boards for examination for commissions as second lieutenants in
the Regular Army, a number of enlisted men then having served
at least two years (if there be so many applicants), equal to
one-half the vacancies created in the Army during the preceding
year, and if they pass the required physical, mental, and moral
qualifications, they shall be commissioned; the other half of
the annual vacancies to be filled from the graduates of the
Military Academy.
11. That in each Congressional District where a Militia
regiment may be organized, the cadet to the Military Academy
from that District shall be selected from the members of the
regiment including the Regular company, within the prescribed
age, who have served in it at least one year, at a competitive
examination, of all who choose to enter, by a board of officers
of the regiment, convened for that purpose by the Governor.
12. That hereafter each alternate vacancy in each grade of each
Regular regiment shall be filled by competitive examinations of
such officers in the next grade below as may choose to enter the
lists; the examinations to be made annually during the months of
June and July at such places as it may be practicable to convene
summer encampments of at least a brigade, embracing all arms of
the service, and that (in addition to the present methods) each
candidate be required to handle tactically company, battalion,
and brigade in presence of the board, and, if a foot officer,
to march with his proper command (using for a reasonable part
of the distance each of the prescribed gaits) a distance of
fifteen miles in six hours, each day, for three consecutive
days; if a mounted officer, the distance to be twenty miles;
the examination to include field officers. The judgment of such
boards to be final and determinate in each case.
13. That the monthly pay of the enlisted men of the Line of the
Regular Army shall hereafter be as follows:
Regimental Sergeant Major and Quartermaster Sergeant, $90, less
the actual cost of his subsistence and clothing.
First Sergeant, $75, less the actual cost of subsistence and
clothing.
Sergeant, $50, less the actual cost of subsistence and clothing.
Corporal, $40, less the actual cost of subsistence and clothing.
Private, $30, less the actual cost of subsistence and clothing.
Wagoner, Artificer, Blacksmith, and Saddler, the pay of Corporal.
As the aggregate number of Senators and Representatives is 447, this
project would create that many regiments of Militia (or National
Guardsmen) which, allowing for the increased number of companies in
Artillery and Infantry, would constitute an Army on a war footing
of about 500,000 men; an added third battalion would increase it to
750,000, and then again if the number of enlisted men in each company
in time of war was increased to, say, 200 men, would give us an Army
of 1,500,000 men (all that the country is likely to need under any
emergency) which would quickly blend and assimilate, Regulars and
Volunteers, in one harmonious whole.
The present pay of the officer is ample but none too great, while
the pay of the men is too niggardly to entice any one into any kind
of employment in this country, save the unfortunate or the idle and
vicious, seeking temporary relief from suffering for food, shelter and
raiment.
The number and monthly pay on first entrance in the different grades
(omitting musicians, artificers, etc.) of the Line of the Army, are as
follows:
40 Colonels $291.67
40 Lieutenant Colonels 250.00
70 Majors 208.33
430 Captains Foot, $150.00 Mounted 166.67
530 First Lieutenants " 125.00 " 133.33
430 Second Lieutenants " 116.67 " 125.00
Mark here the great gulf between officers and men in the gradation of
pay, uniformity above and uniformity below:
Pay Rations Clothing
40 Sergeant Majors $23 $4.00 $3.83 Total, $30.83
430 First Sergeants 25 4.00 3.81 " 32.81
1,860 Sergeants 18 4.00 3.73 " 25.73
1,720 Corporals 15 4.00 3.71 " 22.71
17,264 Privates 13 4.00 3.34 " 20.34
Perhaps the police of our great cities, in the character of duties
and the ends to be accomplished, bear a greater resemblance to the
Army than any one other public organization in the country, and it may
not be unfair to compare their pay, organization and administration
(in the 454 largest cities there are about 36,000 policemen). The
following represents the grades, numbers, salaries, etc., in the three
representative cities of the Republic, New York, Chicago, and San
Francisco, omitting surgeons, detectives, clerks, etc.:
NEW YORK
Number Grade Monthly Salary
1 Superintendent $500.00
1 Chief Inspector 416.66
3 Inspectors 291.66
35 Captains 229.66
197 Sergeants 166.66
166 Roundsmen 108.33
2,548 Patrolmen--First Grade 100.00
287 Patrolmen--Second Grade 91.66
251 Patrolmen--Third Grade 83.33
CHICAGO
1 Superintendent $416.66
2 Assistant Superintendents 250.00
5 Inspectors 233.33
14 Captains 187.91
35 Lieutenants 125.00
55 Patrol Sergeants 100.00
1,738 Patrolmen--First Class 83.33
525 Patrolmen--Second Class 60.00
SAN FRANCISCO
1 Chief of Police $333.33
5 Captains 150.00
38 Sergeants 125.00
336 Patrolmen 102.00
Mark the uniformity in gradation of pay throughout! Their average
hours of duty are nine. The only articles they furnish themselves
which the soldier does not are quarters, subsistence, clothing, and
equipments. The average cost of clothing and equipments per month in
New York is $5.42. San Francisco has a retired list on half pay after
twenty years' service at sixty years of age.
In 1891 there were employed in the Post Office Department in the 454
largest cities in the United States, 10,443 letter-carriers (nearly
half the number of enlisted men in the Army) with monthly pay as
follows: 1st class, $83.33; 2d class, $66.66; 3d class, $50.00; the
average monthly pay being $73.00 per month, or a total annual pay of
$9,161,137.00, nearly one-third more than the total pay and allowances
of the 25,000 enlisted men in the Army.
On the breaking out of the Civil War in the early part of 1861,
there were borne on the rolls of the Regular Army 1,083 commissioned
officers and 15,367 enlisted men. These officers and men had been
maintained by the Government, under the long existing organization and
administration before referred to, for the main purpose of preparing
them for the emergency that was then suddenly thrust upon them, as a
nucleus for the large army then organizing.
Let us see how well they were prepared for that serious business: 282
of the officers abandoned their flag, leaving 801, with almost the
full number of enlisted men remaining loyal. These, under a proper
organization and administration, should have completely officered,
with abundance to spare, the entire 2,000 volunteer regiments called
into the Federal Army, but when they came in contact with them, there
arose great distrust and want of confidence, the volunteers alleging
that the Regular Officer was supercilious and determined to enforce
upon them discipline which they deemed degrading and dishonorable. On
the contrary, the Regular Officers asserted that the volunteers were
ignorant, insubordinate, and unappreciative of the great trials that
were set before them, and it came to pass that by long isolation on
the plains and martinetism the Regular Army had become so alienated
from the sympathies and confidence of the people that even as late as
April 1, 1863, but 112 of the 801 had attained the rank of General,
and comparatively few of these were successful. On the contrary, there
were some 175 officers who had ceased to belong to the Army--most of
them having discarded it, but some having been discarded by it--who
had for years mingled with the people, becoming known to them and in
sympathy with them. Of these, 45 had become general officers by the
same date, and a remarkable proportion of them successful ones. But
here again comes the remarkably instructive fact that for 23 years
after the retirement of General Scott in November, 1861, the Army was
commanded exclusively from this latter class--McClellan for 1 year,
Halleck for 2 years, Grant for 5 years, and Sherman for 14 years; the
only officers borne on the list of the Army at the breaking out of the
war who succeeded to command it being Generals Sheridan and Schofield,
and these latter not until long after the war had closed.
Then comes the additional instructive fact that of the 18 most
distinguished Army and Corps commanders during the war, 12--Grant,
Sherman, McClellan, Halleck, Fremont, Rosecrans, Hooker, Burnside,
Meade, Dix, Curtis, and Slocum (two-thirds), came from the same class
of ex-officers while only 6--Hancock, Thomas, Buell, Pope, McDowell,
and Sheridan (one-third) were from continuous service in the Army.
The only plausible explanation that can be given for these remarkable
facts is that after 5 or 10 years' service in the Army, in time of
peace, under its present organization and administration, ambition,
grasp, individuality, and self-reliance are dwarfed, as compared with
the school of the ex-officer who enters the list of civil pursuits on
the lines of "The survival of the fittest."
As to the 15,000 enlisted men above referred to, from whom such great
service was reasonably expected, they--by reason of the great gulf
that had been placed between them and their officers--had lost much of
their self-reliance, and personal pride, and made small figure in this
four years' terrible war.
To illustrate what unwise and unjust discriminations are brought about
by our present Army organization, where the enlisted men have so
little voice and influence, here is a possible case, an extreme one it
is true, but possible--many of its incidents often occurring.
First Sergeant Jones, sixty years of age, has forty years' continuous
service; receives for his services in pay and allowances $32.81 per
month; his grandson, Smith, with no other merit than the personal
preferment of his Congressman, at the age of sixteen receives his
education and $45 per month for four years while at West Point, at
the expiration of which time he joins his grandfather, who is now
sixty-four, and assumes command of the company, his pay jumping to
$125 per month, but his grandfather's remaining the same. If they
should both be killed the next day in battle (see paragraphs 85 and
162, Army Regulations) Sergeant Jones, the grandfather, may be buried
but at an expense not exceeding $15; Lieutenant Smith, the grandson,
may be buried by the Government at an expense not exceeding $75.
If they should both be disabled by wounds or otherwise and retired,
Jones, the grandfather, receives $27 per month, while Smith, the
grandson, receives $93.75.
If Smith, the grandson, approaches a guard in command of his company
under arms, the guard will turn out and salute. If Jones, the
grandfather, in command of the same company under arms, approaches the
same guard, neither the company nor its commander will be honored.
If both these officers are ordered from San Francisco to New York
as witnesses before a court martial, and travel on the same train
throughout the distance, the grandfather, Jones, receives the actual
cost of his ticket and $7.50 only for commutation during the journey.
Smith, the grandson, receives the actual cost of his ticket and
$156.64 as mileage, etc.
If the Sergeant deserts en route, he is advertised with a reward; if
apprehended, confined and tried as a felon. If the Lieutenant should
do so (as some 24 have done since the Civil War), he would probably
not be pursued, as none of the 24 referred to have been.
Article 66 of the Articles of War reads as follows:
"Soldiers charged with crimes shall be confined until tried by
court martial, or released by proper authority."
Any other authorities of the Government would interpret the word
"crimes," as here used, to cover only acts known as felonies or
threats of violence, where the danger to law and order was too great
to allow the accused to run at large, yet for over a hundred years
Army officers, under the unwritten laws handed down from the Middle
Ages, have interpreted this word to embrace every trifling offense
for which a soldier is triable by court martial, even neglects and
omissions, such as "Failure to attend roll-call" and "Neglect to
clean arms"; that the article was mandatory--that no soldier could
be tried by court martial until first confined in the guard-house,
and grave and serious courts have refused to enter upon the trial
of such enlisted men unless previously confined. The disgrace of the
accused and the presumption of guilt were at once established by the
commencement of punishment, and in hundreds of cases prisoners were
held for weeks on trivial charges awaiting courts for their trial,
when the scarcity of officers and the remoteness of their stations
rendered it impracticable to promptly convene them.
The Adjutant General of the Army, in his report to the General
commanding for the year 1891, reports "From January, 1867, to June
30, 1891 (24½ years), the number of desertions from the Army was
88,475," over one-third the number that enlisted during that period;
he estimates the loss to the Government by their desertion and the
necessary enlistments to replace them at $23,003,500, and further
states that during that period 16,000 deserters were apprehended or
surrendered, and estimates the expense for rewards of apprehension,
transportation, and trials by court martial of these 16,000 at
$2,500,000, making an aggregate pecuniary loss to the Government by
desertion for this period of $25,503,500, or an annual loss from
deserters alone of over $1,000,000.
If the pay of the enlisted men be increased and uniformly graded
down from the commissioned officers as proposed in the project for a
permanent military establishment, it would increase the cost of the
Army but a little over four million dollars per annum; thereafter it
is fair to presume desertion would be almost as infrequent in the Army
as it now is in the police of the large cities or the letter-carriers
of the Federal Government. If so, this saving of one million per annum
would repay one-fourth of this additional expense, but the betterment
only begins here. A large percentage of the force of each garrison is
constantly in the guard-house for other offenses than desertion. This,
and their frequent trials by court martial (in some years aggregating
almost the total number of enlisted men), it is fair to presume, would
almost totally disappear, and there would be another great saving in
the expense, and an equally valuable gain in the efficiency of the
Army.
The project referred to would bring a large per cent of the younger
officers constantly in contact with citizens and the National Guard,
and they would thus soon become imbued with the spirit and desires of
the people and gain their sympathy and confidence in the same degree
that the ex-officers in civil pursuits have done before them.
On the other hand, the National Guard would soon learn to appreciate
the excellence of Regular Army methods--which in the main are
valuable--so that should another occasion occur for the nation
again to organize a vast Army, Regulars and Volunteers would soon
harmoniously unite.
During the four long years of sturdy war, in which was developed the
grandest, most intelligent, patriotic and chivalrous army that ever
trod the face of the earth, save perhaps that which it overcame but
was too magnanimous to subjugate, the Regulars were compelled by force
of intelligent reason to abandon more of their idiosyncrasies than
the Volunteers were of theirs--courts martial and confinements were
comparatively rarely known. The soldier, both in the Regulars and
Volunteers, had attained an individuality and self-reliance not before
known in our Army or that of any other nation. But on separation from
contact with the Volunteers and people, by isolation in the West, the
Regulars, under old methods of organization and administration, soon
lapsed into former conditions. Without remedies, like emergencies will
produce like results in the future.
At the beginning of the war, the War Department issued the following
order:
"WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
"WASHINGTON, _November 20, 1861_.
"GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 101.
"The intention of the Government, in reserving the original
vacancies of Second Lieutenants for the most deserving among
the non-commissioned officers of the new regular regiments,
was twofold: to secure the services of brave, intelligent, and
energetic officers, by appointing only those who had fully
proved themselves to be such, after a fair competition with
all who chose to enter the lists against them, and to give to
the young men of the country--those especially who were poor,
unknown, and without any social or political influence--an equal
opportunity with the most favored. In General Orders No. 16, of
May 4, 1861, this intention was publicly announced. It is now
reaffirmed, and commanding officers of the new regiments will
see that it is carried out in good faith.
"By order,
"L. THOMAS,
"_Adjutant-General_."
Immediately the newly enlisted men of the Regulars became inspired
with ambitious hope and self-reliance; promotion from the ranks was
the rule, and the recipients of that period have ever since proved
equal to those commissioned from other sources.
It may be said that the proposed change of giving one-half the
vacancies to the enlisted men would be a hardship to the graduates
of the Academy when there are now barely sufficient vacancies in the
Army to give them all commissions, but it can hardly be considered
a hardship to a young man favored with an appointment there and
graduated free of expense to himself and family, when if thrown upon
the world he would be better qualified than almost any of his fellows
to fight the battle of life, and in case of war would prove, like
the ex-officers before referred to, most valuable to this country.
If it should be a hardship, it would be no greater than would befall
the hundreds of enlisted men who under this project would doubtless
qualify themselves quite as well for commissions as the graduates, and
for whom, likewise, there would be an insufficiency of vacancies.
No one will assail the excellence of the Military Academy, though the
present course there seems too severe in the higher mathematics and
directed mostly to the production of engineer officers rather than
officers for the command of men; for the former there should be an
extended course, as in the military schools of other nations, but
while admitting the excellence of this course for a portion of the
officers of the Army, from long and varied contact with the people
of almost every State and Territory, I know that he misjudges them
seriously who thinks there is no other method equally good by which at
least a portion of them can be supplied. No profession can maintain a
healthy status where its members are derived solely from one source.
It ought to be understood by the law-makers in dealing with the Army,
as it is in relation to every other service, public or private, that
the Nation is but a joint stock company of seventy million holders,
each with a certain amount of stock; that they require but 2,000 Army
Officers; that commissions, as far as practicable, should be open to
all competitors; that the best qualified may win on original entrance,
promotion thereafter to be on lines of merit which can not be the case
under present methods.
John Stuart Mill says:
"The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance
to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that
disposition to aim at something better than customary, which
is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty,
or that of progress or improvement. The spirit of improvement
is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing
improvements on an unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty,
in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally
and temporarily with the opponents of improvement; but the
only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty,
since by it there are as many possible independent centers of
improvement as there are individuals. The progressive principle,
however, in either shape, whether as the love of liberty or of
improvement, is antagonistic to the sway of custom, involving at
least emancipation from that yoke; and the contest between the
two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind.
The greater part of the world has, properly speaking, no
history, because the despotism of custom is complete."
For the reasons above, so clearly expressed, there is little hope for
the reform before advocated to emanate successfully from the Army
itself, which would be the greater beneficiary. Its officers have
little power in political influence and it is to be regretted that the
efforts they have made to use it have been principally directed to
increasing their own number, rank, tenure of office and pay, or the
establishing of such pernicious vested rights as "lineal promotion."
That is to say, that Tom, who graduated in 1882, shall in no case be
Captain before Dick, who graduated in 1881.
If any change for the betterment come, in this direction, the greater
hope is with the National Guard of the States, who have not been so
long hampered by imperious custom and who are more in contact with the
legislative authorities. Eventually something in this direction must
come about.
ADDRESS BEFORE THE SOCIETY OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND
SEPTEMBER 15, 1913
MR. PRESIDENT: We survivors of the Army of the Cumberland
with our guests are met here on the semi-centennial of its greatest
battle to do honor to the glorious achievements of its members, living
and dead, in the most sanguinary and yet the most chivalrous war ever
waged in all the tide of time; a war, too, that had more significance
at the time it was waged, and has had since, and will continue to have
for the betterment of mankind, than any other war of recorded history.
If, indeed, "it needs be that wars must come," it seems we should all
be thankful to High Providence that it fell to our lot to participate
in this war for the Union rather than any other of which we have
knowledge, and, further, from our knowledge of the past history of
mankind, we should be thankful that it fell to our lot to live in our
generation, race, and country, with all its blood and tears.
In fact, we of our generation who are still alive have witnessed more
and greater progress for betterment physically, mentally, and morally,
than all that had gone before.
But to revert to our text, "The Army of the Cumberland," and the war
itself. My theme is to inspire just but long-belated honors to the
Confederate soldiers in arms.
The nucleus from which sprang the new race and nation of thirty
millions of unmilitary and unwarlike Americans called suddenly to
form the mighty hosts of over three million Confederate and Union
warriors, was the Puritans and Cavaliers of Northern Europe, who
for conscience's sake exiled themselves from religious, social and
political persecution over two hundred years ago to the American
wilderness where they hoped, untrammeled by the imperious custom of
ages, to raise a new people self-reliant and of universal common
interests where all should be schooled in the same ethics politically,
socially and morally.
For over a hundred years they kept faith in their purpose in
a self-reliant way never known before, being almost wholly
self-supporting, having no public factories, each trade making and
repairing its own tools and implements, each rural family raising its
own flax, wool and cotton and almost universally spinning and weaving
its own fabric for clothing. This brought the rearing of children to
the mother's fireside, where the moral training of the mother is more
pure, effective and lasting than all other methods, including schools
and colleges.