CARTHAGINIANS AND ROMANS COMPARED.
The origin of both these people seems alike to have been extremely low.
Romulus, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, could form no more
than three thousand foot and three hundred horse out of his whole
people, where every individual was obliged to be a soldier. The Tyrians,
who accompanied Dido in her flight from her brother Pymalion, could be
but few in number from the very circumstances of their escape from an
avaricious and vigilant tyrant.
Romulus, to supply this defect, not only opened an asylum for all
fugitives, whom he admitted as subjects, but in all his conquests over
the neighbouring states, annexed the lands to his own small territory,
and incorporated the prisoners amongst his own Roman citizens. By this
masterly policy, notwithstanding the number of men he must necessarily
have lost during a warlike reign of thirty-seven years, he left at his
death, according to Dionysius, forty-five thousand foot and a thousand
horse. As the same policy was pursued under the republican as under the
regal government, the Romans, though involved in continual wars, found
themselves not inferior in number even to those nations, who were
reputed the most populous. Dionysius, from whom I have taken this
account, extols the policy of the Romans in this point as greatly
superior to that of the Grecians. The Spartans, says that judicious
historian, were obliged to give up their dominion over Greece by their
single defeat at Leuctra; as the loss of the battle of Chæronea reduced
the Thebans and Athenians to the sad necessity of yielding up the
government of Greece, as well as their liberty, to the Macedonians.
These misfortunes Dionysius imputes to the mistaken policy of the
Grecians, who were, in general, unwilling to communicate the privileges
of their respective states to foreigners. Whereas the Romans, who
admitted even their enemies to the rights of citizenship, derived
additional strength even from their misfortunes. And he affirms, that
after the terrible defeat of Cannæ, where out of eighty-six thousand
little more than three thousand three hundred and seventy men escaped,
the Romans owed the preservation of their state, not to the benevolence
of fortune, as some, he says, imagine, but to the number of their
disciplined militia, which enabled them to encounter every danger. I am
sensible that the remarks of Dionysius, which have been adopted by many
of our modern writers, are extremely just in relation to the Thebans and
Athenians. Because as the former of these people endeavoured to extend
their dominions by arms, the latter both by arms and commerce, both
states ought, like the Romans, to have attracted as many foreigners as
possibly they could, to enable them to execute plans which require an
inexhaustible supply of people. But the exclusion of foreigners ought
not, in my opinion, to be censured as a defect in the Spartan
constitution. Because it is evident, from the testimony of Polybius and
Plutarch, that the great end which Lycurgus proposed by his laws, was
not to increase the wealth or power of his countrymen, but to preserve
the purity of their manners; as his military regulations, according to
the same authors, were not calculated for making conquests and serving
the purposes of ambition, but for the defence and security of his
republick. I observe too in proof of my opinion, that the Spartans
gradually lost their virtue, and afterwards their liberty, only so far
as they deviated from the institutions of their legislator.... But I
return from the digression into which this subject unavoidably led me.
In our researches back into the remote times of antiquity, we must lay
hold of whatever helps we are able to meet with. If Justin therefore is
to be credited, Dido not only received considerable assistance from a
colony of Tyrians which she found settled in Utica, but admitted great
numbers of the natives who settled with her in the new city, and
consequently became Carthaginians.[330] I may add too in proof of this
account, that unless the Carthaginians had long pursued this wise
policy, it is scarce possible by the course of nature, that the Tyrians
alone could have multiplied by propagation to so prodigious a degree,
as to be able to furnish men sufficient to raise and carry on that
extensive commerce, and plant those numerous colonies which we meet with
in the earlier ages of their history.
As to their constitution, Rome and Carthage were both republicks, both
free, and their form of government nearly similar, as far as we can
collect from history. Two supreme magistrates,[331] annually elected,
the senate, and the people, formed the body politick in each republick.
The annual elections of their chief magistrates were a permanent source
of division and faction alike in both; a defect which Lycurgus guarded
against in the Spartan government, where the chief magistracy was
perpetual and hereditary. The senate in both nations was composed out of
the most respectable and greatest men in each republick. At Rome the
consuls chose the senators with the approbation of the people, but at
last the censors arrogated that power to themselves. At Carthage, as
Aristotle informs us, the senators were elected; but as he has no where
told us who were the electors, it is most probable, that the right of
election was the inherent privilege of the people, since he censures
that republick as too much leaning towards democracy. At Rome, in the
virtuous times of that republick, birth and merit alone entitled the
possessor to a place in the senate, as well as the chief offices in the
state. At Carthage, though birth and merit seem to have been
qualifications indispensably necessary, yet even these could not
succeed,[332] unless the candidate was at the same time master of such a
fortune as would enable him to support his dignity with lustre.[333]
This Aristotle censures as a defect. For he looks upon all that merit,
which was unsupported by the proper proportion of wealth, as so much
lost to the Carthaginians; and he lays down that maxim in their
government, as the real cause of that undue respect for wealth, and that
lust of gain, which prevailed so much in that republick. But the
sentiments of this philosopher, like those of his master Plato, are, I
fear, too ideal to be reduced to practice. For he does not seem to
attend to the different genius of different nations, but aims at
adjusting the balance of power in his republick by the nice standard of
philosophick theory. The genius of nations differs perhaps as much as
their climate and situation, which seem (at least in some degree) to be
the natural cause of that difference. The republicks of Sparta and Rome
were both military, and military glory stamped the primary character of
both these people. The republick of Carthage, like that of their
ancestors, the Tyrians, was commercial. Hence the lust of gain marked
their ruling character. Their military character arose from the
necessity of defending that wealth which their commerce had acquired.
Hence military glory was but a secondary passion, and generally
subservient to their lust of gain. Unless we attend to the different
ruling passion, which forms the different character of each republick,
we shall never be able to make such a comparison as will do equal
justice to each people. At Sparta and Rome wealth was despised, when put
in competition with honour, and poverty joined with merit formed the
most estimable of all characters. Quite different maxims prevailed at
Carthage. Wealth with them was the chief support of merit, and nothing
was so contemptible as poverty. Hence the Carthaginians, who were well
acquainted with the power and influence of wealth, required the
additional qualifications of an ample fortune in all candidates for the
senatorial dignity, and publick employments. For they judged that such
men would be less exposed to the temptations of corruption, and at the
same time more anxious for the welfare of a state, in which they were so
deeply interested by their private property. That this was the real
state of the case, at Carthage, notwithstanding the suggestions of
Aristotle and the Greek and Roman historians, may, I think, be fairly
proved from the behaviour of their senate and the choice of their
officers, which ought certainly to be admitted as the best evidence. For
we constantly find all their publick employments filled up with men of
the greatest families, and (unless when the intrigues of faction
sometimes prevailed) of the greatest abilities. We find in general the
same firm and steady attachment to the service of their country, and the
same indefatigable zeal for extending the territories and power of their
republick. Nor does the most partial historian charge any one of them
with sacrificing the honour and interest of his country to any foreign
power for money: a practice which was shamefully common amongst the
Roman generals in the time of Jugurtha. Hence we may, I think, assign
the true reason, why the greatest families in Carthage (as we are
informed by historians) thought it no way derogatory to their honour to
engage in commerce. For as this is most probably to be understood of the
younger sons of their nobility, the true motive seems to arise, not from
avarice, as their enemies object, but from a view of raising such a
fortune, as might qualify them for admission into the senate, or any of
the great employments. Hence too it is evident, that a regulation which
might be highly useful and salutary in an opulent commercial republick,
would be greatly injurious to such military republicks as Rome and
Sparta, by corrupting their manners. We need no other proof than the
fate of those two republicks, who both owed their ruin to the
introduction of that wealth, which was unknown to their virtuous
ancestors. The Carthaginian senate seems to have been much more numerous
than the Roman. For at Carthage there was a select standing committee
established, of one hundred and four of the most respectable members, to
keep a watchful eye over the great families, and repress any attempts
which their ambition might make to subvert the constitution.[334] To
this committee all their commanding officers by sea and land, without
exception, were obliged to give a strict account of their conduct at the
end of every campaign. We may therefore properly term it the
Carthaginian court-martial. Out of this venerable body another select
committee was formed of five members only, who were most conspicuous for
their probity, ability, and experience. These served without fee or
salary; as glory, and the love of their country, were esteemed motives
sufficient to engage men of their superior rank and character, to serve
the publick with zeal and fidelity.[335] For which reason they were
not chosen by lot, but elected by merit. Their power was very extensive.
Their office was for life, and they filled up any vacancy in their own
body, out of the one hundred and four, and all vacancies in that grand
committee, out of the rest of the senate, by their own authority and at
their own discretion.[336] They were the supreme judges besides in all
causes whatsoever without appeal. The institution of this grand
committee, in my opinion, exceeded every thing in the Roman policy. For
it preserved their state from all those violent concussions, which so
frequently shook, and at last totally subverted the Roman
republick.[337] But the power of the committee of five was exorbitant,
and dangerous to the lives and fortunes of their fellow-citizens. The
proof is from fact. For at the conclusion of the second Punick war, they
had made so arbitrary an use of their power, and were grown so odious to
the people, that the great Hannibal regulated that amongst other abuses,
and procured a law, which made that office annual and elective, with a
clause forbidding any future alteration. Whether the Carthaginian
senators enjoyed their seats for life, or whether they were liable to be
expelled for any misdemeanour, and by whom, are points in which history
is quite silent. At Rome, as the censors had the power of promoting to
that dignity, so they had equally the power of expelling any member for
bad manners, by the single ceremony of leaving out his name when they
called over the list of the senate. I cannot help thinking this a great
defect in the Roman polity: since it threw the power of garbling and
modelling the senate into the hands of two men, who were liable to be
corrupted to serve the ends of faction. A power which ought never to be
lodged in so few hands in a country which enjoys the blessings of
liberty. For how serviceable soever it might have been, as a curb to
licentiousness in the earlier ages of that republick; yet Cicero, in his
oration for A. Cluentius, inveighs bitterly against the abuse of the
censorial power in his time, and gives several instances where it was
made subservient to the ends of faction in modelling the senate. And he
seems to fear that the censors list may bring as many calamities upon
the citizens as the late most inhuman proscription; and that the point
of the censors pen may prove as terrible as the sword of their late
dictator. C. Nepos, in the life of Hamilcar, takes notice of an officer
of the same nature amongst the Carthaginians, to whose inspection the
greatest men in that republick seem to have been subject. But it does
not appear from history, whether his power extended so far as to expel a
senator. Should a bad prince, or a wicked minister, ever be invested
with the power of weeding the house, and modelling the parliament at
pleasure, there would be an end of our constitution and liberty.
In the Roman senate all questions were decided (as in our parliament) by
a majority of voices. At Carthage no law could pass, unless the senate
were unanimous, like the Polish diet. One single veto from any one
member, took the question out of the hands of the senate, and gave up
the ultimate decision to the people, who were the _dernier resort_ of
all power. This Aristotle censures as inclining more towards democracy
than was consistent with the just rules of a well regulated
republick.[338] Because the magistrates were not only obliged to open
all the different opinions and debates of the senators upon the
question, in the hearing of the people, who were the absolute and
decisive judges in all these cases of appeal; but any one, even the
lowest fellow in the mob, might freely give his opinion in opposition
just as he thought proper. A source of endless discord, anarchy, and
confusion! A kind of polity, as Aristotle observes, unknown in any other
form of republican government.
In this point, I think the Roman polity far preferable to the
Carthaginian, except in those abuses of the tribunitial power, which so
frequently happened towards the decline of that republick. But when any
one turbulent, seditious tribune, instigated by ambition, or corrupted
by a faction (which in those times was generally the case) could by his
single veto, stop all proceedings of the senate, and haul the case
before the people; nay when he could drag the supreme magistrates, the
consuls themselves, to prison, by his sole authority, and could commit
the most outrageous, and most shameful acts of licentiousness with
impunity, because their office rendered their persons sacred by law, I
esteem the Carthaginian polity infinitely more eligible. For that fear
and jealousy of ceding any part of the authority, which is so natural to
men in power, would always be a strong motive to union in a Carthaginian
senate; because it would naturally induce any member, rather to give up
his private opinion, than suffer an essential part of their power to
devolve to the people. But the Roman tribunitial power, which was in
constant opposition to the senatorial, drew at last by much too great a
weight into the democratick scale, and in the last period of their
liberty was a principal leading cause of the ruin of that republick. For
as the senate was unsupported by a third power so essentially requisite
to preserve the balance of government in its due æquipoise, the tribunes
perpetually fomented and kept up those terrible feuds, which brought on
anarchy, and terminated in absolute insupportable tyranny.
The condition of the Roman populace before the erection of the
tribunitial power, seems, in my judgement, to have been little better
than that state of vassalage, which the peasants groan under in Poland.
The relation between patron and client amongst the Romans, seems to be
something analogous to the relation between lord and vassal, with this
difference, that the client had the free choice of his patron, which the
vassal has not with respect to the lord. At least it is certain, if we
may credit the Roman historians, that their people were subject to
equal, if not greater exactions and oppressions from the Patricians. How
heavy these were, we may learn from the numerous mutinies,
insurrections, and that great secession, which compelled the Patricians
to create the tribunitial office in their favour. This new office
occasioned a great revolution in their new government, and produced
those perpetual conflicts between the aristocratick and democratick
powers, which fill the history of that republick. The Patricians had
recourse frequently to their only resource a dictator with absolute
power, to defend them from the insolence of the tribunes. But this was
only a temporary expedient. The people renewed their attacks, until they
had abolished the distinct prerogatives arising from birth and family,
and laid open all honours, even the consulship, and dictatorship, the
supreme magistracy of all, to the free admission of their own body. The
people were highly elated with these repeated victories, as they
imagined them, over their old enemies the Patricians, but they were
quickly sensible, that in fact, they were only the dupes of their
ambitious leaders. The most opulent and powerful of the Plebeians, by
serving the high offices of the state, acquired the title of nobles, in
contradistinction to those, who were descended from the Patrician
families, who still retained their ancient appellation. These new
nobles, many of whom had crept into the senate, sided constantly with
the Patricians in all disputes and contests with their former friends,
the people, and were generally their greatest enemies. The Patricians,
strengthened by this new acquisition of power, were frequently too hard
for the tribunes. In those memorable contests with the two Gracchi, who
endeavoured in their tribuneship to revive the Agrarian law (calculated
to divide the conquered lands among the poor citizens) the dispute seems
to have lain wholly between the rich and the poor: for the nobles and
rich Plebeians were as unwilling to part with their land, as the
Patricians. This strengthened the Patricians so much, that they were
able in each of those contests, to quell the efforts of the people by
force, and quash the whole affair by the death of both the Gracchi.
It has been a general remark of most writers, both ancient and modern,
that the Roman republick owed its preservation to the firmness and
wisdom of the senate, and the subordinate obedience of the people: and
that the republick of Carthage must ascribe its ruin to that ascendency,
which the people had usurped over the authority of the senate. The
reverse of this seems to be the truth. We meet with but one instance in
history, where the power of the Carthaginian people over-ruled the
authority of their senate, so far as to compel them to act contrary to
their opinion. This was that shameful violation of the law of nations in
seizing the transports which were bringing necessaries to Scipio’s camp,
during the truce he had granted that they might send ambassadours to
Rome to negotiate a peace with the Roman senate. For though they
threatened violence to the senate, if they submitted to those hard terms
which were imposed by Scipio after the defeat at Zama; yet they were
easily reduced to obedience by Hannibal, and resigned the whole affair
to the decision of the senate. The Roman history, on the contrary, is
one continued detail of animosities, and frequently most bloody
contests, between the senate and the people in their perpetual struggles
for power. And the frequent elections of that low Plebeian Marius to the
consular dignity, in opposition to the Patricians, (the malignant
effects of the over-bearing power of the people) opened that scene of
blood and anarchy, which ended only in the utter subversion of their
liberty and constitution.
The judicious Montesquieu observes, “that the Carthaginians grew rich
much sooner than the Romans, and consequently sunk much sooner into
corruption.” He adds too; “that whilst merit alone entitled the
possessor to the great employments at Rome, every thing which the
publick at Carthage had the power of bestowing, was venal.”... The
former part of this assertion is too general to be admitted without
proper restrictions; the latter is a plain transcript from Polybius. The
Carthaginians must have been rich several ages before the Romans. For
both Herodotus and Thucydides (who was but thirteen years younger) take
notice of them as a very formidable maritime power, a circumstance which
could only arise from their naval genius and extensive commerce. Yet we
find no instance of their being corrupt, until the conclusion of the
second Punick war, when Hannibal reformed those shameful abuses, which
had crept into the management of the publick revenue, and restrained
that power which the committee of five had usurped over the lives and
fortunes of their fellow-citizens. As for the quotation out of Polybius,
whose country was at that time a province to the Romans, with whom he
resided only as a state prisoner; I esteem it as no more than a
compliment to the Romans’ vanity at the expense of the Carthaginians,
whose very name was odious to that people. Or very probably he might
bring that charge against the Carthaginians, as a hint to show the
consequences of the same species of corruption, which, even in his time,
had found entrance amongst the Romans.
As to religion, both nations were equally superstitious. If many of the
religious ceremonies amongst the Romans were absurd and childish, it
must be owned that the Carthaginian worship, like that of their
ancestors the Canaanites, from whom they received it, was truly
diabolical.[339] But it is by no means candid to judge of the natural
bent and temper of a people, from effects produced in their minds by
superstition. For the same superstition which enjoins such horrid rites,
will naturally place the chief efficacy of the sacrifice in the zeal and
sincerity of the offerer. Consequently the highest degree of merit in
such oblations, will consist in stifling every human affection, and
over-ruling nature. Thus in the Carthaginian idolatry, the softer sex,
as more susceptible of tenderness for their offspring, were required to
attend in person. They were even compelled,[340] upon this dreadful
occasion, to affect all the joy and cheerfulness of festivity, because,
as Plutarch informs us, if a sigh or a tear escaped them, the merit of
the offering would be absolutely lost, and themselves liable to a fine.
That the Carthaginians were no more void of parental affection than
other nations, is evident from that pious fraud they had so long
practised,[341] of secretly buying up poor children, whom they
substituted as victims to their bloody deity instead of their own. But
after a great defeat which they received from Agathocles, they
attributed their ill fortune to the resentment of their god for their
repeated sacrilege. They sacrificed two hundred children of the first
families in Carthage,[342] and three hundred other persons offered
themselves as voluntary victims to atone for a crime, to which the
highest degree of guilt was affixed by their impious religion. The Roman
superstition must in general be acquitted of the charge of inhumanity.
The only tendency towards it, was in the custom of inhuming alive such
of the vestal virgins, as had violated their vow of chastity.[343] But
the bloody and frequent shows of the gladiators, which were the delight
of the Romans, fix an indelible blot on the character of a brave
people.[344] Historians in general brand the Carthaginians with cruelty
and inhumanity. If the charge is just, it must be chiefly attributed to
that execrable custom of human sacrifices, which always prevailed
amongst that people. Nor do I in the least doubt, but that savage
ferocity, which the Romans were so guilty of in war, was in a great
measure owing to those barbarous spectacles, where wounds, and murder in
cold blood, made the most agreeable part of the entertainment.
As to publick virtue or love of their country, the Carthaginians were no
way inferior to the Romans. The intrepid behaviour of the Philæni,[345]
two Carthaginian brothers, who consented to be buried alive to enlarge
the boundaries of their country, equals the most heroick instance of
that kind of enthusiasm, which the Roman story can boast of. The fate of
Macheus, Bomilcar, Hanno, and others, afford undeniable proof, that
neither birth, dignity, nor the greatest services, could screen that man
from the most ignominious death, who made the least attempt to subvert
the liberty of his country. I have before taken notice of the _punica
fides_, or that proverbial want of sincerity, which has been so often
objected by the Roman historians: but I cannot help observing with the
more impartial Montesquieu,[346] “that the Romans never made peace with
sincerity and good faith, but always took care to insert such conditions
as, in the end, proved the ruin of the people with whom they treated:
that the peace they granted was no more than a politick suspension of
arms, until an opportunity offered of completing their conquests: that
it was their invariable maxim to foment divisions among the neighbouring
powers, and by siding alternately with either party, as they found it
most conducive to their own interest, play one against the other, until
they had reduced all equally into provinces: that they frequently
employed the subtilty and ambiguity of terms in their own language, to
finesse and chicane in their treaties.” Thus they cheated the Ætolians
by the ambiguous phrase of yielding themselves up to the faith of the
Roman people.[347] The poor Ætolians imagined, that the term implied
only alliance. But the Romans soon convinced them, that what they meant
by it, was absolute subjection. They destroyed Carthage under sanction
of the most vile equivocation,[348] pretending, “that though they
promised that deluded people to preserve their state, they did not mean
to grant them their city, which word they had purposely omitted.” Maxims
which the French have steadily and too successfully pursued, and are
still pursuing!... Montesquieu very judiciously observes “... that the
Romans were ambitious from the lust of domination: the Carthaginians
from the lust of gain.” This accounts for the different reception which
commerce met with in the two nations. At Carthage commerce was esteemed
the most honourable of all employments. At Rome commerce was held in
contempt. It was there looked upon as the proper occupation of slaves
only, and disgraceful to a free citizen. Thus the one loved war for the
sake of glory and acquiring dominion; the other looked upon war as a
means of acquiring wealth, and extending commerce. The Romans plundered
the vanquished enemy to make a parade with their wealth in the triumphal
procession. The Carthaginians fleeced not only their enemies, but their
tributary provinces, and oppressed their allies, to feed their own
private avarice, as well as that of the publick. The oppressions of the
Carthaginian generals in Spain lost them all their allies. The wiser
policy of Scipio attached those allies unalterably to the Romans. The
exactions of their rapacious governors in the African provinces, were
the sources of perpetual revolts, upon the approach of any invader, from
a desire of changing masters. When Scipio landed, he was joined by all
those provinces, who looked upon the Romans as their deliverers. As soon
as luxury had introduced avarice and corruption amongst the Romans,
their generals and governours pursued the same destructive maxims, which
was one leading cause of the final ruin of both the western and eastern
empires.
There cannot be a stronger proof of a weak or a corrupt administration,
than when indigent and necessitous men are appointed to the government
of distant provinces, from no other motive than party merit, and with no
other view than to raise a fortune at the expense of the people. Whether
the wretched and defenceless condition in which the French found our
colonies at the beginning of this war, ought not to be ascribed chiefly
to this cause, is a question I shall wave at present. Because the evils
we have already suffered from former misconduct, will, I hope, be now
removed, by a total alteration of measures under an able and honest
administration.
It is remarkable, that not one of the historians who reproach the
Carthaginians with corruption, were ever able to accuse them of luxury
and effeminacy. The Carthaginians, to their immortal honour, stand
single upon the records of history, “the only people in the universe,
upon whom immense wealth was never able to work its usual effects.” The
Romans, corrupted by wealth, quickly lost all pretensions both to
publick and private virtue, and from a race of heroes, degenerated into
a nation of the most abject slaves. The Carthaginian virtue was so far
from degenerating that it shone brighter in the last period of their
history, than in any of the former. Even the behaviour of their women in
that long and brave defence of their city against the whole Roman power,
equalled, or rather exceeded, that of the Roman matrons in those times,
when they were most celebrated for publick virtue. When the Romans were
masters of the city, one small part only excepted, and that part
actually in flames, the generous wife of Asdrubal the chief
commander,[349] closed the scene by as desperate an act of heroick
bravery, as can be met with in history. After she had upbraided her
husband as a coward and a traitor for submitting to Scipio, she declared
her determined resolution of dying free, and not surviving the fate of
her country. She first stabbed both her children, and threw them into
the flames; then leaped in after their bodies, and buried herself in the
ruins of Carthage.
The sententious Montesquieu remarks,[350] “that when Carthage made war
with her opulence against the Roman poverty, her great disadvantage
arose from what she esteemed her greatest strength, and on which she
placed her chief dependence. The reason, as he judiciously observes, is
evident. Gold and silver may be easily exhausted, but publick virtue,
constancy, and firmness of mind, fortitude and poverty, are
inexhaustible.” The Carthaginians in their wars employed foreign
mercenaries. The Roman armies were composed of their own natives. A
defeat or two at sea obstructed the Carthaginian commerce, and stopped
the spring which supplied their publick exchequer. The loss of a battle
in Africa, where their country was quite open, and destitute of
fortresses, and the natives as much strangers to the use of arms as our
own country people, reduced them to submit to whatever terms the victors
thought proper to impose. Regulus, in the first Punick war, cooped up
the Carthaginians in their capital, after he had given them one defeat
by sea, and one by land. The Romans, after receiving four successive
defeats from Hannibal, the last of which was the fatal battle of Cannæ,
where they lost most of their best officers, and all their veteran
troops, would hearken to no terms of accommodation, and even sent
re-enforcements to Spain and other places, though Hannibal was at their
gates. The reason is plain. The citizens of Carthage consisted chiefly
of unarmed, and undisciplined tradesmen. The citizens of Rome, without
distinction, composed a regular body of disciplined militia.... A short
comparison between the Roman and Carthaginian polity, with respect to
the military of each people, will easily point out to us the true cause
which gave the Romans their manifest superiority.
I have already taken notice of some capital defects of the
Carthaginians, both in their marine and military departments.
Montesquieu imputes several capital errors to the Romans, but he
attributes their preservation after the defeat at Cannæ, when they were
at the very brink of ruin, to the force of their institution. He seems
to place this force in the superior wisdom and firmness of the Roman
senate. A short inquiry into their conduct, during the second Punick
war, will show that the cause of their preservation at that time must be
ascribed to a very different principle, and that Montesquieu too hastily
adopted that opinion from the Greek and Roman historians.
If we examine the boasted behaviour of the Roman senate, from the first
attack of Saguntum to the memorable battle of Cannæ, we shall find it to
consist of one continued series of blunders, which carry all the marks
of weak, factious, and divided counsels. The Romans had certain
intelligence of Hannibal’s design of attacking them in Italy. This was
no secret in Spain, where every preparation, and every motion of
Hannibal’s was directed to that point of view. The Romans were certainly
jealous of such a design, when they sent ambassadours to Hannibal, to
inform him, that if he passed the Iberus, and attacked the Saguntines,
they should look upon it as a declaration of war. When they had received
an evasive answer from Hannibal, they crossed over to Africa, and made
the same declaration to the Carthaginian senate. When Hannibal laid
siege to Saguntum, did the Romans act up to their formidable
declaration, or did they send a single man to the assistance of those
faithful allies? just the reverse; they wasted nine months, the time the
siege lasted, in useless debates, and fruitless embassies. They
sacrificed that faithful and heroick people, together with their own
interest and character, by their folly and irresolution.[351] For if
they had sent a powerful army at first, they might have saved Saguntum,
or at least confined the war to Spain, and prevented it from penetrating
into their own bowels. After Hannibal had laid Saguntum in ashes, did
the boasted wisdom and firmness of the Roman senate appear in more
vigorous, or more politick measures? They again employed a whole winter
in a wise embassy to Carthage, to just as little purpose as the former,
and gave Hannibal all the time he could wish to prepare for his
expedition. When Hannibal was on his march for Italy, instead of
shutting up the passages of the Alps, which would easily have defeated
that daring enterprise, they ordered the consul Scipio, with his army,
to oppose his passage over the Rhone. The consul came just in time
enough to learn, that such dilatory measures would never check the
progress of so active and vigilant an enemy, who had already passed that
river, and was on his march for the Alps.[352] The consul immediately
re-embarked his troops, and hastened to meet him in his descent from
those mountains. But Hannibal was already near the banks of the Po,
where the consul attacked him, but was defeated and dangerously wounded.
The senate, alarmed at Hannibal’s passage over the Alps, which they had
taken no precaution to prevent, sent in a great fright for the other
consul Sempronius, with his army, out of Sicily. He arrived, and joined
his wounded colleague Scipio, who was an able officer, and having
learnt, by experience, how dangerous an enemy they had to cope with,
advised caution and prudence in all their operations. But Sempronius,
vain, rash and ignorant, was deaf to all salutary advice, which he
ridiculed as the effect of fear. Hannibal, who never inquired into the
number of his enemies, but studied only the foibles of their commanders,
directed all his operations upon that principle. He applied therefore to
the foible of Sempronius, which he was soon master of, drew him into a
snare, and cut off almost his whole army. The senate was dreadfully
frighted at this second defeat; but to mend the matter, they suffered
Flaminius, a man more vain, more headstrong, and more rash than
Sempronius, to be chosen consul, and sent against Hannibal. As he acted
upon the same principles, he ran headlong into the trap laid for him by
his artful enemy, and lost his life together with his whole army. Though
this terrible blow threw the Romans into inexpressible consternation,
yet it seems to have brought them to their senses. For they at last
created the celebrated Fabius dictator, who was the only Roman commander
capable of opposing Hannibal. Yet even here they could not help giving
another instance of their folly, by forcing Minucius upon him for his
general of horse, a man of the same character with Sempronius or
Flaminius. Fabius acted upon a quite different plan. He knew the danger
and folly of opposing new raised troops to veterans, flushed with
repeated victories, and commanded by so consummate a general. He
therefore opposed art to art, watched every motion of his enemy, and cut
off his foragers. Hannibal, whose army was composed chiefly of soldiers
of fortune out of different nations, connected to him by no other tie
than the hopes of plunder, and their esteem for his personal abilities,
was sensible, that such a conduct in his enemy would quickly put an end
to all his hopes in Italy. He tried therefore every art he was master of
to bring Fabius to a battle; but the wary Roman convinced him, that he
knew his trade too well to deviate from that plan, which alone could
save his country. Though Hannibal did justice to those fine strokes of
his antagonist, yet they were too delicate for the eyes of the Romans.
They were disgusted at his conduct, because they wanted capacity to
understand it, and gave credit to the idle boasts of Minucius, though
they had already suffered so severely by trusting men of his genius.
Yet, by the most unaccountable folly, they raised Minucius to an
equality of power with Fabius; and Rome, for the first time, saw two
dictators vested with unlimited authority. The wiser Fabius, though
amazed at the stupidity of his countrymen, adhered steadily to his first
plan. He gave up half the army to the command of his new colleague, but
was determined to preserve the other moiety at least, upon which so much
depended. Hannibal was sensible that the Romans could not have done him
a more essential piece of service, unless they had recalled Fabius. He
immediately threw out a bait for Minucius, which that rash, unthinking
commander as greedily bit at. He fell into the trap laid for him by the
crafty Hannibal; was enveloped by the Carthaginians, and must inevitably
have perished, with all the troops under his command, if Fabius had not
flown to his assistance, repulsed the enemy, and rescued him from the
most imminent danger of death or captivity. Though Fabius had been so
ill used by his countrymen in general, and by his colleague Minucius in
particular, yet he showed, by this generous action, a greatness of soul
superior to private resentment, and every selfish passion, which he was
always ready to sacrifice to the publick welfare. Minucius indeed felt
the force of the obligation, as well as of his own incapacity: he nobly
acknowledged it in the strongest terms, and returned to his former post
and duty to his abler commander. But this heroick behaviour of Fabius
seems to have made no more impression upon his countrymen, than his
masterly conduct. Two new consuls were chosen, to whom he resigned his
authority and army, and retired to Rome neglected and unemployed. The
new consuls followed the advice of Fabius, and avoided coming to action,
which distressed Hannibal extremely. But the following year exhibits
such a masterpiece of folly and stupidity in that Roman senate, whose
firmness and wisdom are so much boasted of by historians, and such
infatuation in the body of the Roman people as would seem incredible,
if the facts, as handed down to us by their own historians themselves,
did not prove it beyond a possibility of doubt or contradiction.
Determined to drive Hannibal out of Italy, and put a speedy end to so
ruinous a war, they raised one of the mightiest armies they had ever yet
brought into the field, and employed in it every officer of note or
distinction at that time in Rome, the great Fabius alone excepted. This
was the last stake of the Romans, upon which their all was ventured. But
where does the boasted wisdom of the senate appear in the management of
this affair, which was of the last importance? Of the two consuls,
Paulus Æmilius, the one, was a respectable man, and an experienced
officer: Terentius Varro, the other, was a fellow of the lowest
extraction, who, by noise and impudence, had raised himself to the
tribuneship, was afterwards made prætor, and, by the assistance of one
Bebius, his relation, at that time a tribune of the people, had forced
himself into the consular dignity. This wretch, who had but just talents
sufficient for a captain of the mob, who had never seen an action (nor
perhaps an army) in his life, had the impudence to censure the conduct
of Fabius, and to boast in the senate, that he would immediately drive
Hannibal out of Italy. The wise senate were not only so weak as to
believe, but, in opposition to all the remonstrances of Fabius, even to
trust such an empty coxcomb with an equal share in the command. They
even gave the consuls orders to fight the enemy without delay, so great
was their confidence in the gasconading Varro. Hannibal at that time
was so greatly distressed for want of provisions, that his Spanish
troops begun to mutiny, and talked openly of revolting to the Romans,
and he himself had thoughts of retiring into Gaul for his own personal
safety. Æmilius, who endeavoured in every point to follow the advice of
Fabius, declined fighting, and was convinced by his intelligence, that
Hannibal could not subsist his troops above ten days longer. But Varro
was alike deaf to reason or persuasion. Debates at last run so high
between the consuls, that repeated expresses were sent to the senate by
Æmilius for fresh orders. Had the senate acted with that prudence, which
has been so loudly celebrated by historians, they would certainly have
created Fabius dictator at that critical juncture, which would have put
an end to the differences and authority of the consuls. For how could
they reasonably hope for success, whilst the army was commanded by two
generals, vested with equal power, who differed as widely in opinion as
in temper? But their chief view at that time seems to have been to
mortify Fabius, and to that favourite point they wilfully sacrificed the
publick honour and safety.[353] Æmilius at last returned to Rome, and
laid the whole affair before the senate. But Varro’s party proved the
majority, and orders were renewed for fighting, but not immediately.
Æmilius still declined fighting, and followed the advice of Fabius, but
the alternate command of the two consuls, which took place every day,
defeated all his measures. Varro, on the day of his command, marched the
army so close to the enemy, that it was impossible to retire without
fighting. This imprudent step brought on the famous battle of Cannæ,
where Hannibal, whose whole force scarce equalled the moiety of the
Romans, gave them the most remarkable defeat we ever read of in their
history. Polybius, and after him the rest of the historians, impute this
defeat to the great superiority of the Carthaginian army in horse, and
the ignorance of Varro in pitching upon a plain open country for the
field of battle, where Hannibal could employ his cavalry to the best
advantage. That the Carthaginian horse was superior to the Roman in
goodness, is readily admitted. But if we compute the number of the
cavalry of the Romans, and that of their allies, as given us by Polybius
himself, we shall find the difference in each army amounted but to four
thousand; so small an advantage therefore, in point of number, could
never possibly have turned the scale in favour of Hannibal when the
Romans had such prodigious odds in the number of their infantry, who
showed themselves no way inferior to Hannibal’s foot, either in bravery
or intrepidity. The true reason was, the infinite superiority of
Hannibal in point of generalship. That consummate leader, by a most
exquisite disposition of his troops, a _manœvre_ much too fine for the
eyes of the Roman generals, caught their whole infantry fairly in a trap
(though in a plain level country) where they were almost to a man cut to
pieces, or taken. Æmilius, and all the other general officers, with
seventy thousand Romans, lay dead upon the field of battle after a
brave and obstinate resistance.[354] The infamous Varro, that base
minded fellow, as Polybius terms him,[355] who commanded the cavalry of
the allies on the left wing, behaved like a true bully in the face of
danger. He fled almost at the first attack, and rather chose to live
with infamy than die with honour. When the fatal news reached the city
of Rome, both senate and people gave up all hopes of safety. Fabius
alone took the lead, and acted with his usual firmness and calmness upon
this occasion. He placed guards at the gates to prevent the desertion of
the citizens, who were flying in great numbers to escape the conquerors,
whom they expected every moment. He confined the women to their houses,
who had filled the city with lamentations. He manned the walls and
outworks, and took every other precaution which the shortness of the
time would admit of. All resigned themselves implicitly to his conduct,
and he acted for the time as sole governor. Many of the senators, and
principal of the Roman nobility, were in actual consultation about
leaving Italy, and retiring elsewhere for safety. But they were
prevented, as Livy informs us, by the terrible threats of young Scipio,
and compelled to stay and share the fate of their country.[356] Hannibal
has been greatly censured for not attacking Rome itself immediately
after the battle, and is accused of not knowing how to make the proper
use of a victory, though he knew so well how to conquer. The candid
Montesquieu acquits him of this charge. His reasons are, that though
Rome at that time was in the highest degree of consternation, yet the
effects of fear upon a warlike people, inured to arms like the Romans,
and a low undisciplined rabble, who are strangers to the use of arms,
are very different. In the former, who are conscious of their own
strength, it almost always changes into the most desperate courage. In
the latter, who feel their own weakness too sensibly, it dispirits so
much as to render them incapable of resistance. Hence he gives it as his
real opinion, that Hannibal would have failed of success if he had
undertaken the siege of that city. His proof is, because the Romans at
that very time were able to send sufficient succours, drawn from their
own citizens, to every part where they were then wanted. Thus Rome was
saved, not by the wisdom or firmness of the senate, but the prudence and
magnanimity of one old officer, whom they despised and hated, and the
intrepidity of a boy of eighteen, joined, as I observed before from
Dionysius, to the force of that part of their institution, which formed
the whole body of their citizens into a militia, ever ready, and capable
of taking the field as soldiers. All the Roman armies, which were
opposed to Hannibal, were drawn out of this militia. Nor do we meet with
one instance of cowardice, or ill-behaviour amongst the men, but rather
of intrepidity even to rashness, which used to be the characteristick of
the British nation. Polybius, who was at least as able a judge of the
military as any man of that age, and who lived very near the time of the
Hannibalick war (as he terms it) is loud in his praises of the Roman
troops, whose infantry he prefers greatly to the Carthaginian
mercenaries.[357] Nor does he once impute any of their defeats to the
fault of their men, but invariably to the folly and incapacity of their
commanders.
Upon the whole, the great defect in the Carthaginian military
institution consisted in the want of a national militia, which, as
Polybius observes, was the reason of their employing foreign
mercenaries. The capital defects in the Romans lay in that equality of
power with which each consul was vested in the field, and the short
duration of their command, as their office was only annual. Every battle
which the Romans lost to Hannibal except the first, may be fairly
ascribed to the former of these causes. The defeats of Trebia and
Thrasymene were plainly occasioned by the jealousy of one of the
consuls, lest the other should share with him in the glory of beating
Hannibal; as the want of harmony, and difference of opinion between the
two consuls, was the primary cause of the dreadful defeat at Cannæ. To
the latter cause we may justly attribute the long duration of the
Hannibalick war. When the great man, who entered Italy with no more
than twenty thousand foot and six thousand horse, maintained his ground
above sixteen years, without any assistance from Carthage, against the
whole united force and efforts of the Romans, by the mere strength of
his own extraordinary genius. For as every man, who had interest
sufficient to obtain the consulship, was immediately vested with the
command of an army, however qualified or not, so he was obliged to
resign his command at the end of the year, before he had well time to be
thoroughly acquainted with the true method of dealing with his enemy.
Thus every new successive commander, amongst the Romans, had the same
task to begin afresh at the opening of every campaign. I know that
political writers ascribe this mistaken policy to that jealousy, and
fear of lodging so much power in so few hands for any length of time,
which is so natural to all republican governments. And that the office
of dictator was contrived as a remedy against any abuse, or
inconveniency, which might at any time arise from the consular power.
But the event showed, that the remedy was much worse than the disease.
Whilst publick virtue existed, the office of dictator was frequently
useful. But when luxury had introduced corruption, the _pro tempore_
dictator soon came to be perpetual, and the perpetual dictator
terminated in a perpetual and despotick emperor.
At Carthage their military institution was entirely different. The power
of the generals in the field was absolute and unlimited; and, if their
conduct was approved of, generally continued to the end of whatever war
they were engaged in. They had no occasion for the dangerous resource of
a dictator. The watchful eye of their standing court-martial, the
committee of one hundred and four of their ablest senators, was a
perpetual, and never-failing check upon their ambition, or ill behavior
of their generals.[358] The sacred cohort amongst the Carthaginians,
consisted of a large body of volunteers of the richest and greatest
families of the nation. This wise and noble institution was one of the
chief supports of the Carthaginian state; and as it was the constant
seminary of their officers and commanders, might very probably be one
cause why luxury and effeminacy could never obtain footing in that
warlike republick. For we always find this generous body giving the most
signal instances of bravery and conduct,[359] and bearing down all
before them.... Nor did they ever quit the field of battle, until they
were deserted by the rest of the army, and even then generally retired
in excellent order.
The Romans were gradually trained up, from the very infancy of their
republick, in long and obstinate wars with their Italian neighbours, who
were masters of the same arms and disciplines, and were no way their
inferiors in bravery. Nor did they perfect themselves in the art of
war, until they learned it by bloody experience from Pyrrhus, the most
consummate captain of that age. The Carthaginians were only exercised in
war with the wild undisciplined Africans, or the irregular Spaniards,
nor were they able with their numerous fleets and prodigious armies to
complete the reduction of that part of Sicily, which was inhabited by
Grecian colonies, who retained their native arms and discipline. Hence
arose the great superiority of the Romans, both in soldiers and
commanders. Though the Barcan family produced some great officers, who
at least equalled the ablest generals Rome could ever boast of.
It is evident from the course of this inquiry, that the ruin of the
Roman republick arose wholly from internal causes. The ruin of Carthage
was owing remotely to internal, but immediately to external. The
Plebeian faction reduced Rome to the verge of ruin at the battle of
Cannæ, and a complication of factions completed the subversion of that
republick under the two triumvirates. The envy and jealousy of the
Hannonian faction deprived Carthage of all the fruits of Hannibal’s
amazing victories and progress, and paved the way for the utter excision
of their very name and nation by the Roman arms. Such are the direful
effects of faction, when suffered to run its natural lengths without
control, in the most flourishing and best constituted government!...
[330] Justin. lib. 18. c. 5.
[331] Termed consuls by the Romans, _susetes_ by the
Carthaginians.
[332] Οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστίνδην, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτίνδην οἴονται δεῖν
αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας. Arist. de Repub. lib. 2. p. 234. c.
11.
[333] Αἱροῦνται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες (τὸν πλοῦτον, scil.
καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν) καὶ μάλιστα τὰς μεγίστας, τούς τε Βασιλεῖς καὶ
τοὺς στρατηγοὺς. Ibid. p. 335.
[334] Ἔχει δὲ πολιτεία τῶν Καρχηδονίων παραπλήσια τῇ Λακωνικῇ
πολιτείᾳ τὰ μὲν συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιριῶν τοῖς φιδιτίοις· τὴν δὲ
τῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχὴν, τοῖς Ἐφόροις, πλὴν οὐ χεῖρον. Οἱ
μὲν γὰρ, ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων εἰσὶ. Ταύτην δ’ αἱροῦνται τὴν ἀρχὴν
ἀριστίνδην. Ibid. p. 334.
[335] Τὸ δ’ ἀμίσθους καὶ μὴ κληρωτὰς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετέον, καὶ
εἴτε τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. Ibid.
[336] Τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κυρίας οὔσας πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, ὑφ’
αὑτῶν αἱρετὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑκατὸν ταύτας αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν
μεγίστην ἀρχήν. ἔτι δὲ ταύτας πλείονα ἄρχειν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων
(καὶ γὰρ ἐξεληλυθότες ἄρχουσι, καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχικὸν.
Ibid.
[337] Σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης, τὸ τὸν δῆμον ἔχουσαν,
διαμένειν ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτεῖας, καὶ μήτε στάσιν, ὅτι γὰρ
ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, γεγενῆσθαι, μήτε Τύραννον. Ibid.
[338] Τὸ μὲν προσάγειν, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, οἱ
Βασιλεῖς κύριοι μετὰ τῶν γερόντων, ἂν ὁμογνωμονῶσι πάντες. εἰ
δὲ μή, καὶ τούτων ὁ δῆμος. Ἃ δὲ ἂν εἰσφέρωσιν οὗτοι οὐ
διακοῦσαι μόνον ἀποδιδόασι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν,
ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ· καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις
ἀντειπεῖν ἔξεστιν. Ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις πολιτείαις οὐκ ἔστι.
Ibid. pag. 334.
[339] The idol to whom the Carthaginians sacrificed their
children was the Molock of the Canaanites, from whom they were
lineally descended. This idol was the Chronos of the Greeks,
and Saturn of the Latins.
[340] Plut. de Superstit. p. 171.
[341] Diodor. Sicul. lib. 20. p. 739.
[342] Id. ibid.
[343] This institution has been adopted since, by the Greek and
Latin churches. The only difference in the punishment is, that
the ancient vestals were buried alive, the modern vestals are
immured between four walls.
[344] Polybius informs us, that when the Romans took a city by
storm, they not only put all the men to the sword, but even
quartered the dogs, and hewed off the limbs of every other
living creature they found in the place.
Πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων καταλήψεσι τῶν πόλεων,
οὐ μόνους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πεφονευμένους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς κύνας
δεδιχοτομένους, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων μέλη παρακεκομμένα. Polyb.
lib. 10. p. 820.
[345] Sallust. de Bell. Jugurth. p. 126....27.
[346] Grandeur des Romains, p. 68, &c.
[347] In fidem populi Romani sese dedere. Vide Polyb. Exerpt.
Legat. p. 1114, 15.
[348] Ibid. p. 1349, 50.
[349] Appian. de Bell. Pun. p. 82.
[350] Grandeur des Romains, p. 34.
[351] When the Roman ambassadours, soon after the loss of
Saguntum, solicited an alliance with the Volsicani, a people of
Spain, that people seemed astonished at the effrontery of the
Romans, and bid them go and seek for allies amongst those
nations who had never heard of the destruction of Saguntum,
which, as they assured them, would be a melancholy and striking
warning to the Spaniards how they ever placed any confidence in
the good faith and friendship of the Romans. Liv. lib. 21. c.
19. p. 144.
[352] Polyb. lib. 3. p. 270. et seq.
[353] It has been asked—for what reason? I answer, Livy
will inform us in the 22d book of his history.—“The studied
delay of Fabius (who industriously avoided fighting) which
according to that historian, gave such just cause of uneasiness
to Hannibal, was treated at Rome with the utmost contempt by
the citizens of every rank both military and civil;
particularly after the general of the horse Minucius had gained
some slight advantage over Hannibal during his absence.”—He
adds, “that two unlucky incidents concurred to augment the
displeasure of the citizens against the dictator. One was the
artful behaviour of Hannibal; who wasted all the country around
with fire and sword, the estate of Fabius alone excepted, which
he carefully preserved, in hopes that such a different
treatment might be thought the effect of some clandestine
correspondence between the two commanders.”—The other was—his
settling an exchange of prisoners with Hannibal by his own
proper authority, and by the same cartel which had subsisted
between the Roman and Carthaginian generals in the first Punick
war. By that it was agreed: that if any prisoners should remain
on either side, after the exchange of man for man was finished,
such prisoners should be redeemed at the rate of two pounds and
a half of silver for each soldier. When the exchange was made,
two hundred and forty-seven Roman prisoners remained to be
ransomed.—But as the senate hesitated greatly at passing a
decree for the payment of the stipulated sum, because the
dictator had not consulted them upon the occasion; he sold
those very lands which Hannibal had left untouched, and
discharged the debt due from the publick out of his own private
fortune.—Whether these were the only reasons or not; yet, they
had evidently such an effect upon the Romans, that Fabius seems
to have been at that time the object of their resentment, which
they never failed to give proofs of upon every occasion.—Thus
when Fabius opened the campaign, his cautious conduct was so
disagreeable to the officers as well as soldiers, who listened
wholly to the idle boasts of Minucius; that if the choice of
their commander had depended upon the voices of the military
men, Minucius, as Livy affirms, would undoubtedly have been
preferred to Fabius. The same historian tells us; that when
Fabius returned to Rome to preside as dictator at their
religious ceremonies the tribunes of the people inveighed so
bitterly against him in their publick harangues, that he
refrained from coming to their assemblies.—Even what he spoke
in the senate met with a very indifferent reception, especially
when he extolled the conduct and abilities of Hannibal, and
enumerated the repeated defeats they had received for the two
last years through the rashness and incapacity of their own
commanders.—When Fabius returned to the camp he received a
much more mortifying proof of their displeasure. For they
raised Minucius to an equality with him in the command, an act
for which there had been no precedent since the first erection
of the dictatorial office.—Nor did their enmity to Fabius
subside until after the fatal defeat at Cannæ. For the
worthless Varro obtained not only the consulship, but what is
still more extraordinary, even the confidence of the greater
part of the senate, and almost the whole army by railing at
Fabius and Fabian measures, and out boasting Minucius. I have
showed above from Polybius what trust the majority of the
senate reposed in Varro. But I cannot omit a remarkable
instance, which Livy gives us, of the absurd and fatal
partiality of the military men to Varro, in opposition to
Æmilius, who avowedly followed the advice of Fabius.—In a
council of war, says that historian, held a little before the
battle of Cannæ, when each consul persisted firmly in his
former opinion; Æmilius adhering to Fabius’s plan for avoiding
fighting; Varro to his resolution of engaging the enemy
immediately; Servilius one of the consuls of the former year
was the only one who joined Æmilius, the rest declared for
Varro.
[354] Above eighty thousand, according to Dionysius of
Halicarnassus.
[355] Polyb. lib. 3. p. 370.
[356] Liv. lib. 22. p. 242.
[357] Polyb. lib. 6. p. 688.
[358] Our method of trying delinquents, either in the land or
sea service, by a court-martial composed of their respective
officers, has been judged liable to many objections, and has
occasioned no little discontent in the nation. For as their
inquiry is restricted to a particular set of articles in each
service, I don’t see how a commanding officer, vested with a
discretionary power of acting, can strictly or properly come
under their cognizance, or be ever liable to their censure,
unless he is proved guilty of a direct breach of any one of
those articles. But as a commander in chief may easily avoid an
offence of that nature, and yet, upon the whole of his conduct
in any expedition, be highly culpable; a court-martial, thus
circumscribed in their power of inquiry, can never be competent
judges in a cause where they are denied a proper power of
examining into the real demerits of the supposed offender. Much
has been said about trying offences of this nature, like other
criminal cases, by juries: a scheme which, at the very first
sight, must appear absurd and impracticable to the rational and
unprejudiced.
As therefore instruction is the true end and use of all
history, I shall take the liberty of offering a scheme, drawn
from that wise and salutary institution of the Carthaginians,
which is,—“that a select standing committee be appointed, to
be composed of an equal number of members of both houses,
chosen annually by balloting, with a full power of inquiring
into the conduct of all commanders in chief, without any
restraint of articles of war; and that, after a proper
examination, the committee shall refer the case, with their
opinion upon it, to the decision of his majesty.”
This scheme seems to me the least liable to objections of any I
have yet met with. For if the numbers are chosen by balloting,
they will be less liable to the influence of party. If they are
chosen annually, and refer the case to the decision of the
crown, which is the fountain of justice as well as mercy, they
will neither encroach upon the royal prerogative, nor be liable
to that signal defect in the Carthaginian committee, which sat
for life, and whose sentence was final without appeal.
[359] Diodor. Sicul. lib. 20. p. 739.