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Transcriber's note:
Obvious printer's errors have been corrected; all other
inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's spelling
has been retained.
1914
THIS BOOK
IS DEDICATED TO
THE RT. HON. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, M.P.,
TO WHOSE PREVISION, ENERGY
AND TENACITY THE ARMY
AND THE EMPIRE
OWE SO MUCH.
1914
by
FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT FRENCH OF YPRES,
K.P., O.M., ETC.
With Maps
London
Constable and Company Ltd.
1919
CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE ................................................ xi
Chap.
I--PRELIMINARY ...................................... 1
II--THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ................. 16
III--THE SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE .......... 31
IV--THE RETREAT FROM MONS ........................... 56
V--FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT ................... 81
VI--THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE ........................ 113
VII--THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE AND ITS PROGRESS
UP TO SEPTEMBER 30TH ........................... 142
VIII--THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP .................. 175
IX--THE LAST DAYS OF THE BRITISH OPERATIONS
ON THE AISNE--THE NORTHERN MOVE ................ 193
X--THE BATTLE OF YPRES--FIRST PHASE, OCTOBER
15TH TO OCTOBER 26TH ........................... 214
XI--THE BATTLE OF YPRES--SECOND PHASE,
OCTOBER 27TH TO OCTOBER 31ST ................... 237
XII--THE BATTLE OF YPRES--THIRD PHASE, NOVEMBER
1ST TO NOVEMBER 10TH ........................... 257
XIII--THE BATTLE OF YPRES--FOURTH AND FINAL
PHASE, NOVEMBER 11TH TO THE END OF
THE BATTLE ..................................... 277
XIV--THE ENTRY OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY .............. 287
XV--A REVIEW OF THE ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST
AT THE CLOSE OF THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES ...... 301
XVI--THE OPERATIONS OF DECEMBER 14TH-19TH, 1914 ..... 320
XVII--THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1914 ..................... 332
XVIII--AMMUNITION ..................................... 347
INDEX ................................................. 363
LIST OF MAPS.
1. GENERAL MAP OF NORTHERN FRANCE AND BELGIUM.
2. MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE RETREAT FROM MONS AND
BATTLES OF THE MARNE AND THE AISNE.
3. MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGN IN BELGIUM, 1914.
PREFACE
Le Marechal FRENCH commandait en Chef l'Armee Britannique au debut de
la Guerre.
Comme on le sait, les allemands ont cherche en 1914 a profiter de leur
superiorite numerique et de l'ecrasante puissance de leur armement,
pour mettre hors de cause les Armees Alliees d'Occident, par une
manoeuvre enveloppante, aussi rapide que possible.
Apres avoir cherche en vain la decision a la MARNE, puis a l'AISNE et
a la SOMME, ils la poursuivent successivement a ARRAS, sur l'YSER et a
YPRES.
A mesure que dans cette course a la mer, le terrain disponible se
restreint devant eux, les coups se precipitent et se repetent plus
violents, les reserves s'engagent, de nouveaux Corps d'Armee entrent
en ligne nombreux et intacts. La reddition d'ANVERS assure d'ailleurs
a l'ennemi d'importantes disponibilites.
Mais deja l'Armee Belge, appuyee de troupes francaises, arrete les
allemands sur l'YSER, de NIEUPORT a DIXMUDE. Apres avoir pris part aux
actions de l'AISNE, l'Armee Britannique a ete transportee dans le
Nord. C'est ainsi qu'elle s'engage progressivement de la
BASSEE a YPRES, s'opposant partout a l'invasion.
Bref, les allemands, apres avoir vainement developpe leurs efforts de
la Mer a la LYS, des le 15 octobre, sont dans l'obligation, a la fin
du mois, de vaincre a YPRES, ou bien leur manoeuvre echoue
definitivement, leur offensive expire en Occident et la Coalition
reste debout.
Ainsi sont-ils amenes, sur ce point d'YPRES, dans une lutte acharnee,
a concentrer leurs moyens, une forte artillerie lourde largement
approvisionee, renforcee de minenwerfers, de corps d'armee nombreux et
renouveles.
Quant aux Allies, ils sont reduits a recevoir le choc avec des
effectifs restreints, des munitions comptees et rares, une faible
artillerie lourde. Toute releve leur est interdite par la penurie de
troupes, quelle que soit la duree de la bataille. Pour ne citer qu'un
exemple, le premier corps britannique reste engage du 20 octobre au 15
novembre--au milieu des plus violentes attaques et malgre de
formidables pertes.
Mais a cette derniere date la bataille etait gagnee. Les Allies
avaient inflige un retentissant echec a l'ennemi: ils avaient sauve
les communications de la Manche et par la fixe le sort et l'avenir de
la Coalition.
Si l'union etroite du Commandement Allie et la valeur des troupes ont
permis ces glorieux resultats, c'est que le Marechal FRENCH a deploye
la plus_ _entiere droiture, la plus complete confiance, la
plus grande energie: resolu a se faire passer sur le corps plutot qu'a
reculer.
La Grande-Bretagne avait trouve en lui un grand soldat. Il avait
maintenu ses troupes a la hauteur de celles de WELLINGTON.
Avec l'emotion d'un souvenir profond et toujours vivant, je salue le
vaillant compagnon d'armes des rudes journees et les glorieux drapeaux
Britanniques de la Bataille d'YPRES.
[Illustration: Signature Foch]
_Marechal de France_.
CHAPTER I.
PRELIMINARY.
For years past I had regarded a general war in Europe as an eventual
certainty. The experience which I gained during the seven or eight
years spent as a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and my
three years tenure of the Office of Chief of the General Staff,
greatly strengthened this conviction.
For reasons which it is unnecessary to enter upon, I resigned my
position as Chief of the Staff in April, 1914, and from that time I
temporarily lost touch with the European situation as it was
officially represented and appreciated.
I remember spending a week in June of that year in Paris, and when
passing through Dover on my return, my old friend, Jimmie Watson
(Colonel Watson, late of the 60th Rifles, A.D.C. to the Khedive of
Egypt), looked into my carriage window and told me of the murder of
the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his Consort. I cannot say that I
actually regarded this tragedy as being the prelude which should lead
ultimately to a great European convulsion, but in my own mind, and in
view of my past experience, it created a feeling of unrest within me
and an instinctive foreboding of evil. Then came a few weeks
of the calm which heralded the storm--a calm under cover of which
Germany was vigorously preparing for "the day."
One afternoon, late in July, I was the guest at lunch of the German
Ambassador, Prince Lichnowski. It was a small party, comprising, to
the best of my recollection, only Princess Henry of Pless, Lady
Cunard, Lord Kitchener, His Excellency and myself. The first idea I
got of the storm which was brewing came from a short conversation
which I had with the Ambassador in a corner of the room after lunch.
He was very unhappy and perturbed, and he plainly told me that he
feared all Europe would be in a blaze before we were a fortnight
older. His feeling was prophetic. His surprising candour foreshadowed
the moral courage with which Prince Lichnowski subsequently issued his
famous apologia.
On July 28th Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. The military
preparations of the Dual Monarchy inevitably led to a partial
mobilisation by Russia against Austria, whereupon the German Emperor
proclaimed the "Kriegsgefahrszustand" on July 31st, following this up
by declaring war against Russia on August 1st. On August 2nd German
troops entered Luxemburg and, without declaration of war, violated
French territory. Great Britain declared war against Germany on August
4th and against Austria on August 12th, France having broken off
relations with Austria two days earlier.
On Thursday, July 30th, I was sent for by the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, and was given private intimation that, if an
expeditionary force were sent to France, I was to command it. On
leaving the room I found some well-known newspaper correspondents
in the passage. I talked a little with them and found that great doubt
existed in their minds as to whether this country would support France
by force of arms. This doubt was certainly shared by many.
I remember well that on the morning of Saturday, August 1st, the day
upon which Germany declared war on Russia, and it was known that the
breaking out of hostilities between Germany and France was only a
question of hours, I received a visit from the Vicomte de la Panouse,
the French Military Attache in London. He told me that the Ambassador
was much disheartened in mind by these doubts and fears. We talked
matters over, and he came to dinner with me that night. Personally, I
felt perfectly sure that so long as Mr. Asquith remained Prime
Minister, and Lord Haldane, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Winston Churchill
continued to be members of the Cabinet, their voices would guide the
destinies of the British Empire, and that we should remain true to our
friendly understanding with the _Entente_ Powers. As the result of the
long conversation I had with the Vicomte de la Panouse, I think I was
successful in causing this conviction to prevail at the French
Embassy.
England declared war on Germany on Tuesday, August 4th, and on the 5th
the mobilisation of Regulars, Special Reserve and Territorials was
ordered. On Wednesday, August 5th, a Council of War was held at 10,
Downing Street, under the Presidency of the Prime Minister. Nearly all
the members of the Cabinet were present, whilst Lord Roberts, Lord
Kitchener, Sir Charles Douglas, Sir Douglas Haig, the late Sir James
Grierson, General (now Sir Henry) Wilson and myself were directed to
attend. To the best of my recollection the two main subjects
discussed were:--
1. The composition of the Expeditionary Force.
2. The point of concentration for the British Forces on
their arrival in France.
As regards 1.
It was generally felt that we were under some obligation to France to
send as strong an army as we could, and there was an idea that one
Cavalry Division and six Divisions of all arms had been promised. As
to the exact number, it did not appear that we were under any definite
obligation, but it was unanimously agreed that we should do all we
could. The question to be decided was how many troops it was necessary
to keep in this country adequately to guard our shores against
attempted invasion and, if need be, to maintain internal order.
Mr. Churchill briefly described the actual situation of the Navy. He
pointed out that the threat of war had come upon us at a most
opportune moment as regards his own Department, because, only two or
three weeks before, the Fleet had been partially mobilised, and large
reserves called up for the great Naval Review by His Majesty at
Spithead and the extensive naval manoeuvres which followed it. So
far as the Navy was concerned, he considered Home Defence reasonably
secure; but this consideration did not suffice to absolve us from the
necessity of keeping a certain number of troops at home. After this
discussion it was decided that two Divisions must for the moment
remain behind, and that one Cavalry Division and four Divisions of all
arms should be sent out as speedily as possible. This meant a force of
approximately 100,000 men.
As regards 2.
The British and French General Staffs had for some years been in close
secret consultation with one another on this subject. The German
menace necessitated some preliminary understanding in the event of a
sudden attack. The area of concentration for the British Forces had
been fixed on the left flank of the French, and the actual detraining
stations of the various units were all laid down in terrain lying
between Maubeuge and Le Cateau. The Headquarters of the Army were
fixed at the latter place.
This understanding being purely provisional and conditional upon an
unprovoked attack by Germany, the discussion then took the turn of
overhauling and reviewing these decisions, and of making arrangements
in view of the actual conditions under which war had broken out. Many
and various opinions were expressed; but on this day no final
decisions were arrived at. It was thought absolutely necessary to ask
the French authorities to send over a superior officer who should be
in full possession of the views and intentions of the French General
Staff. It was agreed that no satisfactory decision could be arrived at
until after full discussion with a duly accredited French Officer. I
think this is the gist of the really important points dealt with at
the Council.
During the week the Headquarters of the Expeditionary Force were
established in London at the Hotel Metropole, and the Staff was
constituted as follows:--
Chief of Staff Gen. Sir Archibald Murray.
Sub-Chief Brig.-Gen. H. H. Wilson.
Adjutant-General Major-Gen. Neville Macready.
Quartermaster-General Major-Gen. Sir William Robertson.
Director of Intelligence Brig.-Gen. Macdonogh.
C.R.A. Major-Gen. Lindsay.
C.R.E. Brig.-Gen. Fowke.
Military Secretary Col. the Hon. W. Lambton.
Principal Medical Officer Surg.-Gen. T. P. Woodhouse.
Principal Veterinary Officer Brig.-Gen. J. Moore.
It was about Thursday the 7th, or Friday the 8th, August, that Lord
Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State for War, and on Monday, the
10th, the Mission sent by the French Government arrived. It was headed
by Colonel Huguet, a well-known French Artillery Officer who had
recently been for several years French Military Attache in London.
As before mentioned, one of the most important matters remaining for
discussion and decision was finally to determine whether the original
plan as regards the area of concentration for the British Forces in
France was to be adhered to, or whether the actual situation demanded
some change or modification. There was an exhaustive exchange of views
between soldiers and Ministers, and many conflicting opinions were
expressed. The soldiers themselves were not agreed. Lord Kitchener
thought that our position on the left of the French line at Maubeuge
would be too exposed, and rather favoured a concentration farther back
in the neighbourhood of Amiens. Sir Douglas Haig suggested postponing
any landing till the campaign had actively opened and we should be
able to judge in which direction our co-operation would be most
effective.
Personally, I was opposed to these ideas, and most anxious to adhere
to our original plans. Any alteration in carrying out our
concentration, particularly if this meant delay, would have upset the
French plan of campaign and created much distrust in the
minds of our Allies. Delay or hanging back would not only have looked
like hesitation, but might easily have entailed disastrous
consequences by permanently separating our already inferior forces.
Having regard to what we subsequently knew of the German plans and
preparations, there can be no doubt that any such delayed landing
might well have been actively opposed. As will be seen hereafter, we
were at first hopeful of carrying out a successful offensive, and, had
those hopes been justified, any change or delay in our original plans
would have either prevented or entirely paralysed it. The vital
element of the problem was speed in mobilisation and concentration,
change of plans meant inevitable and possibly fatal delay.
Murray, Wilson, Grierson and Huguet concurred in my views, and it was
so settled.
The date of the embarkment of the Headquarters Staff was fixed for
Friday, August 14th.
During the fateful days which intervened, daily and almost hourly
reports reached us as to the progress of mobilisation both of our
Allies and our Enemies. From the first it became quite evident that
the German system of mobilisation was quicker than the French. There
was reason to believe that Germany had partly mobilised some classes
of her reserves before formal mobilisation. The splendid stand made by
the Belgians in defence of their frontier fortresses is well known,
and the course of the preliminary operations on the Belgian and
Luxemburg frontiers, as well as those in the neighbourhood of Nancy,
gave us hope that the wonderful army of which we had heard so much,
was not altogether the absolutely invincible war machine we had been
led to expect and believe. During this most critical time,
my mind was occupied day and night with anxious thought. I will try to
recall those days of the first half of August, 1914, and crystallise
the result of my meditations. This will serve to show the doubts,
fears, hopes and aspirations, in short the mental atmosphere in which
I awaited the opening of the campaign.
In the ten years previous to the War, I had constantly envisaged the
probable course of events leading up to the outbreak of this
world-war, as well as the manner of the outbreak itself. In
imagination I had seen the spark suddenly emitted in some obscure
corner of Europe, followed by the blowing-up of one huge magazine,
such as the declaration of war between Russia and Austria would prove
to be, then the conflagration spreading with lightning speed, and I
had seemed to have a foretaste amid it all of the anxious hesitation
which would precede our entry into the war.
I have been a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence since 1906,
and have assisted at the innumerable deliberations of that Aulic
Council. It was somewhere about 1908 that the certainty of a war was
forced upon my mind. Lord Haldane was then Secretary of State for War
and I was Inspector-General of the Forces. Lord Haldane was himself
alive to the possibility of war; but, while he hoped to ward it off by
diplomacy and negotiation, he fully acquiesced in the desirability of
making every preparation which could be carried out in complete
secrecy. He told me that were he in power, if and when the event
occurred, he would designate me to command the Expeditionary Force,
and requested me to study the problem carefully and do all I could to
be ready. It thus fell out that in August, 1914, the many
possibilities and alternatives of action were quite familiar
to my mind.
It is now within the knowledge of all that the General Staffs of Great
Britain and France had, for a long time, held conferences, and that a
complete mutual understanding as to combined action in certain
eventualities existed.
Belgium, however, remained a "dark horse" up to the last, and it is
most unfortunate that she could never be persuaded to decide upon her
attitude in the event of a general war. All we ever had in our mind
was _defence_ against attack by Germany. We had guaranteed the
neutrality of Belgium, and all reports pointed to an intention by
Germany to violate that neutrality. What we desired above all things
was that Belgium should realise the danger which subsequently laid her
waste. We were anxious that she should assist and co-operate in her
own defence. The idea of _attacking_ Germany through Belgium or in any
other direction never entered our heads.
Pre-war arrangements like these were bound in such circumstances to be
very imperfect, though infinitely better than none at all.
It will be of interest at this point to narrate a conversation I had
with the Emperor William in August, 1911. When His Majesty visited
this country in the spring of that year to unveil the statue of Queen
Victoria, he invited me to be his guest at the grand cavalry
manoeuvres to be held that summer in the neighbourhood of Berlin.
It was an experience I shall never forget, and it impressed me
enormously with the efficiency and power of the German cavalry. It was
on about the third day of the manoeuvres that the Emperor
arrived by train at five in the morning to find the troops drawn up on
the plain close by to receive him. I have never seen a more
magnificent military spectacle than they presented on that brilliant
August morning, numbering some 15,000 horsemen with a large force of
horse artillery, jaeger and machine guns.
When His Majesty had finished the inspection of the line, and the
troops had moved to take up their points for manoeuvre, the Emperor
sent for me. He was very pleasant and courteous, asked me if I was
made comfortable, and if I had got a good horse. He then went on to
say that he knew all our sympathies in Great Britain were with France
and against Germany. He said he wished me to see everything that could
be seen, but told me he trusted to my honour to reveal nothing if I
visited France.
After the manoeuvres of the day were completed, at about 11 or 12
o'clock, I was placed next to His Majesty at luncheon and we had
another conversation. He asked me what I thought of what I had seen in
the morning and told me that the German cavalry was the most perfect
in the world; but he added: "It is not only the Cavalry; the
Artillery, the Infantry, all the arms of the Service are equally
efficient. The sword of Germany is sharp; and if you oppose Germany
you will find how sharp it is."
Before I left, His Majesty was kind enough to present me with his
photograph beautifully framed. Pointing to it, he remarked,
semi-jocularly: "There is your archenemy! There is your disturber of
the peace of Europe!"
Reverting to my story. Personally, I had always thought that Germany
would violate Belgian neutrality, and in no such half measure as by a
march through the Ardennes, which was what our joint plans mainly
contemplated. I felt convinced that if ever she took this drastic
step, she would make the utmost use of it to pour over the whole
country and outflank the Allies.
The principal source of the terrible anxiety I felt took its root in
the thought that we were too much mentally committed to meet an attack
from the east, instead of one which was to come as it actually did. It
reassured me, however, to know that our actual dispositions did not
preclude the possibility of stemming the first outburst of the storm
so effectively as to ward off any imminent danger which might threaten
Northern France and the Channel Ports.
To turn from the province of strategy to the sphere of tactics, a
life-long experience of military study and thought had taught me that
the principle of the tactical employment of troops must be
instinctive. I knew that in putting the science of war into practice,
it was necessary that its main tenets should form, so to speak, part
of one's flesh and blood. In war there is little time to think, and
the right thing to do must come like a flash--it must present itself
to the mind as perfectly _obvious_.
No previous experience, no conclusion I had been able to draw from
campaigns in which I had taken part, or from a close study of the new
conditions in which the war of to-day is waged, had led me to
anticipate a war of positions. All my thoughts, all my prospective
plans, all my possible alternatives of action, were concentrated upon
a war of movement and manoeuvre. I knew perfectly well that modern
up-to-date inventions would materially influence and modify our
previous conceptions as to the employment of the three arms
respectively; but I had not realised that this process would work in
so drastic a manner as to render all our preconceived ideas of the
method of tactical field operations comparatively ineffective and
useless. Judged by the course of events in the first three weeks of
the War, neither French nor German generals were prepared for the
complete transformation of all military ideas which the development of
the operations inevitably demonstrated to be imperative for waging war
in present conditions.
It is easy to be "wise after the event"; but I cannot help wondering
why none of us realised what the most modern rifle, the machine gun,
motor traction, the aeroplane and wireless telegraphy would bring
about. It seems so simple when judged by actual results. The modern
rifle and machine gun add tenfold to the relative power of the defence
as against the attack. This precludes the use of the old methods of
attack, and has driven the attack to seek covered entrenchments after
every forward rush of at most a few hundred yards.
It has thus become a practical operation to place the heaviest
artillery in position close behind the infantry fighting line, not
only owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction but also because
the old dread of losing the guns before they could be got away no
longer exists. The crucial necessity for the effective employment of
heavy artillery is observation, and this is provided by the balloon
and the aeroplane, which, by means of wireless telegraphy, can keep
the batteries instantly informed of the accuracy of their fire.
I feel sure in my own mind that had we realised the true effect of
modern appliances of war in August, 1914, there would have been no
retreat from Mons, and that if, in September, the Germans
had learnt their lesson, the Allies would never have driven them back
to the Aisne. It was in the fighting on that river that the eyes of
all of us began to be opened.
New characteristics of offensive and defensive war began vaguely to be
appreciated; but it required the successive attempts of Maunoury, de
Castelnau, Foch and myself to turn the German flanks in the north in
the old approved style, and the practical failure of these attempts,
to bring home to our minds the true nature of war as it is to-day.
About the middle of November, 1914--after three and a half months of
war--we were fairly settled down to the war of positions.
It was, therefore, in a somewhat troubled frame of mind that I began
to play my humble part in this tremendous episode in the history of
the world. The new lessons had to be learned in a hard school and
through a bitter experience. However, for good or for evil, I have
always been possessed of a sanguine temperament. No one, I felt, had
really been able to gauge the respective fighting values of the French
and German Armies. I hoped for the best and rather believed in it; and
in this confident spirit, although anxious and watchful, I landed at
Boulogne at 5 p.m. on August 14th, 1914.
It will be a fitting close to this chapter if I add the instructions
which I received from His Majesty's Government before leaving.
"Owing to the infringement of the neutrality of Belgium by Germany,
and in furtherance of the Entente which exists between this country
and France, His Majesty's Government has decided, at the request of
the French Government, to send an Expeditionary Force to
France and to entrust the command of the troops to yourself.
"The special motive of the Force under your control is to support and
co-operate with the French Army against our common enemies. The
peculiar task laid upon you is to assist the French Government in
preventing or repelling the invasion by Germany of French and Belgian
territory and eventually to restore the neutrality of Belgium, on
behalf of which, as guaranteed by treaty, Belgium has appealed to the
French and to ourselves.
"These are the reasons which have induced His Majesty's Government to
declare war, and these reasons constitute the primary objective you
have before you.
"The place of your assembly, according to present arrangements, is
Amiens, and during the assembly of your troops you will have every
opportunity for discussing with the Commander-in-Chief of the French
Army, the military position in general and the special part which your
Force is able and adapted to play. It must be recognised from the
outset that the numerical strength of the British Force and its
contingent reinforcement is strictly limited, and with this
consideration kept steadily in view it will be obvious that the
greatest care must be exercised towards a minimum of losses and
wastage.
"Therefore, while every effort must be made to coincide most
sympathetically with the plans and wishes of our Ally, the gravest
consideration will devolve upon you as to participation in forward
movements where large bodies of French troops are not engaged and
where your Force may be unduly exposed to attack. Should a contingency
of this sort be contemplated, I look to you to inform me fully and
give me time to communicate to you any decision to which His
Majesty's Government may come in the matter. In this connection I wish
you distinctly to understand that your command is an entirely
independent one, and that you will in no case come in any sense under
the orders of any Allied General.
"In minor operations you should be careful that your subordinates
understand that risk of serious losses should only be taken where such
risk is authoritatively considered to be commensurate with the object
in view.
"The high courage and discipline of your troops should, and certainly
will, have fair and full opportunity of display during the campaign,
but officers may well be reminded that in this, their first experience
of European warfare, a greater measure of caution must be employed
than under former conditions of hostilities against an untrained
adversary.
"You will kindly keep up constant communication with the War Office,
and you will be good enough to inform me as to all movements of the
enemy reported to you as well as to those of the French Army.
"I am sure you fully realise that you can rely with the utmost
confidence on the wholehearted and unswerving support of the
Government, of myself, and of your compatriots, in carrying out the
high duty which the King has entrusted to you and in maintaining the
great tradition of His Majesty's Army.
"(Signed) KITCHENER,
"Secretary of State"