CHAPTER I.

Note: Images of the original pages are available through

the Google Books Library Project. See

http://www.google.com/books?id=yb4XAAAAYAAJ

REFLECTIONS ON THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.

Adapted to the Present State of Great Britain.

Οὐ τί τῷδε, ἢ τῷδε δόξει λογιζόμενος

Ἀλλὰ τί πέπρακται λέγων.

Lucian. Histor. Scribend.

by

EDWARD W. MONTAGU, JUN.

Philadelphia:

Printed and Published by C. P. Wayne.

1806.

CONTENTS.

Page.

PREFACE, i

INTRODUCTION, vii

CHAP. i. OF THE REPUBLICK OF SPARTA 1

CHAP. ii. OF ATHENS 54

CHAP. iii. OF THEBES 127

CHAP. iv. OF CARTHAGE 144

CHAP. v. OF ROME 184

CHAP. vi. OF THE REAL CAUSE OF THE RAPID

DECLENSION OF THE ROMAN

REPUBLICK 249

CHAP. vii. CARTHAGINIANS AND ROMANS

COMPARED 270

CHAP. viii. OF REVOLUTIONS IN MIXED GOVERNMENTS 311

CHAP. ix. OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 322

PREFACE

Plutarch takes notice of a very remarkable law of Solon’s,[1] “which

declared every man infamous, who, in any sedition or civil dissension in

the state, should continue neuter, and refuse to side with either

party.” Aulus Gellius,[2] who gives a more circumstantial detail of this

uncommon law, affirms the penalty to be “no less than confiscation of

all the effects, and banishment of the delinquent.” Cicero mentions the

same law to his friend Atticus,[3] and even makes the punishment

capital, though he resolves at the same time not to conform to it under

his present circumstances, unless his friend should advise him to the

contrary.

Which of these relators has given us the real penalty annexed to this

law by Solon, is scarce worth our inquiry. But I cannot help observing,

that strange as this law may appear at first sight, yet if we reflect

upon the reasons of it, as they are assigned by Plutarch and A. Gellius,

it will not appear unworthy of that great legislator.

The opinion of Plutarch is; “that Solon intended no citizen, as soon as

ever he had provided for the security of his own private affairs, should

be so unfeeling with respect to the publick welfare, as to affect a

brutal insensibility,[4] and not to sympathize with the distress and

calamities of his country: but that he should immediately join the

honester and juster party; and rather risque his all in defence of the

side he had espoused, than keep aloof from danger until he saw which

party proved the stronger.”

The reason given by A. Gellius is more striking, and less liable to

objections than that of Plutarch. “If (says that writer) all the good

men in any state, when they find themselves too weak to stem the torrent

of a furious divided populace, and unable to suppress a sedition at its

first breaking out, should immediately divide, and throw themselves into

the opposite sides, the event in such a case would be that each party,

which they had differently espoused, would naturally begin to cool, and

put themselves under their direction, as persons of the greatest weight

and authority: thus it would be greatly in the power of such men so

circumstanced, to reconcile all differences, and restore peace and

union, while they mutually restrained and moderated the fury of their

own party, and convinced the opposite side, that they sincerely wished

and laboured for their safety, not for their destruction.”

What effect this law had in the Athenian state is no where mentioned.

However, as it is plainly founded upon that relation which every member

bears to the body politick, and that interest which every individual is

supposed to have in the good of the whole community; it is still, though

not in express terms, yet virtually received in every free country. For

those who continue neuter in any civil dissension, under the

denomination of moderate men, who keep aloof and wait quietly in order

to follow the fortune of the prevailing side, are generally stigmatized

with the opprobious name of _time servers_, and consequently neither

esteemed, nor trusted by either party.

As our own country is blessed with the greatest share of liberty, so is

it more subject to civil dissensions than any other nation in Europe.

Every man is a politician, and warmly attached to his respective party;

and this law of Solon’s seems to take place as strongly in Britain, as

ever it did in the most factious times at Athens. Freedom of thought, or

the liberty of the mind, arises naturally from the very essence of our

constitution; and the liberty of the press, that peculiar privilege of

the British subject, gives every man a continual opportunity of laying

his sentiments before the publick. Would our political writers pursue

the salutary intention of Solon, as delivered to us by A. Gellius in his

explication of that extraordinary law, they might contribute greatly to

the establishment of that harmony and union, which can alone preserve

and perpetuate the duration of our constitution. But the opposite views

and interests of parties make the altercation endless; and the victory

over an antagonist is generally the aim, whilst the investigation of

truth only, ought ever to be the real end proposed in all controversial

inquiries. The points which have lately exercised so many pens, turn

upon the present expediency, or absolute insignificancy, of a _militia_;

or, what principles conduce most to the power, the happiness, and the

duration of a free people. The dispute has been carried on, not only

with warmth, but even with virulence. The chicane of sophistry has been

employed, whilst indecent personal reflections, and the unfair charge of

disaffection, have been too often made use of to supply the defect of

argument, and to prejudice the reader, where they despaired of confuting

the writer. Historical facts have been either misrepresented, or

ascribed to wrong principles; the history of ancient nations has been

quoted in general terms, without marking the different periods

distinguished by some memorable change in the manners or constitution of

the same people, which will ever make a wide difference in the

application.

Anxious after truth, and unsatisfied with so many bold assertions

destitute of all proof but the writer’s word, which I daily met with, I

determined coolly and impartially to examine the evidence arising from

ancient history, which both sides so frequently appealed to: for bare

speculative reasoning is no more conclusive in political inquiries than

in physical. Facts and experience alone must decide: and political facts

and experience must alone be learned from history. Determined therefore

to judge for myself, I carefully read over the histories of the most

celebrated republicks of antiquity in their original languages, unbiased

either by comments or translations; a part of history of all others the

most instructive, and most interesting to an Englishman.

As instruction was the sole end of my inquiries, I here venture to offer

the result of them to the candour of the publick, since my only motive

for writing was a most ardent concern for the welfare of my country. The

design therefore of these papers is, to warn my countrymen, by the

example of others, of the fatal consequences which must inevitably

attend our intestine divisions at this critical juncture; and to

inculcate the necessity of that national union, upon which the strength,

the security, and the duration of a free state must eternally depend.

Happy, if my weak endeavours could in the least contribute to an end so

salutary, so truly desirable!

In the numerous quotations from the Greek and Latin historians, which

are unavoidable in a treatise of this nature, I have endeavoured to give

the genuine sense and meaning of the author, to the best of my

abilities. But as every reader has an equal right of judging for

himself, I have subjoined in the margin, the original words of the

author, with the book, page, name, and date of the respective edition, I

made use of, for the ease as well as the satisfaction of the candid and

judicious: for that vague and careless manner, which some writers

affect, of quoting an author by name only, without specifying the

particular passage referred to in evidence, is neither useful, nor

satisfactory to the generality of readers; whilst the unfair method, too

often practised, of quoting disjointed scraps, or unconnected sentences,

is apt to raise strong suspicions, that the real sentiments and

intention of the author are kept out of sight, and that the writer is

endeavouring to palm false evidence upon his readers.

I must take the liberty of offering another reason, which, I confess,

was of more weight with me, because more personally interesting. As the

British state and the ancient free republicks were founded upon the same

principles, and their policy and constitution nearly similar, so, as

like causes will ever produce like effects, it is impossible not to

perceive an equal resemblance between their and our manners, as they and

we equally deviated from those first principles. Unhappily, the

resemblance between the manners of our own times, and the manners of

those republicks in their most degenerate periods, is, in many respects,

so striking, that unless the words in the original were produced as

vouchers, any well-meaning reader, unacquainted with those historians,

would be apt to treat the descriptions of those periods, which he may

frequently meet with, as licentious, undistinguished satire upon the

present age.

The behaviour of some of our political writers makes an apology of this

nature in some measure necessary; on the one hand, that I may avoid the

imputation of pedantry, or being thought fond of an idle ostentatious

parade of learning; on the other, _lest a work calculated to promote

domestick peace and union, should be strained, by the perverseness of

party construction, into an inflammatory libel_.

[1] Plut. in Vit. Solon. ἄτιμον.

[2] A. Gellii Noct. Attic. lib. 2. c. 12.

[3] Epist. ad Attic. lib. 10. epist. 1.

[4] Μὴ συναλγεῖν, μηδὲ συννοσεῖν.

INTRODUCTION.

I am not at all surprised at those encomiums which the philosophers and

poets so lavishly bestow upon the pleasures of a country retirement. The

profusion of varying beauties, which attend the returning seasons,

furnishes out new and inexhaustible subjects for the entertainment of

the studious and contemplative. Even winter carries charms for the

philosophick eye, and equally speaks the stupendous power of the great

author of nature. To search out and adore the Creator through his works,

is our primary duty, and claims the first place in every rational mind.

To promote the publick good of the community of which we are born

members, in proportion to our situation and abilities, is our secondary

duty as men and citizens. I judged therefore a close attention to the

study of history the most useful way of employing that time which my

country recess afforded, as it would enable me to fulfil this

obligation: and upon this principle I take the liberty of offering these

papers as my mite towards the publick good.

In the course of these researches nothing gave me so much pleasure as

the study of ancient history: because it made me so truly sensible of

the inestimable value of our own constitution, when I observed the very

different maxims and conduct, and the strong contrast between the

founders of despotick monarchies, and the legislators of the free states

of antiquity. In the former, that absurd and impious doctrine of

millions created for the sole use and pleasure of one individual, seems

to have been the first position in their politicks, and the general rule

of their conduct. The latter fixed the basis of their respective states

upon this just and benevolent plan, “that the safety and happiness of

the whole community was the only end of all government.” The former

treated mankind as brutes, and lorded it over them by force. The latter

received them as their fellow-creatures, and governed them by reason:

hence whilst we detest the former as the enemies and destroyers; we

cannot help admiring and revering the latter, as the lovers and

benefactors of mankind.

The histories which I considered with the greatest attention, gave me

the highest entertainment, and affected me most, were those of the free

states of Greece, Carthage, and Rome. I saw with admiration the profound

wisdom and sagacity, the unwearied labour and disinterested spirit of

those amiable and generous men, who contributed most towards forming

those states, and settling them upon the firmest foundations. I traced

with pleasure their gradual progress towards that height of power, to

which in process of time they arrived; and I remarked the various steps

and degrees by which they again declined, and at last sunk gradually

into their final dissolution, not without a just mixture of sorrow and

indignation.

It would be a labour of more curiosity, than of real use at this time,

to give a long detail of the original formation of those states, and the

wise laws and institutions by which they were raised to that envied

degree of perfection; yet a concise account of the primitive

constitution of each state may be so far necessary, as it will render

the deviations from that constitution more intelligible, and more fully

illustrate the causes of their final subversion. But to point out and

expose the principal causes, which contributed gradually to weaken, and

at length demolish and level with the ground, those beautiful fabricks

raised by the publick virtue, and cemented by the blood of so many

illustrious patriots, will, in my opinion, be more interesting and more

instructive.

When I consider the constitution of our own country, I cannot but think

it the best calculated for promoting the happiness, and preserving the

lives, liberty, and property of mankind, of any yet recorded in profane

history. I am persuaded too, that our wise ancestors, who first formed

it, adopted whatever they judged most excellent and valuable in those

states when in their greatest perfection; and did all that human wisdom

could do for rendering it durable, and transmitting it pure and entire

to future generations. But as all things under the sun are subject to

change, and children are too apt to forget and degenerate from the

virtues of their fathers, there seems great reason to fear, that what

has happened to those free states may at length prove the melancholy

fate of our own country; especially when we reflect, that the same

causes, which contributed to their ruin, operate at this time so very

strongly amongst us. As I thought therefore that it might be of some use

to my country at this dangerous crisis, I have selected the interesting

examples of those once free and powerful nations, who by totally

deviating from those principles upon which they were originally founded,

lost first their liberty, and at last their very existence, so far as to

leave no other vestiges remaining of them as a people, but what are to

be found in the records of history.

It is an undoubted truth, that our own constitution has at different

times suffered very severe shocks, and been reduced more than once to

the very point of ruin: but because it has hitherto providentially

escaped, we are not to flatter ourselves that opportunities of recovery

will always offer. To me therefore the method of proof drawn from

example, seemed more striking, as well as more level to every capacity,

than all speculative reasoning: for as the same causes will, by the

stated laws of sublunary affairs, sooner or later invariably produce

the same effects, so whenever we see the same maxims of government

prevail, the same measures pursued, and the same coincidences of

circumstances happen in our own country, which brought on, and attend

the subversion of those states, we may plainly read our own fate in

their catastrophe, unless we apply speedy and effectual remedies, before

our case is past recovery. It is the best way to learn wisdom in time

from the fate of others; and if examples will not instruct and make us

wiser, I confess myself utterly at a loss to know what will.

In my reflections, which naturally arose in the course of these

researches, truth and impartiality have been my only guides. I have

endeavoured to show the principal causes of that degeneracy of manners,

which reduced those once brave and free people into the most abject

slavery. I have marked the alarming progress which the same evils have

already made, and still continue to make amongst us, with that honest

freedom which is the birthright of every Englishman. My sole aim is to

excite those who have the welfare of their country at heart, to unite

their endeavours in opposing the fatal tendency of those evils, whilst

they are within the power of remedy. With this view, and this only, I

have marked out the remote as well as immediate causes of the ruin of

those states, as so many beacons warning us to avoid the same rocks upon

which they struck, and at last suffered shipwreck.

Truth will ever be unpalatable to those who are determined not to

relinquish error, but can never give offence to the honest and

well-meaning amongst my countrymen. For the plain-dealing remonstrances

of a friend differ as widely from the rancour of an enemy, as the

friendly probe of the physician from the dagger of the assassin.

REFLECTIONS ON THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE REPUBLICK OF SPARTA.

All the free states of Greece were at first monarchical,[5] and seem to

owe their liberty rather to the injudicious oppressions of their

respective kings, than to any natural propensity in the people to alter

their form of government. But as they had smarted so severely under an

excess of power lodged in the hands of one man, they were too apt to run

into the other extreme, democracy; a state of government the most

subject of all others to disunion and faction.

Of all the Grecian states, that of Sparta seems to have been the most

unhappy, before their government was new modelled by Lycurgus. The

authority of their kings and their laws (as Plutarch informs us) were

alike trampled upon and despised. Nothing could restrain the insolence

of the headstrong encroaching populace; and the whole government sunk

into anarchy and confusion. From this deplorable situation the wisdom

and virtue of one great man raised his country to that height of power,

which was the envy and the terror of her neighbours. A convincing proof

how far the influence of one great and good man will operate towards

reforming the most bold licentious people, when he has once thoroughly

acquired their esteem and confidence! Upon this principle Lycurgus

founded his plan of totally altering and new moulding the constitution

of his country. A design, all circumstances considered, the most daring,

and the most happily executed, of any yet immortalized in history.[6]

Lycurgus succeeded to the moiety of the crown of Sparta at the death of

his elder brother; but his brother’s widow declaring herself with child,

and that child proving to be a son, he immediately resigned the regal

dignity to the new born infant, and governed as protector and guardian

of the young prince during his minority. The generous and disinterested

behaviour of Lycurgus upon this occasion endeared him greatly to the

people; who had already experienced the happy effect of his wise and

equitable administration. But to avoid the malice of the queen-mother

and her faction, who accused him of designs upon the crown, he prudently

quitted both the government and his country. In his travels during this

voluntary exile, he drew up and thoroughly digested his great scheme of

reformation. He visited all those states which at that time were most

eminent for the wisdom of their laws, or the form of their constitution.

He carefully observed all the different institutions, and the good or

bad effects which they respectively produced on the manners of each

people. He took care to avoid what he judged to be defects; but selected

whatever he found calculated to promote the happiness of a people; and

with these materials he formed his so much celebrated plan of

legislation, which he very soon had an opportunity of reducing to

practice. For the Spartans, thoroughly sensible of the difference

between the administration of Lycurgus and that of their kings, not only

earnestly wished for his presence, but sent repeated deputations to

entreat him to return, and free them from those numerous disorders under

which their country at that time laboured. As the request of the people

was unanimous, and the kings no ways opposed his return, he judged it

the critical time for the execution of his scheme. For he found affairs

at home in the distracted situation they had been represented, and the

whole body of the people in a disposition proper for his purpose.

Lycurgus began his reform with a change in the constitution, which at

that time consisted of a confused medley of hereditary monarchy divided

between two families, and a disorderly democracy, utterly destitute of

the balance of a third intermediate power, a circumstance so essential

to the duration of all mixed governments. To remedy this evil, he

established a senate with such a degree of power, as might fix them the

inexpugnable barrier of the constitution against the encroachments

either of kings or people. The crown of Sparta had been long divided

between two families descended originally from the same ancestor, who

jointly enjoyed the succession. But though Lycurgus was sensible that

all the mischiefs which had happened to the state, arose from this

absurd division of the regal power, yet he made no alteration as to the

succession of the two families. Any innovation in so nice a point might

have proved an endless source of civil commotions, from the pretensions

of that line which should happen to be excluded. He therefore left them

the title and the ensignia of royalty, but limited their authority,

which he confined to the business of war and religion. To the people he

gave the privilege of electing the senators, and giving their sanction

to those laws which the kings and senate should approve.

When Lycurgus had regulated the government, he undertook a task more

arduous than any of the fabled labours of Hercules. This was to new

mould his countrymen, by extirpating all the destructive passions, and

raising them above every weakness and infirmity of human nature. A

scheme which all the great philosophers had taught in theory, but none

except Lycurgus was ever able to reduce to practice.

As he found the two extremes, of great wealth and great indigence, were

the source of infinite mischiefs in a free state, he divided the lands

of the whole territory into equal lots proportioned to the number of the

inhabitants. He appointed publick tables, at which he enjoined all the

citizens to eat together without distinction; and he subjected every

man, even the kings themselves, to a fine if they should violate this

law by eating at their own houses.[7] Their diet was plain, simple, and

regulated by the law, and distributed amongst the guests in equal

portions. Every member was obliged monthly to contribute his quota for

the provision of his respective table. The conversation allowed at these

publick repasts, turned wholly upon such subjects as tended most to

improve the minds of the younger sort in the principles of wisdom and

virtue. Hence, as Xenophon observes, they were schools not only for

temperance and sobriety, but also for instruction. Thus Lycurgus

introduced a perfect equality amongst his countrymen. The highest and

the lowest fared alike as to diet, were all lodged and clothed alike,

without the least variation either in fashion or materials.

When by these means he had exterminated every species of luxury, he next

removed all temptation to the acquisition of wealth, that fatal source

of the innumerable evils which prevailed in every other country. He

effected this with his usual policy, by forbidding the currency of gold

and silver money, and substituting an iron coinage of great weight and

little value, which continued the only current coin through the whole

Spartan dominions for several ages.

To bar up the entrance of wealth, and guard his citizens against the

contagion of corruption, he absolutely prohibited navigation and

commerce, though his country contained a large extent of sea coast

furnished with excellent harbours. He allowed as little intercourse as

possible with foreigners, nor suffered any of his countrymen to visit

the neighbouring states, unless when the publick business required it,

lest they should be infected with their vices. Agriculture, and such

mechanick trades as were absolutely necessary for their subsistence, he

confined to their slaves the Helots; but he banished all those arts

which tended either to debase the mind, or enervate the body. Musick he

encouraged, and poetry he admitted, but both subject to the inspection

of the magistrates.[8] Thus by the equal partition of the lands, and the

abolition of gold and silver money, he at once preserved his country

from luxury, avarice, and all those evils which arise from an irregular

indulgence of the passions, as well as all contentions about property,

with their consequence, vexatious lawsuits.

To ensure the observance of his laws to the latest posterity, he next

formed proper regulations for the education of their children, which he

esteemed one of the greatest duties of a legislator. His grand maxim was

“that children were the property of the state, to whom alone their

education was to be intrusted.” In their first infancy, the nurses were

instructed to indulge them neither in their diet, nor in those little

froward humours which are so peculiar to that age; to inure them to bear

cold and fasting; to conquer their first fears by accustoming them to

solitude and darkness; and to prepare them for that stricter state of

discipline, to which they were soon to be initiated.

When arrived at the age of seven years, they were taken from the nurses,

and placed in their proper classes. The diet and clothing of all were

the same, just sufficient to support nature, and defend them from the

inclemency of the seasons; and they all lodged alike in the same

dormitory on beds of reeds, to which for the sake of warmth they were

all allowed in winter to add the down of thistles. Their sports and

exercises were such as contributed to render their limbs supple, and

their bodies compact and firm. They were accustomed to run up the

steepest rocks barefoot; and swimming, dancing, hunting, boxing, and

wrestling, were their constant diversions. Lycurgus was equally

solicitous in training up the youth to a habit of passive courage as

well as active. They were taught to despise pain no less than danger,

and to bear the severest scourgings with the most invincible constancy

and resolution. For to flinch under the strokes, or to exhibit the least

sign of any sense of pain, was deemed highly infamous.

Nor were the minds of the Spartan youth cultivated with less care. Their

learning, as Plutarch informs us, was sufficient for their occasions,

for Lycurgus admitted nothing but what was truly useful. They carefully

instilled into their tender minds the great duties of religion, and the

sacred indispensable obligation of an oath, and trained them up in the

best of sciences, the principles of wisdom and virtue. The love of

their country seemed to be almost innate; and this leading maxim, “that

every Spartan was the property of his country, and had no right over

himself,” was by the force of education incorporated into their very

nature.

When they arrived to manhood they were enrolled in their militia, and

allowed to be present in their publick assemblies: privileges which only

subjected them to a different discipline. For the employments and way of

living of the citizens of Sparta were fixed, and settled by as strict

regulations as in an army upon actual service. When they took the field,

indeed, the rigour of their discipline with respect to diet and the

ornament of their persons was much softened, so that the Spartans were

the only people in the universe, to whom the toils of war afforded ease

and relaxation. In fact, Lycurgus’s plan of civil government was

evidently designed to preserve his country free and independent, and to

form the minds of his citizens for the enjoyment of that rational and

manly happiness, which can find no place in a breast enslaved by the

pleasures of the senses, or ruffled by the passions; and the military

regulations which he established, were as plainly calculated for the

protection of his country from the encroachments of her ambitious

neighbours.[9] For he left no alternative to his people, but death or

victory; and he laid them under a necessity of observing those

regulations, by substituting the valour of the inhabitants in the place

of walls and fortifications for the defence of their city.

If we reflect that human nature is at all times and in all places the

same, it seems to the last degree astonishing, how Lycurgus could be

able to introduce such a self-denying plan of discipline amongst a

disorderly licentious people: a scheme, which not only levelled at once

all distinction, as to property, between the richest and the poorest

individual, but compelled the greatest persons in the state to submit to

a regimen which allowed only the bare necessaries of life, excluding

every thing which in the opinion of mankind seems essential to its

comforts and enjoyments. I observed before that he had secured the

esteem and confidence of his countrymen, and there was, besides, at that

time a very lucky concurrence of circumstances in his favour. The two

kings were men of little spirit, and less abilities, and the people were

glad to exchange their disorderly state for any settled form of

government. By his establishment of a senate consisting of thirty

persons who held their seats for life, and to whom he committed the

supreme power in civil affairs, he brought the principal nobility into

his scheme, as they naturally expected a share in a government which

they plainly saw inclined so much to an aristocracy. Even the two kings

very readily accepted seats in his senate, to secure some degree of

authority. He awed the people into obedience by the sanction he procured

for his scheme from the oracle at Delphos, whose decisions were, at that

time, revered by all Greece as divine and infallible. But the greatest

difficulty he had to encounter was to procure the equal partition of the

lands. The very first proposal met with so violent an opposition from

the men of fortune, that a fray ensued, in which Lycurgus lost one of

his eyes. But the people, struck with the sight of the blood of this

admired legislator, seized the offender, one Alcander, a young man of a

hot, but not disingenuous disposition, and gave him up to Lycurgus to be

punished at discretion. But the humane and generous behaviour of

Lycurgus quickly made a convert of Alcander, and wrought such a change,

that from an enemy he became his greatest admirer and advocate with the

people.

Plutarch and the rest of the Greek historians leave us greatly in the

dark as to the means by which Lycurgus was able to make so bitter a

pill, as the division of property, go down with the wealthy part of his

countrymen. They tell us indeed, that he carried his point by the gentle

method of reasoning and persuasion, joined to that religious awe which

the divine sanction of the oracle impressed so deeply on the minds of

the citizens. But the cause, in my opinion, does not seem equal to the

effect. For the furious opposition which the rich made to the very

first motion for such a distribution of property, evinces plainly, that

they looked upon the responses of the oracle as mere priestcraft, and

treated it as the _esprits-forts_ have done religion in modern times; I

mean as a state engine fit only to be played off upon the common people.

It seems most probable, in my opinion, that as he effected the change in

the constitution by the distribution of the supreme power amongst the

principal persons, when he formed his senate; so the equal partition of

property was the bait thrown out to bring over the body of the people

entirely to his interest. I should rather think that he compelled the

rich to submit to so grating a measure, by the assistance of the poorer

citizens, who were vastly the majority.

As soon as Lycurgus had thoroughly settled his new polity, and by his

care and assiduity imprinted his laws so deeply in the minds and manners

of his countrymen, that he judged the constitution able to support

itself, and stand upon its own bottom, his last scheme was to fix, and

perpetuate its duration down to latest posterity, as far as human

prudence and human means could effect it. To bring his scheme to bear,

he had again recourse to the same pious artifice which had succeeded so

well in the beginning. He told the people in a general assembly, that he

could not possibly put the finishing stroke to his new establishment,

which was the most essential point, until he had again consulted the

oracle. As they all expressed the greatest eagerness for his undertaking

the journey, he laid hold of so fair an opportunity to bind the kings,

senate, and people, by the most solemn oaths, to the strict observance

of his new form of government, and not to attempt the least alteration

in any one particular until his return from Delphos. He had now

completed the great design which he had long in view, and bid an eternal

adieu to his country. The question he put to the oracle was “whether the

laws he had already established, were rightly formed to make and

preserve his countrymen virtuous and happy?” The answer he received was

just as favourable as he desired. It was “that his laws were excellently

well calculated for that purpose; and that Sparta should continue to be

the most renowned city in the world, as long as her citizens persisted

in the observance of the laws of Lycurgus.” He transmitted both the

question and the answer home to Sparta in writing, and devoted the

remainder of his life to voluntary banishment. The accounts in history

of the end of this great man are very uncertain. Plutarch affirms, that

as his resolution was never to release his countrymen from the

obligation of the oath he had laid them under, he put a voluntary end to

his life at Delphos by fasting. Plutarch extols the death of Lycurgus in

very pompous terms, as a most unexampled instance of heroic patriotism,

since he bequeathed, as he terms it, his death to his country, as the

perpetual guardian to that happiness, which he had procured for them

during his lifetime. Yet the same historian acknowledges another

tradition, that Lycurgus ended his days in the island of Crete, and

desired, as his last request, that his body should be burnt, and his

ashes thrown into the sea;[10] lest, if his remains should at any time

be carried back to Sparta, his countrymen might look upon themselves as

released from their oath as much as if he had returned alive, and be

induced to alter his form of government. I own, I prefer this latter

account, as more agreeable to the genius and policy of that wise and

truly disinterested legislator.

The Spartans, as Plutarch asserts, held the first rank in Greece for

discipline and reputation full five hundred years, by strictly adhering

to the laws of Lycurgus; which not one of their kings ever infringed for

fourteen successions quite down to the reign of the first Agis. For he

will not allow the creation of those magistrates called the ephori, to

be any innovation in the constitution, since he affirms it to have been,

“not a relaxation, but an extension, of the civil polity.”[11] But

notwithstanding the gloss thrown over the institution of the ephori by

this nice distinction of Plutarch’s, it certainly induced as fatal a

change into the Spartan constitution, as the tribuneship of the people,

which was formed upon that model, did afterwards into the Roman. For

instead of enlarging and strengthening the aristocratical power, as

Plutarch asserts, they gradually usurped the whole government, and

formed themselves into a most tyrannical oligarchy.

The ephori (a Greek word signifying inspectors or overseers) were five

in number, and elected annually by the people out of their own body. The

exact time of the origin of this institution and of the authority

annexed to their office, is quite uncertain. Herodotus ascribes it to

Lycurgus; Xenophon to Lycurgus jointly with the principal citizens of

Sparta. Aristotle and Plutarch fix it under the reign of Theopompus and

Polydorus, and attribute the institution expressly to the former of

those princes about one hundred and thirty years after the death of

Lycurgus. I cannot but subscribe to this opinion as the most probable,

because the first political contest we meet with at Sparta happened

under the reign of those princes, when the people endeavoured to extend

their privileges beyond the limits prescribed by Lycurgus. But as the

joint opposition of the kings and senate was equally warm, the creation

of this magistracy out of the body of the people, seems to have been the

step taken at that time to compromise the affair, and restore the

publick tranquility: a measure which the Roman senate copied afterwards,

in the erection of the tribuneship, when their people mutinied, and made

that memorable secession to the _mons sacer_. I am confirmed in this

opinion by the relation which Aristotle gives us of a remarkable dispute

between Theopompus and his wife upon that occasion.[12] The queen much

dissatisfied with the institution of the ephori, reproached her husband

greatly for submitting to such a diminution of the regal authority, and

asked him if he was not ashamed to transmit the crown to his posterity

so much weaker and worse circumstanced, than he received it from his

father. His answer, which is recorded amongst the laconick _bons mots_,

was, “no, for I transmit it more lasting.”[13] But the event showed that

the lady was a better politician, as well as truer prophet, than her

husband. Indeed the nature of their office, the circumstances of their

election, and the authority they assumed, are convincing proofs that

their office was first extorted, and their power afterwards gradually

extended, by the violence of the people, irritated too probably by the

oppressive behaviour of the kings and senate. For whether their power

extended no farther than to decide, when the two kings differed in

opinion, and to overrule in favour of him whose sentiments should be

most conducive to the publick interest, as we are told by Plutarch in

the life of Agis; or whether they were at first only select friends,

whom the kings appointed as deputies in their absence, when they were

both compelled to take the field together in their long wars with the

Messenians, as the same author tells us by the mouth of his hero

Cleomenes, is a point, which history does not afford us light enough to

determine. This however is certain, from the concurrent voice of all the

ancient historians, that at last they not only seized upon every branch

of the administration, but assumed the power of imprisoning, deposing,

and even putting their kings to death by their own authority. The kings

too, in return, sometimes bribed, sometimes deposed or murdered the

ephori, and employed their whole interest to procure such persons to be

elected, as they judged would be most tractable. I look therefore on the

creation of the ephori as a breach in the Spartan constitution, which

proved the first inlet to faction and corruption. For that these evils

took rise from the institution of the ephori is evident from the

testimony of Aristotle, “who thought it extremely impolitick to elect

magistrates, vested with the supreme power in the state, out of the body

of the people;[14] because it often happened, that men extremely

indigent were raised in this manner to the helm, whom their very poverty

tempted to become venal. For the ephori, as he affirms, had not only

been frequently guilty of bribery before his time, but, even at the very

time he wrote, some of those magistrates, corrupted by money, used their

utmost endeavours, at the publick repasts, to accomplish the destruction

of the whole city. He adds too, that as their power was so great as to

amount to a perfect tyranny, the kings themselves were necessitated to

court their favour by such methods as greatly hurt the constitution,

which from an aristocracy degenerated into an absolute democracy. For

that magistracy alone had engrossed the whole government.”

From these remarks of the judicious Aristotle, it is evident that the

ephori had totally destroyed the balance of power established by

Lycurgus. From the tyranny therefore of this magistracy proceeded those

convulsions which so frequently shook the state of Sparta, and at last

gradually brought on its total subversion. But though this fatal

alteration in the Spartan constitution must be imputed to the intrigues

of the ephori and their faction, yet it could never, in my opinion, have

been effected without a previous degeneracy in their manners; which must

have been the consequence of some deviation from the maxims of Lycurgus.

It appears evidently from the testimony of Polybius and Plutarch, that

the great scheme of the Spartan legislator was, to provide for the

lasting security of his country against all foreign invasions, and to

perpetuate the blessings of liberty and independency to the people. By

the generous plan of discipline which he established, he rendered his

countrymen invincible at home. By banishing gold and silver, and

prohibiting commerce and the use of shipping, he proposed to confine

the Spartans within the limits of their own territories; and by taking

away the means, to repress all desires of making conquests upon their

neighbours. But the same love of glory and of their country which made

them so terrible in the field, quickly produced ambition and a lust of

domination; and ambition as naturally opened the way for avarice and

corruption. For Polybius truly observes, that as long as they extended

their views no farther than the dominion over their neighbouring states,

the produce of their own country was sufficient for what supplies they

had occasion for in such short excursions.[15] But when, in direct

violation of the laws of Lycurgus, they began to undertake more distant

expeditions both by sea and land, they quickly felt the want of a

publick fund to defray their extraordinary expenses. For they found by

experience, that neither their iron money, nor their method of trucking

the annual produce of their own lands for such commodities as they

wanted (which was the only traffick allowed by the laws of Lycurgus)

could possibly answer their demands upon those occasions. Hence their

ambition, as the same historian remarks, laid them under the scandalous

necessity of paying servile court to the Persian monarchs for pecuniary

supplies and subsidies, to impose heavy tributes upon the conquered

islands, and to exact money from the other Grecian states, as occasions

required.

Historians unanimously agree, that wealth with its attendants, luxury

and corruption, gained admission at Sparta in the reign of the first

Agis. Lysander, alike a hero and a politician; a man of the greatest

abilities and the greatest dishonesty that Sparta ever produced;

rapacious after money, which at the same time he despised, and a slave

only to ambition, was the author of an innovation so fatal to the

manners of his countrymen. After he had enabled his country to give law

to all Greece by his conquest of Athens, he sent home that immense mass

of wealth, which the plunder of so many states had put into his

possession. The most sensible men amongst the Spartans, dreading the

fatal consequences of this capital breach of the institutions of their

legislator, protested strongly before the ephori against the

introduction of gold and silver, as pests destructive to the publick.

The ephori referred it to the decision of the senate, who, dazzled with

the lustre of that money, to which until that time they had been utter

strangers, decreed “that gold and silver money might be admitted for the

service of the state; but made it death, if any should ever be found in

the possession of a private person.” This decision Plutarch censures as

weak and sophistical.[16] As if Lycurgus was only afraid simply of

money, and not of that dangerous love of money which is generally its

concomitant; a passion which was so far from being rooted out by the

restraint laid upon private persons, that it was rather inflamed by the

esteem and value which was set upon money by the publick. Thus, as he

justly remarks, whilst they barred up the houses of private citizens

against the entrance of wealth by the terror and safeguard of the law,

they left their minds more exposed to the love of money and the

influence of corruption, by raising an universal admiration and desire

of it, as something great and respectable. The truth of this remark

appears by the instance given us by Plutarch, of one Thorax, a great

friend of Lysander’s, who was put to death by the ephori, upon proof

that a quantity of silver had been actually found in his possession.

From that time Sparta became venal, and grew extremely fond of subsidies

from foreign powers. Agesilaus, who succeeded Agis, and was one of the

greatest of their kings, behaved in the latter part of his life more

like the captain of a band of mercenaries, than a king of Sparta. He

received a large subsidy from Tachos, at that time king of Egypt, and

entered into his service with a body of troops which he had raised for

that purpose. But when Nectanabis, who had rebelled against his uncle

Tachos, offered him more advantageous terms, he quitted the unfortunate

monarch and went over to his rebellious nephew, pleading the interest of

his country in excuse for so treacherous and infamous an action.[17] So

great a change had the introduction of money already made in the

manners of the leading Spartans!

Plutarch dates the first origin of corruption, that disease of the body

politick, and consequently the decline of Sparta, from that memorable

period, when the Spartans having subverted the domination of Athens,

glutted themselves (as he terms it) with gold and silver.[18] For when

once the love of money had crept into their city, and avarice and the

most sordid meanness grew up with the possession, as luxury, effeminacy

and dissipation did with the enjoyment of wealth, Sparta was deprived of

many of her ancient glories and advantages, and sunk greatly both in

power and reputation, until the reign of Agis and Leonidas.[19] But as

the original allotments of land were yet preserved (the number of which

Lycurgus had fixed and decreed to be kept by a particular law) and were

transmitted down from father to son by hereditary succession, the same

constitutional order and equality still remaining, raised up the state

again, however, from other political lapses.

Under the reign of those two kings happened the mortal blow, which

subverted the very foundation of their constitution. Epitadeus, one of

the ephori, upon a quarrel with his son, carried his resentment so far

as to procure a law which permitted every one to alienate their

hereditary lands, either by gift or sale, during their lifetime, or by

will at their decease. This law produced a fatal alteration in the

landed property. For as Leonidas, one of their kings, who had lived a

long time at the court of Seleucus, and married a lady of that country,

had introduced the pomp and luxury of the east at his return to Sparta,

the old institutions of Lycurgus, which had fallen into disuse, were by

his example soon treated with contempt.[20] Hence the necessity of the

luxurious, and the extortion of the avaricious, threw the whole property

into so few hands, that out of seven hundred, the number to which the

ancient Spartan families were then reduced, about one hundred only were

in possession of their respective hereditary lands allotted by

Lycurgus.[21] The rest, as Plutarch observes, lived an idle life in the

city, an indigent abject herd, alike destitute of fortune and

employment; in their wars abroad, indolent dispirited dastards; at home

ever ripe for sedition and insurrections, and greedily catching at every

opportunity of embroiling affairs in hope of such a change as might

enable them to retrieve their fortunes. Evils, which the extremes of

wealth and indigence are ever productive of in free countries.

Young Agis, the third of that name, and the most virtuous and

accomplished king that ever sat upon the throne of Sparta since the

reign of the great Agesilaus, undertook the reform of the state, and

attempted to re-establish the old Lycurgic constitution, as the only

means of extricating his country out of her distresses, and raising her

to her former dignity and lustre. An enterprise attended not only with

the greatest difficulties, but, as the times were so corrupt, with the

greatest danger.[22] He began with trying the efficacy of example, and

though he had been bread in all the pleasures and delicacy which

affluence could procure, or the fondness of his mother and grandmother,

who were the wealthiest people in Sparta, could indulge him in, yet he

at once changed his way of life as well as his dress, and conformed to

the strictest discipline of Lycurgus in every particular. This generous

victory over his passions, the most difficult and most glorious of all

others, had so great an effect amongst the younger Spartans, that they

came into his measures with more alacrity and zeal than he could

possibly have hoped for.[23] Encouraged by this success, Agis brought

over some of the principal Spartans, amongst whom was his uncle

Agesilaus, whose influence he made use of to persuade his mother, who

was sister to Agesilaus, to join his party.[24] For her wealth, and the

great number of her friends, dependants, and debtors, made her extremely

powerful, and gave her great weight in all publick transactions.

His mother, terrified at first at her son’s rashness, condemned the

whole as the visionary scheme of a young man, who was attempting a

measure not only prejudicial to the state, but quite impracticable. But

when the reasonings of Agesilaus had convinced her that it would not

only be of the greatest utility to the publick but might be effected

with great ease and safety, and the king himself entreated her to

contribute her wealth and interest to promote an enterprise which would

redound so much to his glory and reputation;[25] she and the rest of her

female friends at last changed their sentiments. Fired then with the

same glorious emulation, and stimulated to virtue; as it were by some

divine impulse, they not only voluntarily spurred on Agis, but summoned

and encouraged all their friends, and incited the other ladies to engage

in so generous an enterprise.[26] For they were conscious (as Plutarch

observes) of the great ascendency which the Spartan women had always

over their husbands, who gave their wives a much greater share in the

publick administration, than their wives allowed them in the management

of their domestic affairs. A circumstance which at that time had drawn

almost all the wealth of Sparta into the hands of the women, and proved

a terrible, and almost unsurmountable obstacle to Agis. For the ladies

had violently opposed a scheme of reformation, which not only tended to

deprive them of those pleasures and trifling ornaments, which, from

their ignorance of what was truly good and laudable, they absurdly

looked upon as their supreme happiness, but to rob them of that respect

and authority which they derived from their superior wealth. Such of

them therefore as were unwilling to give up these advantages, applied to

Leonidas, and entreated him, as he was the more respectable man for his

age and experience, to check his young hotheaded colleague, and quash

whatever attempts he should make to carry his designs into execution.

The older Spartans were no less averse to a reformation of that nature.

For as they were deeply immersed in corruption, they trembled at the

very name of Lycurgus, as much as runaway slaves, when retaken, do at

the sight of their master.

Leonidas was extremely ready to side with and assist the rich, but durst

not openly oppose Agis for fear of the people, who were eager for such a

revolution. He attempted therefore to counteract all his attempts

underhand, and insinuated to the magistrates, that Agis aimed at setting

up a tyranny, by bribing the poor with the fortunes of the rich; and

proposed the partition of lands and the abolition of debts as the means

for purchasing guards for himself only, not citizens, as he pretended,

for Sparta.

Agis, however, pursued his design, and having procured his friend

Lysander to be elected one of the ephori, immediately laid his scheme

before the senate. The chief heads of his plan were: “that all debts

should be totally remitted; that the whole land should be divided into a

certain number of lots; and that the ancient discipline and customs of

Lycurgus should be revived.” Warm debates were occasioned in the senate

by this proposal, which at last was rejected by a majority of one

only.[27] Lysander in the meantime convoked an assembly of the people,

where after he had harangued, Mondroclidas and Agesilaus beseeched them

not to suffer the majesty of Sparta to be any longer trampled upon for

the sake of a few luxurious overgrown citizens, who imposed upon them at

pleasure.[28] They reminded them not only of the responses of ancient

oracles, which enjoined them to beware of avarice, as the pest of

Sparta, but also of those so lately given by the oracle at Pasiphae,

which, as they assured the people, commanded the Spartans to return to

that perfect equality of possessions, which was settled by the law first

instituted by Lycurgus.[29] Agis spoke last in this assembly, and to

enforce the whole by example, told them in a very few words, “that he

offered a most ample contribution towards the establishment of that

polity, of which he himself was the author. That he now resigned his

whole patrimony into the common stock, which consisted not only of rich

arable and pasture land, but of six hundred talents besides in coined

money. He added, that his mother, grandmother, friends and relations,

who were the most wealthy of all the citizens of Sparta, were ready to

do the same.”

The people, struck with the magnanimity and generosity of Agis, received

his offer with the loudest applause, and extolled him, as the only king

who for three hundred years past had been worthy of the throne of

Sparta. This provoked Leonidas to fly out into the most open and violent

opposition from the double motive of avarice and envy. For he was

sensible, that if this scheme took place, he should not only be

compelled to follow their example, but that the surrender of his estate

would then come from him with so ill a grace, that the honour of the

whole measure would be attributed solely to his colleague. Lysander,

finding Leonidas and his party too powerful in the senate, determined to

prosecute and expel him for the breach of a very old law, which forbid

any of the royal family to intermarry with foreigners, or to bring up

any children which they might have by such marriage, and inflicted the

penalty of death upon any one who should leave Sparta to reside in

foreign countries.

After Lysander had taken care that Leonidas should be informed of the

crime laid to his charge, he with the rest of the ephori, who were of

his party, addressed themselves to the ceremony of observing a sign from

heaven.[30] A piece of state craft most probably introduced formerly by

the ephori to keep the kings in awe, and perfectly well adapted to the

superstition of the people. Lysander affirming that they had seen the

usual sign, which declared that Leonidas had sinned against the gods,

summoned him to his trial, and produced evidence sufficient to convict

him. At the same time he spirited up Cleombrotus, who had married the

daughter of Leonidas, and was of the royal blood, to put in his claim to

the succession. Leonidas, terrified at these daring measures, fled, and

took sanctuary in the temple of Minerva: he was deposed therefore for

non-appearance, and his crown given to his son-in-law Cleombrotus.

But as soon as the term of Lysander’s magistracy expired, the new

ephori, who were elected by the prevailing interest of the opposite

party, immediately undertook the protection of Leonidas. They summoned

Lysander and his friends to answer for their decrees for cancelling

debts, and dividing the lands, as contrary to the laws, and treasonable

innovations; for so they termed all attempts to restore the ancient

constitution of Lycurgus. Alarmed at this, Lysander persuaded the two

kings to join in opposing the ephori; who, as he plainly proved, assumed

an authority which they had not the least right to, as long as the

kings acted together in concert. The kings, convinced by his reasons,

armed a great number of the youth, released all who were prisoners for

debt, and thus attended went into the forum, where they deposed the

ephori, and procured their own friends to be elected into that office,

of whom Agesilaus the uncle of Agis was one. By the care and humanity of

Agis, no blood was spilt on this memorable occasion. He even protected

his antagonist Leonidas against the designs which Agesilaus had formed

upon his life, and sent him under a safe convoy to Tegea.

After this bold stroke, all opposition sunk before them, and every thing

succeeded to their wishes; when the single avarice of Agesilaus, that

most baneful pest, as Plutarch terms it, which had subverted a

constitution the most excellent, and the most worthy of Sparta that had

ever yet been established, overset the whole enterprise. By the

character which Plutarch gives of Agesilaus, he appears to have been

artful and eloquent, but at the same time effeminate, corrupt in his

manners, avaricious, and so bad a man, that he engaged in this projected

revolution with no other view but that of extricating himself from an

immense load of debt, which he had most probably contracted to support

his luxury.[31] As soon therefore as the two kings, who were both young

men, agreed to proceed upon the abolition of debts, and the partition of

lands, Agesilaus artfully persuaded them not to attempt both at once,

for fear of exciting some terrible commotion in the city. He assured

them farther that if the rich should once be reconciled to the law for

cancelling the debts, the law for dividing the lands would go down with

them quietly and without the least obstruction. The kings assented to

his opinion, and Lysander himself was brought over to it, deceived by

the same specious, though pernicious reasoning: calling in therefore all

the bills, bonds, and pecuniary obligations, they piled them up, and

burnt them all publickly in the forum, to the great mortification of the

moneyed men, and the usurers. But Agesilaus in the joy of his heart

could not refrain from joking upon the occasion, and told them with a

sneer, that whatever they might think of the matter, it was the

brightest and most cheerful flame, and the purest bonfire, he had ever

beheld in his lifetime.[32] Agesilaus had now carried his point, and his

conduct proves, that the Spartans had learned the art of turning publick

measures into private jobs, as well as their politer neighbours. For

though the people called loudly for the partition of lands, and the

kings gave orders for it to be done immediately, Agesilaus contrived to

throw new obstacles in the way, and protracted the time by various

pretences, until Agis was obliged to march with the Spartan auxiliaries

to assist their allies the Achæans. For he was in possession of a most

fertile and extensive landed estate at the very time when he owed more

than he was worth; and as he had got rid of all his incumbrances at once

by the first decree, and never intended to part with a single foot of

his land, it was by no means his interest to promote the execution of

the second.

The Spartan troops were mostly indigent young men, who elate with their

freedom from the bonds of usury, and big with the hopes of a share in

the lands at their return, followed Agis with the greatest vigour and

alacrity, and behaved so well in their march, that they reminded the

admiring Greeks of the excellent discipline and decorum for which the

Spartans were formerly so famous under the most renowned of their

ancient leaders. But whilst Agis was in the field, affairs at home took

a very unhappy turn in his disfavour. The tyrannical behaviour of

Agesilaus, who fleeced the people with insupportable exactions, and

stuck at no measure, however infamous or criminal, which would bring in

money, produced another revolution in favour of Leonidas. For the

people, enraged at being tricked out of the promised partition of the

lands, which they imputed to Agis and Cleombrotus, and detesting the

rapaciousness of Agesilaus, readily joined that party which conspired to

restore Leonidas. Agis finding affairs in this desperate situation at

his return, gave up all for lost, and took sanctuary in the temple of

Minerva, as Cleombrotus had done in the temple of Neptune.

Though Cleombrotus was the chief object of Leonidas’s resentment, yet he

spared his life at the intercession of his daughter Chelonis, the wife

of Cleombrotus; but condemned him to perpetual exile. The generous

Chelonis gave a signal instance, upon this occasion, of that heroick

virtue, for which the Spartan ladies were once so remarkably eminent.

When her father was expelled by the intrigues of Lysander, she followed

him into exile, and refused to share his crown with Cleombrotus. In this

calamitous reverse of fortune, she was deaf to all entreaties, and

rather chose to partake of the miseries of banishment with her husband,

than all the pleasures and grandeur of Sparta with her father. Plutarch

pays the ladies a fine compliment, upon this occasion, when he says,

“that unless Cleombrotus should have been wholly corrupted by false

ambition, he must have deemed himself more truly happy in a state of

banishment with such a wife, than he could have been upon a throne

without her.”[33]

But though Cleombrotus escaped death, yet nothing but the blood of Agis

could satisfy the vindictive rage of the ungrateful Leonidas, who, in

the former revolution, owed his life to that unfortunate prince’s

generosity. After many ineffectual attempts to entice Agis from his

asylum, three of his intimate friends in whom he most confided, who used

to accompany and guard him to the baths and back again to the temple,

betrayed him to his enemies. Amphares, the chief of these, and the

contriver of the plot, was one of the new ephori created after the

deposition of Agesilaus. This wretch had lately borrowed a quantity of

valuable plate, and a number of magnificent vestments, of Agis’s mother

Agesistrata, and determined to make them his own by the destruction of

Agis and his family; at their return therefore in their usual friendly

manner from the baths, he first attacked Agis by virtue of his office,

whilst Demochares and Arcesilaus, the other two, seized and dragged him

to the publick prison. Agis supported all these indignities with the

utmost magnanimity: and when the ephori questioned him, whether

Agesilaus and Lysander did not constrain him to do what he had done, and

whether he did not repent of the steps he had taken; he undauntedly took

the whole upon himself, and told them that he gloried in his scheme,

which was the result of his emulation to follow the example of the great

Lycurgus. Stung with this answer, the ephori condemned him to die by

their own authority, and ordered the officers to carry him to the place

in the prison where the malefactors were strangled. But when the

officers and even the mercenary soldiers of Leonidas refused to be

concerned in so infamous and unprecedented an action as laying hands

upon their king, Demochares threatening and abusing them greatly for

their disobedience, seized Agis with his own hands, and dragged him to

the execution room, where he was ordered to be dispatched immediately.

Agis submitted to his fate with equal intrepidity and resignation,

reproving one of the executioners who deplored his calamities, and

declaring himself infinitely happier than his murderers. The unfeeling

and treacherous Amphares attended the execution, and as soon as Agis was

dead, he admitted his mother and grandmother into the prison, who came

to intercede that Agis might be allowed to make his defence before the

people. The wretch assured the mother, with an insulting sneer, that her

son should suffer no heavier punishment than he had done already; and

immediately ordered her mother Archidamia, who was extremely old, to

execution. As soon as she was dead, he bid Agesistrata enter the room,

where, at the sight of the dead bodies, she could not refrain from

kissing her son, and crying out, that his too great lenity and

good-nature had been their ruin. The savage Amphares, laying hold of

those words, told her, that as she approved of her son’s actions she

should share his fate. Agesistrata met death with the resolution of an

old Spartan heroine, praying only that this whole affair might not prove

prejudicial to her country.

Thus fell the gallant Agis in the cause of liberty and publick virtue,

by the perfidy of his mercenary friends, and the violence of a corrupt

and most profligate faction. I have given a more particular detail of

the catastrophe of this unfortunate prince as transmitted to us by

Plutarch, because it furnishes convincing proofs, how greatly the

introduction of wealth had corrupted and debased the once upright and

generous spirit of the Spartans.

Archidamas, the brother of Agis, eluded the search made for him by

Leonidas, and escaped the massacre by flying from Sparta. But Leonidas

compelled his wife Agiatis, who was a young lady of the greatest beauty

in all Greece, and sole heiress to a vast estate, to marry his own son

Cleomenes, though Agiatis had but just lain-in of a son, and the match

was entirely contrary to her inclinations. This event however produced a

very different effect from what Leonidas intended, and after his death

proved the ruin of his party, and revenged the murder of Agis.[34] For

Cleomenes, who was very young, and extremely fond of his wife, would

shed sympathizing tears whenever she related the melancholy fate of

Agis, and occasionally desire her to explain his intentions, and the

nature of his scheme, to which he would listen with the greatest

attention. From that time he determined to follow so glorious an

example, but kept the resolution secret in his own breast until the

means and opportunity should offer. He was sensible that an attempt of

that nature would be utterly impracticable whilst his father lived; who,

like the rest of the leading citizens, had wholly given himself up to a

life of ease and luxury. Warned too by the fate of Agis, he knew how

extremely dangerous it was even once to mention the old frugality and

simplicity of manners, which depended upon the observance of the

discipline and institutions of Lycurgus. But as soon as ever he

succeeded to the crown at the death of his father, and found himself the

sole reigning king of Sparta without a colleague, he immediately applied

his whole care and study to accomplish that great change which he had

before projected. For he observed the manners of the Spartans in general

were grown extremely corrupt and dissolute, the rich sacrificing the

publick interest to their own private avarice and luxury; the poor, from

their extreme indigence, averse to the toils of war, careless and

negligent of education and discipline; whilst the ephori had engrossed

the whole royal power, and left him in reality nothing but the empty

title: circumstances greatly mortifying to an aspiring young monarch,

who panted eagerly after glory, and impatiently wished to retrieve the

lost reputation of his countrymen.

He began by sounding his most intimate friend, one Xenares, at a

distance only, inquiring what sort of a man Agis was, and which way, and

by whose advice, he was drawn into those unfortunate measures. Xenares,

who attributed all his questions to the curiosity natural to a young

man, very readily told him the whole story, and explained ingenuously

every particular of the affair as it really happened. But when he

remarked that Cleomenes often returned to the charge, and every time

with greater eagerness, more and more admiring and applauding the scheme

and character of Agis, he immediately saw through his design. After

reproving him, therefore, severely for talking and behaving thus like a

madman, Xenares broke off all friendship and intercourse with him,

though he had too much honour to betray his friend’s secret. Cleomenes,

not in the least discouraged at this repulse, but concluding that he

should meet with the same reception from the rest of the wealthy and

powerful citizens, determined to trust none of them, but to take upon

himself the whole care and management of his scheme.[35] However, as he

was sensible that the execution of it would be much more feasible, when

his country was involved in war, than in a state of profound peace, he

waited for a proper opportunity; which the Achæans quickly furnished him

with. For Aratus, the great projector of the famous Achæan league, into

which he had already brought many of the Grecian states, holding

Cleomenes extremely cheap, as a raw unexperienced boy, thought this a

favourable opportunity of trying how the Spartans stood affected

towards that union. Without the least previous notice therefore, he

suddenly invaded such of the Arcadians as were in alliance with Sparta,

and committed great devastations in that part of the country which lay

in the neighbourhood of Achaia.

The ephori, alarmed at this unexpected attack, sent Cleomenes at the

head of the Spartan forces to oppose the invasion. The young hero

behaved well, and frequently baffled that old experienced commander. But

his countrymen growing weary of the war, and refusing to concur in the

measures he proposed for carrying it on, he recalled Archidamus the

brother of Agis from banishment, who had a strict hereditary right to

the other moiety of the kingdom; imagining that when the throne was

properly filled according to law, and the regal power preserved entire

by the union of the two kings, it would restore the balance of

government and weaken the authority of the ephori. But the faction which

had murdered Agis, justly dreading the resentment of Archidamus for so

atrocious a crime, took care privately to assassinate him upon his

return.

Cleomenes now more than ever intent upon bringing his great project to

bear, bribed the ephori with large sums to intrust him with the

management of the war.[36] His mother Cratesiclea not only supplied him

with money upon this occasion, but married one Megistonus, a man of the

greatest weight and authority in the city, purposely to bring him over

to her son’s interest. Cleomenes taking the field, totally defeated the

army of Aratus, and killed Lydiadas the Megalopolitan general. This

victory, which was entirely owing to the conduct of Cleomenes, not only

raised the courage of his soldiers, but gave them so high an opinion of

his abilities, that he seems to have been recalled by his enemies,

jealous most probably of his growing interest with the army. For

Plutarch, who is not very methodical in his relations, informs us, that

after this affair, Cleomenes convinced his father-in-law, Megistonus, of

the necessity of taking off the ephori, and reducing the citizens to

their ancient equality according to the institutions of Lycurgus, as the

only means of restoring Sparta to her former sovereignty over

Greece.[37] This scheme therefore must have been privately settled in

Sparta. For we are next told, that Cleomenes again took the field,

carrying with him such of the citizens as he suspected were most likely

to oppose him. He took some cities from the Achæans that campaign, and

made himself master of some important places, but harrassed his troops

so much with many marches and countermarches, that most of the Spartans

remained behind in Arcadia at their own request, whilst he marched back

to Sparta with his mercenary forces and such of his friends as he could

most confide in. He timed his march so well that he entered Sparta

whilst the ephori were at supper, and despatched Euryclidas before with

three or four of his most trusty friends and a few soldiers to perform

the execution. For Cleomenes well knew that Agis owed his ruin to his

too cautious timidity, and his too great lenity and moderation. Whilst

Euryclidas therefore amused the ephori with a pretended message from

Cleomenes, the rest fell upon them sword in hand, and killed four upon

the spot, with above ten persons more who came to their assistance.

Agesilaus the surviver of them fell, and counterfeiting himself dead,

gained an opportunity of escaping. Next morning as soon as it was light,

Cleomenes proscribed and banished fourscore of the most dangerous

citizens, and removed all the chairs of the ephori out of the forum,

except one which he reserved for his own seat of judicature. He then

convoked an assembly of the people, to whom he apologized for his late

actions. He showed them, in a very artful and elaborate speech, “the

nature and just extent of the power of the ephori, the fatal

consequences of the authority they had usurped of governing the state by

their own arbitrary will, and of deposing and putting their kings to

death without allowing them a legal hearing in their own defence.[38]

He urged the example of Lycurgus himself, who came armed into the forum

when he first proposed his laws, as a proof that it was impossible to

root out those pests of the commonwealth, which had been imported from

other countries, luxury, the parent of that vain expense which runs such

numbers in debt, usury, and those more ancient evils, wealth and

poverty, without violence and bloodshed: that he should have thought

himself happy, if like an able physician he could have radically cured

the diseases of his country without pain: but that necessity had

compelled him to do what he had already done, in order to procure an

equal partition of the lands, and the abolition of their debts, as well

as to enable him to fill up the number of the citizens with a select

number of the bravest foreigners, that Sparta might be no longer exposed

to the depredations of her enemies for want of hands to defend her.”

To convince the people of the sincerity of his intentions, he first gave

up his whole fortune to the publick stock; Megistonus, his

father-in-law, with his other friends, and all the rest of the citizens,

followed his example. In the division of the lands, he generously set

apart equal portions for all those citizens he had banished, and

promised to recall them as soon as the publick tranquillity was

restored. He next revived the ancient method of education, the

gymnastick exercises, publick meals, and all other institutions of

Lycurgus; and lest the people, unaccustomed to the denomination of a

single king, should suspect that he aimed at establishing a tyranny, he

associated his brother Euclidas with him in the kingdom. By training up

the youth in the old military discipline, and arming them in a new and

better manner, he once more recovered the reputation of the Spartan

militia, and raised his country to so great a height of power, that

Greece in a very short time saw Sparta giving law to all

Peloponnesus.[39]

The Achæans, humbled by repeated defeats, and begging peace of Cleomenes

upon his own terms, the generous victor desired only to be appointed

general of their famous league, and offered upon that condition to

restore all the cities and prisoners he had taken. The Achæans gladly

consenting to such easy terms, Cleomenes released and sent home all the

persons of rank amongst his prisoners, but was obliged by sickness to

defer the day appointed for the convention, until his return from

Sparta. This unhappy delay was fatal to Greece.[40] For Aratus, who had

enjoyed that honour thirty-three years, could not bear the thought of

having it wrested from him by so young a prince, whose glory he envied

as much as he dreaded his valour. Finding therefore all other methods

ineffectual, he had recourse to the desperate remedy of calling in the

Macedonians to his assistance, and sacrificed the liberty of his own

country, as well as that of Greece, to his own private pique and

jealousy. Thus the most publick-spirited assertor of liberty, and the

most implacable enemy to all tyrants in general, brought back those very

people into the heart of Greece, whom he had driven out formerly purely

from his hatred to tyranny, and sullied a glorious life with a blot

never to be erased, from the detestable motives of envy and revenge. A

melancholy proof, as Plutarch moralizes upon the occasion, of the

weakness of human nature, which with an assemblage of the most excellent

qualities is unable to exhibit the model of a virtue completely perfect.

A circumstance which ought to excite our compassion towards those

blemishes which we unavoidably meet with in the most exalted characters.

Cleomenes supported this unequal war against the Achæans and the whole

power of Macedon with the greatest vigour, and by his success gave many

convincing proofs of his abilities; but venturing a decisive battle at

Sallasia, he was totally defeated by the superior number of his enemies,

and the treachery of Damoteles, an officer in whom he greatly confided,

who was bribed to betray him by Antigonus. Out of six thousand Spartans,

two hundred only escaped, the rest with their king Euclidas were left

dead on the field of battle. Cleomenes retired to Sparta, and from

thence passed over to Ptolemy Euergetes king of Egypt, with whom he was

then in alliance, to claim the assistance he had formerly promised. But

the death of that monarch, which followed soon after, deprived him of

all hopes of succour from that quarter. The Spartan manners were as

odious to his successor Ptolemy Philopater, a weak and dissolute prince,

as the Spartan virtue was terrible to his debauched effeminate

courtiers. Whenever Cleomenes appeared at court, the general whisper

ran, that he came as a lion in the midst of sheep; a light in which a

brave man must necessarily appear to a herd of such servile dastards.

Confined at last by the jealousy of Ptolemy, who was kept in a perpetual

alarm by the insinuations of his iniquitous minister Sosybius, he with

about twelve more of his generous Spartan friends broke out of prison

determined upon death or liberty. In their progress through the streets,

they first slew one Ptolemy, a great favourite of the king, who had been

their secret enemy; and meeting the governor of the city, who came at

the first noise of the tumult, they routed his guards and attendants,

dragged him out of his chariot, and killed him. After this they ranged

uncontrouled through the whole city of Alexandria, the inhabitants

flying every where before them, and not a man daring either to assist or

oppose them. Such terror could thirteen brave men only strike into one

of the most populous cities in the universe, where the citizens were

bred up in luxury, and strangers to the use of arms! Cleomenes,

despairing of assistance from the citizens, whom he had in vain summoned

to assert their liberty, declared such abject cowards fit only to be

governed by women. Scorning therefore to fall by the hands of the

despicable Egyptians, he with the rest of the Spartans fell desperately

by their own swords, according to the heroism of those ages.[41]

The liberty and happiness of Sparta expired with Cleomenes.[42] For the

remains of the Spartan history furnishes us with very little after his

death, besides the calamities and miseries of that unhappy state,

arising from their intestine divisions. Machanidas, by the aid of one of

the factions which at that time rent that miserable republick, usurped

the throne, and established an absolute tyranny. One Nabis, a tyrant,

compared to whom even Nero himself may be termed merciful, succeeded at

the death of Machanidas, who fell in battle by the hand of the great

Philopœmen. The Ætolians treacherously murdered Nabis, and endeavoured

to seize the dominion of Sparta; but they were prevented by Philopœmen,

who partly by force, partly by persuasion, brought the Spartans into the

Achæan league, and afterwards totally abolished the institutions of

Lycurgus.[43] A most inhuman and most iniquitous action, as Plutarch

terms it, which must brand the character of that hero with eternal

infamy. As if he was sensible that as long as the discipline of Lycurgus

subsisted, the minds of the Spartan youth could never be thoroughly

tamed, or effectually broke to the yoke of foreign government. Wearied

out at last by repeated oppressions, the Spartans applied to the Romans

for redress of all their grievances; and their complaints produced that

war which ended in the dissolution of the Achæan league, and the

subjection of Greece to the Roman domination.

I have entered into a more minute detail of the Spartan constitution, as

settled by Lycurgus, than I at first proposed; because the maxims of

that celebrated lawgiver are so directly opposite to those which our

modern politicians lay down as the basis of the strength and power of a

nation.

Lycurgus found his country in the most terrible of all situations, a

state of anarchy and confusion. The rich, insolent and oppressive; the

poor groaning under a load of debt, mutinous from despair, and ready to

cut the throats of their usurious oppressors. To remedy these evils, did

this wise politician encourage navigation, strike out new branches of

commerce, and make the most of those excellent harbours, and other

natural advantages which the maritime situation of his country afforded?

Did he introduce and promote arts and sciences, that by acquiring

and diffusing new wealth amongst his countrymen, he might make his

nation, in the language of our political writers, secure, powerful, and

happy? just the reverse. After he had new-modelled the constitution, and

settled the just balance between the powers of government, he abolished

all debts, divided the whole land amongst his countrymen by equal lots,

and put an end to all dissensions about property by introducing a

perfect equality. He extirpated luxury and a lust of wealth, which he

looked upon as the pests of every free country, by prohibiting the use

of gold and silver; and barred up the entrance against their return by

interdicting navigation and commerce, and expelling all arts, but what

were immediately necessary to their subsistence. As he was sensible that

just and virtuous manners are the best support of the internal peace and

happiness of every kingdom, he established a most excellent plan of

education for training up his countrymen, from their very infancy, in

the strictest observance of their religion and laws, and the habitual

practice of those virtues which can alone secure the blessings of

liberty and perpetuate their duration. To protect his country from

external invasions, he formed the whole body of the people, without

distinction, into one well armed, well disciplined national militia,

whose leading principle was the love of their country, and who esteemed

death in its defence, the most exalted height of glory to which a

Spartan was capable of attaining. Nor were these elevated sentiments

confined solely to the men; the colder breasts of the women caught fire

at the glorious flame, and glowed even with superior ardour. For when

their troops marched against an enemy, “to bring back their shields, or

to be brought home upon them,” was the last command which the Spartan

mothers gave their sons at parting.[44]

Such was the method which Lycurgus took to secure the independency and

happiness of his country; and the event showed, that his institutions

were founded upon maxims of the truest and justest policy. For I cannot

help observing upon the occasion, that from the time of Lycurgus to the

introduction of wealth by Lysander in the reign of the first Agis, a

space of five hundred years, we meet with no mutiny amongst the people,

upon account of the severity of his discipline, but on the contrary the

most religious reverence for, and the most willing and cheerful

obedience to the laws he established. As on the other hand, the wisdom

of his military institutions is evident from this consideration; that

the national militia alone of Sparta, a small insignificant country as

to extent, situated in a nook only of the Morea, not only gave laws to

Greece, but made the Persian monarchs tremble at their very name, though

absolute masters of the richest and most extensive empire the world

then knew.

I observe farther, that the introduction of wealth by Lysander, after

the conquest of Athens, brought back all those vices and dissensions

which the prohibition of the use of money had formerly banished; and

that all historians assign that open violation of the laws of Lycurgus,

as the period from which the decadence of Sparta is to be properly

dated. I observe too, with Plutarch, that though the manners of the

Spartans were greatly corrupted by the introduction of wealth, yet that

the landed interest (as I may term it) which subsisted as long as the

original allotments of land remained unalienable, still preserved their

state; notwithstanding the many abuses which had crept into their

constitution. But that as soon as ever the landed estates became

alienable by law, the moneyed interest prevailed, and at last totally

swallowed up the landed, which the historians remark as the

death’s-wound of their constitution. For the martial virtue of the

citizens not only sunk with the loss of their estates, but their number,

and consequently the strength of the state, diminished in the same

proportion. Aristotle, who wrote about sixty years after the death of

Lysander, in his examen of the Spartan republick, quite condemns that

law which permitted the alienation of their lands.[45] For he affirms,

that the same quantity of land which, whilst equally divided, supplied

a militia of fifteen hundred horse, and thirty thousand heavy armed

foot, could not in his time furnish one thousand; so that the state was

utterly ruined for want of men to defend it.[46] In the reign of Agis

the 3d, about a hundred years after the time of Aristotle, the number of

the old Spartan families was dwindled (as I remarked before) to seven

hundred; out of which about one hundred rich overgrown families had

engrossed the whole land of Sparta, which Lycurgus had formerly divided

into thirty-nine thousand shares, and assigned for the support of as

many families. So true it is, that a landed interest diffused through a

whole people is not only the real strength, but the surest bulwark of

the liberty and independency, of a free country.

From the tragical fate of the third Agis we learn, that when abuses

introduced by corruption are suffered by length of time to take root in

the constitution, they will be termed by those whose interest it is to

support them, essential parts of the constitution itself; and all

attempts to remove them will ever be clamoured against by such men, as

attempts to subvert it: As the example of Cleomenes will teach us, that

the publick virtue of one great man may not only save his falling

country from ruin, but raise her to her former dignity and lustre, by

bringing her back to those principles on which her constitution was

originally founded. Though the violent remedies made use of by Cleomenes

never ought to be applied, unless the disease is grown too desperate to

admit of a cure by milder methods.

I shall endeavour to show in its proper place, that the constitution

established by Lycurgus, which seemed to Polybius to be rather of divine

than of human institution, and was so much celebrated by the most

eminent philosophers of antiquity, is much inferior to the British

constitution as settled at the revolution.[47] But I cannot quit this

subject without recommending that excellent institution of Lycurgus

which provided for the education of the children of the whole community

without distinction. An example which under proper regulations would be

highly worthy of our imitation, since nothing could give a more

effectual check to the reigning vices and follies of the present age, or

contribute so much to a reformation of manners, as to form the minds of

the rising generation by the principles of religion and virtue. Where

the manners of a people are good, very few laws will be wanting; but

when their manners are depraved, all the laws in the world will be

insufficient to restrain the excesses of the human passions. For as

Horace justly observes....

_Quid legis sine moribus

Vanæ proficiunt._ Ode 24. lib. 3.

[5] Dion. Halicarn. p. 248. edit. Rob. Steph. 1546.

[6] Plutarch relates this affair greatly to the honour of

Lycurgus in the beginning of his life.

[7]

Ἄγιδος γοῦν τοῦ βασιλέως

ἐζημίωσαν αὐτόν

Plut. vita Lycur. pag. 46. lit. c. Edit. Xiglandri.

[8] Lycurgus was the first who collected the entire works of

Homer; which he brought into Greece out of Asia-Minor.

[9] Plutarch has taken no notice of them. But Xenophon has

fully explained them in his treatise on the Spartan republick,

p. 542, and seq.

[10] Plut. Vit. Lycurg. ad finem.

[11] Plut. ibid. p. 58. A. Ἡ γὰρ τῶν Ἐφόρων κατάστασις, &c.

[12] De Rebuspubl. cap. 11. p. 154. vol. 2. Edit Basil. 1550.

[13] Οὐ δῆτα φάναι παραδίδωμι γὰρ πολυχρονιωτέραν.

[14] Arist. de. Rebuspubl. lib. 2. c. 7. p. 122. lit. 1. vol.

2.

[15] Polyb. lib. 6. p. 685. vol. 1. edit. Isaac Gronov. 1670.

[16] Plut. in Vit. Lysand. p. 442. lit. E.

[17] Plut. it Vit. Agesi. p. 617. lit. C.

[18] In Vit. Agid. p. 796. lit. C.

[19] Ibid. p. 797. lit. C.

[20] In Vit Agid. p. 797. lit. A.

[21] Ibid. lit. E.

[22] Vita Agid. p. 797. lit. B.

[23] Ibid. lit. C.

[24] Ibid. p. 798. lit. B.

[25] Something seems plainly to be wanting in this passage,

which is strangely obscure and intricate. It is evident that

Agis employed his uncle Agesilaus to persuade his mother, who

was Agesilaus’s sister, τὴν μητέρα πείθειν, ἀδελφὴν οὖσαν τοῦ

Ἀγησιλάου. The king himself entreats his mother to assist him,

&c αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐδεῖτο τῆς μητρός. And after he has

enumerated the advantages which would result from his scheme,

Plutarch abruptly adds οὕτω μετέπεσον ταῖς γνώμαις αἱ γυναῖκες

&c. in the plural number, though he had just before mentioned

Agis’s mother only, as the woman applied to on this occasion.

It is evident therefore that his grandmother and all their

female friends and relations must have been present that time,

though not mentioned, and that they were the only Spartan

ladies who came heartily into his scheme. For when Agis

afterwards offers his whole fortune to the publick, he assures

the people that his mother and grandmother, τὰς μητέρας, and

his friends and relations, who were the richest families in

Sparta, were ready to do the same. As Agis certainly includes

the wives of his friends and relations, and mentions no other

women, I have taken that speech for my guide in giving the

sense of this whole passage, in which I could get no assistance

from any of the commentators.

[26] In Vit. Agid. p. 798. lit. D.

[27] Vit. Agid. p. 800. lit. A.

[28] Ibid. 799. lit. A.

[29] This is an oracle mentioned by Plutarch, about which the

learned are not agreed: however, it seems to have given its

responses in dreams.

[30] The reader may be glad perhaps to find here the ceremony

made use of upon this occasion. Vit. Agid. p. 800. lit. B.

δι’ ἐτῶν ἐννέα λαβόντες οἱ Ἔφοροι, &c. Every ninth year the

ephori taking the opportunity of a clear and still night, when

the moon did not appear, sat silently and observed the sky with

great attention, and if they saw a star shoot, they judged the

kings had offended the gods; and removed them from government,

until an oracle came from Delphos which was favourable to them.

[31] Plut. Vit. Agid. p. 798. lit. A.

[32] Ibid. p. 801. lit. B.

[33] Vit. Agid. p. 803. lit. A.

[34] Plut. Vit. Cleom. p. 805. lit. B.

[35] Plut. Vit. Cleom. p. 809. lit. A.

[36] Plut. Vit. Cleom. p. 807. lit. B.

[37] Vit. Cleom. p. 808. lit. A.

[38] Vit. Cleom. p. 809. lit. A.

[39] Parallel. inter Agid. et Cleom. et T. et C. Gracch. p.

844. lit. D.

[40] Vit. Cleom. p. 811. lit. C.

[41] Plut. Vit. Cleom. p. 822. lit. E.

[42] Polyb. lib. 4. p. 479.

[43] Plut. Vit. Philopœm. p. 365. lit. E.

[44] To bring back their shields, implied victory; to be

brought home upon them, a glorious death in defence of their

country; because the Spartans, if possible, brought back and

buried all who fell in battle in their native country.

[45] Aristot. de Rebuspubl. lib. 2. cap. 7. fol. 122. lit.

Θ.

[46] Ἡ πόλις ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν. Aristot. ibid.

[47] Ὥστε θειοτέραν τὴν ἐπινοίαν ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον

αὐτὸν νομίζειν. Polyb. lib. 6. p. 683.