought not_, and the
like.
A person is obligated or ought to do a thing when he has the intellect to
perceive what is _best_, and thus _right_, and the moral susceptibilities
just described. When he is destitute either of the intellect or of these
susceptibilities, he ceases to be a moral and accountable being. He can no
longer be made to feel any moral obligations.