less because they were fighting under the eyes of the king, who was
watching the battle from a projecting point of Mount Ægaleos on the
mainland of Attica. The native Persians and Medes, as inland peoples,
were serving as what we call marines on board the ships furnished by
the maritime provinces of Phœnicia, Egypt, and Cilicia. But they seldom
had the chance of showing their prowess in boarding, and when they
had they were hardly a match for their better-armed and more athletic
antagonists. As for the management of the ships, the sailors from the
east were not, as a rule, equal, either in resolution or in skill, to
the hardier races of the west. Their superior numbers, in the narrow
space to which the battle was confined, were a hindrance rather than
a help. There was no mutual confidence, and no common speech. And the
cogent motive that sent them into action was fear of punishment or, at
the best, obedience to a ruling race, while the Greeks were fighting
for home and country. The Persian fleet was more successful where the
Asiatic Greeks were matched with the squadrons from the Peloponnesus.
Herodotus, himself an Asiatic Greek by birth, vindicates their honour
as combatants at the expense of their Greek patriotism. "I could
mention," he says, "the names of many captains who took ships from the
Greeks." He thinks it prudent, however, to omit them--and indeed when
Herodotus wrote, such exploits would be better forgotten--and gives
two names only, both of them well known already. He also mentions with
pleasure the signal discomfiture of some Phœnician captains, who,
having lost their ships early in the day, sought to excuse themselves
to Xerxes by laying the blame on the treasonable practices of the
Greeks. The battle was still going on, and almost while they were
speaking a Samothracian ship was seen to ram and sink an Athenian. It
was in turn disabled by an Æginetan trireme. But the Samothracian crew
were expert javelin-throwers. They cleared the deck of the Æginetan,
boarded, and captured it. Xerxes turned fiercely on the Phœnicians, and
ordered that they should be instantly executed, as having ventured to
slander men braver than themselves.
Another incident of the day Herodotus relates from personal knowledge.
His native city of Halicarnassus had been ruled for some years by
Artemisia, the daughter of one Lygdamis and the widow of another.
She had advised Xerxes not to engage the Greek fleet, speaking with a
frankness which might well have put her life in danger. Overruled by
other counsellors, she did her best for the king's cause, but found
herself in the greatest peril. An Athenian ship was in close pursuit of
her, and there was a crowd of Persian vessels in front which hindered
her escape. One of these belonged to a Carian neighbour, with whom, it
is possible, she was not on the best of terms. She bore down upon his
vessel, and sank it. The Athenian captain concluded at once that she
had changed sides and was now fighting for Greece. He abandoned the
pursuit, and Artemisia escaped. And she earned praise as well. "Sire,"
said one of the courtiers who stood by the king's seat, "dost thou see
how bravely Artemisia bears herself? She has just sunk a Greek ship."
He was sure, he went on to say, that the exploit was Artemisia's,
for he knew her flag. No one seemed to have suspected the truth, and
fortunately for Artemisia there was not a single survivor from the
Carian ship to tell the tale.
Herodotus gives no estimate of the loss on either side. A later Greek
writer says that two hundred Persian and forty Greek ships were
destroyed, and that the Persian loss in men was in a much greater
proportion. Few of them could swim, and consequently, when a ship was
sunk, the whole crew perished with it. Most of the Greeks, on the
contrary, were able to save themselves by swimming. Another disaster
to the king's forces was the total destruction of the Persian troops
landed on the island of Psyttaleia. Aristides disembarked with some
Greek heavy-armed, and put them all to the sword. Among them were some
of the king's own guard.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 3: These were Peleus and Phocus, sons of Æacus. Telamon, also
a son of Æacus, and Ajax, son of Telamon, were worshipped in Salamis.]
V
THE BATTLES ON THE PLAIN AND ON THE SHORE
After the defeat at Salamis Xerxes withdrew his army into Thessaly.
The result of his deliberations with his advisers was that he should
himself go home, protected by a division of 60,000 men, and that his
uncle Mardonius should stop in Greece with the intention of renewing
the campaign in the following year. Mardonius was allowed to choose
such portions of the army as he thought best, and having selected
300,000 men, went into winter quarters in Thessaly. It is needless
to relate all that happened during the six months or so that passed
from the opening of the campaign in the spring of 479 up to the final
struggle in the early autumn of that year. It will suffice to say that
Mardonius did his best to detach the Athenians from the cause of Greece
by the most liberal offers, and that the Peloponnesians did all they
could to bring about the same end by the consistent selfishness of
their policy. To Mardonius the Athenians returned a firm refusal. To
the Spartans they addressed a strong remonstrance. They represented
that they had been already deserted, that the promise of help to be
given for the defence of Attica had been shamefully broken. They
hinted that if the Spartans and their friends persisted in neglecting
every Greek interest outside the Isthmus they would be compelled, much
against their will, to make terms with the enemy.
The Spartans would probably have continued to temporise but for the
plain speaking of a native of Tegea in Arcadia, a friendly state for
which they felt the greatest respect. "No wall at the Isthmus will
protect us," he said, "if you drive the Athenians into alliance with
Persia. They will put their fleet at the disposal of the enemy, and you
will be helpless." The change in the Spartan policy was dramatically
sudden. That very night five thousand Spartans set out for the front,
a larger force than the state ever before put into the field, or was
ever to put afterwards. Each Spartan had seven light-armed helots to
attend him. The same number of the non-Spartan population of Laconia,
each with one helot, followed. Mardonius, on hearing of this movement,
withdrew from Attica into Bœotia and prepared to give battle.
The contingents of the Peloponnesian States mustered at Corinth. As
they marched north, the Athenians, who had crossed over from Salamis,
joined them. The whole force amounted to more than 100,000 men. It is
not necessary to give all the numbers sent by the various states. The
Lacedæmonians had 10,000 heavy armed (with 40,000 light armed), the
Tegeans 1,500, the Athenians 8,000; the other contingents, for reasons
which will shortly appear, may be left out of the account.
Mardonius had constructed an entrenched camp on the north or left bank
of the river Asopus. In front of this camp he drew up his line of
battle. The Greek army, which was under the command of Pausanias, uncle
of one of the kings of Sparta and regent, took up its position on the
slopes of Mount Cithæron. Their unwillingness to descend into the plain
and come to close quarters emboldened Mardonius to attack them with
his cavalry. The contingent from Megara happened to be in a peculiarly
advanced or otherwise exposed situation, and suffered so severely that
it had to send for help. It explains Pausanias's apparent timidity
when we find that he could not induce any of his troops to go to the
assistance of their hard-pressed countrymen. In the end three hundred
Athenians volunteered for this service. They took with them a force
of archers, an arm in which Megarians were entirely deficient. Some
sharp fighting ensued; at last an arrow killed the horse of the Persian
general Masistius, and the general, a man of great stature and beauty,
and a splendid figure in his gilded chain-armour, was thrown to the
ground. This happened close to the Athenian lines, and Masistius was
soon killed, though it was only by a thrust in the eye that he could
be despatched, so impenetrable was his armour. The Persian cavalry,
as soon as it became aware of its leader's fate, charged furiously to
recover the body. For a time the Greeks were driven back, but they
rallied and recovered the prize. The Persians, demoralised, in the
usual fashion of Asiatics, by the loss of their leader, retreated in
disorder.
Encouraged by this success, the Greeks descended into the plain,
and took up a second position on the right bank of the Asopus. The
Lacedæmonians occupied the right wing, the Athenians the left. A
curious instance of the want of discipline in the army is afforded by
the dispute which arose between the Athenians and the Tegeans as to
precedence. The first post of honour, the right wing, was conceded by
common consent to the Lacedæmonians; the second part, the left wing,
was the matter in dispute. Tegea claimed it on account of various
mythical exploits, and on more recent successes achieved in company
with Sparta. Athens had also its mythical claims, but it relied on the
victory at Marathon. The decision was given in favour of Athens by
a general vote of the Lacedæmonian soldiery. The new position taken
up by the Greeks was found to be anything but convenient. The army
suffered from a scarcity of water; it was unsafe to approach the river
banks, for this was commanded by the Persian archers, and consequently
the sole supply was a spring, known by the name of Gargaphia, which
was close to the Lacedæmonian position. Mardonius shifted his line of
battle a little to the west, so as to front the new Greek position.
His picked native troops, the Persians and the Sacæ (Turkomans) were
posted, not in the centre, the post of honour in an Asiatic army, as we
have seen more than once before, but on the left wing, where they would
face the Spartans; to the Theban contingent was allotted a place on
the right where they were opposed to their old enemies of Athens. This
was done at the suggestion of the Theban leaders, and the suggestion
did credit, as we shall see, to their sagacity.
For ten days the two armies remained in position without moving. The
soothsayers on both sides reported that the sacrifices portended
success to a policy of defence; disaster, if an attack should be
attempted. It was to the Greek cause that the delay was more perilous.
The army suffered greatly from the incessant attacks of the Persian
cavalry; the scanty water supply was a great inconvenience and even a
danger; and when, at the suggestion of his Theban friends, Mardonius
sent his cavalry to cut off the supplies that were sent by the passes
of Cithæron into the Greek camp, the dangers of the situation were
still further aggravated. But the most serious peril of all was of
another kind. The spirit of party, without which no free state can
exist, but by which every free state is ultimately ruined, was rife in
the Greek ranks. The traitors who had shown the signal of the shield
after Marathon were not absent from the ranks at Platæa. The Thebans,
with malignant sagacity, suggested to Mardonius that he should rely
on the influences that were working for him, and avoid a general
engagement. Happily for Greece, he refused their advice, which was
discreditable, he said, to Persian honour. A people so superior in war
had no need to resort to such expedients. He resolved to assume the
offensive.
The Greeks were apprised of this change of plan by a visitor from
the Persian camp. After nightfall, Alexander, King of Macedonia, who
claimed to be descended from the great hero Achilles, rode up to the
Athenian outposts and demanded speech with the generals. They were
fetched by the guard, and he told them that Mardonius had tried in vain
to obtain from the sacrifices signs that promised success, but that,
nevertheless, he was determined to attack. "Be prepared," he went on,
"and if you prevail, do something for my freedom; I have risked my life
for love of Greece, to save you from a surprise by the barbarians. I am
Alexander of Macedon."
When Pausanias heard the news he made a proposition to the Athenian
generals, which, as coming from a Spartan, a race so punctilious in
military honour, sounds very strange. He suggested that they should
take the place of the Spartans on the right wing, where they would
be opposed to the Persian infantry whom they had already conquered at
Marathon, but whom the Spartans had never met in battle. The Athenians
promptly agreed, but the movement was detected by Mardonius, and
was met by a corresponding change in his line. On perceiving this,
Pausanias reverted to the former arrangement.
The first offensive movement on the part of Mardonius was eminently
successful. His cavalry got past, or broke through the Spartan line, so
as to get at the spring of Gargaphia. This they choked, and so deprived
the Greek army of their only available water supply.
A change of position became necessary. The new ground which the
council of war determined to occupy was near Platæa, and went by the
name of the Island, because it lay between two small streams which
descend from Cithæron. The army would have a water supply, and would
be protected, in a degree, from the Persian cavalry. It was then too
late to make the movement, which would not be practicable except under
cover of darkness. The whole of the next day had to be spent in extreme
discomfort; and when at nightfall orders were given for a change of
position, two somewhat alarming incidents took place. The centre of
the Greek force, comprising all the smaller contingents, had been so
demoralised, it would seem, by the troubles of the day that, as soon
as the night fell, they marched off, not to the Island, but beyond it,
to a place which they very probably considered to be better protected
against the harassing attacks of the cavalry. This was the town of
Platæa itself. They took up a position in front of the temple of Heré,
a building of considerable size, as we know from the ruins still to
be seen, and on high ground. Here they had the town behind them, and
ground, unfavourable to the action of cavalry on either side. The other
disconcerting event was the conduct of one of the Spartan officers,
Amompharetus by name.[4] This man conceived that the movement ordered
by Pausanias was a retreat, and so forbidden by the strict code of
Spartan military honour. Accordingly he refused to move. An angry
dispute followed, Pausanias and his second in command doing all they
could to convince their subordinate, he obstinately adhering to his
decision. In the midst of the argument a messenger from the Athenians
arrived on horseback. They were perplexed by the inaction of the
Spartans, and, very possibly, suspicious of some design which would be
compromising to their own safety. At the moment of this messenger's
arrival Amompharetus had delivered his ultimatum. Taking up from the
ground a huge stone, he cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying at the
same time, "I give my vote for staying"--the same word serves in Greek
for vote and pebble, pebbles being used in the ballot-boxes. Pausanias
hurriedly explained the situation to the Athenian, and begged him to
carry back a message that he hoped his countrymen would not move till
he could overcome the difficulty in which he found himself. This,
indeed, seemed almost hopeless. At last, just before dawn, Pausanias
made up his mind to leave the refractory captain behind. Finding
himself alone with his company, he would, he hoped, consent to follow.
And this was what actually took place.
By this time day was dawning, and Mardonius became aware of what had
happened. He seems to have looked upon the movement in much the same
way as Amompharetus had done. It was a flight. These Spartans, for all
their boasted courage, were running away. His Persian troops answered
the command by a disorderly advance. They crossed the Asopus, which,
it will be remembered, flowed in front of their position, and hurried
in the track of the Spartans; the rest of the Asiatics followed their
example. Pausanias sent a message to the Athenians, telling them that
the Persians were concentrating their whole strength against his
division, and begging that they would come to his help, at least by
sending their archers. The Athenians, however, had by this time work
enough of their own to deal with, for the Thebans and Thessalians had
commenced an attack upon them.
The Spartans, therefore, had to bear the brunt of the Persian attack
alone. They had ten thousand heavy-armed and four times as many
light-armed, numbers slightly increased by the contingent from Tegea,
a force of three thousand, equally divided between the two classes
of troops. Pausanias, who seems to have shown little ability or
presence of mind from the beginning to the end of the campaign, was
busy with the customary sacrifice. Unfortunately the victims showed no
encouraging signs, and he was content, possibly was compelled by the
public opinion of his men--for a Greek army, even when it came from
Sparta, was a democracy--to postpone any movement of offence till the
Fates seemed propitious. Meanwhile his men were falling about him--one
of the slain was reputed to be the handsomest man in the whole Greek
army.[5] In an agony of distress, Pausanias lifted his eyes to the
Temple of Heré, which stood on a conspicuous height, and prayed for the
help of the goddess. The signs immediately changed, and the welcome
signal to charge was given. The Tegeans seem to have already moved.
Together they advanced against the Persian line, which was protected
by a rampart of wicker shields, from behind which the archers had
been pouring volleys of arrows. The rampart was soon broken down.
Then a fierce hand-to-hand fight began. Again and again the Persian
braves dashed themselves on the Spartans' spears and broke or strived
to break them. "They were not one whit inferior to the Greeks in
boldness and warlike spirit"--such is the testimony which men who had
borne their part in that fierce struggle bore to the bravery of their
antagonists--but their armament was less effective and their military
training less complete. The battle raged most furiously about the
person of Mardonius, who was surrounded by a bodyguard of a thousand
Immortals. As long as he lived these picked warriors held their own;
when he was struck down--a Spartan, Aeimnestus[6] by name, had the
credit of the deed--they fled in wild confusion to their camp. A body
of forty thousand was led off the field by the general in command, when
he saw how the fortune of the day was going.
On the right wing of the Persian army the Theban infantry, always
distinguished for its steady courage, held its own for a considerable
time against the Athenians. It stood alone, however. The other Greeks,
whom Xerxes or his lieutenant had pressed into the Persian service,
felt no zeal for the cause, and took the first opportunity that
occurred of retreating. The Thebans, who must have been much inferior
in numbers to their Athenian adversaries, were driven back, with a
considerable loss in killed. They took refuge within the walls of their
city. Their cavalry, indeed, achieved the only success that the army of
Mardonius could boast. News reached the Greek centre, in its position
outside Platæa, that the right wing had put the Persians to flight, and
it hurriedly advanced to take a share in the victory. The movement was
made in a careless and disorderly way. So relaxed was discipline that
the whole force did not even keep together. Two of the contingents,
from Megara and Phlius (a small state in the north of the Peloponnese)
were attacked by the Theban cavalry as they crossed the plain and
suffered a very heavy loss, as many as six hundred being slain. "So
they perished without honour," says Herodotus. It must be owned that
from first to last the smaller Greek States earned little distinction
in the war.
The Persian entrenched camp was for a time a difficulty. The Spartans
attacked it, but made no progress, being wholly unacquainted with the
methods of assaulting fortified places. They had to await the arrival
of the Athenians, who seem to have had, if not more experience, at
least more intelligence. With their help the camp was taken by assault.
The spoil was very great. Pausanias says that he saw at Athens the
golden scymetar of Mardonius, taken from his tent on the day of the
victory.
The loss of the Persians was, of course, very great. Herodotus says
that only 3,000 survived. This may be an exaggeration, but it is
doubtless true that the chances of escape were very small, and that no
mercy would be shown. Of the Greeks 159 are said to have fallen. To
this number must be added the 600 cut off by the Theban cavalry, and
about as many more who fell in the preliminary conflicts. Plutarch,
while giving the same number as Herodotus, states that the total Greek
loss, from first to last, was 1,360.
Among the Spartan dead were Amompharetus, and Aristodemus, the unhappy
survivor of Thermopylæ.
Two of the Greek contingents, from Mantinea and from Elis, arrived
after the battle was over. They fined the generals whose tardiness had
deprived them of all share in the glory of the victory.
Much might be said of what was done by the conquerors to commemorate
their victory; but my task is finished when the battle has been
described. For one curious story, however, I must find room. Out of the
tenth of the spoil dedicated to the Delphian Apollo, a golden tripod,
or caldron, supported by three legs, was made. This tripod rested on
a bronze pedestal. The gold was plundered by the Phocians about a
century and a half later, but the pedestal was carried by the Emperor
Constantine to his new capital on the Bosphorus. This relic was seen by
English travellers in the seventeenth century, and was more minutely
examined at the time of the Crimean war. The original inscription put
by Pausanius was erased by the Lacedæmonians, a list of the states
that took part in the battle being substituted. Solvents applied to
the rust that had accumulated on the metal made this list legible. It
contains the names of states which we know to have had no claim to the
honour. This exactly agrees with what Herodotus tells us. Systematic
falsification of history was carried on by the cities which by their
misfortune or their fault took no part in the victory.
* * * * *
The combined Greek fleet did little or nothing after the victory
at Salamis. Themistocles proposed, indeed, a vigorous policy. The
Persians should be closely pursued, the bridge across the Hellespont
destroyed, and the whole of the invading army destroyed. The
Spartans took a different line, urging that Greece would do well to
let an enemy, who might still be dangerous, depart without further
molestation. This policy had something to be said for it, and Sparta
carried the other allies with her. The Asiatic Greeks, however,
were not disposed to lose the opportunity of freedom. In the spring
of the following year (479) they sent envoys to the leaders of the
Greek fleet, which was then stationed at Ægina, begging them to
follow up the successes already won. The envoys found their task a
very difficult one. The Spartan Leotychides, who was in command, was
unwilling to undertake the responsibility. He moved as far eastward
as Delos, and there remained. Later in the year another effort was
made, this time by three natives of Samos, which was then governed by
a tyrant established in power by the Persians. The envoys urged on
Leotychides the duty of helping his fellow Greeks to escape from the
Persian yoke, and enlarged on the prospects of success. "Stranger,"
said the Spartan to the spokesman of the embassy, "tell me your name."
"Hegisistratus" (army-leader), answered the man. "I accept the omen,"
cried Leotychides, and the resolution to advance was taken.
The Greek admirals had expected to find the Persian fleet at Samos. In
this they were disappointed. It had left the island, and had taken up
a position on the mainland, where it would have the assistance of the
army, numbering, we are told, 60,000, which had been left to overawe
the Greek cities. The place was _Mycalé_, now known as Cape St. Mary.
The channel between the mainland and Samos is here at its narrowest.
The ships were beached, and protected by a rampart made of stones and
timber.