CHAPTER V.

OF ROME.

Though there is a concurrence of several causes which bring on the ruin

of a state, yet where luxury prevails, that parent of all our fantastick

imaginary wants, ever craving and ever unsatisfied, we may justly assign

it as the leading cause: since it ever was and ever will be the most

baneful to publick virtue. For as luxury is contagious from its very

nature, it will gradually descend from the highest to the lowest ranks,

until it has ultimately infected a whole people. The evils arising from

luxury have not been peculiar to this or that nation, but equally fatal

to all wherever it was admitted. Political philosophy lays this down as

a fundamental and incontestable maxim,[244] that all the most

flourishing states owed their ruin, sooner or later, to the effects of

luxury; and all history, from the origin of mankind, confirms this truth

by the evidence of facts to the highest degree of demonstration. In the

great despotick monarchies it produced avarice, dissipation,

rapaciousness, oppression, perpetual factions amongst the great, whilst

each endeavoured to engross the favour of the prince wholly to himself;

venality, and a contempt of all law and discipline both in the military

and civil departments. Whilst the people, following the pernicious

example of their superiors, contracted such a dastardly effeminacy,

joined to an utter inability to support the fatigues of war, as quickly

threw them into the hands of the first resolute invader. Thus the

Assyrian empire sunk under the arms of Cyrus with his poor but hardy

Persians. The extensive and opulent empire of Persia fell an easy

conquest to Alexander and a handful of Macedonians; and the Macedonian

empire, when enervated by the luxury of Asia, was compelled to receive

the yoke of the victorious Romans.

Luxury, when introduced into free states, and suffered to be diffused

without controul through the body of the people, was ever productive of

that degeneracy of manners, which extinguished publick virtue, and put a

final period to liberty. For as the incessant demands of luxury quickly

induced necessity, that necessity kept human invention perpetually on

the rack to find out ways and means to supply the demands of luxury.

Hence the lower classes at first sold their suffrages in privacy and

with caution; but as luxury increased, and the manners of the people

grew daily more corrupt, they openly set them up to sale to the best

bidder. Hence too the ambitious amongst the higher classes, whose

superior wealth was frequently their only qualification, first purchased

the most lucrative posts in the state by this infamous kind of

traffick, and then maintained themselves in power by that additional

fund for corruption, which their employments supplied, until they had

undone those they had first corrupted.

But of all the ancient republicks, Rome in the last period of her

freedom was the scene where all the inordinate passions of mankind

operated most powerfully and with the greatest latitude. There we see

luxury, ambition, faction, pride, revenge, selfishness, a total

disregard to the publick good, and an universal dissoluteness of

manners, first make them ripe for, and then complete their destruction.

Consequently that period, by showing us more striking examples, will

afford us more useful lessons than any other part of their history.

Rome, once the mighty mistress of the universe, owed her rise, according

to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the most curious and most exact inquirer

into the Roman antiquities, to a small colony of the Albans under the

conduct of Romulus, the supposed grandson of Numitor king of Alba. That

the Albans derived their origin from the Greeks seems highly probable

from the nature of the Alban and Roman monarchical government, which

appears to be plainly copied from Lycurgus.

The government first instituted by Romulus, the founder of this

extraordinary empire, was that perfect sort, as it is termed by

Dionysius and Polybius, which consisted of a due admixture of the regal,

aristocratick, and democratick powers. As this great man received the

crown as a reward for his superior merit, and held it by the best of all

titles, the willing and unanimous choice of a free people; and as he is

universally allowed to be the sole institutor of their first form of

government, I cannot help ranking him amongst the most celebrated

lawgivers and heroes of antiquity. Romulus’s plan of government, though

formed upon the model of Lycurgus, was evidently, in some respects,

superior to the Spartan. For the executive power in the Roman government

was lodged in one man only; the number of the senators was much greater,

and though the whole body of the Romans was formed into one regular

militia, yet the lowest class of the people were directed to apply

themselves to agriculture, grazing, and other lucrative employments; a

practice wholly prohibited to the free Spartans. The great employments

of the state were solely confined to the Patricians, or aristocratick

part; but the Plebeians, or commonalty, had in return the power of

choosing magistrates, enacting laws, and determining about all wars when

proposed by the king. But still their decrees were not final, for the

concurrence of the senate was absolutely necessary to give a sanction to

whatever the people had determined.

Whether the Romans would have continued the regal power in their

founder’s family by hereditary succession, cannot possibly be

determined, because, when Romulus was put to death by the Patricians for

aiming at more power than was consistent with their limited monarchy, he

left no children. This however is certain, that their monarchy continued

to be elective, and was attended with those disorders which are the

usual effects of that capital error in politicks, until the usurpation

of Tarquinius Superbus.

After the death of Romulus, Numa, a man of a very different genius, was

invited to the throne by the unanimous consent of the whole body of the

Romans. This worthy prince reclaimed his subjects from their savage

fondness for war and plunder, and taught them the arts of peace, and the

happiness of civil and social life, by instructing them in the great

duties of religion, or piety towards their gods, and the laws of justice

and humanity, which contained their duty towards their fellow creatures.

The long reign of this wise and good prince was the most remarkable, and

the most happy period of time Rome ever knew from her foundation to her

dissolution. For during the whole term of forty-three years, which was

the extent of his reign, the harmony of the Roman state was neither

interrupted by any civil dissension at home, nor the happiness of the

people disturbed by any foreign war or invasion. After the death of

Numa, who died universally lamented as the father of the people, Tullus

Hostilius, a man of real merit, was legally elected king, but, after a

victorious reign of thirty-two years, was destroyed with his whole

family by lightning, according to some authors, but, according to

others, was murdered by Ancus Marcius, grandson to Numa by his only

daughter, who looked upon his own right to the crown as prior to Tullus,

or his family. Ancus Marcius however received the crown by a free

election of the people, and died a natural death after a reign of

twenty-four years, in which he restored such of the religious

institutions of his grandfather Numa as had been neglected during the

reign of his predecessor. He greatly enlarged the city of Rome itself,

and made it a seaport by fortifying the haven at the mouth of the river

Tiber.

Lucius Tarquinius, a man of Greek extraction by his father’s side, and

admitted to the privilege of a Roman citizen under the reign of Ancus

Marcius, was raised to the throne for his uncommon merit, and showed

himself worthy of that high trust, which was reposed in him by the

Romans. He increased the number of the senators to three hundred,

greatly enlarged their territories, and beautified the city; and, after

an illustrious reign of thirty-eight years, was assassinated in his

palace by the contrivance of the two sons of Ancus Marcius, who hoped

after his death to recover the kingdom, which their father had been

possessed of. But their scheme was far from succeeding, for Tarquinius

was so well beloved by his people, that the persons who committed the

murder, were executed, and the sons of Ancus banished, and their estates

confiscated. Tullius Servius, who had married the daughter of

Tarquinius, succeeded to the crown by the artful management of his

mother-in-law, and by the favour of the people, though without the

concurrence either of the senate or Patricians. Tullius was certainly a

man of real merit, and, as I think, superior in point of abilities to

all the Roman kings, Romulus alone excepted. But as he seemed to affect

a democracy, and was chiefly supported by the people, he was always

disagreeable to the Patricians, who looked upon his advancement to the

crown as an illegal intrusion. But as he did most signal services to his

country, during a glorious reign of four and forty years, I cannot help

taking notice of some of his institutions, without the knowledge of

which it is hardly possible to form a perfect idea of the Roman

constitution.

Tullius ordered all the Romans to register their names and ages, with

those of their parents, wives and children, and the place of their

abode, either in the city or the country. At the same time he enjoined

them to give in upon oath a just valuation of their effects, on pain of

being whipped and sold for slaves if they failed in registering all

these particulars. From this register he formed his plan for a regular

and general militia, which was invariably followed by the Romans, until

the time of Marius. To effect this he divided the whole body of the

citizens into six classes. The first class consisted of those whose

possessions amounted to a hundred _minæ_.[245] These he armed in the

completest manner, and divided into eighty centuries; forty of which,

composed of the younger men, were appointed to take the field in time of

war; the other forty were assigned for the defence of the city. To these

eighty centuries of heavy armed foot he added eighteen centuries of

horse, selected out of those who had the largest estates, and were of

distinguished birth. Thus the first class contained ninety-eight

centuries. The second, third, and fourth classes consisted each of

twenty centuries only, and were composed of citizens, whose effects were

estimated at seventy-five, fifty, and five and twenty _minæ_; and their

arms were lighter according to their respective classes. To the second

class he added two centuries of armourers and axe-men. To the fourth

class two centuries of trumpeters and blowers on the horn, which

contained the martial musick of the army. The fifth class consisted of

those who were worth twelve _minæ_ and a half, which he divided into

thirty centuries, armed with darts and slings only, and were properly

irregulars. The sixth class, which was by much the most numerous, was

comprehended in one century only, and consisted of the poorest

citizens, who were exempted from all kind of taxes, as well as all

service in the army.

By this wise disposition the burthen of the war fell chiefly upon those

who were best able to support it. Thus, for instance, if he wanted to

raise twenty thousand men, he divided that number amongst the centuries

of the first five classes, and ordered each century to furnish its

respective quota. He then calculated the sum necessary for the support

of the war, which he divided in the same manner amongst the centuries,

and ordered every man to pay in proportion to his possessions. Hence the

rich, who were fewer in number, but divided into more centuries, were

not only obliged to serve oftener, but to pay greater taxes. For Tullius

thought it just, that they who had the greatest property at stake should

bear the greatest share of the burden, both in their persons and

fortunes: as he judged it equitable, that the poor should be exempted

from taxes, because they were in want of the necessaries of life; and

from the service; because the Roman soldiers served at that time at

their own expense; a custom which continued long after. For the Roman

soldiers received no pay, as Livy informs us,[246] until the three

hundred and forty-eighth year from the foundation of the city.... As the

rich, by this regulation, were subjected to the greatest share of the

expense and danger, Tullius made them an ample recompense by throwing

the chief power of the government into their hands, which he effected by

the following scheme, too artful for the penetration of the common

people.

By the fundamental constitution of the Romans, the electing magistrates,

both civil and military, the enacting or repealing laws, and the

declaring war, or concluding peace, were all determined by the suffrages

of the people. But as the people voted by their curiæ,[247] into ten of

which every tribe was divided, the meanest citizen had an equal vote

with the greatest: consequently as the poor were much more numerous than

the rich, they carried every point by a sure majority. Tullius altered

this method, assembled the people, and took their votes by centuries,

not by curiæ. This artful measure turned the scale, and transferred the

majority to the rich. For as the votes of the first class were first

taken, the votes of that class, which contained ninety-eight centuries,

if unanimous, always constituted a majority of three votes, which

decided the question without taking the votes of the five succeeding

classes, as they were in that case wholly useless.

Tullius had married his two daughters to Tarquinius and Aruns, the

grandsons of his predecessor, whose guardianship he had undertaken

during their minority. But what tie is strong enough to restrain

ambition! his younger daughter Tullia, the most ambitious, and most

detestable of her sex, unable to prevail upon her husband Aruns to join

in deposing her father, applied to her brother-in-law Tarquinius, whose

temper was congenial with her own, and offered to be his wife if he

would assert his just right, as she termed it, and attempt to supplant

her father. The offer was accepted, and the incestuous match agreed

upon, which was soon after completed by the death of her husband and

sister, who were privately despatched, that there might be no obstacle

remaining. Tarquinius, now the worthy husband of such a wife, attempted

in the senate to procure the deposition of Tullius, but failing in his

design, at the instigation of his impious wife, he procured the old king

to be openly assassinated in the street before his palace, and the

unnatural Tullia drove her chariot in triumph over the body of her

murdered father. By this complicated scene of adultery, murder, and

parricide, Tarquin, surnamed the Proud, forced his way to the throne,

and to usurpation added the most execrable and avowed tyranny. The

Patricians,[248] who had favoured his usurpation, either from their

hatred to Tullius and the Plebeians, or from the hopes of sharing in the

government, with which, according to Dionysius, they had been privately

allured, were the first who felt the bloody effects of his arbitrary

temper. Not only the friends of Tullius, and those whom he suspected as

uneasy under his usurpation, but all who were distinguished by their

superior wealth fell a sacrifice to his suspicion or avarice. All such

were accused, by his profligate emissaries, of many fictitious crimes,

but particularly of a conspiracy against his person; the common pretence

of all tyrants. As the tyrant himself sat as judge, all defence was

useless. Some received sentence of death, some of banishment, and the

estates of both were alike confiscated. The greater number of those that

were accused, knowing the true motives of the tyrant’s conduct, and

despairing of safety, voluntarily left the city; but some of the

greatest note were privately murdered by his orders, whose bodies could

never be found. When he had sufficiently thinned the senate by the

death, or banishment of its most valuable members, he filled up the

vacant seats with his own creatures. But as he allowed nothing to be

proposed or done there, but in conformity to his orders, he reduced it

to an empty form, without the least shadow of power. The Plebeians, who

beheld with pleasure the sufferings of the Patricians, which they

esteemed a just punishment for their behaviour under the reign of

Tullius, were quickly treated with much greater severity.[249] For the

tyrant not only abolished all the laws which Tullius had established to

secure them against the oppressions of the Patricians, but loaded them

with ruinous taxes, and prohibited all their publick religious

assemblies, that they might have no opportunity of meeting to form

secret conspiracies. Proceeding then upon the constant maxim of all

tyrants, that idleness in the people is the parent of sedition, he

exhausted them so much by the slavish drudgery, in which he kept them

constantly employed at the publick works, that the Patricians rejoiced

in their turn at the heavier miseries of the Plebeians, whilst neither

of them endeavoured to put a period to their common calamities. After

the Romans had groaned five and twenty years under this cruel and

ignominious bondage, the rape committed by Sextus, the eldest son of

Tarquin, upon Lucretia, the wife of Collatinus, an eminent Patrician,

and near relation of the Tarquin family, produced a coalition of both

orders, which ended in the expulsion of Tarquin and his sons, and a

solemn abjuration of monarchical government.

The tyranny of Tarquin had made the very name of king so odious to the

Romans in general, that the Patricians, who were the chief conductors of

this revolution, found it no difficult matter to establish an

aristocracy upon the ruins of monarchy.[250] Two magistrates were

appointed, termed consuls, vested with the regal power, whose office was

annual and elective. The senate was filled up out of the most eminent

of the Plebeians, after they had first been created Patricians, and the

people restored to their right of holding assemblies, of giving their

votes and doing whatever they were entitled to by former customs. But

the power of the people was rather nominal than real. For though the

consuls were annually elected by the suffrages of the people, a

privilege which carried the appearance of a democracy, yet as the votes

were taken by centuries, not by tribes, the Patricians were generally

masters of the election. It is remarkable that, after the expulsion of

Tarquin, Dionysius constantly terms the new government an aristocracy.

It evidently appears too through the whole remaining part of his

history, that there was a selfish and haughty faction amongst the

Patricians, who affected a tyrannical oligarchy, and aimed at reducing

the Plebeians to a state of servitude. Valerius, surnamed Poplicola, the

most humane patriot of all those who were concerned in banishing the

Tarquins, introduced some beneficent laws, which, according to

Dionysius, gave great relief to the Plebeians. For by one he made it

capital for any person to exercise any magistracy over the Romans,

unless that office should be received from the people: as he ordered by

another, that no Roman should be punished without a legal trial; and

that if any Roman should be condemned by any magistrate to be fined,

whipped, or put to death, the condemned person might appeal from the

sentence of that magistrate to the people, and should be liable to no

punishment until his fate had been determined by their suffrages. A

plain proof that the Plebeians until that time laboured under grievances

not very consistent with their pretended liberty. Another proof may be

drawn from the wretched state of the Plebeians, under the cruel

oppressions arising from the avarice and extortions of the Patricians,

which first gave birth to those perpetual seditions, which fill the

history of that republick. For as the Roman soldiers, who were all free

citizens, not only paid their proportion of the taxes, but were obliged

to serve in the field at their own expense during the whole campaign,

this frequently obliged them to borrow money at high interest of the

Patricians, who had engrossed by far the greater part of publick wealth.

But as the Roman territories were often ravaged by their neighbours in

those wars, which Tarquin perpetually incited to procure the recovery of

his crown, the loss fell heaviest upon the Plebeians, who were

frequently stript of all their effects, and reduced to the utmost

poverty. Hence unable to pay the principal of their debts, joined to an

accumulated load of usury upon usury, they were surrendered by the

judges to the discretion of their creditors. These unfeeling wretches

confined their debtors in chains, tortured their bodies with whips, and

treated them with such inhumanity, that great numbers of the Romans were

in as bad a situation as the poor Athenians when Solon first undertook

the administration. The effects of this detestable treatment of people,

who had been taught to call themselves free, appeared about twelve years

after the erection of their new government. For when the Tarquins had

raised up a confederacy of thirty cities of the Latins against them, the

Plebeians peremptorily refused to enlist until a vote was passed for the

abolition of their debts. As persuasions had no effect, the senate met

upon the occasion. Valerius, the son of the humane Poplicola, pleaded

strongly in favour of the people, but was violently opposed by Appius

Claudius, a haughty and imperious man, who is termed by Dionysius an

abettor of the oligarchy, and head of that faction, which were enemies

to the people. The moderate men amongst the senators proposed, that the

debts should be paid out of the publick treasury; a measure which would

preserve the poor for the service of the state, and prevent any

injustice to the creditors. Salutary as this measure must seem, the

opposition was so great that nothing was agreed to, and the result of

the debates was, “that no decree should be made at present relating to

this affair, but that as soon as the war should be concluded with

success, the consuls should lay it before the senate, and take their

vote upon the occasion. That in the mean time no debt should be sued

for, and that the execution of all laws, except those relating to the

war, should be suspended.” This decree did not wholly quiet the ferment

amongst the people. Several of the poorer sort demanded an immediate

abolition of their debts, as the condition for their taking a share in

the dangers of the war, and looked upon this delay rather as an

imposition. The senate, who, as the event showed, were determined never

to grant their request, and yet were afraid of new commotions, resolved

to abolish the consulship, and all other magistracies for the present,

and to invest a new magistrate with absolute and unlimited power, and

subject to no account for his actions. This new officer was termed the

dictator, and the duration of his office was limited to six months, at

the end of which term the consuls were to resume their former authority.

The chief reason, as Dionysius informs us, which induced the senate to

make use of this dangerous expedient, was to evade that law which

Poplicola had procured in favour of the Plebeians, which made it death

for a magistrate to punish a Roman without a legal trial, or before he

was condemned by the people.[251] The senate then made a decree for the

election of a dictator, and the Plebeians ignorant, as Dionysius

observes, of the importance of that decree, not only confirmed the

resolutions of the senate, but gave up to them the power of choosing the

person who should be invested with that dignity. Titus Lartius, one of

the consuls, was nominated by his colleague according to the form at

that time agreed upon in the senate. When the dictator appeared in all

the pomp and grandeur of his new office, he struck a terror into the

most turbulent, and the people, thus tricked out of that law which was

their only protection, immediately submitted. Lartius, who seems to have

been one of the greatest men of his time, ordered in a general register

of all the Romans, and formed his army after that wise method first

instituted by Servius Tullius. When he took the field he persuaded the

Latins, by his singular address, to disband their forces and conclude a

truce, and thus diverted the impending storm without fighting. He then

returned home, and resigned his office before the time was expired,

without having exercised any one act of severity upon a single Roman. A

noble instance of moderation and publick virtue!

At the expiration of the truce, which was made for one year only, the

Latins took the field with a powerful army. Aulus Posthumius was created

dictator by the Romans, and a decisive battle was fought near the lake

Regillus, in which the Romans were completely victors. Sextus Tarquin

was killed upon the spot, and old Tarquin the father died soon after. As

soon as this war was ended, the senate, regardless of their promise,

ordered all those suits for debt to be determined according to law,

which had been suspended during the war. This faithless proceeding

raised such violent commotions amongst the people, that a foreign war

was judged the best expedient to divert the storm which threatened the

aristocracy. The haughty Appius Claudius, and Publius Servilius, a man

of a very different character, were nominated consuls by Posthumius and

his colleague, which seems a manifest invasion of the rights of the

people.[252] A war was resolved upon against the Volscians, but the

Plebeians again refused to obey the summons for enlisting. Servilius

adhered to the maxims of Valerius, and advised an immediate decree for

the abolition of the debts. But he was furiously opposed by the

inexorable Appius,[253] who called him a flatterer of the people, and

declared that it would be giving up the government to the people when

they had it in their power to live under an aristocracy. After much time

was spent in these debates, Servilius, who was a popular man, prevailed

upon the Plebeians, by his entreaties, and raised an army of volunteers,

with which he marched against the enemy. The Volscians, who placed their

chief dependance upon the disunion which prevailed amongst the Romans,

submitted to whatever terms the consul should think proper to impose,

and delivered three hundred hostages chosen out of their principal

families, as a security for their behaviour. But this submission was far

from real, and was calculated only to amuse the Romans and gain time for

their military preparations. War was once more decreed against the

Volscians; but whilst the senate was deliberating about the number of

the forces proper to be employed, a man advanced in years appeared in

the forum and implored the assistance of the people. Famine sat pictured

in his pale and meagre face,[254] and the squalid hue of his dress

indicated the extremes of poverty and wretchedness. This man, who was

not unknown to the people, and, according to report, had borne a command

in the army, first showed several honourable scars in his breast,

remains of the wounds he had received in the service of his country, and

then informed them: “that he had been present in eight and twenty

battles, and frequently received rewards bestowed only upon superior

bravery: that in the Sabine war his cattle were driven off by the enemy,

his estate plundered, and his house reduced to ashes: that under these

unhappy circumstances he was compelled to borrow money to pay the

publick taxes; that this debt, accumulated by usury, reduced him to the

sad necessity of selling the estate descended to him from his ancestors,

with what little effects he had remaining: but that all this proving

insufficient, his devouring debts, like a wasting consumption, had

attacked his person, and he, with his two sons, were delivered up as

slaves, and led away to the slaughterhouse by his creditors.” When he

had said this, he threw off his rags, and showed his back yet bleeding

from the scourge of his merciless master. This sight inflamed the people

greatly, but the debtors breaking out of their creditor’s houses, most

of whom were loaded with chains and fetters, raised their fury even to

madness. If any one desired them to take up arms in defence of their

country, the debtors showed their chains,[255] as the reward they had

met with for their past services, and asked with indignation, whether

such blessings were worth fighting for. Whilst numbers of them openly

declared that it was much more eligible to be slaves to the Volscians

than the Patricians. The senate, quite disconcerted by the violence of

the tumult, entreated Servilius to take the management of the people.

For an express was just arrived from the Latins, with advice that a

numerous army of the enemy had already entered their territories.

Servilius remonstrated to the people the consequences of disunion at so

critical a juncture, and pacified them by the assurance that the senate

would confirm whatever concessions he should make; he then ordered the

crier to proclaim that no citizen who voluntarily enlisted should be

subject to the demands or insults of his creditors whilst the army

continued in the field. The people now flocked in with cheerfulness, and

the levies were soon completed. Servilius took the field and defeated

the Volscians, made himself master of their camp, took several of their

cities, and divided the whole plunder amongst his soldiers. At the news

of this success the sanguinary Appius ordered all the Volscian hostages

to be brought into the forum,[256] there to be whipped and publickly

beheaded. And when at his return Servilius demanded a triumph, he loudly

opposed it, called him a factious man, and accused him of defrauding the

treasury of the booty, and prevailed upon the senate to deny him that

honour. Servilius, enraged at this usage, entered the city in triumph

with his army, amidst the acclamations of the people, to the great

mortification of the Patricians.

Under the following consulship the Sabines prepared to invade the

Romans, and the people again refused to serve unless the debts were

first abolished. Lartius, the first dictator, pleaded strongly for the

people, but the inflexible Appius proposed the nomination of a dictator,

as the only remedy against the mutiny. His motion was carried in the

senate by a majority of voices, and Manius Valerius, a brother to the

great Poplicola, was created dictator. Valerius, who was a man of great

honour, engaged his word to the Plebeians, that if they would serve

cheerfully upon this occasion, he would undertake the senate should

reward them by quieting the contests relating to their debts, and

granting whatever they could reasonably desire, and commanded at the

same time that no citizen should be sued for debt during his

administration. The people had so often experienced the publick virtue

of the Valerian family, and no longer apprehensive of being again

imposed upon, offered themselves in such crowds, that ten legions of

four thousand men each were levied, the greatest army of natives the

Romans had ever brought into the field. The dictator finished the

campaign with glory, was rewarded with a triumph, and discharged the

people from farther service. This step was not at all agreeable to the

senate,[257] who feared the people would now claim the performance of

the dictator’s promises. Their fears were just; for Valerius kept his

word with the people, and moved the senate that the promise they had

made to him might be taken into consideration. But the Appian faction

opposed it with the utmost virulence, and exclaimed against his family

as flatterers of the people, and introducers of pernicious laws.

Valerius, finding his motion over-ruled, reproached the senate for their

behaviour, and foretold the consequences which would attend it; and

quitting the senate abruptly called assembly of the people. After he had

thanked them for their fidelity and bravery, he informed them of the

usage he had met with in the senate, and declared how greatly both he

and they had been imposed upon, and resigning his office, submitted

himself to whatever treatment the people should think proper. The people

heard him with equal veneration and compassion, and attended him home

from the forum with repeated acclamations. The Plebeians now kept no

measures with the senate, but assembled openly, and consulted about

seceding from the Patricians. To prevent this step, the senate ordered

the consuls not to dismiss their armies, but to lead them out into the

field, under pretence that the Sabines were again preparing for an

invasion. The consuls left the city and encamped nearly together; but

the soldiers, instigated by one Sicinnius Bellutus, seized the arms and

ensigns to avoid violating their military oath, seceded from the

consuls, and after they had appointed Sicinnius commander in chief,

encamped on a certain eminence near the river Anio, which from that

event was always termed the _mons sacer_, or the holy mountain.

When the news of this secession was brought to Rome, the confusion was

so great, that the city had the appearance of a place taken by storm,

and the Appian faction were severely reproached as the cause of this

desertion. Their enemies at the same time making inroads up to the very

gates of Rome, increased the general consternation, as the Patricians

were terribly afraid they would be joined by the seceders. But the

soldiers behaved with so much decency and moderation, that the senate

after long debates sent deputies to invite them to return, with the

promise of a general amnesty. The offer was received with scorn, and the

Patricians were charged with dissimulation, in pretending ignorance of

the just demands of the Plebeians, and the true cause of their

secession. At the return of the deputies, the affair was again debated

in the senate. Agrippa Menenius, a man respectable for his superior

wisdom and thorough knowledge of the true principles of government, and

who was alike an enemy to tyranny in the aristocracy, and licentiousness

in the people, advised healing measures, and proposed to send such

persons as the people could confide in with full power to put an end to

the sedition in the manner they should judge most proper, without

farther application to the senate. Manius Valerius, the last dictator,

spoke next, and reminded the senate, “that his predictions of the evils

which would result from their breach of promise were now verified, that

he advised a speedy accommodation with the people, lest the same evils,

if suffered to make a farther progress, should become incurable: that in

his opinion the demands of the people would rise higher than the bare

abolition of debts, and that they would insist upon such security as

might be the firm guardian of their rights and liberty for the future.

Because the late institution of the dictatorship had superseded the

Valerian law which was before the only guardian of their liberty, and

the late denial of a triumph to the consul Servilius, who had deserved

that honour more than any man in Rome, evidently proved, that the people

were deprived of almost all those privileges they had formerly enjoyed,

since a consul and a dictator who showed the least concern for the

interests of the people, were treated with abuse and ignominy by the

senate: that he did not impute these arbitrary measures to the most

considerable and respectable persons amongst the Patricians, but to a

combination of proud and avaricious men wholly intent upon unwarrantable

gain; who by advancing large sums at excessive interest, had enslaved

many of their fellow-citizens, and by their cruel and insulting

treatment of their unhappy debtors, had alienated the whole body of the

Plebeians from the aristocracy: that these men, by forming themselves

into a faction, and placing Appius, a known enemy to the people and

abettor of the oligarchy, at their head, had under his patronage,

reduced the commonwealth to its present desperate situation.” He

concluded by seconding the motion of Menenius for sending ambassadours

to put a speedy end to the sedition upon the best terms they should be

able to obtain.

Appius, finding himself thus personally attacked, rose up and replied to

Valerius in a hot inflammatory speech full of the most virulent

invectives. He denied that he was ever guilty of enslaving his debtors:

“he denied too, that those who had acted in that manner could be charged

with injustice, since they had done no more than the laws allowed. He

affirmed that the imputation of being an enemy to the people, and

favouring oligarchy, arose from his steady adherence to the aristocracy,

and equally affected all those of superior worth, who like him disdained

to be governed by their inferiors, or to suffer the form of government

which they had inherited from their ancestors[258] to deviate into the

worst of all constitutions, a democracy. He recriminated upon Valerius,

and charged him with aiming at tyranny, by courting the most profligate

of the citizens, as the most effectual and shortest way of enslaving his

country. He termed the seceders, vile, mean wretches, a thoughtless

senseless multitude, whose present arrogance had been first inspired by

that old man, as he contemptuously called Valerius. He declared

absolutely against sending ambassadours, or making the least

concession, and advised rather to arm the slaves and send for assistance

from their allies the Latins, than submit to any thing that might

derogate from the power and dignity of the Patricians. He proposed, if

the seceders should appear in arms against them, to put their wives and

children to death before their faces by the most severe and ignominious

tortures. But if they would submit at discretion to the senate, he

advised to treat them with moderation.” This speech produced a violent

tumult in the senate, and the young Patricians who adhered to Appius

behaved with so much insolence, that the consuls threatened to exclude

them from the publick counsels, by a law which should fix the age for

the qualification of every senator. Nothing was determined at that time,

but in a few days, the moderate party, supported by the firmness of the

consuls, prevailed against the still inflexible Appius, and ten

ambassadours, at the head of whom were Menenius and Valerius, were sent

with full powers to treat with the seceders. After many debates,

Menenius in the name of the senate promised full redress of all their

grievances with respect to the debts, and offered to confirm this

promise by the solemn oaths of all the ambassadours. His offer was upon

the point of being accepted, when Lucius Junius, who affected the

surname of Brutus, a bold and able Plebeian, interposed and insisted

upon such a security from the senate as might protect the Plebeians for

the future from the power of their enemies, who might find an

opportunity of wreaking their vengeance on the people for the step they

had taken. When Menenius desired to know what security he required,

Junius demanded leave for the people to choose annually a certain number

of magistrates out of their own body, vested with the power of

defending their rights and liberties, and protecting their persons from

injury and violence. As this new and unexpected demand seemed of too

great consequence to be granted by the ambassadours, Valerius with some

others were sent to take the opinion of the senate upon that subject.

Valerius laid this demand before the senate, and gave his opinion that

the favour should be granted, and Appius, as usual, opposed it with

outrageous fury. But the majority, determined at all events to put a

period to the secession, ratified all the promises made by the

ambassadours, and granted the desired security. The seceders held their

assembly in the camp, and taking the votes by curiæ, elected five

persons for their annual magistrates, who were termed tribunes of the

people. By a law made immediately after the election, the persons of the

tribunes were rendered sacred; and the people obliged themselves to

swear by whatever was held most sacred that they and their posterity

would preserve it inviolably.

The erection of the tribunitial-power, which happened about seventeen

years after the expulsion of the kings, is certainly the æra from which

the liberty of the Roman people ought properly to be dated. All the

neighbouring states were at that time subject to aristocracy, where the

people had little or no share in the government, and it appears

evidently from the Roman historians that the Romans intended to

establish the same form of government at Rome after the abolition of

monarchy. For the senate, as Livy informs us,[259] gave a loose to that

unbounded joy which the death of Tarquin inspired, and begun to oppress

and injure the people, whom until that time they had courted with the

utmost assiduity. But Sallust is more full and explicit. For he

affirms,[260] “that after the expulsion of the kings, as long as the

fear of Tarquin and the burdensome war with the Etrurians kept the

Romans in suspense, the government was administered with equity and

moderation. But as soon as ever the dread of those impending dangers was

removed, the senate begun to domineer over the people and treat them as

slaves; inflicting death or scourging after the arbitrary manner of

despotick tyrants; expelling them from their lands, and arrogating the

whole power of government to themselves, without communicating the least

share of it to the Plebeians.” Thus the people, before the creation of

this magistracy, were amused with the name of liberty, whilst in fact

they had only changed the tyranny of one, for the more galling yoke of

three hundred. But the tribunicial-power proved an invincible obstacle

to the arbitrary schemes of the aristocratick faction, and at last

introduced that due admixture of democracy, which is so essentially

necessary to the constitution of a well regulated republick.

As a minute detail of a history so well known as that of the Romans

would be quite superfluous, I shall only observe, that the democratick

power in that republick did not arrive at its just state of

independence, until the Plebeians were not only entitled to the highest

posts and dignities, equally with the Patricians, but until the

plebiscita or decrees made by the people in their assembly by

tribes,[261] were confirmed to be equally binding as those made in their

assembly by centuries. This law was first made when the tyranny of the

decemvirs was abolished by the second secession of the people to the

Sacred Mountain, but was perpetually violated by the over-bearing power

of the aristocracy. But an event similar to that which occasioned the

first secession of the people, to which they properly owed the origin of

their liberty, was the cause of the third and last secession, which

fully completed that liberty, and gave the fatal blow to the arbitrary

aristocratick faction. Veturius, the son of Titus Veturius, who had been

consul and died insolvent, borrowed a sum of money of one Plotius to

defray the expenses of his father’s funeral. As the father was greatly

indebted to the same Plotius, he demanded of young Veturius the payment

of both debts which his father and he himself had contracted. As the

unhappy young man was utterly unable to satisfy the demand, Plotius

seized his unfortunate debtor, and confined him to the work of a slave,

until he had discharged both principal and interest. Veturius bore his

servitude with patience, and did his utmost to please his creditor. But

as he refused to gratify the detestable passion of the infamous Plotius

he treated him with the utmost inhumanity to force him to a compliance.

One day he had the good fortune to escape out of the house of his

merciless creditor, and fled to the forum, where he showed his back torn

with stripes and his body covered with blood, and explained the reason

of his shocking treatment. The people, enraged at so dreadful a

spectacle, demanded an absolute security against that law, which gave

the creditors such a shameful power over their insolvent debtors. For

though that law had been abolished near forty years before upon a like

occasion, yet the Patricians, by their superior power, had again revived

it. The consuls reported the affair to the senate, who committed Plotius

to prison, and ordered all those who were in custody for debt to be set

at liberty. The Plebeians, not satisfied with these trifling

concessions, insisted upon the absolute abolition of that inhuman law;

but they were opposed with equal animosity by the Patricians. Despairing

therefore of gaining their point by entreaties and remonstrances, they

retired in a body to the Janiculum, resolutely determined never to enter

the city, until they had received full satisfaction. The senate, alarmed

at this secession, had recourse to their last resource in all desperate

cases, the creation of a dictator. Q. Hortensius was nominated dictator

upon this occasion, a man of great temper and prudence, and a real

friend to liberty. As he was vested with absolute power by virtue of his

office, he totally abolished that law which had given such just cause of

uneasiness, and notwithstanding all the opposition of the senate,

revived and confirmed two laws which had been formerly made, though

constantly violated by the Patricians. One was, “that the decrees made

by the Plebeians should be equally obligatory to the Patricians:” the

other, “that all laws passed in the senate should be laid before the

comitia, or assemblies of the people, either to be confirmed or

rejected.” Thus the liberty, which the Plebeians had acquired by the

first secession, was confirmed in the plainest and strongest manner by

the last, which happened about two hundred and six years after. For the

Patricians, from that memorable æra, had scarce any other advantage

over the Plebeians, except what arose from their superior wealth, and

that respect which is naturally paid by inferiors to men of superior

birth.

It is evident, from that sudden change which the Plebeians experienced

in the behaviour of the Patricians at the death of Tarquin, that if the

senate could have supported themselves in that arbitrary power, which

they so visibly aimed at, the condition of the people would have been

just like that of the Polish peasants under their imperious lords. For

in that detestable aristocracy, the Patricians, not content with the

wealth of the republick, which centered chiefly in their own body, used

their utmost efforts to engross the entire possession of the lands. The

secession of the people, and the creation of the tribunes, defeated the

scheme they had formed for establishing an aristocratick tyranny. But

the frequent attempts to revive the Agrarian law prove undeniably that

the Patricians never lost sight of their ambitious views of aggrandizing

their families by an illegal usurpation of the conquered lands. Spurius

Cassius, a Patrician, was the first author of this law, about eight

years after the secession, with a view of raising himself to the regal

power by conciliating the affection and interest of the people. The law

itself was certainly just, and founded upon that equality in the

distribution of the land, which was a part of the constitution, as

settled by their founder Romulus. The plea therefore of Cassius, “that

the lands, which had been conquered by the blood and valour of the

people, should be taken from the rich and applied to the service of the

publick,” was founded upon the strictest equity, as well as the

fundamental principles of their constitution. Even Appius, the most

inveterate enemy to the people, acknowledged the justice of his

proposal, since he moved that commissioners should be appointed by the

senate to fix the boundaries of the land in question, and sell, or let

it out in farms for the benefit of the publick. This advice was

unanimously approved of, and the senate passed a decree, that ten of the

most ancient consular senators should be appointed commissioners to

carry this scheme into execution. This decree at once pacified the

people and ruined Cassius. For as he had proposed to divide two thirds

of the lands between the Latins and Hernici, whose assistance he at that

time courted, the people gave him up to the resentment of the senate,

who condemned him for plotting to introduce a single tyranny, and

ordered him to be thrown down the Tarpeian precipice.

This was the first rise of the famous agrarian law, which occasioned

such frequent contests between the senate and the people, and stirred up

the first civil war in Rome, which ended in the murder of both the

Gracchi, about three hundred and fifty years after. For the senate not

only evaded the nomination of the commissioners, as they had promised in

their decree, but, whenever that affair was brought upon the carpet,

they acted with an insincerity and artifice which are highly

inconsistent with the so much vaunted probity of the Roman senate.

Unless therefore we attend to the true reasons, upon which the agrarian

law was originally founded, we can never form a right judgment of the

perpetual dissensions between the senate and the tribunes upon that

subject. For though the chief blame, in all these contests, is most

commonly thrown upon the turbulent and seditious temper of the tribunes,

yet, if the real cause of those dissensions is impartially examined, we

shall find that most of them took rise from the avarice and injustice of

the Patricians. But though the tribunitial power was sometimes made

subservient to the interested views of some ambitious tribunes, yet no

argument can justly be drawn from the abuse of that power against its

real utility. For how much it was dreaded as the bulwark of the liberty

of the people, is evident from this consideration: that it was reduced

almost to nothing by Sylla, and afterwards totally absorbed by Augustus

and the succeeding emperors, who never looked upon the people as

thoroughly enslaved until they had annexed the tribunitial power to the

imperatorial dignity.

I remarked before, that when the highest dignities and employments in

the republick were laid open to the Plebeians, and the decrees of the

people had the same force, and affected the Patricians in the same

manner as those which were issued by the senate, the democratick power

was raised to an equality with the aristocratick. But as a third power,

or estate (as we term it) was wanting, capable of preserving the

requisite æquilibrium between the other two, it was impossible from the

very nature of the republican constitution, that the equality between

the two powers could be long supported. The concessions made by

Hortensius quieted indeed the civil dissensions; and it is remarkable

too, that after peace was restored to the republick, the progress of the

Roman conquests was so amazingly rapid, that in little more than two

hundred years from that period they had subjugated the most opulent

empires in the universe. But the same conquests, which raised the

republick to the summit of her grandeur, threw too much weight into the

democratick scale, and, by totally corrupting the Roman manners, brought

on the final ruin of their liberty and constitution. For as every

conquered province created successively a new government, these new

dignities immediately became new objects of avarice and ambition. But as

the command of the armies, the government of provinces, and the highest

posts in the state, were disposed of by the suffrages of the people; the

candidates for those lucrative employments left no means unattempted to

secure a majority. Hence, as the poor Plebeians were extremely numerous,

the man who was able to distribute the greatest largesses, or divert the

mob with the finest shows, was generally the most successful. When the

interest of the candidates was nearly equal, force was frequently made

use of to decide the contest; and it was not uncommon to see the

forum[262] covered with the slaughtered bodies of the electors. The

generals who were elected fleeced the provinces to enable themselves to

keep up their interest at home with the people, and connived at the

rapines of their soldiers to secure their affections. Hence at Rome

liberty degenerated into the most outrageous licentiousness, whilst the

soldiers gradually wore off that parental love for their country, which

was once the characteristick of the Romans, and attached themselves

wholly to the fortunes of their generals. Hence the most succesful

leaders began to look upon themselves no longer as servants, but as

masters of the republick, and each endeavoured to support his

pretensions by force of arms. The faction of Sylla and Marius filled the

city alternately with slaughter and rapine, as the fortune of their

respective leaders prevailed in the course of that destructive contest.

And Rome frequently felt the calamitous effects of war in her own

bowels, at a time when her victorious arms abroad were adding new

provinces to her dominions. These factions were far from expiring with

their leaders, but broke out again with the same baleful fury under the

first and second triumvirate. Each of these, strictly speaking, were no

more than coalitions of the same factions, where three chiefs united

their several parties to crush every other. When they had accomplished

this, and satiated their ambition, their avarice, and their private

resentments, by the most bloody proscriptions, they quarrelled about the

division of power, like captains of banditti about the division of

booty, with whom they agreed in principle, and differed only in degree.

These quarrels occasioned those civil wars, which gave the finishing

blow to the Roman republick. The ablest and most dangerous man, in each

triumvirate, proved at last the conqueror; and Julius Cæsar first put

those chains upon his country, which Augustus riveted beyond a

possibility of removal.

All the historians, from whom we have received any account of the Roman

affairs, agree unanimously in fixing their conquest of Antiochus the

Great, as the æra from whence we are to date the rise of luxury and

corruption amongst them. Livy assures us, that luxury was first

introduced into their city by the army of Manlius at their return from

Asia. They, he informs us, were the first who made Rome acquainted with

the finely ornamented couches, the rich carpets, the embroidered

hangings, and other expensive productions of the looms of Asia, with all

those elegant tables of various forms and workmanship, which were

esteemed so essential a part of that magnificence which they affected in

their furniture. They introduced wenches, who sung and played upon

different instruments, with dancers of anticks, to heighten the mirth

and indulgence of the table. To show to what height they carried the

expense and luxury of the table, he adds, with indignation, that a cook,

who, by their frugal and temperate ancestors, was looked upon, from his

very office, as the vilest slave in the household, was now esteemed an

officer of mighty consequence, and cookery was erected into an art,

which before was looked upon as the most servile kind of drudgery. Yet

new and strange as these first specimens might seem, Livy assures us,

that they were but trifles when compared to their succeeding luxury.

Before that fatal æra the Romans were poor, but they were contented and

happy, because they knew no imaginary wants: and whilst their manners

were virtuous, poverty itself was honourable, and added a new lustre to

every other virtue. But when once they had contracted a relish for the

luxury of Asia, they quickly found that the wealth of Asia was necessary

to support it; and this discovery as quickly produced a total change in

their manners. Before that time the love of glory, and a contempt of

wealth, was the ruling passion of the Romans. Since that time money was

the only object of their applause and desire. Before, ambition impelled

them to war, from a thirst of dominion; now avarice, for the sake of

plunder to support the expense of luxury. Before, they seemed a race of

heroes; they were now a gang of insatiable robbers. Formerly, when they

had reduced a people to obedience, they received them as their allies;

they now made the conquered nations their slaves. They fleeced the

provinces, and oppressed their friends. As the great offices, which

entitled the possessors to the command of armies, and the government of

provinces, were disposed of by the votes of the people, no method was

left unattempted to secure a majority of suffrages. The candidates for

these employments, not only exhausted their own fortunes, but strained

their credit to the utmost, to bribe the people with shows and

donatives. To this infamous period we must fix the rise of that torrent

of corruption, which so quickly deluged the Roman republick. The

successful candidates set out for their government, like hungry

emaciated wolves, to fatten upon the blood of the miserable provinces.

Cicero makes heavy complaints of the rapine and extortion of these

rapacious oppressors; and his orations against Verres, when accused by

the Sicilians, give us a complete idea of the behaviour of a Roman

governour in his province. The complaints of the oppressed provincials

were incessant; but every governour had his friends amongst the leading

men, whom he secured by a share of the plunder, and the weight of their

whole interest was applied to screen the criminal. Laws indeed were made

against this crime of peculation, but they were easily eluded, because

the judges, who were chosen out of the body of the people, were as

corrupt as the offenders, and were frequently their associates in

villany. Thus corruption made its way into the very vitals of the

republick. Every thing was venal, and the venality had made so rapid a

progress, even in the time of Jugurtha, which was about eighty years

after the defeat of Antiochus, as to occasion the severe sarcasm of that

prince, recorded by Sallust, which places the corruption of the Romans

in a stronger point of view, than the most laboured and pathetick

description of their historians. “That Rome had carried her venality to

so great a height, as to be ready to sell herself to destruction, if she

could but find a purchaser.” When the Romans had beggared the monarchs,

whom they vouchsafed to style their friends, and drained the provinces

until they had scarce any thing left to plunder; the same principle

which had induced them to pillage the universe, impelled them now to

prey upon one another.[263] Marius and Sylla were the first Romans who

set the fatal precedent, and were the first who bridled Rome with a

standing army. The civil power was compelled to give way to the

military, and from that period we may truly date the ruin of the Roman

liberty. The state continued to fluctuate between despotism and anarchy,

until it terminated irretrievably under the Cæsars, in the most

absolute, and most infernal tyranny that any people were ever yet

cursed with. Marius opened the bloody scene, and glutted his followers

with the blood and wealth of the friends of Sylla. Sylla repaid the

Marian faction in the same coin with usury. Battles were fought in the

very streets; and Rome, more than once, experienced all the horrors of a

city taken by storm from her own citizens. Personal resentment and

revenge for injuries received, were the pretence on both sides, but

plunder and confiscations seem to have been the chief motives. For the

rich were equally looked upon as enemies, and equally proscribed by both

factions, and they alone were safe who had nothing worth taking.

If we connect the various strokes, interspersed through what we have

remaining of the writings of Sallust, which he levelled at the vices of

his countrymen, we shall be able to form a just idea of the manners of

the Romans in the time of that historian. From the picture, thus

faithfully exhibited, we must be convinced, that not only those shocking

calamities, which the republick suffered during the contest between

Marius and Sylla, but those subsequent, and more fatal evils, which

brought on the utter extinction of the Roman liberty and constitution,

were the natural effects of that foreign luxury, which first introduced

venality and corruption. Though the introduction of luxury from Asia

preceded the ruin of Carthage in point of time, yet, as Sallust informs

us, the dread of that dangerous rival restrained the Romans within the

bounds of decency and order.[264] But as soon as ever that obstacle was

removed,[265] they gave a full scope to their ungoverned passions. The

change in their manners was not gradual, and by little and little, as

before, but rapid and instantaneous. Religion, justice, modesty,

decency, all regard for divine or human laws, were swept away at once by

the irresistible torrent of corruption. The nobility strained the

privileges annexed to their dignity,[266] and the people their liberty,

alike into the most unbounded licentiousness. Every one made the

dictates of his own lawless will his only rule of action. Publick

virtue, and the love of their country, which had raised the Romans to

the empire of the universe, were extinct. Money,[267] which alone could

enable them to gratify their darling luxury, was substituted in their

place. Power, which alone could enable them to gratify their darling

dominion, honours, and universal respect, were annexed to the possession

of money. Contempt, and whatever was most reproachful, was the bitter

portion of poverty; and to be poor, grew to be the greatest of all

crimes in the estimation of the Romans. Thus wealth and poverty

contributed alike to the ruin of the republick. The rich employed their

wealth in the acquisition of power,[268] and their power in every kind

of oppression and rapine, for the acquisition of more wealth. The

poor,[269] now dissolute and desperate, were ready to engage in every

seditious insurrection, which promised them the plunder of the rich, and

set up both their liberty and their country to sale to the best bidder.

The republick,[270] which was the common prey to both, was thus rent to

pieces between the contending parties. As an universal selfishness is

the genuine effect of universal luxury, so the natural effect of

selfishness is to break through every tie, both divine and human, and

to stick at no kind of excesses in the pursuit of wealth, its favourite

object. Thus the effects of selfishness will naturally appear in

irreligion,[271] breach of faith, perjury, a contempt of all the social

duties, extortion, frauds in our dealings, pride, cruelty, universal

venality and corruption. From selfishness arises that vicious ambition

(if I may be allowed the term) which Sallust rightly defines, “the lust

of domination.”[272] Ambition as a passion, precedes avarice; for the

seeds of ambition seem almost to be innate. The desire of pre-eminence,

the fondness for being distinguished above the rest of our

fellow-creatures, attends us from the cradle to the grave. Though as it

takes its complexion, so it receives its denomination from the different

objects it pursues, which in all are but the different means of

attaining the same end. But the lust of domination, here mentioned by

Sallust, though generally confounded with ambition, is in reality a

different passion, and is, strictly speaking, only a different mode of

selfishness. For the chief end which we propose, by the lust of

domination, is to draw every thing to centre in ourselves, which we

think will enable us to gratify every other passion. I confess it may be

alleged, that self-love and selfishness both arise from the general law

of self-preservation, and are but different modes of the same

principle. I acknowledge, that if we examine strictly all those heroick

instances of love, friendship, or patriotism, which seem to be carried

to the most exalted degree of disinterestedness, we shall probably find

the principle of self-love lurking at the bottom of many of them. But,

if we rightly define these two principles, we shall find an essential

difference between our ideas of self-love, and selfishness. Self-love,

within its due bounds, is the practice of the great duty of

self-preservation, regulated by that law which the great author of our

being has given for that very end. Self-love therefore is not only

compatible with the most rigid practice of the social duties, but is in

fact a great motive and incentive to the practice of all moral virtue.

Whereas selfishness, by reducing every thing to the single point of

private interest, a point which it never loses sight of, banishes all

the social virtues, and is the first spring of action, which impels to

all those disorders, which are so fatal to mixed government in

particular, and to society in general. From this poisonous source

Sallust deduces all those evils,[273] which spread the pestilence of

corruption over the whole face of the republick, and changed the mildest

and most upright government in the universe into the most inhuman, and

most insupportable tyranny. For as the lust of domination can never

possibly attain its end without the assistance of others, the man, who

is actuated by that destructive passion, must, of necessity, strive to

attach to himself a set of men of similar principles, for the

subordinate instruments. This is the origin of all those iniquitous

combinations, which we call factions. To accomplish this,[274] he must

put on as many shapes as Proteus; he must ever wear the mask of

dissimulation, and live a perpetual lie. He will court the friendship of

every man, who is capable of promoting, and endeavour to crush every

man, who is capable of defeating his ambitious views. Thus his

friendship and his enmity will be alike unreal, and easily convertible,

if the change will serve his interest. As private interest is the only

tie which can ever connect a faction,[275] the lust of wealth, which was

the cause of the lust of domination, will now become the effect, and

must be proportional to the sum total of the demands of the whole

faction; and, as the latter know no bounds, so the former, will be alike

insatiable. For when once a man is inured to bribes in the service of

faction,[276] he will expect to be paid as well for acting for, as for

acting against the dictates of his conscience. A truth, which every

minister must have experienced, who has been supported by a faction, and

which a late great minister (as he frankly confessed) found to be the

case with him during his long administration. But how deeply soever a

state may be immersed in luxury and corruption, yet the man who aims at

being the head of a faction for the end of domination,[277] will at

first cloak his real design under an affected zeal for the service of

the government. When he has established himself in power, and formed his

party, all who support his measures will be rewarded as the friends; all

who oppose him will be treated as enemies to the government. The honest

and uncorrupt citizen will be hunted down as disaffected, and all his

remonstrances, against mal-administration, will be represented as

proceeding from that principle. The cant term, _disaffection_, will be

the watch-word of the faction; and the charge of disaffection, that

constant resource of iniquitous ministers, that infallible sign that a

cause will not stand the test of a fair inquiry, will be perpetually

employed by the tools of power to silence those objections which they

want argument to answer. The faction will estimate the worth of their

leader,[278] not by his services to his country, for the good of the

publick will be looked upon as obsolete and chimerical; but his ability

to gratify, or screen his friends, and crush his opponents. The leader

will fix the implicit obedience to his will, as the test of merit to his

faction: consequently all the dignities, and lucrative posts will be

conferred upon persons of that stamp only, whilst honesty and publick

virtue will be standing marks of political reprobation. Common justice

will be denied to the latter in all controverted elections, whilst the

laws will be strained, or over-ruled in favour of the former. Luxury is

the certain forerunner of corruption, because it is the certain parent

of indigence: consequently a state so circumstanced will always furnish

an ample supply of proper instruments for faction. For as luxury

consists in an inordinate gratification of the sensual passions,[279]

the more the passions are indulged they grow the more importunately

craving, until the greatest fortune must sink under their insatiable

demands. Thus luxury necessarily produces corruption. For as wealth is

essentially necessary to the support of luxury, wealth will be the

universal object of desire in every state where luxury prevails:

consequently all those who have dissipated their private fortunes in the

purchase of pleasure, will be ever ready to enlist in the cause of

faction for the wages of corruption. A taste for pleasure immoderately

indulged, quickly strengthens into habit, eradicates every principle of

honour and virtue, and gets possession of the whole man. And the more

expensive such a man is in his pleasures, the greater lengths he will

run for the acquisition of wealth for the end of profusion. Thus the

contagion will become so universal, that nothing but an uncommon share

of virtue can preserve the possessor from infection. For when once the

idea of respect and homage is annexed to the possession of wealth

alone,[280] honour, probity, every virtue and every amiable quality

will be held cheap in comparison, and looked upon as awkward and quite

unfashionable. But as the spirit of liberty will yet exist in some

degree in a state which retains the name of freedom, even though the

manners of that state should be generally depraved, an opposition will

arise from those virtuous citizens, who know the value of their

birthright, _liberty_, and will never submit tamely to the chains of

faction. Force then will be called in to the aid of corruption,[281] and

a standing army will be introduced. A military government will be

established upon the ruins of the civil, and all commands and

employments will be disposed of at the arbitrary will of lawless power.

The people will be fleeced to pay for their own fetters, and doomed,

like the cattle, to unremitting toil and drudgery for the support of

their tyrannical masters. Or, if the outward form of civil government

should be permitted to remain, the people will be compelled to give a

sanction to tyranny by their own suffrages, and to elect oppressors

instead of protectors.

From this genuine portrait of the Roman manners, it is evident to a

demonstration, that the fatal catastrophe of that republick (of which

Sallust himself was an eye witness) was the natural effect of the

corruption of their manners. It is equally as evident from our author,

and the rest of the Roman historians, that the corruption of their

manners was the natural effect of foreign luxury, introduced and

supported by foreign wealth. The fatal tendency of these evils, was too

obvious to escape the notice of every sensible Roman, who had any regard

for liberty, and their ancient constitution. Many sumptuary laws were

made to restrain the various excesses of luxury; but these efforts were

too feeble to check the over-bearing violence of the torrent. Cato

proposed a severe law, enforced by the sanction of an oath, against

bribery and corruption at elections; where the scandalous traffick of

votes was established by custom as at a publick market. But, as Plutarch

observes,[282] he incurred the resentment of both parties by that

salutary measure. The rich were his enemies, because they found

themselves precluded from all pretensions to the highest dignities; as

they had no other merit to plead but what arose from their superior

wealth. The electors abused, cursed, and even pelted him as the author

of a law which deprived them of the wages of corruption, and reduced

them to the necessity of subsisting by labour.[283] But this law, if it

really passed, had as little effect as any of the former; and like the

same laws in our own country, upon the same occasion, was either evaded

by chicane, or over-ruled by power. Our own septennial scenes of

drunkenness, riot, bribery, and abandoned perjury, may serve to give us

an idea of the annual elections of the Romans in those abominable

times.[284] Corruption was arrived at its last stage, and the depravity

was universal. The whole body of the unhappy republick was infected, and

the distemper was utterly incurable. For those excesses which formerly

were esteemed the vices of the people,[285] were now, by the force of

custom fixed into habit, become the manners of the people. A most

infallible criterion, by which we may ascertain the very point of time,

when the ruin of the any free state, which labours under these evils,

may be naturally expected.

The conspiracies of Catiline and Cæsar against the liberty of their

country, were but genuine effects of that corruption, which Sallust has

marked out to us, as the immediate cause of the destruction of the

republick. The end proposed by each of these bad men, and the means

employed for that end, were the same in both. The difference in their

success arose only from the difference of address and abilities in the

respective leaders. The followers of Catiline, as Sallust informs us,

were the most dissolute, the most profligate, and the most abandoned

wretches, which could be culled out of the most populous and most

corrupt city of the universe.[286] Cæsar, upon the same plan, formed his

party, as we learn from Plutarch out of the most infected, and most

corrupt members of the very same state.[287] The vices of the times

easily furnished a supply of proper instruments. To pilfer the publick

money,[288] and to plunder the provinces by violence, though

state-crimes of the most heinous nature, were grown so familiar by

custom, that they were looked upon as no more than mere

office-perquisites. The younger people, who are ever most ripe for

sedition and insurrection, were so corrupted by luxury,[289] that they

might be deservedly termed, “an abandoned race, whose dissipation made

it impracticable for them to keep their own private fortunes; and whose

avarice would not suffer their fellow-citizens to enjoy the quiet

possession of theirs.”

It is not at all strange that Rome thus circumstanced should fall a

victim to the corruption of her own citizens: nor that the empire of the

universe, the toil and labour of ages, to which the Romans had waded

through seas of blood, should be destined to feed the detestable vices

of a few monsters, who were a disgrace even to human nature. The total

change of the Roman constitution, the unlimited tyranny of the emperors,

and the abject slavery of the people, were all effects of the same

cause, extended in degree by a natural progression. The Romans in fact

were no more; the name indeed subsisted, but the idea affixed to that

name, was as totally changed as their ancient constitution. In the time

of Pyrrhus the Roman senate appeared an assembly of kings to his

ambassadour Cyneas. When the east had felt the force of the Roman arms,

the most despotick princes received the orders of a Roman senate, and

executed them with as prompt obedience, as a slave would do the commands

of his master. A deputy from the Roman senate made a haughty monarch

tremble at the head of a victorious army, compelled him to resign all

his conquests, and return ingloriously home, by a single motion of his

walking-stick.[290]

What an elevated idea must this give us of the Roman manners, whilst

that haughty people retained their freedom! Nothing is more grand;

nothing more striking. Shift but the scene, and view the manners of the

Romans when enslaved. Nothing is so abjectly servile, nothing so

despicable. We see the Roman senate deifying the worst of mankind;

wretches, who had sunk even below humanity, and offering the adoration

of incense to these idols of their own making, who were more

contemptible than the very stone and wooden representatives of their

deities. Instead of giving law to monarchs, and deciding the fate of

nations, we see the august Roman senate run trembling like slaves at the

summons of their master Domitian,[291] to debate in form about the

important business of dressing a turbot!! The majesty of the Roman

people, which received the tributary homage of the universe, expired

together with their liberty. That people, who disposed of the highest

offices in the government, the command of armies, provinces and

kingdoms, were sunk into a herd of dispirited slaves. Their total

insignificancy screened them from the fatal effects of the caprices of

their tyrants. They dragged on a wretched being in a state of idleness

and poverty in the midst of slavery, and the utmost extent of their

wishes amounted to no more, than bread for their daily subsistence, and

diversions for their amusement.[292] The emperors supplied the one by

their frequent largesses of corn, and gratified the other by their

numerous publick shows. Hence historians observe, that the most infamous

of their tyrants were as fond of rareeshows, as the mob themselves, and

as they were by much the most profuse of all their emperors, their

deaths were always most regretted by the people. So striking is the

contrast between a state when blessed with liberty, and the same state

when reduced to slavery by the corruption of its people!

As I have already made some reflections upon that passion for theatrical

entertainments, which prevailed at Athens, I cannot help observing, that

after the introduction of luxury, the fondness for that kind of

diversion amongst the Romans, was at least equal to that of the

Athenians. The Romans seem to have been strangers to every kind of

stage-plays for the first four hundred years. Their first attempts of

that kind were rude and simple, and not unlike the ancient mummery at

our country wakes, or Christmas gambols. The regular drama was imported

together with the luxury of Greece, but every species of this kind of

entertainment, whether tragedy, comedy, farce, or pantomime, was

comprehended under the general denomination of stage-plays,[293] and the

different performers alike ranged under the general term of

players.[294] The profession itself was reckoned scandalous, and proper

only for slaves, and if once a Roman citizen appeared upon the stage, he

immediately forfeited his right of voting, and every other privilege of

a free man. Upon this account Cicero seems to lament the fate of his

friend Roscius, when he tells us, “that he was so superior to all, as a

player,[295] that he alone seemed worthy of appearing upon the stage:

but of so exalted a character, as a man, that of all men he deserved

least to be doomed to so scandalous a profession.” Suetonius, speaking

of the licentiousness and insolence of the players, takes notice of an

ancient law, which empowered the prætors and œdiles to whip those

players publickly, who gave the least offence, or did not perform to

the satisfaction of the people. Though Augustus[296] as the same

historian informs us, exempted players from the ignominy of that law,

yet he took care to restrain them within the bounds of decency and good

manners.[297] For he ordered Stephanio, a celebrated comedian, to be

whipped publickly through all the theatres, and afterwards banished him,

for presuming privately to keep a Roman matron disguised under the habit

of his boy. Upon a complaint from the prætor he made Hylas the pantomime

be lashed openly in the court of his own palace, to which place the

offender had fled for refuge; and banished Pylades, one of the most

eminent players, not only from Rome but even from Italy, for affronting

one of the audience who had hissed him upon the stage. But these

restraints seem to have expired with Augustus. For we find the pride and

insolence of the players carried to so great a height in the reign of

his successor Tiberius, as to occasion their total banishment. The

fondness of the populace for the entertainments of the theatre, and the

folly of the degenerate nobility, were the causes of this alteration.

For both Pliny and Seneca assure us, that persons of the very first rank

and fashion were so scandalously mean, as to pay the most obsequious

court to the players, to dangle at their levees, to attend them openly

in the streets like their slaves; and treat them like the masters,

instead of the servants of the publick.[298] Every eminent player had

his party, and these ridiculous factions interested themselves so warmly

in the cause of their respective favourites, that the theatres became a

perpetual scene of riot and disorder. The nobility mingled with the mob

in these absurd conflicts;[299] which always ended in bloodshed, and

frequently in murder. The remonstrances and authority of the magistrates

had so little effect, that they were obliged to have recourse to the

emperor. Bad as Tiberius was, yet he was too wise to tolerate such

shameful licentiousness. He laid the case before the senate, and

informed them, that the players were the cause of those scandalous riots

which disturbed the repose of the publick: that they spread lewdness

and debauchery through all the chief families; that they were arrived

to such a height of profligacy and insolence, through the protection of

their factions, that the authority of the senate itself was requisite to

restrain them within proper bounds. Upon this remonstrance they were

driven out of Italy as a publick nuisance;[300] and Suetonius informs

us, that all the frequent and united petitions of the people could never

prevail upon Tiberius to recall them.

Augustus affected an extreme fondness for all kinds of diversion; he

invited the most celebrated players of every denomination into Italy,

and treated the people, at an immense expense, with every kind of

entertainment, which the theatre or circus could furnish. This is

remarked as an instance of that refined policy of which he was so

thorough a master. For that artful prince was not yet firmly settled in

his newly usurped power. He well knew, that if he gave the people time

to cool and reflect, they might possibly thwart the execution of his

ambitious schemes. He therefore judged that the best expedient to

prepare them for the yoke of slavery would be, to keep them constantly

intoxicated by one perpetual round of jollity and diversions. That this

was the opinion of thinking people, at that time, is evident from that

remarkably pertinent answer of Pylades the player to Augustus,

transmitted to us by Dion Cassius. Pylades, as I have already observed,

had been banished by Augustus for a misdemeanor, but pardoned and

recalled to gratify the humour of the people. At his return, when

Augustus reproved him for quarrelling with one Bathyllus, a person of

the same profession, but protected by his favourite Mæcenas; Pylades is

reported to have made this bold and sensible answer. “It is your true

interest, Cæsar, that the people should idle away that time upon us and

our affairs, which they might otherwise employ in prying too narrowly

into your government.”[301]

I am far from being an enemy to the stage. On the contrary, I think the

stage under proper regulations might be rendered highly useful. For of

all our publick diversions, the stage, if purged from the obscenity of

farce, and the low buffoonery of pantomime, is certainly capable of

affording infinitely the most rational, and the most manly

entertainment. But when I see the same disorders in our own theatres,

which were so loudly complained of in the time of Tiberius; when the

ridiculous contests between contending players are judged to be of such

mighty importance, as to split the publick into the same kind of

factions; when these factions interest themselves so warmly in the

support of the supposed merit of their respective favourites, as to

proceed to riots, blows, and the most extravagant indecencies; I cannot

help wishing for the interposition of the reforming spirit of Augustus.

And when I see the same insatiable fondness for diversions, the same

unmeaning taste (so justly ridiculed by Horace in his countrymen)

prevail in our own nation,[302] which mark the most degenerate times of

Greece and Rome, I cannot but look upon them as a certain indication of

the frivolous and effeminate manners of the present age.

[247] Romulus had divided the whole people into thirty curiæ,

ten of which composed a tribe. At their comitia or general

assemblies, the people divided into their respective curiæ and

gave their votes man by man. The majority of votes in each

curia passed for the voice of the whole curia, and the majority

of the curiæ for the general determination of the whole people.

Tullius on the contrary took their votes only by centuries, the

whole number of which amounted to one hundred and ninety-three,

into which he had subdivided the six classes. But as the first

class alone, which was composed wholly of the rich, contained

ninety-eight of these centuries, if the centuries of the first

class were unanimous, which, as Dionysius informs us, was

generally the case, they carried every point by a sure majority

of three.... If they disagreed, Tullius called the centuries of

the second class, and so on until ninety-seven centuries agreed

in one opinion, which made a majority of one. If the numbers

continued equal, that is ninety-six on each side of the

question, after the five first classes had voted; Tullius

called up the sixth class which was composed wholly of the

poorest people, and contained but one century, and the vote of

this century determined the question.... But this case, as

Dionysius observes, happened so very rarely; that even the

votes of the fourth class were seldom called for, and thus the

votes of the fifth and sixth were generally useless.

Consequently when the people voted by their curiæ, where the

vote of every individual was taken, the poor who were much the

most numerous, might always be secure of a great majority....

But when the votes were taken by centuries, according to the

new method instituted by Tullius, that numerous body of the

poor, which composed the single century of the sixth class, and

consequently had but one vote, became wholly insignificant.

[244] Dionys. Halicarn. cap. 2. p. 137. Edit. Wechel.

[245] About three hundred pounds.

[246] Liv. lib. 4. p. 276.

[248] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 4. p. 182. edit. 1546.

[249] Dionys. Halicarn. id. ibid.

[250] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 5. p. 205.

[251] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 5. p. 247.

[252] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 255.

[253] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 266.

[254] I have chiefly followed Livy in his beautiful relation of

this affair, as the description he gives of this unhappy

object, is not only much more striking than that of Dionysius,

but one of the most pathetick I ever met with in history. Liv.

lib. 2. p. 92.

[255] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 61. p. 268.

[256] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 270.

[257] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 276...77.

[258] It is remarkable that Appius terms the aristocracy, which

at that very time was hardly seventeen years standing, the form

of government which they had inherited from their ancestors.

[259] Liv. lib. 2. p. 91.

[260] Sallust. Fragment. apud Augustin. de civitate Dei. lib.

2. cap. 18. edit. Froben. 1569.

[261] In the comitia tributa or assemblies by tribes the people

voted in the same manner, as in the comitia curiata or

assemblies by curiæ. The majority of single votes in every

tribe constituted the voice of that tribe, and the majority of

the tribes decided the question. But the Patricians conscious

of their superiority in the comitia centuriata or assemblies by

centuries, constantly refused to obey the plebiscita or decrees

made by the people in their assemblies by tribes, which they

insisted were binding to the Plebeians only. After the

abolition of the decemvirate the people obtained a law: ...

“that all laws passed in their assemblies by tribes should have

equal force with those made in the assemblies by centuries, and

should be equally obligatory to all the Romans without

distinction.”

[262] The place of election.

[263] Proscriptiones innoxiorum ob divitias, cruciatus virorum

illustrium, vastam urbem fuga et cædibus, bona civium miserorum

quasi Cimbricam prædum, venum aut dono datam. Sall. Frag. p.

142.

[264] Ante Carthaginem deletam ... metus hostilis in bonis

artibus civitatem retinebat. Sall. Bell. Jug. p. 80.

[265] Postquam remoto metu Punico mores non paulatim ut antea,

sed torrentis modo præcipitati. Sall. Frag. p. 139.

... Rapere, consumere, sua parvi pendere, aliena cupere,

pudorem, pudicitiam, divina humana promiscua, nihil pensi,

neque moderati habere. De Bell. Cat. pag. 8.

[266] Cæpere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in

lubidinem vertere. Bell. Jug. p. 80.

[267] Postquam divitiæ honori esse cœperunt, et eas gloria,

imperium, potentia sequebatur hebescere virtus, paupertas

probro haberi, innocentia pro malevolentia duci cæpit. Bell.

Cat. p. 8.

[268] Ita cum potentia avaritia sine modo, modestiaque

invadere, polluere, et vastare omnia, nihil pensi neque sancti

habere. p. 81.

Sibi quisque ducere, trahere rapere. De Bell. Jug. p. 81.

[269] Eos paulatim expulsos agris, inertia atque inopia

incertas domos habere subegit: cæpere alienas opes petere,

libertatem suam cum Republica venalem habere. Sall. Orat. 2. ad

Cæsarem de Repub. Ordinand. p. 197.

[270] Ita omnia in duas partes abstracta sunt: respublica, quæ

media fuerat, dilacerata. De Bell. Jug. p. 80.

[271] Pecuniæ cupido fidem, probitatem ceterasque bonas artes

subvertit; pro his superbiam, crudelitatem deos negligere,

omnia venalia habere edocuit. De Bell. Cat. p. 7.

[272] Cupido Imperii, id. p. 7.

[273] Primo pecuniæ, dein imperii cupido crevit, ea quasi

materies omnium malorum fuere.... Post ubi contagio, quasi

pestilentia, invasit, civitas immutata, imperium ex justissimo

atque optumo, crudele intolerandumque factum. De Bell. Cat. p.

7.

[274] Aliud clausum in pectore, aliud promptum in lingua

habere, amicitias, inimicitiasq; vultum, quam ingenium bonum

habere. Ibid.

[275] Malitia præmiis exercetur; ubi ea demseris, nemo omnium

gratuito malus est. p. 200.

[276] Nam, ubi malos præmia sequuntur, haud facile quisquam

gratuito bonus est. Sall. Orat. Philip. contra Lapid. p. 145.

[277] Pauci potentes, quorum in gratia plerique concesserant,

sub honesto patrum, aut plebis nomine dominationes affectabant,

bonique et mali cives appellati, non ob merita in rempublicam

(omnibus pariter corruptis) sed uti quisque locupletissimus et

injuria validior, quia præsentia defendebat, pro bono

ducebatur. Frag. p. 139.

[278] Iidem illi factiosi regunt, dant, adimunt quæ lubet;

innocentes circumveniunt: suos ad honorem extollunt. Non

facinus, non probrum, aut flagitium obstat, quo minus

magistratus expetant: quod commodum est, trahunt, rapiunt:

postremo tamquam urbe capta, lubidine ac licentia sua pro

legibus utuntur. Sall. Or. 2. ad Cæsar. p. 196.

[279] Divitiis, quas honeste habere licebat, per turpitudinem

abuti properabant. Lubido stupri, ganeæ, cæterique cultus non

minor incesserat.... Vescendi causa, terra mariq; omnia

exquirere; dormire priusquam somni cupido esset: non famam, aut

sitim, neq; frigus, neq; lassitudinem operiri; sed ea omnia

luxu ante capere. Hæc juventutem, ubi familiares opes

defecerant, ad facinora incedebant. Animus imbutus malis

artibus haud facile lubidinibus carebat: eo profusius omnibus

modis quæstui atque sumtui deditus erat. Sall. de Bell. Cat. p.

9.

[280] Ubi divitiæ claræ habentur, ibi omnia bona vilia sunt,

fides, probitas, pudor, pudicitia. Sall. Orat. 2. ad Cæs. p.

199.

[281] Itaque omnes concessere jam in paucorum dominationem, qui

per militare nomen, ærarium, exercitum, regnum, provincias

occupavere, et arcem habent ex spoliis vestris: cum interim

more pecudum vos multitudo singulis habendos, fruendosque

præbetis, exsuti omnibus, quæ majores reliquere: nisi quia

vosmet ipsi per suffragia, uti præsides olim, nunc dominos

destinatis. Salt. Frag. Orat. Lepid. ad Pleb. p. 160.

[282] Διαφθειρομένου δὲ τοῦ δήμου ταῖς δωροδοκίαις ὑπὸ τῶν

φιλαρχούντων, καὶ χρωμένων τῷ δεκάζεσθαι καθάπερ ἐργασίᾳ

συνήθει τῶν πολλῶν, βουλόμενος ἐκκόψαι παντάπασι τὸ νόσημα

τοῦτο τῆς πόλεως, ἔπεισε δόγμα θέσθαι τὴν σύγκλητον, ὅπως οἱ

κατασταθέντες ἄρχοντες, εἰ μηδένα κατήγορον ἔχοιεν, αὐτοὶ

παριόντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰς ἔνορκον δικαστήριον εὐθύνας διδῶσιν.

Plut. in Vit. Cat. p. 126.

[283] Ἕωθεν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα τοῦ Κάτωνος, προελθόντος, ἀθρόοι

προσπεσόντες ἐβόων, ἐβλασφήμουν, ἔβαλλον. Plut. ibid.

[284]

Hinc rapti fasces pretio: sectorque favoris

Ipse sui populus: lethalisque ambitus urbi

Annua venali referens certamina campo.

Lucan. Pharsal. lib. 1. Edit. 1506.

[285] Mala sua, quod malorum ultimum est, amant ... et definit

esse remedio locus, ubi quæ fuerant vitia, mores sunt. Senec.

Ep. 39. p. 100.

[286] In tanta tamque corrupta civitate, Catilina omnium

flagitiosorum, atque facinorosorum circum se, tamquam

stipatorum catervas habebat. Sall. de Bell. Cat. p. 9.

[287] Καίσαρος]——τὰ νοσοῦντα καὶ διεφθαρμένα τῆς πολιτείας μέρη

ταράττοντος καὶ συνάγοντος πρὸς αὑτὸν. Plut. in Vit. Cat. Min.

p. 241.

[288] Peculatus ærarii, et per vim sociis ereptæ pecuniæ, quæ

quamquam gravia sunt, tamen consuetudine jam pro nihilo

habentur. Sall. de Bell. Jug. p. 73.

[289] Adeo juventus luxu atque avaritia corrupta est, uti

merito dicatur, genitos esse, qui neque ipsi habere possent res

familiares, neque alios pati. Sall. Frag. pag. 139.

[290] Popilius to Antiochus Epiph. Livy. lib. 45. p. 672.

[291] Juv. Sat. 4.

[292]

... Ex quo suffragia nulli

Vendimus, effugit Curas. Nam qui dabat olim

Imperium, fasces, legiones, omnia, nunc se

Continet, atque duas tantum res anxius optat

Panem et Circenses.

Juv. Sat. 10. lin. 77.

Otium cum servitio.

Sall. Frag. p. 341.

[293] Ludi Scenici.

[294] Histriones.

[295] Etenim cum artifex ejusmodi sit; ut solus dignus videatur

esse, qui in scena spectetur: tum vir ejusmodi est, ut solus

dignus videatur, qui eo non accedat. Orat. pro Rosc. Edit.

Glasg. p. 43.

[296] Divus Augustus immunes verberum histriones quondam

responderat. Tacit. c. 14. p. 42. Edit. Glasg.

Coercitionem in histriones magistratibus in omni tempore et

loco lege vetere permissam ademit. Suet. in Vit. Aug. p. 163.

[297] Histrionum licentiam adeo compescuit, ut Stephanionem

Togatorium, cui in puerilem habitum circumtonsam matronam

ministrasse compererat, per tria theatra virgis cœsum

relegaverit. Hylam pantomimum querente prætore, in atrio domus

suæ, nemine excluso, flagellis verberaverit: et Hyladem urbe

atque Italia submoverit, quod spectatorem a quo exsibilabatur,

demonstrasset digito, conspicuumque fecisset. Ibid.

[298] Ostendam nobilissimos juvenes mancipia pantomimorum.

Senec. Epist. 47. p. 118.

[299] Variis dehinc et sæpius irritis prætorum questibus,

postremo Cæsar de immodestia histrionum retulit; multa ab iis

in publicum seditiose, fœda per domos tentari ... eo

flagitiorum et virium venisse, ut auctoritate patrum coercendum

sit. Pulsi tum histriones Italia. Tacit. Annal. 4. p. 134.

[300] Cæde in theatro per discordiam admissa, capita factionum

et histriones propter quos dissidebatur, relegavit: nec ut

revocaret unquam ullis populi precibus potuit evinci. Suet. in

Tib. c. 37.

[301] Συμφέρει σοὶ, Καῖσαρ, περὶ ἡμᾶς τὸν δῆμον

ἀποδιατρίβεσθαι. Dion. Cass. lib. 54. p. 533.

[302]

Verum equitis quoque jam migravit ab aure voluptas

Omnis, ad incertos oculos, et gaudia vana.

Hor. epist. 1. lib. 2. lin. 187.

Tanto cum strepitu ludi spectantur, et artes,

Divitiæque peregrinæ: quibus oblitus actor

Quum stetit in scena, concurrit dextera lævæ:

Dixit adhuc aliquid? nil sane. Quid placet ergo?

Lana Tarentino violas imitata veneno.

Ibid. lin. 203.

Reflections on the Rise and Fall of the Ancient Republicks Adapted to the Present State of Great Britain · 第 5 / 9 章