Paragraph 255 (e) and (f), in numerical order the next passages
complained of, refer to the fact that when the co-ordinates in the
Auckland computer were altered a symbol was used which had the effect
of including in the information to be sent to the United States air
traffic controller at McMurdo Station the word 'McMurdo' instead of the
actual co-ordinates (latitude and longitude) of the southernmost
waypoint. The Commissioner said:
(e) When the TACAN position [a navigational aid at McMurdo Station
enabling aircraft to ascertain their distance from it] was typed
into the airline's ground computer in the early morning of 28
November 1979, there was also made the additional entry to which I
have referred, which would result in the new co-ordinates not being
transmitted to McMurdo with the Air Traffic Control flight plan for
that day. It was urged upon me, on behalf of the airline, that
McMurdo Air Traffic Control would consider the word 'McMurdo' as
indicating a different position from that appearing on Air Traffic
Control flight plans dispatched from Auckland during 1978 and 1979.
I cannot for a moment accept that suggestion. First Officer Rhodes
made a specific inquiry at McMurdo within a few days of the
disaster and ascertained that the destination waypoint of the first
Air Traffic Control flight plan for 1979 had been plotted by the
United States Air Traffic Control personnel, and there was evidence
from the United States witnesses that this would be normal
practice. In my view the word 'McMurdo' would merely be regarded,
and was indeed regarded, by McMurdo Air Traffic Control as
referring to the same McMurdo waypoint which had always existed. In
my opinion, the introduction of the word 'McMurdo' into the Air
Traffic Control flight plan for the fatal flight was deliberately
designed to conceal from the United States authorities that the
flight path had been changed, and probably because it was known
that the United States Air Traffic Control would lodge an objection
to the new flight path.
(f) I have reviewed the evidence in support of the allegation that
the Navigation Section believed, by reason of a mistaken verbal
communication, that the altered McMurdo waypoint only involved a
change of 2.1 nautical miles. I am obliged to say that I do not
accept that explanation. There were certainly grave deficiencies in
communication within the Navigation Section, but the high
professional skills of the Navigation Section's staff entirely
preclude the possibility of such an error. In my opinion this
explanation that the change in the waypoint was thought to be
minimal in terms of distance is a concocted story designed to
explain away the fundamental mistake, made by someone, in failing
to ensure that Captain Collins was notified that his aircraft was
now programmed to fly on a collision course with Mt. Erebus.
These paragraphs are attacked on the grounds, in short, that the members
of the navigation section said to be adversely affected by
them--according to the applicants, Mr R. Brown as regards (e) and Messrs
Amies, Brown, Hewitt and Lawton as regards (f)--were not given a fair
opportunity of answering the findings or allegations.
To understand this complaint one needs a clear picture of what it was
that the Commission found or alleged against the navigation section.
When studying the report as a whole we have encountered difficulties in
this regard, difficulties not altogether removed when we explored them
during the argument with Mr Baragwanath. But our understanding is that
in essence the Commissioner suggests that the original change of the
southernmost point to one in the Sound, 25 miles west of McMurdo
Station, was probably deliberate on the part of the navigation section
(although he refrained from a definite finding) and that in November
1979 they deliberately made a major change back to the vicinity of
McMurdo Station but deliberately set out to conceal the change from the
American personnel there. The motive for the 1979 change ascribed by the
Commissioner to the navigation section appears to be that they
considered that the New Zealand Civil Aviation Division had only
approved a route over Mount Erebus, yet at the same time that the
American 'authorities' would object to that route, regarding the route
down the Sound as safer. In short the theory (if we understand it
correctly) is that the navigation section were in a dilemma as there was
no route approved by all concerned.
Beyond argument, it would seem, there was slipshod work within the
airline in the making of the change and the failure to expressly notify
flight crews. But the allegations of deliberate concealment and a
concocted story are another matter. The complaint is that they were
never put squarely to the members of the navigation section. The
Commissioner himself did put to the chief navigator, Mr Hewitt, that
'Someone may suggest before the inquiry is over' that the word 'McMurdo'
was relayed to McMurdo to conceal a long-standing error in the
co-ordinates. Mr Hewitt replied 'Certainly not, sir' and there, the
applicants point out, the matter was left, without further questions to
witnesses by anyone or any reference in counsel's final submissions.
On the other hand Mr Baragwanath urged in substance that the witnesses
from the navigation section must have understood that their evidence was
under suspicion; that they had ample opportunities to explain how and
why any mistakes occurred; and that it was for the Commissioner to
assess their explanations, taking into account any impressions they made
on him individually as witnesses.