ESSAY XV. ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHARACTER

It is astonishing, with all our opportunities and practice, how little

we know of this subject. For myself, I feel that the more I learn, the

less I understand it.

I remember, several years ago, a conversation in the diligence coming

from Paris, in which, on its being mentioned that a man had married

his wife after thirteen years' courtship, a fellow-countryman of

mine observed, that 'then, at least, he would be acquainted with her

character'; when a Monsieur P----, inventor and proprietor of the

_Invisible Girl,_ made answer, 'No, not at all; for that the very next

day she might turn out the very reverse of the character that she had

appeared in during all the preceding time.'(1) I could not help admiring

the superior sagacity of the French juggler, and it struck me then that

we could never be sure when we had got at the bottom of this riddle.

There are various ways of getting at a knowledge of character--by looks,

words, actions. The first of these, which seems the most superficial, is

perhaps the safest, and least liable to deceive: nay, it is that which

mankind, in spite of their pretending to the contrary, most generally go

by. Professions pass for nothing, and actions may be counterfeited; but

a man cannot help his looks. 'Speech,' said a celebrated wit, 'was given

to man to conceal his thoughts.' Yet I do not know that the greatest

hypocrites are the least silent. The mouth of Cromwell is pursed up in

the portraits of him, as if he was afraid to trust himself with words.

Lord Chesterfield advises us, if we wish to know the real sentiments of

the person we are conversing with, to look in his face, for he can more

easily command his words than his features. A man's whole life may be

picture painted of him by a great artist would probably stamp his

true character on the canvas, and betray the secret to posterity.

Men's opinions were divided, in their lifetimes, about such prominent

personages as Charles V. and Ignatius Loyola, partly, no doubt, from

passion and interest, but partly from contradictory evidence in their

ostensible conduct: the spectator, who has ever seen their pictures by

Titian, judges of them at once, and truly. I had rather leave a good

portrait of myself behind me than have a fine epitaph. The face, for the

most part, tells what we have thought and felt--the rest is nothing. I

prefixed to his poems than from anything he ever wrote. Caesar's

_Commentaries_ would not have redeemed him in my opinion, if the bust of

him had resembled the Duke of Wellington. My old friend Fawcett used

to say, that if Sir Isaac Newton himself had lisped, he could not have

thought anything of him. So I cannot persuade myself that any one is a

great man who looks like a fool. In this I may be wrong.

First impressions are often the truest, as we find (not unfrequently) to

our cost when we have been wheedled out of them by plausible professions

or actions. A man's look is the work of years, it is stamped on his

countenance by the events of his whole life, nay, more, by the hand of

nature, and it is not to be got rid of easily. There is, as it has been

remarked repeatedly, something in a person's appearance at first sight

which we do not like, and that gives us an odd twinge, but which is

overlooked in a multiplicity of other circumstances, till the mask is

taken off, and we see this lurking character verified in the plainest

manner in the sequel. We are struck at first, and by chance, with what

is peculiar and characteristic; also with permanent _traits_ and general

effect: this afterwards goes off in a set of unmeaning, common-place

details. This sort of _prima facie_ evidence, then, shows what a man is

better than what he says or does; for it shows us the habit of his mind,

which is the same under all circumstances and disguises. You will say,

on the other hand, that there is no judging by appearances, as a general

rule. No one, for instance, would take such a person for a very clever

man without knowing who he was. Then, ten to one, he is not: he may have

got the reputation, but it is a mistake. You say, there is Mr. -----,

undoubtedly a person of great genius; yet, except when excited by

something extraordinary, he seems half dead. He has wit at will, yet

wants life and spirit. He is capable of the most generous acts,

yet meanness seems to cling to every motion. He looks like a poor

creature--and in truth he is one! The first impression he gives you of

him answers nearly to the feeling he has of his personal identity;

and this image of himself, rising from his thoughts, and shrouding his

faculties, is that which sits with him in the house, walks out with him

into the street, and haunts his bedside. The best part of his existence

is dull, cloudy, leaden: the flashes of light that proceed from it, or

streak it here and there, may dazzle others, but do not deceive himse

deficiency it indicates. He who undervalues himself is justly

undervalued by others. Whatever good properties he may possess are,

in fact, neutralised by a 'cold rheum' running through his veins, and

taking away the zest of his pretensions, the pith and marrow of his

performances. What is it to me that I can write these TABLE-TALKS? It

is true I can, by a reluctant effort, rake up a parcel of half-forgotten

observations, but they do not float on the surface of my mind, nor

stir it with any sense of pleasure, nor even of pride. Others have more

property in them than I have: they may reap the benefit, I have only had

the pain. Otherwise, they are to me as if they had never existed; nor

should I know that I had ever thought at all, but that I am reminded of

it by the strangeness of my appearance, and my unfitness for everything

else. Look in Coleridge's face while he is talking. His words are such

as might 'create a soul under the ribs of death.' His face is a blank.

Which are we to consider as the true index of his mind? Pain, languor,

shadowy remembrances, are the uneasy inmates there: his lips move

mechanically!

There are people that we do not like, though we may have known them

long, and have no fault to find with them, 'their appearance, as we

say, is so much against them.' That is not all, if we could find it out.

There is, generally, a reason for this prejudice; for nature is true

to itself. They may be very good sort of people too, in their way, but

still something is the matter. There is a coldness, a selfishness, a

levity, an insincerity, which we cannot fix upon any particular phrase

or action, but we see it in their whole persons and deportment. One

reason that we do not see it in any other way may be, that they are all

the time trying to conceal this defect by every means in their power.

There is, luckily, a sort of _second sight_ in morals: we discern

the lurking indications of temper and habit a long while before their

palpable effects appear. I once used to meet with a person at an

ordinary, a very civil, good-looking man in other respects, but with

an odd look about his eyes, which I could not explain, as if he saw you

under their fringed lids, and you could not see him again: this man

was a common sharper. The greatest hypocrite I ever knew was a little,

demure, pretty, modest-looking girl, with eyes timidly cast upon the

ground, and an air soft as enchantment; the only circumstance that could

lead to a suspicion of her true character was a cold, sullen, watery,

glazed look about the eyes, which she bent on vacancy, as if determined

to avoid all explanation with yours. I might have spied in their

glittering, motionless surface the rocks and quicksands that awaited

me below! We do not feel quite at ease in the company or friendship

of those who have any natural obliquity or imperfection of person.

The reason is, they are not on the best terms with themselves, and are

sometimes apt to play off on others the tricks that nature has played

them. This, however, is a remark that, perhaps, ought not to have been

made. I know a person to whom it has been objected as a disqualification

for friendship, that he never shakes you cordially by the hand. I own

this is a damper to sanguine and florid temperaments, who abound in

these practical demonstrations and 'compliments extern.' The same person

who testifies the least pleasure at meeting you, is the last to quit

his seat in your company, grapples with a subject in conversation right

earnestly, and is, I take it, backward to give up a cause or a friend.

Cold and distant in appearance, he piques himself on being the king

of _good haters,_ and a no less zealous partisan. The most phlegmatic

constitutions often contain the most inflammable spirits--a fire is

struck from the hardest flints.

And this is another reason that makes it difficult to judge of

character. Extremes meet; and qualities display themselves by the most

contradictory appearances. Any inclination, in consequence of

being generally suppressed, vents itself the more violently when

an opportunity presents itself: the greatest grossness sometimes

accompanies the greatest refinement, as a natural relief, one to the

other; and we find the most reserved and indifferent tempers at the

beginning of an entertainment, or an acquaintance, turn out the most

communicative and cordial at the end of it. Some spirits exhaust

themselves at first: others gain strength by progression. Some minds

have a greater facility of throwing off impressions--are, as it were,

more transparent or porous than others. Thus the French present a marked

contrast to the English in this respect. A Frenchman addresses you at

once with a sort of lively indifference: an Englishman is more on his

guard, feels his way, and is either exceedingly reserved, or lets you

into his whole confidence, which he cannot so well impart to an entire

stranger. Again, a Frenchman is naturally humane: an Englishman is, I

should say, only friendly by habit. His virtues and his vices cost him

more than they do his more gay and volatile neighbours. An Englishman is

said to speak his mind more plainly than others,--yes, if it will give

you pain to hear it. He does not care whom he offends by his discourse:

a foreigner generally strives to oblige in what he says. The French are

accused of promising more than they perform. That may be, and yet they

may perform as many good-natured acts as the English, if the latter are

as averse to perform as they are to promise. Even the professions of the

French may be sincere at the time, or arise out of the impulse of the

moment; though their desire to serve you may be neither very violent nor

very lasting. I cannot think, notwithstanding, that the French are not a

serious people; nay, that they are not a more reflecting people than

the common run of the English. Let those who think them merely light and

mercurial explain that enigma, their everlasting prosing tragedy. The

English are considered as comparatively a slow, plodding people. If the

French are quicker, they are also more plodding. See, for example, how

highly finished and elaborate their works of art are! How systematic and

correct they aim at being in all their productions of a graver cast!

'If the French have a fault,' as Yorick said, 'it is that they are

too grave.' With wit, sense, cheerfulness, patience, good-nature, and

refinement of manners, all they want is imagination and sturdiness of

moral principle! Such are some of the contradictions in the character

of the two nations, and so little does the character of either appear to

have been understood! Nothing can be more ridiculous indeed than the

way in which we exaggerate each other's vices and extenuate our own.

The whole is an affair of prejudice on one side of the question, and

of partiality on the other. Travellers who set out to carry back a

true report of the case appear to lose not only the use of their

understandings, but of their senses, the instant they set foot in a

foreign land. The commonest facts and appearances are distorted and

discoloured. They go abroad with certain preconceived notions on the

subject, and they make everything answer, in reason's spite, to their

favourite theory. In addition to the difficulty of explaining customs

and manners foreign to our own, there are all the obstacles of wilful

prepossession thrown in the way. It is not, therefore, much to be

wondered at that nations have arrived at so little knowledge of one

another's characters; and that, where the object has been to widen the

breach between them, any slight differences that occur are easily

blown into a blaze of fury by repeated misrepresentations, and all the

exaggerations that malice or folly can invent!

This ignorance of character is not confined to foreign nations: we are

ignorant of that of our own countrymen in a class a little below or

above ourselves. We shall hardly pretend to pronounce magisterially on

the good or bad qualities of strangers; and, at the same time, we are

ignorant of those of our friends, of our kindred, and of our own. We are

in all these cases either too near or too far off the object to judge of

it properly.

Persons, for instance, in a higher or middle rank of life know little

or nothing of the characters of those below them, as servants, country

people, etc. I would lay it down in the first place as a general rule

on this subject, that all uneducated people are hypocrites. Their sole

business is to deceive. They conceive themselves in a state of hostility

with others, and stratagems are fair in war. The inmates of the kitchen

and the parlour are always (as far as respects their feelings and

intentions towards each other) in Hobbes's; 'state of nature.' Servants

and others in that line of life have nothing to exercise their spare

talents for invention upon but those about them. Their superfluous

electrical particles of wit and fancy are not carried off by those

established and fashionable conductors, novels and romances. Their

faculties are not buried in books, but all alive and stirring, erect

and bristling like a cat's back. Their coarse conversation sparkles with

'wild wit, invention ever new.' Their betters try all they can to set

themselves up above them, and they try all they can to pull them down to

their own level. They do this by getting up a little comic interlude,

a daily, domestic, homely drama out of the odds and ends of the family

failings, of which there is in general a pretty plentiful supply, or

make up the deficiency of materials out of their own heads. They turn

the qualities of their masters and mistresses inside out, and any real

kindness or condescension only sets them the more against you. They are

not to be taken in that way--they will not be baulked in the spite they

have to you. They only set to work with redoubled alacrity, to lessen

the favour or to blacken your character. They feel themselves like a

degraded _caste,_ and cannot understand how the obligations can be all

on one side, and the advantages all on the other. You cannot come to

equal terms with them--they reject all such overtures as insidious and

hollow--nor can you ever calculate upon their gratitude or goodwill, any

more than if they were so many strolling Gipsies or wild Indians. They

have no fellow-feeling, they keep no faith with the more privileged

classes. They are in your power, and they endeavour to be even with you

by trick and cunning, by lying and chicanery. In this they have nothing

to restrain them. Their whole life is a succession of shifts, excuses,

and expedients. The love of truth is a principle with those only who

have made it their study, who have applied themselves to the pursuit of

some art or science, where the intellect is severely tasked, and learns

by habit to take a pride in, and to set a just value on, the correctness

of its conclusions. To have a disinterested regard to truth, the mind

must have contemplated it in abstract and remote questions; whereas the

ignorant and vulgar are only conversant with those things in which their

own interest is concerned. All their notions are local, personal, and

consequently gross and selfish. They say whatever comes uppermost--turn

whatever happens to their own account--and invent any story, or give any

answer that suits their purposes. Instead of being bigoted to general

principles, they trump up any lie for the occasion, and the more of a

_thumper_ it is, the better they like it; the more unlooked-for it is,

why, so much the more of a _God-send!_ They have no conscience about

the matter; and if you find them out in any of their manoeuvres, are not

ashamed of themselves, but angry with you. If you remonstrate with

them, they laugh in your face. The only hold you have of them is their

interest--you can but dismiss them from your employment; and _service is

no inheritance._ If they effect anything like decent remorse, and hope

you will pass it over, all the while they are probably trying to recover

the wind of you. Persons of liberal knowledge or sentiments have no kind

of chance in this sort of mixed intercourse with these barbarians in

civilised life. You cannot tell, by any signs or principles, what is

passing in their minds. There is no common point of view between you.

You have not the same topics to refer to, the same language to express

yourself. Your interests, your feelings are quite distinct. You take

certain things for granted as rules of action: they take nothing for

granted but their own ends, pick up all their knowledge out of their own

occasions, are on the watch only for what they can catch--are

Subtle as the fox for prey:

Like warlike as the wolf, for what they eat.

They have indeed a regard to their character, as this last may affect

their livelihood or advancement, none as it is connected with a sense

of propriety; and this sets their mother-wit and native talents at work

upon a double file of expedients, to bilk their consciences, and salve

their reputation. In short, you never know where to have them, any more

than if they were of a different species of animals; and in trusting to

them, you are sure to be betrayed and overreached. You have other

things to mind; they are thinking only of you, and how to turn you to

advantage. _Give and take_ is no maxim here. You can build nothing

on your own moderation or on their false delicacy. After a familiar

conversation with a waiter at a tavern, you overhear him calling you by

some provoking nickname. If you make a present to the daughter of the

house where you lodge, the mother is sure to recollect some addition to

her bill. It is a running fight. In fact, there is a principle in

human nature not willingly to endure the idea of a superior, a sour,

jacobinical disposition to wipe out the score of obligation, or efface

the tinsel of external advantages--and where others have the opportunity

of coming in contact with us, they generally find the means to establish

a sufficiently marked degree of degrading equality. No man is a hero

to his valet-de-chambre, is an old maxim. A new illustration of this

principle occurred the other day. While Mrs. Siddons was giving her

readings of Shakespear to a brilliant and admiring drawing-room, one of

the servants in the hall below was saying, 'What, I find the old lady is

making as much noise as ever!' So little is there in common between the

different classes of society, and so impossible is it ever to unite the

diversities of custom and knowledge which separate them.

Women, according to Mrs. Peachum, are 'bitter bad judges' of the

characters of men; and men are not much better of theirs, if we can form

any guess from their choice in marriage. Love is proverbially blind. The

whole is an affair of whim and fancy. Certain it is that the greatest

favourites with the other sex are not those who are most liked or

respected among their own. I never knew but one clever man who was

what is called a _lady's man;_ and he (unfortunately for the argument)

happened to be a considerable coxcomb. It was by this irresistible

quality, and not by the force of his genius, that he vanquished. Women

seem to doubt their own judgments in love, and to take the opinion which

a man entertains of his own prowess and accomplishments for granted. The

wives of poets are (for the most part) mere pieces of furniture in the

room. If you speak to them of their husbands' talents or reputation in

the world, it is as if you made mention of some office that they held.

It can hardly be otherwise, when the instant any subject is started or

conversation arises, in which men are interested, or try one another's

strength, the women leave the room, or attend to something else. The

qualities, then, in which men are ambitious to excel, and which ensure

the applause of the world,--eloquence, genius, learning, integrity,--are

not those which gain the favour of the fair. I must not deny, however,

that wit and courage have this effect. Neither is youth or beauty the

sole passport to their affections.

The way of woman's will is hard to find,

Harder to hit.

Yet there is some clue to this mystery, some determining cause; for we

find that the same men are universal favourites with women, as others

are uniformly disliked by them. Is not the loadstone that attracts so

powerfully, and in all circumstances, a strong and undisguised bias

towards them, a marked attention, a conscious preference of them to

every other passing object or topic? I am not sure, but I incline

to think so. The successful lover is the _cavalier servente_ of all

nations. The man of gallantry behaves as if he had made an assignation

with every woman he addresses. An argument immediately draws off my

attention from the prettiest woman in the room. I accordingly succeed

better in argument--than in love!--I do not think that what is called

_Love at first sight_ is so great an absurdity as it is sometimes

imagined to be. We generally make up our minds beforehand to the sort of

person we should like,--grave or gay, black, brown, or fair; with golden

tresses or with raven locks;--and when we meet with a complete example

of the qualities we admire, the bargain is soon struck. We have never

seen anything to come up to our newly-discovered goddess before, but she

is what we have been all our lives looking for. The idol we fall down

and worship is an image familiar to our minds. It has been present to

our waking thoughts, it has haunted us in our dreams, like some fairy

vision. Oh! thou who, the first time I over beheld thee, didst draw my

soul into the circle of thy heavenly looks, and wave enchantment

round me, do not think thy conquest less complete because it was

instantaneous; for in that gentle form (as if another Imogen had

entered) I saw all that I had ever loved of female grace, modesty, and

sweetness!

I shall not say much of friendship as giving an insight into character,

because it is often founded on mutual infirmities and prejudices.

Friendships are frequently taken up on some sudden sympathy, and we

see only as much as we please of one another's characters afterwards.

Intimate friends are not fair witnesses to character, any more than

professed enemies. They cool, indeed, in time, part, and retain only a

rankling grudge of past errors and oversights. Their testimony in the

latter case is not quite free from suspicion.

One would think that near relations, who live constantly together, and

always have done so, must be pretty well acquainted with one another's

characters. They are nearly in the dark about it. Familiarity confounds

all traits of distinction: interest and prejudice take away the power

of judging. We have no opinion on the subject, any more than of one

another's faces. The Penates, the household gods, are veiled. We do not

see the features of those we love, nor do we clearly distinguish their

virtues or their vices. We take them as they are found in the lump,--by

weight, and not by measure. We know all about the individuals, their

sentiments, history, manners, words, actions, everything; but we know

all these too much as facts, as inveterate, habitual impressions,

as clothed with too many associations, as sanctified with too many

affections, as woven too much into the web of our hearts, to be able to

pick out the different threads, to cast up the items of the debtor and

creditor account, or to refer them to any general standard of right and

wrong. Our impressions with respect to them are too strong, too real,

too much _sui generis,_ to be capable of a comparison with anything

but themselves. We hardly inquire whether those for whom we are thus

interested, and to whom we are thus knit, are _better_ or _worse_ than

others--the question is a kind of profanation--all we know is, they are

_more_ to us than any one else can be. Our sentiments of this kind are

rooted and grow in us, and we cannot eradicate them by voluntary means.

Besides, our judgments are bespoke, our interests take part with our

blood. If any doubt arises, if the veil of our implicit confidence is

drawn aside by any accident for a moment, the shock is too great, like

that of a dislocated limb, and we recoil on our habitual impressions

again. Let not that veil ever be rent entirely asunder, so that those

images may be left bare of reverential awe, and lose their religion; for

nothing can ever support the desolation of the heart afterwards.

The greatest misfortune that can happen among relations is a different

way of bringing up, so as to set one another's opinions and characters

in an entirely new point of view. This often lets in an unwelcome

daylight on the subject, and breeds schisms, coldness, and incurable

heart-burnings in families. I have sometimes thought whether the

progress of society and march of knowledge does not do more harm in this

respect, by loosening the ties of domestic attachment, and preventing

those who are most interested in and anxious to think well of one

another from feeling a cordial sympathy and approbation of each

other's sentiments, manners, views, etc., than it does good by any real

advantage to the community at large. The son, for instance, is brought

up to the Church, and nothing can exceed the pride and pleasure the

father takes in him while all goes on well in this favourite direction.

His notions change, and he imbibes a taste for the Fine Arts. From

this moment there is an end of anything like the same unreserved

communication between them. The young man may talk with enthusiasm

of his 'Rembrandts, Correggios, and stuff': it is all _Hebrew_ to the

elder; and whatever satisfaction he may feel in the hearing of his son's

progress, or good wishes for his success, he is never reconciled to the

new pursuit, he still hankers after the first object that he had set

his mind upon. Again, the grandfather is a Calvinist, who never gets the

better of his disappointment at his son's going over to the Unitarian

side of the question. The matter rests here till the grandson, some

years after, in the fashion of the day and 'infinite agitation of men's

wit,' comes to doubt certain points in the creed in which he has

been brought up, and the affair is all abroad again. Here are three

generations made uncomfortable and in a manner set at variance by a

veering point of theology, and the officious, meddling biblical critics!

Nothing, on the other hand, can be more wretched or common than that

upstart pride and insolent good fortune which is ashamed of its origin;

nor are there many things more awkward than the situation of rich and

poor relations. Happy, much happier, are those tribes and people who

are confined to the same _caste_ and way of life from sire to son, where

prejudices are transmitted like instincts, and where the same unvarying

standard of opinion and refinement blends countless generations in its

improgressive, everlasting mould!

Not only is there a wilful and habitual blindness in near kindred to

each other's defects, but an incapacity to judge from the quantity of

materials, from the contradictoriness of the evidence. The chain of

particulars is too long and massy for us to lift it or put it into the

most approved ethical scales. The concrete result does not answer to any

abstract theory, to any logical definition. There is black, and white,

and grey, square and round--there are too many anomalies, too many

redeeming points, in poor human nature, such as it actually is, for us

to arrive at a smart, summary decision on it. We know too much to come

to any hasty or partial conclusion. We do not pronounce upon the present

act, because a hundred others rise up to contradict it. We suspend our

judgments altogether, because in effect one thing unconsciously balances

another; and perhaps this obstinate, pertinacious indecision would be

the truest philosophy in other cases, where we dispose of the question

of character easily, because we have only the smallest part of the

evidence to decide upon. Real character is not one thing, but a thousand

things; actual qualities do not conform to any factitious standard in

the mind, but rest upon their own truth and nature. The dull stupor

under which we labour in respect of those whom we have the greatest

opportunities of inspecting nearly, we should do well to imitate before

we give extreme and uncharitable verdicts against those whom we only

see in passing or at a distance. If we knew them better, we should be

disposed to say less about them.

In the truth of things, there are none utterly worthless, none without

some drawback on their pretensions or some alloy of imperfection. It has

been observed that a familiarity with the worst characters lessens our

abhorrence of them; and a wonder is often expressed that the greatest

criminals look like other men. The reason is that _they are like other

men in many respects._ If a particular individual was merely the wretch

we read of, or conceive in the abstract, that is, if he was the mere

personified idea of the criminal brought to the bar, he would not

disappoint the spectator, but would look like what he would be--a

monster! But he has other qualities, ideas, feelings, nay, probably

virtues, mixed up with the most profligate habits or desperate acts.

This need not lessen our abhorrence of the crime, though it does of

the criminal; for it has the latter effect only by showing him to us in

different points of view, in which he appears a common mortal, and not

the caricature of vice we took him for, or spotted all over with infamy.

I do not, at the same time, think this is a lax or dangerous, though it

is a charitable view of the subject. In my opinion, no man ever answered

in his own mind (except in the agonies of conscience or of repentance,

in which latter case he throws the imputation from himself in another

way) to the abstract idea of a _murderer._ He may have killed a man

in self-defence, or 'in the trade of war,' or to save himself from

starving, or in revenge for an injury, but always 'so as with a

difference,' or from mixed and questionable motives. The individual, in

reckoning with himself, always takes into the account the considerations

of time, place, and circumstance, and never makes out a case of

unmitigated, unprovoked villainy, of 'pure defecated evil' against

himself. There are degrees in real crimes: we reason and moralise only

by names and in classes. I should be loth, indeed, to say that 'whatever

is, is right'; but almost every actual choice inclines to it, with some

sort of imperfect, unconscious bias. This is the reason, besides the

ends of secrecy, of the invention of _slang_ terms for different acts

of profligacy committed by thieves, pickpockets, etc. The common names

suggest associations of disgust in the minds of others, which those who

live by them do not willingly recognise, and which they wish to sink in

a technical phraseology. So there is a story of a fellow who, as he was

writing down his confession of a murder, stopped to ask how the word

_murder_ was spelt; this, if true, was partly because his imagination

was staggered by the recollection of the thing, and partly because he

shrunk from the verbal admission of it. '_Amen_ stuck in his throat'!

The defence made by Eugene Aram of himself against a charge of murder,

some years before, shows that he in imagination completely flung from

himself the _nominal_ crime imputed to him: he might, indeed, have

staggered an old man with a blow, and buried his body in a cave, and

lived ever since upon the money he found upon him, but there was 'no

malice in the case, none at all,' as Peachum says. The very coolness,

subtlety, and circumspection of his defence (as masterly a legal

document as there is upon record) prove that he was guilty of the act,

as much as they prove that he was unconscious of the _crime_.(2) In

the same spirit, and I conceive with great metaphysical truth, Mr.

Coleridge, in his tragedy of _Remorse,_ makes Ordonio (his chief

character) wave the acknowledgment of his meditated guilt to his own

mind, by putting into his mouth that striking soliloquy:

Say, I had lay'd a body in the sun!

Well! in a month there swarm forth from the corse

A thousand, nay, ten thousand sentient beings

In place of that one man. Say I had _kill'd_ him!

Yet who shall tell me, that each one and all

Of these ten thousand lives Is not as happy

As that one life, which being push'd aside,

Made room for these unnumber'd.--Act ii. Sc. 2.

I am not sure, indeed, that I have not got this whole train of

speculation from him; but I should not think the worse of it on that

account. That gentleman, I recollect, once asked me whether I thought

that the different members of a family really liked one another so well,

or had so much attachment, as was generally supposed; and I said that

I conceived the regard they had towards each other was expressed by the

word _interest_ rather than by any other, which he said was the true

answer. I do not know that I could mend it now. Natural affection is

not pleasure in one another's company, nor admiration of one another's

qualities; but it is an intimate and deep knowledge of the things that

affect those to whom we are bound by the nearest ties, with pleasure

or pain; it is an anxious, uneasy fellow-feeling with them, a jealous

watchfulness over their good name, a tender and unconquerable yearning

for their good. The love, in short, we bear them is the nearest to that

we bear ourselves. _Home,_ according to the old saying, _is home, be it

never so homely._ We love ourselves, not according to our deserts, but

our cravings after good: so we love our immediate relations in the next

degree (if not, even sometimes a higher one), because we know best

what they have suffered and what sits nearest to their hearts. We are

implicated, in fact, in their welfare by habit and sympathy, as we are

in our own.

If our devotion to our own interests is much the same as to theirs, we

are ignorant of our own characters for the same reason. We are parties

too much concerned to return a fair verdict, and are too much in

the secret of our own motives or situation not to be able to give a

favourable turn to our actions. We exercise a liberal criticism upon

ourselves, and put off the final decision to a late day. The field is

large and open. Hamlet exclaims, with a noble magnanimity, 'I count

myself indifferent honest, and yet I could accuse me of such things!'

If you could prove to a man that he is a knave, it would not make much

difference in his opinion, his self-love is stronger than his love of

virtue. Hypocrisy is generally used as a mask to deceive the world, not

to impose on ourselves: for once detect the delinquent in his knavery,

and he laughs in your face or glories in his iniquity. This at least

happens except where there is a contradiction in the character, and our

vices are involuntary and at variance with our convictions. One

great difficulty is to distinguish ostensible motives, or such as we

acknowledge to ourselves, from tacit or secret springs of action. A man

changes his opinion readily, he thinks it candour: it is levity of min

We are callous by custom to our defects or excellences, unless where

vanity steps in to exaggerate or extenuate them. I cannot conceive how

it is that people are in love with their own persons, or astonished at

their own performances, which are but a nine days' wonder to every one

else. In general it may be laid down that we are liable to this twofold

mistake in judging of our own talents: we, in the first place, nurse the

rickety bantling, we think much of that which has cost us much pains

and labour, and comes against the grain; and we also set little store by

what we do with most ease to ourselves, and therefore best. The works of

the greatest genius are produced almost unconsciously, with an ignorance

on the part of the persons themselves that they have done anything

extraordinary. Nature has done it for them. How little Shakespear seems

to have thought of himself or of his fame! Yet, if 'to know another

well were to know one's self,' he must have been acquainted with his

own pretensions and character, 'who knew all qualities with a learned

spirit.' His eye seems never to have been bent upon himself, but

outwards upon nature. A man who thinks highly of himself may almost set

it down that it is without reason. Milton, notwithstanding, appears to

have had a high opinion of himself, and to have made it good. He was

conscious of his powers, and great by design. Perhaps his tenaciousness,

on the score of his own merit, might arise from an early habit of

polemical writing, in which his pretensions were continually called to

the bar of prejudice and party-spirit, and he had to plead not guilty to

the indictment. Some men have died unconscious of immortality, as others

have almost exhausted the sense of it in their lifetimes. Correggio

might be mentioned as an instance of the one, Voltaire of the other.

There is nothing that helps a man in his conduct through life more

than a knowledge of his own characteristic weaknesses (which, guarded

against, become his strength), as there is nothing that tends more

to the success of a man's talents than his knowing the limits of his

faculties, which are thus concentrated on some practicable object. One

man can do but one thing. Universal pretensions end in nothing. Or, as

Butler has it, too much wit requires

As much again to govern it.

There are those who have gone, for want of this self-knowledge,

strangely out of their way, and others who have never found it. We find

many who succeed in certain departments, and are yet melancholy and

dissatisfied, because they failed in the one to which they first

devoted themselves, like discarded lovers who pine after their scornful

mistress. I will conclude with observing that authors in general

overrate the extent and value of posthumous fame: for what (as it has

been asked) is the amount even of Shakespear's fame? That in that very

country which boasts his genius and his birth, perhaps, scarce one

person in ten has ever heard of his name or read a syllable of his

writings!

Table Talk: Essays on Men and Manners · 第 77 / 83 题