In the preceding chapter we have applied the principles of common sense to
gain evidence of the existence of a Creator, or Great First Cause, whose
natural attributes we can discover only by _the nature_ of our own minds.
This being so, our next step in seeking after God is to examine the
construction or nature of our own minds.
The only way to discover the nature of a thing is to examine what are its
qualities, how it acts, and how it is acted upon. This also is the same as
studying the _philosophy_ of things. For when learned men set forth any
branch of philosophy, they only teach the qualities of certain things, how
they act, and how they are acted upon.
Whoever, therefore, gives attention to the nature of mind so as to
discover its qualities, how it acts, and how it is acted upon, is studying
the philosophy of mind, or mental philosophy.
The _nature of mind_, _the philosophy of mind_, and _mental philosophy_
are terms all expressing the same thing.
Now, the only possible way in which any person can discover the nature of
another mind is by a knowledge of his own. We first learn by experience
the qualities of our own mind, how it acts and how it is acted upon, and
then, by a process of reasoning, we learn that there are other minds
around us, and that they have similar qualities.
The study of mental philosophy, then, is directing attention to the nature
of our own mind, and thus discovering the nature of other minds.
It differs from all other studies in this respect, that all men have the
materials of the knowledge sought in their own minds, and are required
simply to direct attention to their own mental states and acts.
This being so, the common people are as fully qualified to settle all
questions in regard to the nature or philosophy of their own minds as the
most learned and profound metaphysicians or theologians can be. All that
is requisite to success is, that they direct their attention to the
subject by suitable methods.
It will be found, on examination, that the common people have secured a
written system of mental philosophy as real as has ever yet been furnished
by any metaphysician or theologian, while it is free from the great
defects which render many works on mental science unpractical and
repulsive.
This—_the people’s system of mental philosophy_—it will be the object of
what follows to set forth.
In attempting it, we shall find that mankind, in the uses of every‐day
life, have arranged the various acts and states of mind into classes and
subdivisions, and have given names to these classes, and to the specific
acts or states included in these classes. These classifications and terms
are recorded by lexicographers in their dictionaries.
All words have that meaning which is attached to them by the people who
use them. The business of the lexicographer is, not to settle what meaning
ought to belong to words, but rather to state the meaning which men
actually attach to them in writing and speaking.
In setting forth the people’s system of natural philosophy as contained in
lexicographies, we find that almost every word is used to express several
meanings, similar in some respects and diverse in others. In consequence
of this, we only can attempt thus much for mental science, as for many
other subjects, viz., to describe the thing intended, and then to select
the word most frequently used to express this idea, as set forth in our
dictionaries.
This, then, is the course pursued in the following pages. A description is
set forth of a given act or state of mind, sufficient to identify it from
all others, and then the word is selected from dictionaries of our
language which has most frequently been used by the common people in
expressing the idea intended. Thus every person who cares enough about the
matter to read and think, can decide as well as the most celebrated
metaphysician, whether the description given is _true to his own
experience_, and also whether, according to lexicographers, the word
selected is frequently used by man to express this idea.
The writer, in her first attempts to investigate the philosophy of mind,
examined the works of Stewart, Reid, Locke, Edwards, Brown, Coleridge,
Cousin, Jouffroy, Coombe, Spurtzheim and several others. More recently
some attention has been given to the writings of Sir William Hamilton,
Hickok and others. The result has been the conviction, that most of these
works contain the people’s system, more or less disguised with diverse
modes of classification and new technics, which tend to render the whole
subject misty and perplexing. And still more unfortunately, some of them
attempt the discussion of questions which are unpractical and often
unintelligible.
As an example, certain metaphysicians have attempted to prove that there
is nothing existing but mind, and that all which we believe to be
realities without ourselves are not so, but merely ideas in the mind.
Other metaphysicians have attempted to meet their arguments, and to prove
that the world around us is a reality.
Both attempts have ended in books which seem to have no sort of
_practical_ influence either way. Men can not help believing that there is
an outer world, and that the men and things that affect our senses are
realities, and such arguments neither lessen nor increase this belief.
Meantime, the books written to prove or disprove this truth are
incomprehensible to most common minds, at least the writer of this work
has in vain essayed to understand them, or to find any person who could
communicate any clear ideas of their contents.