THE NOOTKA SOUND CONVENTION--ITS RECEPTION AND RESULTS.
After submitting the English ultimatum to the extraordinary junta, as
studied in the last chapter, Floridablanca continued his conferences
with Fitzherbert. He made strenuous efforts to induce the British
ambassador to modify the English demands. In the first article, which
declared that the buildings and lands on the Northwest Coast should
be restored to the British subjects, the Count pressed earnestly for
the insertion of the clause, “notwithstanding the exclusive rights
which Spain has claimed.” This would have been almost tantamount to
a recognition of the Spanish claim. Fitzherbert would not consent to
it. But since the declarations of July had expressly reserved the
discussion of those rights, and since the Spanish minister would not be
content without some reference to them in the convention, the British
ambassador consented to mention them in the preamble. Consequently, he
proposed the insertion of the clause, “laying aside all retrospective
discussion of the rights and claims of the two parties.” He was very
careful to word it so that there would not be in it any admission of
the justice of the Spanish claim. After some hesitation the Count
accepted it.
In the second article Fitzherbert consented to the omission of one
word. The projet had provided that “for all other acts of violence or
hostility,” etc., reparation should be made. The Count objected to the
word “other” as an unnecessary and invidious reference to the action
of Martinez at Nootka in 1789, in view of the fact that satisfactory
reparation for it had already been made. The British ambassador
consented to omit “other.” The Spanish minister attempted to limit this
reparation to offenses committed “on the said continent and the islands
adjacent.” Fitzherbert would not agree. This would not have included
the violence recently done to Captain Macdonald in the West Indies,
mentioned in the last chapter. England apprehended other similar
seizures, and such would not have been unnatural under the strained
relations existing between the two countries for so many months.
The last clause of the third article, making the privilege of landing
anywhere on the coast subject to the restrictions contained in the
following articles, was not in the draft _without_ a demarkation of
limits which was made the basis of the treaty, but it was in the
draft _with_ a demarkation of limits. Fitzherbert compromised on this
point and combined the two drafts. He admitted a limitation of the
privilege without obtaining a definite demarkation of the boundaries of
Spanish exclusive sovereignty. If Floridablanca had not secured this
concession, it would have meant that the English could have landed and
established colonies in any unoccupied spot on the coast of California,
Mexico, Central or South America. This concession was not included
in the draft which was examined by the special junta. It was on this
point that they so violently opposed conceding the English demands and
advised war at all hazards instead.
In the fourth article, regarding the limit of 10 leagues within
which English vessels should not approach Spanish establishments,
Floridablanca pressed very earnestly for extending the distance to
15 leagues. As a precedent for his contention, he cited the treaty
of 1763 between England and France, which fixed 15 leagues as the
distance within which French fishermen might not approach the coasts
of Cape Breton. He suggested the insertion of the words “in the said
seas,” which would confine this restriction to the Pacific. Fitzherbert
embodied the last mentioned suggestion, since he conceived that it
might be of advantage to the English fisheries on the Atlantic coasts
of Spanish America, but he would not admit the extension to 15 leagues.
His private instructions, as mentioned in the last chapter, had named
5 leagues as the distance to be first proposed, but had allowed him to
concede 8 or even 10.
The fifth and sixth articles contained the stipulations upon which
there was the most difficulty in agreeing. In the course of their
discussion the negotiation was frequently on the point of being broken
off. Floridablanca would not consent to a convention that failed to
secure to Spain her exclusive intercourse with her establishments.
Neither would he consent to fix any precise line as the boundary of
the Spanish possessions, either on the north or the south. He pleaded
insufficient information. Fitzherbert wrote to the British Cabinet
that the language of the Spanish minister on both of these points was
so firm and decisive as to make it evident beyond a doubt that the
alternative of peace or war rested on finding or not finding a solution
of these difficulties. Neither of the two drafts of the English
ultimatum afforded a solution. The one provided that the subjects of
the two Crowns should have free access to all unoccupied places and
to all establishments formed since April, 1789, or to be formed north
of a fixed line on the Northwest Coast and south of a fixed line on
the South American coast. The other, omitting any reference to fixed
limits, provided that this privilege should extend to the whole Pacific
coast of North and South America.
In order to solve this difficulty the English ambassador admitted the
restriction at the end of the third article, mentioned above. For the
same purpose he consented to insert in the fifth article the clause,
“situated to the north of the parts of the said coast already occupied
by Spain.” This preserved the Spanish exclusive dominion as far
northward as her most northern establishment. The provision in article
6 was materially changed. The draft of the ultimatum had provided that
the subjects of neither nation should make any establishment south
of a definite line to be fixed so long as no settlement should be
formed thereon by the subjects of any other power. Instead of fixing
a definite line the negotiators agreed to insert the clause, “in such
part of those coasts as are situated to the south of those parts of the
same coasts and of the islands adjacent already occupied by Spain.”
They added the provision that in such places the respective subjects
should have the right of landing and constructing temporary buildings
for purposes connected with their fisheries. The clause, “so long as
no establishments shall be formed thereon by the subjects of any other
power,” was omitted from the article. This had been objected to on the
ground that it would be virtually a public invitation to all nations
to make settlements there and so join England in despoiling Spain of
her dominions. In order to remove the Spanish objection to publicity
and still assure England that she would not be compelled to keep her
hands off while other nations should do the thing that she had bound
herself not to do, the stipulation was embodied in a secret article.
This secret clause provided that the stipulation in the sixth article
forbidding the subjects of Spain and England to make establishments
in such places should remain in force only so long as no settlements
should be formed there by the subjects of any other power.[424]
These changes having been agreed to, Fitzherbert presented to
Floridablanca on October 23 a new projet embodying them. He said
that he had conformed to the ideas of Floridablanca as far as his
instructions would permit. In order to discuss the new draft before it
should be laid before the King, the British ambassador proposed to call
on the Count in the evening of the same day.[425] When their conference
closed, the Spanish minister said that he was still in doubt whether
the reply which he should give the next morning would be for peace or
war.[426] On the morning of October 24 Floridablanca said that the King
had agreed to Fitzherbert’s terms and had promised that the convention
should be signed with the usual formalities three or four days
later.[427] The British ambassador pressed for an immediate signature,
but the minister said that he could not consent to it. The Count was at
the time with the King at San Ildefonso, whither His Majesty had gone
on a hunting trip. Fitzherbert had gone to the same place to continue
his conferences with the Count. The latter said that if the convention
should be signed while there his enemies would charge him with having
taken advantage of the fact that he was almost alone with the King to
induce His Majesty to agree to a measure contrary to the interests
of his Crown. He said also that he wished, before signing, to send a
memorial to the junta to justify himself for signing the convention
contrary to their opinion. He pledged His Catholic Majesty’s word
that the convention should be signed “verbatim et literatim.”[428] The
exchange of full powers took place on October 26, and the wording of
the titles of the two negotiators to be inserted in the preamble was
arranged on October 27.[429] According to the agreement made four days
earlier, the following convention was signed on October 28:
_The Nootka Sound convention._
Their Britannic and Catholic Majesties being desirous of
terminating, by a speedy and solid agreement, the differences
which have lately arisen between the two Crowns, have considered
that the best way of attaining this salutary object would be that
of an amicable arrangement which, setting aside all retrospective
discussions of the rights and pretensions of the two parties,
should regulate their respective positions for the future on bases
which would be conformable to their true interests as well as to
the mutual desires with which Their said Majesties are animated,
of establishing with each other, in everything and in all places,
the most perfect friendship, harmony, and good correspondence.
With this in view they have named and constituted for their
plenipotentiaries, to wit, on the part of His Britannic Majesty,
Alleyne Fitzherbert, of the privy council of His said Majesty in
Great Britain and Ireland, and his ambassador extraordinary and
minister plenipotentiary to His Catholic Majesty; and on the part
of His Catholic Majesty, Don Joseph Moñino, Count of Floridablanca,
Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Spanish Order of Charles III,
counselor of state to His said Majesty, and his principal secretary
of state and of the cabinet, who, after having communicated to each
other their full powers, have agreed on the following articles:
ARTICLE I.
It is agreed that the buildings and tracts of land situated on the
Northwest Coast of the continent of North America, or on islands
adjacent to that continent, of which the subjects of His Britannic
Majesty were dispossessed about the month of April, 1789, by a
Spanish officer, shall be restored to the said British subjects.
ARTICLE II.
Further, a just reparation shall be made, according to the nature of
the case, for every act of violence or hostility which may have been
committed since the said month of April, 1789, by the subjects of
either of the contending parties against the subjects of the other;
and in case any of the respective subjects shall, since the same
period, have been forcibly dispossessed of their lands, buildings,
vessels, merchandise, or any other objects of property on the said
continent or on the seas or islands adjacent, they shall be replaced
in possession of them or a just compensation shall be made to them
for the losses which they have sustained.
ARTICLE III.
And in order to strengthen the bonds of friendship and to preserve
in the future a perfect harmony and good understanding between the
two contracting parties, it is agreed that their respective subjects
shall not be disturbed or molested either in navigating or carrying
on their fisheries in the Pacific Ocean or in the South Seas, or in
landing on the coasts of those seas in places not already occupied,
for the purpose of carrying on their commerce with the natives of
the country or of making establishments there; the whole subject,
nevertheless, to the restrictions and provisions which shall be
specified in the three following articles.
ARTICLE IV.
His Britannic Majesty engages to employ the most effective measures
to prevent the navigation and fishery of his subjects in the Pacific
Ocean or in the South Seas from being made a pretext for illicit
trade with the Spanish settlements; and with this in view it is
moreover expressly stipulated that British subjects shall not
navigate nor carry on their fishery in the said seas within the
distance of 10 maritime leagues from any part of the coast already
occupied by Spain.
ARTICLE V.
It is agreed that as well in the places which are to be restored
to British subjects by virtue of the first article as in all other
parts of the Northwest Coast of North America or of the islands
adjacent, situated to the north of the parts of the said coast
already occupied by Spain, wherever the subjects of either of the
two powers shall have made settlements since the month of April,
1789, or shall hereafter make any, the subjects of the other
shall have free access and shall carry on their commerce without
disturbance or molestation.
ARTICLE VI.
It is further agreed with respect to the eastern and western coasts
of South America and the islands adjacent, that the respective
subjects shall not form in the future any establishment on the
parts of the coast situated to the south of the parts of the same
coast and of the islands adjacent already occupied by Spain; it
being understood that the said respective subjects shall retain the
liberty of landing on the coasts and island so situated for objects
connected with their fishery and of erecting thereon huts and other
temporary structures serving only those objects.
ARTICLE VII.
In all cases of complaint or infraction of the articles of the
present convention the officers of either party without previously
permitting themselves to commit any act of violence or assault
shall be bound to make an exact report of the affair and of its
circumstances to their respective Courts, who will terminate the
differences in an amicable manner.
ARTICLE VIII.
The present convention shall be ratified and confirmed within the
space of six weeks, to be counted from the day of its signature, or
sooner if possible.
In witness whereof we, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of their
Britannic and Catholic Majesties, have, in their names and by virtue
of our full powers, signed the present convention, and have affixed
thereto the seals of our arms.
Done at the palace of San Lorenzo the 28th of October, 1790.[430]
ALLEYNE FITZHERBERT.
THE COUNT OF FLORIDABLANCA.
SECRET ARTICLE.
Since by article 6 of the present convention it has been stipulated,
respecting the eastern and western coasts of South America, that the
respective subjects shall not in the future form any establishment
on the parts of these coasts situated to the south of the parts
of the said coasts actually occupied by Spain, it is agreed and
declared by the present article that this stipulation shall remain
in force only so long as no establishment shall have been formed
by the subjects of any other power on the coasts in question. This
secret article shall have the same force as if it were inserted in
the convention.
In witness whereof, etc.[431]
Ratifications were exchanged by Floridablanca and Fitzherbert on
November 22.
* * * * *
The fact that the convention was signed in opposition to the advice
of the special junta occasioned lively comment for several weeks in
Spanish official circles. It will be recalled from the last chapter
that the sittings of the junta were on October 21, 22, 24, and 25,
and that on the last date the junta hurried its conclusions off to
Floridablanca, advising war rather than compliance with the English
demands. From a statement in an earlier part of the present chapter,
it will be remembered that the convention was virtually concluded
between Floridablanca and Fitzherbert at their interview of October
23; and that on the next day the King pledged his word to sign the
convention as it then was.
On October 27 a letter from Floridablanca informed Iriarte, the
secretary of the junta, that the conclusions of the junta had been
received on the 25th, had been laid before the King on the 26th,
and were being considered by the Council of State. He cautioned the
members of the junta to keep the proceedings of that body absolutely
secret.[432] The Count evidently hoped to keep concealed the fact that
the convention had already been agreed upon. He did not succeed long in
doing this. On October 28 Iriarte replied to the Count’s letter of the
day before, discussing at length the latter’s injunction to secrecy.
Notes in Iriarte’s hand on slips of paper inserted later in these two
letters show that he had learned of the fact of the convention’s having
been agreed upon before the conclusions of the junta had been received,
though it had not been signed until afterwards. In proof of the fact he
referred to a circular letter which the British ambassador had written
on October 26, telling all of the English consuls in Spain that the
dispute had been settled and that the convention would be formally
signed in a few days. Another brief note similarly inserted censured
the administration very severely for accepting the English terms. It
said:
This convention of October 28, 1790, is the first treaty that
has been made during the reign of Charles IV, and in it has been
conceded to England what has always been resisted and refused to all
powers since the discovery of the Indies; and the concession means
much to us.[433]
On November 21 Floridablanca expressed the King’s thanks to all of the
ministers that took part in the junta for their promptness and zeal.
His Majesty assured them that he would not have hesitated a moment to
carry out their recommendations if motives absolutely secret to himself
had not compelled him to order the convention signed. The Count
inclosed some reflections on the convention which His Majesty offered
in addition to the secret motives.[434]
These reflections declared that the purpose of the Convention was to
avoid a war in the present unhappy circumstances, reserving it for a
more favorable time, if it should become necessary. It did not involve
an absolute renunciation in case Spain chose not to observe it. It
was shown that by a strict interpretation of some of its terms the
Convention could be made of little value to England and little loss to
Spain. In the stipulations that granted to English subjects privileges
of commerce and settlement north or south of places already occupied,
attention was called to the expression “already occupied.” The word
“occupied” did not mean nearly so much as “inhabited” or “peopled”
would have meant, and “already” did not mean “actually” or “now.” If
a place had been once occupied and then abandoned this expression
could be made to apply to it. The implication was that formal acts
of taking possession where there had been no thought of making an
actual settlement could be made to come under this head. Such acts had
been performed practically all along the coast. Such a construction
would have almost nullified the privileges granted to England. The
reflections said further that the English were not allowed to approach
Spanish settlements and Spain had equal rights with England anywhere on
the coast. It was thought that Russia’s fear of English encroachments
would be a safeguard against England. English trade and settlements
were limited to the part of the coast north of Nootka. It was insisted
that the treaty simply recognized existing conditions; that it conceded
nothing except what had been allowed, and on the other hand obtained
concessions by limiting the privileges. It was proposed to observe the
Convention only so long as it should be to the advantage of Spain to do
so. Whenever she felt strong enough to assert her ancient rights she
could still do it.[435] The purpose of these arguments was doubtless to
quiet adverse criticism of the Convention. It was partially successful
at the time. A few days later, after the letter of Floridablanca
and the reflections had been considered, all of the ministers of the
junta sent to the King their thanks for his confidence.[436] But this
success did not last long. Criticism of the Convention continued and
finally led to the overthrow of Floridablanca. In May, 1791, the
British ambassador wrote that the Spanish prime minister was very
anxious to have England take effectual measures for preventing British
vessels from touching at Spanish ports, that his enemies might not
find new reasons for attacking him.[437] Finally, in the latter part
of February, 1792, Floridablanca was dismissed from office. The Nootka
business was said to have been the principal cause of his fall.[438]
News of the agreement to sign the convention reached London November
4. On that day Leeds wrote to Auckland that a messenger had just
arrived with a dispatch from Fitzherbert, dated October 24, saying
that the convention had been agreed upon and would be signed four days
later. A copy inclosed with this letter exactly corresponds to the
convention as signed.[439] An unofficial letter, written on the same
day by a clerk in the foreign office and accompanying this official
note, declared that the convention would speak for itself; that it
contained everything that England had demanded. The writer said that
the Spanish ministry had been decidedly for war rather than make the
sacrifice, but that Floridablanca had obtained the King’s consent while
on a hunting trip, and pledged his master’s word that the convention
would be signed on their return, that it might have the sanction of
his colleagues “pro forma.”[440] The signed convention reached London
five days later. Leeds immediately sent a copy of it to Auckland,
that the latter might lay it before the Dutch Government. The Duke
congratulated the ambassador on the happy termination of such a very
important negotiation.[441] On the day of its arrival, November 9, the
British Court ratified the convention, and hurried a messenger off to
Fitzherbert.[442] As stated above, the ratifications were exchanged at
Madrid on November 22.
On November 12 Burges, under secretary for the foreign office, wrote to
Auckland:
That you and our Dutch friends are satisfied with the conclusion of
the Spanish business, I am not surprised. Even the opposition here,
always ready enough to pick holes, as you know, whenever they can,
seem to be dumfounded, and to have nothing to say against us except
that we have asked and carried so much that it is impossible such a
peace can last long.
Speaking of the credit given to Fitzherbert for his success in the
negotiation and of the honor conferred upon him by his being raised to
the peerage, the same letter continued:
Fitzherbert of course gains much glory, as all good ministers should
who follow up their instructions, and I understand that he is
forthwith to receive the high reward of an Irish peerage.[443]
These references are sufficient to show that the English ministry
was highly pleased with the success of the negotiation. On November
24 the mayor, the aldermen, and the commons of the city of London,
in common council assembled, assured the King of their gratitude for
the continuance of peace with Spain, and congratulated him on the
reconciliation.[444] On November 26 Parliament assembled. The King’s
speech mentioned the successful termination of the negotiation and laid
before the Houses copies of the declaration and counter declaration
and the convention.[445] On the same day the House of Lords accorded
enthusiastic thanks and congratulations.[446] Four days later the
Commons, after an extended debate and some criticisms from the
opposition, approved the address, and assured the King that provision
would be made for the expenses of the armament.[447] A general
discussion of the merits of the convention was made the order of the
day for December 13 in the House of Lords. The debate was extended, and
the criticism of the ministry by the opposition was very severe. The
friends of the Government seemed confident of the results and did not
exert themselves greatly to refute the arguments. The convention was
approved.[448] On the same day the Commons debated a motion calling for
all of the correspondence on the dispute. There were the same violent
attacks by the opposition and the same apparent indifference on the
part of the friends of the administration. The motion was defeated by
an overwhelming majority. On the next day, December 14, the merits of
the convention were discussed. The opposing sides manifested much the
same spirit, and in the end the convention was approved by a large
majority.[449]
The logical results of the convention were interfered with by England’s
taking part in the war against France within a little more than
two years after its signature. This absorbed her attention almost
continuously for twenty-two years and prevented her, to a great extent,
from taking advantage of the concessions gained. Before the end of
that period the United States had entered the contest for controlling
the Northwest Coast, and in a few years more purchased the Spanish
claim. Thereby the whole matter was merged in the Oregon controversy.
The immediate result for England was that she obtained free access to
an extended coast, of which she has since come into full possession.
For Spain, it was the first external evidence of the weakness of the
reign of Charles IV, and was the beginning of the series of disasters
which Spain successively suffered under that incompetent Monarch and
his corrupt advisers. It was the first express renunciation of Spain’s
ancient claim to exclusive sovereignty over the American shores of
the Pacific Ocean and the South Seas. It marks the beginning of the
collapse of the Spanish colonial system.[450]