A different matter was considered by the Commissioner in relation to the
change made in November 1979 to move the waypoint back to the TACAN at
Williams Field. As usual a signal was sent to the United States base at
McMurdo with advice that the aircraft was to fly to the Antarctic on
28th November and the flight plan for the journey. And in the list of
waypoints appears the word "McMurdo" in lieu of the geographical
co-ordinates which had appeared in the equivalent signal for the flight
three weeks earlier. The message had been prepared by Mr Brown, one of
the four officers in the navigation section.
The use of the word "McMurdo" was the subject of an idea put by the
Commissioner to Mr Hewitt, who was the second of the witnesses from the
navigation section. The Commissioner asked:
"I know you have explained to me how that happened but someone may
suggest to me before the enquiry is over that the object was to
thats (sic) not to reveal there had been this long standing error
in the co-ordinates and that is why the word McMurdo was relayed to
them. I take you would not agree with that"
Mr Hewitt said:
"Certainly not sir."
The suggestion had not been raised earlier at the Inquiry and it was not
mentioned by anybody subsequently. In particular it was not put to Mr
Brown himself when the latter was called to give evidence three months
later. However the Commissioner expressed his view upon the matter in
the following way. In paragraph 255 (e) he said this--
"In my opinion, the introduction of the word 'McMurdo' into the Air
Traffic Control flight plan for the fatal flight was deliberately
designed to conceal from the United States authorities that the
flight path had been changed, and probably because it was known
that the United States Air Traffic Control would lodge an objection
to the new flight path."
It will be observed that the last few words are qualified by "probably".
It appears that the Commissioner was told during a visit to Antarctica
that the United States authorities would not have approved a flight path
over Ross Island. But there was no evidence that Air New Zealand had
ever received an intimation from the United States authorities to that
effect or that the navigation section had reason to think they would so
object. The qualification seems to reflect that position. In the result,
when the findings in the two sub-paragraphs 255 (e) and (f) are put
together they reveal the theory that at one at the same time the
navigation section felt obliged to conceal from officials in Wellington
the use of a flight track down McMurdo Sound that was regarded
favourably by officials at McMurdo Station and from officials at McMurdo
Station a flight track over Ross Island that was regarded favourably by
officials in Wellington.