Then and there that war should have ended. To say that the whole
country was aghast at Lee's escape would be only the plainest
expression of the popular feeling of the day. Naturally enough
one great chorus of disappointment greeted its announcement. Was
this all? Had these two armies merely had a wrestling match? Had
Meade and Lee compared their bruises, only to separate with the
understanding that they would fight again at some future day when
both felt stronger? Apparently the war was no nearer its ending than
before. To the common understanding it did seem "a most lame and
impotent conclusion." If the Confederates could not be crushed when
everything conspired against them, and in favor of the Union army,
when would they be?
That Lee extricated his army from its highly dangerous position
must no longer be attributed to his superior generalship, we think,
but to the want of it on the Union side. It is vain to ask why this
or that thing was not done, since this campaign is unique for its
omissions. Meade at Gettysburg was like a man who has been pushed
into a fight reluctantly, and who stops the moment his adversary is
down.
The history of this battle is largely that of the two commanders and
their subordinates. Things done or left undone control the destinies
of nations as well as of individuals. The want of cordiality among
some of the Union generals was an incident of importance.
In arresting Lee's triumphal march, Meade had undoubtedly achieved
all that the best-informed persons would have asked of him when he
took the command, more perhaps than he allowed himself to expect
when the magnitude of the task first unfolded itself to his troubled
vision. His measures are so expressive of this want of confidence
that any other conclusion seems inadmissible. Very sanguine persons,
indeed, said that Lee ought never to return to Virginia except as
a prisoner of war. The bare notion of a successful invasion by
seventy thousand or eighty thousand men, with one hundred thousand
behind them and the whole North before them, was scouted as a
piece of folly designed and put in execution by madmen. If one
hundred thousand were not enough, were there not one hundred and
fifty thousand available? When Lee got to the Susquehanna these
demands were somewhat lowered. They did not know, these unreflecting
persons, that what an army wants is not men, but a man--one man.
So far this army had been a school in which mediocrity had risen.
The really great commander had not yet forced his way to the front
in spite of cabals in or out of the army. There had been a series of
experiments--disastrous experiments. No army had ever marched more
bravely to defeat or so seldom to victory. Few expected victory now.
Yielding to an imperative order, Meade found the Herculean task
thrust upon him, with the fact staring him in the face that a
defeated general meant a disgraced one.
But even then he did not find himself free to handle his army as he
thought proper, because in Halleck he had always a tutor and critic
who from his easy-chair in Washington assumed to supervise the acts
of the commander in the field. Upon a not over-confident general
the effect was especially pernicious. The war-cry at Washington was,
"Beat the enemy, but make no mistakes!" This was constantly ringing
in Meade's ears. As Halleck was an excellent closet strategist,
some of his suggestions would have been eminently proper and
useful, could he have been on the spot himself, but under existing
conditions they could serve only to make Meade still more hesitating
and timid. Handled in this way, no army has ever achieved great
results, and no army ever will achieve them.
At the close of the Third Day's sanguinary encounter with Lee, Meade
had found himself victorious. The fact that the fortune of war had
thus placed the initiative in his hands seems to have become a
source of embarrassment and perplexity; from that moment his acts
became timid, halting, partial. When pressed to more active measures
he flew into a passion.
The fault, as we look at it, was not so much in the commander as in
the man. Meade the commander could do no more than Meade the man. He
was no genius. He was only a brave, methodical, and conscientious
soldier, who, within his limitations, had acted well his part. Under
Grant he made an excellent so-called second in command.
It has been said that in defending itself successfully, the Union
army had done all that could be expected, under the circumstances.
Must we then admit that for Lee not to conquer was in itself
a victory? Unquestionably there was a prevalent, a somewhat
overshadowing, feeling that all the best generalship was on the
Confederate side.
By a sort of perversity of the human mind, a certain class of
critics is always found ready to prove why a beaten general is the
best general.
Nevertheless, Lee himself goes down in history as a general who
never won a decisive victory.
He was certainly lucky at Gettysburg. For a time his great
reputation silenced the voice of criticism. His own subordinates are
now accusing him of making fatal mistakes. May it not be equally
true that Lee rashly undertook more at Gettysburg than he was able
to perform? He has as good as admitted it. Carried away by a first
success, he committed the old mistake of underrating his adversary.
His victory of the first day was due to no combinations of his
own, because he was then completely ignorant of where the Federal
army was. He supposed it at least twenty miles off. His success of
the second, again, arose first out of an entire misconception on
his part as to the Union position, which was nowhere near where
he thought it was, and next from a piece of recklessness on the
part of one of the Union generals, by which an inferior force was
again opposed to a superior one. On the third, he used means wholly
inadequate to the work in hand, yet of his own planning; and on
all three days, with the field of battle under his eye, little or
no manœuvring for advantage of position, and plenty of time to
look about him in, he signally failed to secure coöperation among
his corps commanders. We see no evidence here, we confess, of
generalship. Indeed, this inability to make himself obeyed indicates
a serious defect somewhere. Like another great but also unfortunate
captain, Lee might have exclaimed in bitterness of spirit,
"Incomprehensible day! Concurrence of unheard-of fatalities! Strange
campaign when, in less than a week, I three times saw assured
victory escape from my grasp! And yet all that skill could do was
done."
Gettysburg made no reputations on either side. It may have destroyed
some illusions in regard to the invincibility of Confederate
generals. Meade succeeded because he was able to move troops to
threatened points more rapidly than his assailant, but the battle
was won more through the gallantry of the soldiers than by the
skill of their generals. Victory restored to them their feeling of
equality--their morale. And that was no small thing.
Considered with reference to its political effect upon the fortunes
of the Confederacy, not to have succeeded was even worse than not to
have tried at all, since it settled the question, once and for all,
of achieving independence on Northern soil. Peace without submission
was no longer possible, because the end was no longer in doubt. It
came at last. And never in the history of the world, it is believed,
have the victors shown such magnanimity to the vanquished.
THE END.
APPENDIX
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AS IT FOUGHT AT GETTYSBURG.
Major-Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding.
STAFF.
Major-Gen. Daniel Butterfield, Chief of Staff; Brig.-Gen. M.
R. Patrick, Provost Marshal-General; Brig.-Gen. Seth Williams,
Adjutant-General; Brig.-Gen. Edmund Shriver, Inspector-General;
Brig.-Gen. Rufus Ingalls, Q. M. General; Brig.-Gen. Gouverneur
K. Warren, Chief of Engineers; Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt, Chief
of Artillery; Col. Henry F. Clarke, Chief Commissary; Major John
Letterman, Chief of Medical Department; Major D. W. Flagler, Chief
Ordnance Officer; Capt. L. B. Norton, Chief Signal Officer.
FIRST ARMY CORPS.
Major-Gen. JOHN F. REYNOLDS.
_First Division._--Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth. _First Brigade_:
Brig.-Gen. Solomon Meredith; _Second Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. Lysander
Cutler.
_Second Division._--Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson. _First Brigade_:
Brig.-Gen. Gabriel R. Paul; _Second Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. Henry
Baxter.
_Third Division._--Maj.-Gen. Abner Doubleday. _First Brigade_:
Brig.-Gen. Thos. A. Rowley; _Second Brigade_: Col. Roy Stone; _Third
Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. Geo. J. Stannard; _Artillery Brigade_: Col.
Chas. S. Wainwright.
SECOND ARMY CORPS.
Major-Gen. WINFIELD S. HANCOCK.
_First Division._--Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell. _First Brigade_:
Col. Edwin E. Cross; _Second Brigade_: Col. Patrick Kelly; _Third
Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. S. K. Zook; _Fourth Brigade_: Col. John R.
Brooke.
_Second Division._--Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon. _First Brigade_:
Brig.-Gen. William Harrow; _Second Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. Alex. S.
Webb; _Third Brigade_: Col. Norman J. Hall.
_Third Division._--Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays. _First Brigade_: Col.
Samuel S. Carroll; _Second Brigade_: Col. Thomas A. Smyth; _Third
Brigade_: Col. Geo. L. Willard; _Artillery Brigade_: Capt. J. G.
Hazard.
THIRD ARMY CORPS.
Major-Gen. DANIEL E. SICKLES.
_First Division._--Major-Gen. David B. Birney. _First Brigade_:
Brig.-Gen. C. K. Graham; _Second Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward;
_Third Brigade_: Col. Philip R. De Trobriand.
_Second Division._--Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys. _First Brigade_:
Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Carr; _Second Brigade_: Col. Wm. R. Brewster;
_Third Brigade_: Col. Geo. C. Burling; _Artillery Brigade_: Capt.
Geo. E. Randolph.
FIFTH ARMY CORPS.
Major-Gen. GEORGE B. SYKES.
_First Division._--Brig.-Gen. James Barnes. _First Brigade_: Col. W.
S. Tilton; _Second Brigade_: Col. J. B. Sweitzer; _Third Brigade_:
Col. Strong Vincent.
_Second Division._--Brig.-Gen. Romayn B. Ayres. _First Brigade_:
Col. Hannibal Day; _Second Brigade_: Col. Sidney Burbank; _Third
Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. S. H. Webb.
_Third Division._--Brig.-Gen. S. Wiley Crawford. _First Brigade_:
Col. Wm. McCandless; _Second Brigade_: Col. Joseph W. Fisher;
_Artillery Brigade_: Capt. A. P. Martin.
SIXTH ARMY CORPS.
Major-Gen. JOHN SEDGWICK.
_First Division._--Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright. _First Brigade_:
Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert; _Second Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. J. J.
Bartlett; _Third Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell.
_Second Division._--Brig.-Gen. A. P. Howe. _Second Brigade_: Col. L.
A. Grant; _Third Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. T. H. Neill.
_Third Division._--Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton. _First Brigade_:
Brig.-Gen. Alex. Shaler; _Second Brigade_: Col. H. L. Eustis; _Third
Brigade_: Col. David J. Nevin; _Artillery Brigade_: Col. C. H.
Tompkins.
ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS.
Major-Gen. OLIVER O. HOWARD.
_First Division._--Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow. _First Brigade_:
Col. Leopold von Gilsa; _Second Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. Adelbert Ames.
_Second Division._--Brig.-Gen. A. von Steinwehr. _First Brigade_:
Col. Chas. R. Coster; _Second Brigade_: Col. Orlando Smith.
_Third Division._--Major-Gen. Carl Shurz. _First Brigade_:
Brig.-Gen. A. von Schimmelpfennig; _Second Brigade_: Col. Waldimir
Kryzanowski; _Artillery Brigade_: Maj. Thos. W. Osborn.
TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.
Major-Gen. HENRY W. SLOCUM.
_First Division._--Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams. _First Brigade_:
Col. Archibald L. McDougall; _Second Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. Henry H.
Lockwood; _Third Brigade_: Col. Silas Colgrove.
_Second Division._--Brig.-Gen. John W. Geary. _First Brigade_: Col.
Chas. Candy; _Second Brigade_: Col. Geo. A. Cobham, Jr.; _Third
Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. Geo. S. Greene; _Artillery Brigade_: Lieut.
Edw. D. Muhlenberg.
CAVALRY CORPS.
Major-Gen. ALFRED PLEASONTON.
_First Division._--Brig.-Gen. John Buford. _First Brigade_: Col. Wm.
Gamble; _Second Brigade_: Col. Thos. C. Devin; _Reserve Brigade_:
Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt.
_Second Division._--Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg. _First Brigade_:
Col. J. B. McIntosh; _Second Brigade_: Col. Pennock Huey; _Third
Brigade_: Col. J. I. Gregg.
_Third Division._--Brig.-Gen. Judson Kilpatrick. _First Brigade_:
Brig.-Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth; _Second Brigade_: Brig.-Gen. Geo. A.
Custer.
HORSE ARTILLERY.
_First Brigade_: Capt. John M. Robertson; _Second Brigade_: Capt.
John C. Tidball.
ARTILLERY RESERVE.
Brig.-Gen. R. O. TYLER.
_First Regular Brigade_: Capt. D. R. Ransom; _First Volunteer
Brigade_: Lieut.-Col. F. McGilvery; _Second Volunteer Brigade_:
Capt. E. D. Taft; _Third Volunteer Brigade_: Capt. James F.
Huntington; _Fourth Volunteer Brigade_: Capt. R. H. Fitzhugh.
INDEX
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC follows Lee, 39;
order of march, 40;
halts at Frederick, Md., 40;
change of commanders, 40;
dangerous meddling, 41;
effect on the army, 42;
its _morale_, 43, 44;
its efficiency, _note_, 45;
in march toward the enemy, 49;
diverging while the enemy is concentrating, 52;
hard marching, 53;
is badly scattered, 53;
left wing in a critical position, 54;
how posted on June 30, 55;
Buford's cavalry engaged at Gettysburg, 62;
First Corps gets up to its support, 63;
holds the ground till the Eleventh arrives, 68;
both are defeated, 76; losses, 77;
reasons for defeat, 77;
ordered to Gettysburg, 85;
Twelfth Corps gets up, 87;
also part of Third, 89;
other corps, 90;
strength of the corps, _note_, 96;
as posted July 2 on Cemetery Ridge, 98;
Third Corps movements, 101, _et seq._;
how this corps was formed to resist Lee's attack, 109;
whole of the army up at last, 109;
the battle begins, 112;
Sickles' whole line is driven in, 124;
we hold Little Round Top, 121;
portions of the Second and Fifth assist the Third;
they have to fall back, 123;
other troops compel Longstreet to desist, 125;
dispositions for renewing the battle, 133, 134;
Culp's Hill attacked, 135;
Ewell driven out, 136;
sustains a terrific cannonade, 137, 138, 139;
lines as formed to resist charge of July 3, 140;
the assault repulsed, 143, _et seq._;
remains inactive, 153;
while Lee retreats, 154;
marches in pursuit, 154;
finds enemy in a strong position, 156; _notes_, 159;
and Lee again slips away, 157;
losses during the campaign, 157.
Baltimore alarmed, _note_, 45.
Baltimore Pike, cutting the Union lines, 99.
Battlefield Memorial Association, _note_, 21.
Buford's (John) cavalry operations on the left, 40;
riding to Fairfield, 49;
finds the enemy, 54;
is ordered to hold Gettysburg, 55;
posts himself on Oak Ridge, 61;
fights till relieved, 63;
is sent off to the rear, 101.
Cavalry, battles of July 3d, 148;
operations during Lee's retreat, _notes_, 158.
Carlisle, Pa., occupied, 29;
evacuated, 51.
Cemetery Ridge, described, 15, 16;
becomes a rallying-point, July 1, 77;
situation afternoon of July 1, 82;
Hancock renders it secure, 87;
described more in detail, 98, _et seq._;
the enemy succeed in scaling it, July 2, 125, 128;
but are repulsed, 129;
its advantages for defence better availed of, 130.
Chambersburg, Pa., occupied by Lee's cavalry, 25;
becomes his headquarters, 27.
Confederate Army, The, eludes ours, _note_, 32;
and invades Pennsylvania, 23;
its strength, 24;
its composition, _note_, 32;
points of superiority, 24, 25;
its _personnel_, 26, 27;
at Chambersburg, 26, 27;
moves to York and Carlisle, 28;
its spirit, 29;
moves to concentrate, 52;
its advance upon Gettysburg is disputed, 62;
finally defeats the forces opposed to it, 69, _et seq._;
losses, _note_, 80;
all but one division up night of July 1, 91;
how formed, _note_, 110;
the attack on Sickles, 115;
Sickles defeated, 123;
Longstreet's losses, 125;
Cemetery Ridge reached by Hill's troops, 125;
Ewell gains a foothold at Culp's Hill, 126;
advantage to the Confederates, 127;
position at close of the day, _note_, 131;
Ewell expelled from Culp's Hill, 136;
cannonades Union position, 137;
final attack repulsed, 141, _et seq._;
evacuates Gettysburg, 150;
getting ready to retreat, 150;
retreat effected, 157;
losses, _note_, 159.
Culp's Hill, its relation to Cemetery Hill, 19;
occupied by Union troops, 84;
made secure, 87;
enemy gain a lodgment at, 126;
retaken, 136.
Cumberland Valley, route of Lee's invasion, 23;
exodus from, 34.
Curtin, A. G., his efforts to meet the invasion, 36.
DEVIL'S DDEN, The, situation of, 20;
surroundings, _note_, 22;
struggle for its possession, 115, 116, 117;
in the enemy's hands, _note_, 131.
EARLY'S (J. E.) operations around York, 28;
as a blind, _note_, 33;
recalled to Gettysburg, 52;
his arrival decides the day, 73, 76;
assaults Cemetery Hill, July 2, 128;
but is forced out, 129.
Emmettsburg Road, described, 21;
picketed by Union troops, 88;
its relation to the hostile armies, 99;
becomes a point of direction for Longstreet's attack, 114.
Ewell's Confederate corps at Chambersburg, 26;
moves on to Carlisle and York, 28;
moves to Gettysburg and decides the first of July, 69, _et seq.;_
but hesitates to attack Cemetery Hill, 81.
FREDERICK, Md., becomes the pivot for the Union army, 40.
GETTYSBURG, described, 10, 11;
its strategic value, 13, 14, 15, _et seq._;
its topography, 15, 16, _et seq._;
Cemetery Ridge, 16;
Seminary Ridge, 17;
commanding points, 19, 20;
Cemetery Ridge as a defensive line, 20; _notes_ 1, 2, and 3, p. 21;
memorials of battle, _note_, 21;
first appearance of Confederates in, 28; and _note_, 33;
Lee's whole army marching to, 52;
Union forces approaching, 55;
how and where the battle began, see Chap. V., p. 60;
in first day's conflict, 60, _et seq._;
occupied by Ewell, 78;
evacuated, 150.
Great Round Top, how situated, 19.
HANCOCK, Winfield S., organizing victory from defeat, 81, 82, 83;
orders Culp's Hill occupied, 84;
his report to Meade, 85; _note_, 95;
sends Geary's division to Little Round Top, 88.
Harrisburg alarmed, 25;
enemy near it, 29;
the panic at, 34, _et seq._;
militia ordered to, 37;
narrow escape of, 50.
Heth's (Harry) Confederate division approaches Gettysburg first, 52;
encounters Buford's cavalry, 62
brings on battle of July 1, 63;
sustains a check, 66;
Pender, Rodes, and Early come to his aid, 69, 75;
takes part in the famous charge of July 3, 140, 141.
Hood, John B., marches into Chambersburg, 26, 27;
attacks the Union left, July 2d, 114;
is wounded, 115;
his attack checked, 117;
Union cavalry in his rear, 148.
Hooker's (Joseph) plan of campaign, 40;
objections to, _note_, 45;
is superseded, 40.
Howard, Oliver O., takes command at Gettysburg, 70;
calls in vain for help, 70, 71.
LEE, Robert E., his ascendancy over his troops, 29;
portrait of, 30;
wants his cavalry badly, 38;
feels what it is to be in an enemy's country, 39;
plans thwarted by Meade, 50;
decides to cross South Mountain and give battle, 50; _note_, 59;
orders all corps to Gettysburg, 51;
steals a march on Meade, 53;
at Gettysburg, 81;
decides to attack, 91;
Longstreet to turn Union left, 94;
the plan in detail, 105, 106;
determines to renew the battle, 133;
reinforces Ewell, 133;
orders Longstreet to assault Cemetery Ridge, 134;
sends off his wounded, 153;
follows with his army, 154;
gets to the Potomac before he can be intercepted, 156;
and crosses to Virginia safely, 157.
Little Round Top, its position and appearance, 19; _note_, 22;
Hancock causes its occupation, 88;
is abandoned, 98;
is about to fall into the enemy's hands, 115;
troops brought up to it, 119, 120;
conflict for its possession, 120, 121;
Union troops remain masters, 121.
Longstreet, James, opposes Lee's purpose, 91;
is ordered to begin the attack of July 2, 105;
gets into position, 106;
as a fighter, 106, 107;
method of attacking Sickles, 114, 115;
is successful here, but halts before the main position, 125.
Lutheran Church a hospital, 22.
Lutheran Seminary, its situation, 17;
Union troops make a stand there, 77.
MCLAWS, (Lafayette) Confederate division attacks Sickles, July 2,
117.
Meade, George G., takes command, 42;
his qualifications, 43;
divining Lee's intentions, 47, 48;
discards Hooker's plan, 48;
his own, 49;
transfers his base to Westminster, 49;
relieves Harrisburg and York, 51;
his perplexities, 51;
is outmanœuvred, 53;
learns that Lee is moving to the east of South Mountain, 55;
but holds his purpose of concentrating at Big Pipe Creek, 57;
learns of the defeat at Gettysburg and sends Hancock there with
full powers, 70;
decides to fight at Gettysburg, 85;
though the chances are against him, 90;
gets to the field, 94;
designs attacking Lee himself, 97;
posting his troops, 98;
depressed by the results of July 2 he calls a council of war which
decides to fight it out, 132;
sends troops to retake Culp's Hill, 133;
starts his cavalry on reconnoisances, _note_, 158;
his indecision, 151;
follows Lee to the Potomac, 155.
NATIONAL CEMETERY, Account of, _note_, 21.
OAK RIDGE, Buford's cavalry defends it, 62, 63;
see Chap. V.
PENNSYLVANIA invaded, 23;
first effects of, 34, _et seq._
Philadelphia during the invasion, _note_, 45.
Pickett's (Geo. E.) Confederate division ordered to charge Cemetery
Ridge, 134;
it advances, 141;
is cannonaded, 142
but keeps on, 143;
is attacked in flank, 143, 144;
encounters a terrible musketry fire, 144;
breaks through the Union line, 146; is destroyed, 147;
his losses suppressed, 157.
Pittsburgh, Defensive works at, _note_, 45.
REYNOLDS, John F., commands Union left wing, 54;
orders Buford to hold Gettysburg, 55;
orders up his troops and hastens there himself, 62;
is killed while posting his soldiers, 64;
his fall a misfortune, 64, 73.
Rock Creek, its position on the field, 19.
SEMINARY RIDGE described, 17.
Sherfy's Peach Orchard, 89, 103, 104;
is occupied by the Third Union Corps, 108;
not strong enough to cover the ground, 109;
_note_, 110;
is attacked, 118;
is carried, 122;
_note_, 130.
Sickles, Daniel E., 101;
feels the enemy on his front, 104;
finds him extending his right, 104;
determines to move his corps out to the Peach Orchard, 105;
his attitude toward the general commanding, 107, 108;
_notes_, 111;
is attacked, 112;
wounded, 122.
South Mountain assumes the first strategic importance, 39;
masks Lee's movements, 50.
Stuart's (J. E. B.) Confederate cavalry operations, _note_, 32;
is cut off from Lee, 38.
Swale, The, its situation, 20.
WARREN, Gouverneur K., sees the peril of Little Round Top and saves
it, 119.
Westminster, Pa., as base of the Union army, 49.
Wheat-field, Combat at the, July 2, 117, 123.
Willoughby Run, 61;
see Chap. V.
YORK, Pa., occupied by Confederates, 28;
evacuated, 51.
* * * * *
Transcriber's note:
Minor typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected
without note. Irregularities and inconsistencies in the text have
been retained as printed.
The cover for the eBook version of this book was created by the
transcriber and is placed in the public domain.
Page 25, Footnote 10: A footnote anchor was missing and inserted
here by the transcriber. "adversary is already prepared,--whereas
if there is anything a Southerner piques himself upon, it is his
horsemanship."[10]