Methods of Political Development, and Elimination of Warfare.
This rise of empires, this coalescence of small groups of men into
larger and larger political aggregates, has been the chief work of
civilization, when looked at on its political side.[13] Like all the
work of evolution, this process has gone on irregularly and
intermittently, and its ultimate tendency has only gradually become
apparent. This process of coalescence has from the outset been brought
about by the needs of industrial civilization, and the chief obstacle
which it has had to encounter has been the universal hostility and
warfare bequeathed from primeval times. The history of mankind has been
largely made up of fighting, but in the careers of the most progressive
races this fighting has been far from meaningless, like the battles of
kites and crows. In the stream of history which, beginning on the shores
of the Mediterranean Sea, has widened until in our day it covers both
sides of the Atlantic and is fast extending over the remotest parts of
the earth,--in this main stream of history the warfare which has gone on
has had a clearly discernible purpose and meaning. Broadly considered,
this warfare has been chiefly the struggle of the higher industrial
civilization in defending itself against the attacks of neighbours who
had not advanced beyond that early stage of humanity in which warfare
was chronic and normal. During the historic period, the wars of Europe
have been either contests between the industrial and the predatory types
of society, or contests incident upon the imperfect formation of large
political aggregates. There have been three ways in which great
political bodies have arisen. The earliest and lowest method was that of
_conquest without incorporation_. A single powerful tribe conquered and
annexed its neighbours without admitting them to a share in the
government. It appropriated their military strength, robbed them of most
of the fruits of their labour, and thus virtually enslaved them. Such
was the origin of the great despotic empires of Oriental type. Such
states degenerate rapidly in military strength. Their slavish
populations, accustomed to be starved and beaten or massacred by the
tax-gatherer, become unable to fight, so that great armies of them will
flee before a handful of freemen, as in the case of the ancient Persians
and the modern Egyptians. To strike down the executive head of such an
assemblage of enslaved tribes is to effect the conquest or the
dissolution of the whole mass, and hence the history of Eastern peoples
has been characterized by sudden and gigantic revolutions.
The second method of forming great political bodies was that of
_conquest with incorporation_. The conquering tribe, while annexing its
neighbours, gradually admitted them to a share in the government. In
this way arose the Roman empire, the largest, the most stable, and in
its best days the most pacific political aggregate the world had as yet
seen. Throughout the best part of Europe, its conquests succeeded in
transforming the ancient predatory type of society into the modern
industrial type. It effectually broke up the primeval clan-system, with
its narrow ethical ideas, and arrived at the broad conception of rights
and duties coextensive with Humanity. But in the method upon which Rome
proceeded there was an essential element of weakness. The simple device
of representation, by which political power is equally retained in all
parts of the community while its exercise is delegated to a central
body, was entirely unknown to the Romans. Partly for this reason, and
partly because of the terrible military pressure to which the frontier
was perpetually exposed, the Roman government became a despotism which
gradually took on many of the vices of the Oriental type. The political
weakness which resulted from this allowed Europe to be overrun by
peoples organized in clans and tribes, and for some time there was a
partial retrogression toward the disorder characteristic of primitive
ages. The retrogression was but partial and temporary, however; the
exposed frontier has been steadily pushed eastward into the heart of
Asia; the industrial type of society is no longer menaced by the
predatory type; the primeval clan-system has entirely disappeared as a
social force; and warfare, once ubiquitous and chronic, has become local
and occasional.
The third and highest method of forming great political bodies is that
of _federation_. The element of fighting was essential in the two lower
methods, but in this it is not essential. Here there is no conquest, but
a voluntary union of small political groups into a great political
group. Each little group preserves its local independence intact, while
forming part of an indissoluble whole. Obviously this method of
political union requires both high intelligence and high ethical
development In early times it was impracticable. It was first attempted,
with brilliant though ephemeral success, by the Greeks, but it failed
for want of the device of representation. In later times it was put into
operation, with permanent success, on a small scale by the Swiss, and on
a great scale by our forefathers in England. The coalescence of shires
into the kingdom of England, effected as it was by means of a
representative assembly, and accompanied by the general retention of
local self-government, afforded a distinct precedent for such a gigantic
federal union as men of English race have since constructed in America.
The principle of federation was there, though not the name. And here we
hit upon the fundamental contrast between the history of England and
that of France. The method by which the modern French nation has been
built up has been the Roman method of conquest with incorporation. As
the ruler of Paris gradually overcame his vassals, one after another, by
warfare or diplomacy, he annexed their counties to his royal domain, and
governed them by lieutenants sent from Paris. Self-government was thus
crushed out in France, while it was preserved in England. And just as
Rome achieved its unprecedented dominion by adopting a political method
more effective than any that had been hitherto employed, so England,
employing for the first time a still higher and more effective method,
has come to play a part in the world compared with which even the part
played by Rome seems insignificant. The test of the relative strength of
the English and Roman methods came when England and France contended for
the possession of North America. The people which preserved its
self-government could send forth self-supporting colonies; the people
which had lost the very tradition of self-government could not. Hence
the dominion of the sea, with that of all the outlying parts of the
earth, fell into the hands of men of English race; and hence the
federative method of political union--the method which contains every
element of permanence, and which is pacific in its very conception--is
already assuming a sway which is unquestionably destined to become
universal.
Bearing all this in mind, we cannot fail to recognize the truth of the
statement that the great wars of the historic period have been either
contests between the industrial and the predatory types of society or
contests incident upon the imperfect formation of great political
aggregates. Throughout the turmoil of the historic period--which on a
superficial view seems such a chaos--we see certain definite tendencies
at work; the tendency toward the formation of larger and larger
political aggregates, and toward the more perfect maintenance of local
self-government and individual freedom among the parts of the aggregate.
This two-sided process began with the beginnings of industrial
civilization; it has aided the progress of industry and been aided by
it; and the result has been to diminish the quantity of warfare, and to
lessen the number of points at which it touches the ordinary course of
civilized life. With the further continuance of this process, but one
ultimate result is possible. It must go on until warfare becomes
obsolete. The nineteenth century, which has witnessed an unprecedented
development of industrial civilization, with its attendant arts and
sciences, has also witnessed an unprecedented diminution in the strength
of the primeval spirit of militancy. It is not that we have got rid of
great wars, but that the relative proportion of human strength which has
been employed in warfare has been remarkably less than in any previous
age. In our own history, of the two really great wars which have
permeated our whole social existence,--the Revolutionary War and the War
of Secession,--the first was fought in behalf of the pacific principle
of equal representation; the second was fought in behalf of the pacific
principle of federalism. In each case, the victory helped to hasten the
day when warfare shall become unnecessary. In the few great wars of
Europe since the overthrow of Napoleon, we may see the same principle at
work. In almost every case the result has been to strengthen the pacific
tendencies of modern society. Whereas warfare was once dominant over the
face of the earth, and came home in all its horrid details to
everybody's door, and threatened the very existence of industrial
civilization; it has now become narrowly confined in time and space, it
no longer comes home to everybody's door, and, in so far as it is still
tolerated, for want of a better method of settling grave international
questions, it has become quite ancillary to the paramount needs, of
industrial civilization. When we can see so much as this lying before us
on the pages of history, we cannot fail to see that the final extinction
of warfare is only a question of time. Sooner or later it must come to
an end, and the pacific principle of federalism, whereby questions
between states are settled, like questions between individuals by due
process of law, must reign supreme over all the earth.