As to the subject-matter of Mr. Stead's letter, the point which he
wishes to prove appears to be this--that Mr. Bramwell Booth did not
make a false statement, but that he withheld from the officers of
justice, pursuing a most serious criminal inquiry, a fact of grave
importance, which lay within his own knowledge. And this because he
had promised Mr. Stead to keep the fact secret. In short, Mr. Bramwell
Booth did not say what was wrong; but he did what was wrong.
I will take care to give every weight to the correction. Most people,
I think, will consider that one of the "main pillars of my argument,"
as Mr. Stead is pleased to call them, has become very much
strengthened.
[312]
LEGAL OPINIONS RESPECTING
"GENERAL" BOOTH'S ACTS.
In referring to the course of action adopted by "General" Booth and
Mr. Bramwell Booth in respect of their legal obligations to other
persons, or to the criminal and civil law, I have been as careful as I
was bound to be, to put any difficulties suggested by mere lay
commonsense in an interrogative or merely doubtful form; and to
confine myself, for any positive expressions, to citations from
published declarations of the judges before whom the acts of "General"
Booth came; from reports of the Law Courts; and from the deliberate
opinions of legal experts. I have now some further remarks to make on
these topics.
I. The observations at p. 305 express, with due reserve, the
impression which the counsel's opinions, quoted by "General" Booth's
solicitors, made on my mind. They were written and sent to the printer
before I saw the letter from a "Barrister NOT Practising on the Common
Law Side," and those from Messrs. Clarke and Calkin and Mr. George
Kebbell, which appeared in the "Times" of February 3rd and 4th.
These letters fully bear out the conclusion which I had formed, but
which it would have [313] been presumptuous on my part to express,
that the opinions cited by "General" Booth's solicitors were like the
famous broken tea-cups "wisely ranged for show"; and that, as Messrs.
Clarke and Calkin say, they "do not at all meet the main points on
which Mr. Hatton advised." I do not think that any one who reads
attentively the able letter of "A Barrister NOT Practicing on the
Common Law Side" will arrive at any other conclusion; or who will not
share the very natural desire of Mr. Kebbell to be provided with clear
and intelligible answers to the following inquiries:--
(1) Does the trust deed by its operation empower any one legally to
call upon Mr. Booth to account for the application of the funds?
(2) In the event of the funds not being properly accounted for, is
any one, and, if so, who, in a position to institute civil or criminal
proceedings against any one, and whom, in respect of such refusal or
neglect to account?
(3) In the event of the proceedings, civil or criminal, failing to
obtain restitution of misapplied funds, is or are any other person or
persons liable to make good the loss?
On December 24th, 1890, a letter of mine appeared in the "Times" (No.
V. above) in which I put questions of the same import, and asked Mr.
Booth if he would not be so good as to take counsel's opinion on the
"trusts" of which so [314] much has been heard and so little seen, not
as they stood in 1878, or in 1888, but as they stand now? Six weeks
have elapsed, and I wait for a reply.
It is true that Dr. Greenwood has been authorized by Mr. Booth to
publish what he calls a "Rough outline of the intended Trust Deed"
("General Booth and His Critics," p. 120), but unfortunately we are
especially told that it "does not profess to be an absolutely accurate
analysis." Under these circumstances I am afraid that neither lawyers
nor laymen of moderate intelligence will pay much attention to the
assertion, that "it gives a fair idea of the general effect of the
draft," even although "the words in quotation marks are taken from it
verbatim."
These words, which I give in italics, (1) define the purposes of the
scheme to be "for the social and moral regeneration and improvement of
persons needy, destitute, degraded, or criminal, in some manner
indicated, implied, or suggested in the book called 'In Darkest
England.'" Whence I apprehend that, if the whole funds collected are
applied to "mothering society" by the help of speculative attorney
"tribunes of the people," the purposes of the trust will be
unassailably fulfilled. (2) The name is to be "Darkest England
Scheme," (3) the General of the Salvation Army is to be "Director of
the Scheme." Truly valuable information all this! But taking it for
what it is worth, the [315] public must not be misled into supposing
that it has the least bearing upon the questions to which neither I,
nor anybody else, has yet been able to obtain an intelligible answer,
and that is, where are the vast funds which have been obtained, in one
way or another, during the last dozen years in the name of the
Salvation Army? Where is the presumably amended Trust Deed of 1888? I
ask once more: Will Mr. Booth submit to competent and impartial legal
scrutiny the arrangements by which he and his successors are prevented
from dealing with the funds of the so-called "army chest" exactly as
he or they may please?
II. With respect to the "Eagle" case, I am advised that Dr. Greenwood,
whose good faith I do not question, has been misled into
misrepresenting it in the appendix to his pamphlet. And certainly, the
evidence of authoritative records which I have had the opportunity of
perusing, appears to my non-legal mind to be utterly at variance with
the statement to which Dr. Greenwood stands committed. I may observe,
further, that the excuse alleged on behalf of Mr. Booth, that he
signed the affidavit set before him by his solicitors without duly
considering its contents, is one which I should not like to have put
forward were the case my own. It may be, and often is, necessary for a
person to sign an affidavit without [316] being able fully to
appreciate the technical language in which it is couched. But his
solicitor will always instruct him as to the effect of these terms.
And, in this particular case where the whole matter turns on Mr.
Booth's personal intentions, it was his plainest duty to inquire, very
seriously, whether the legal phraseology employed would convey neither
more nor less than such intentions to those who would act on the
affidavit, before he put his name to it.
III. With respect to Mr. Bramwell Booth's case, I refer the reader to
p. 311.
IV. As to Mr. Booth-Clibborn's misrepresentations, see above, pp. 298,
299.
This much for the legal questions which have been raised by various
persons since the first edition of the pamphlet was published.