JOHN TYLER.

WASHINGTON, _January 31, 1843_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

At the last session of Congress a resolution was passed by the House of

Representatives requesting me to cause to be communicated to the House

"the several reports made to the Department of War by Lieutenant-Colonel

Hitchcock relative to the affairs of the Cherokee Indians, together with

all information communicated by him concerning the frauds he was charged

to investigate; also all facts in the possession of the Executive

relating to the subject."

A resolution of the same import had been passed by the House of

Representatives on the 18th of May last, requiring the Secretary of

War to communicate to the House the same reports and matters. After

consultation with me and under my directions, the Secretary of War

informed the House that the reports referred to relative to the affairs

of the Cherokees contained information and suggestions in reference

to the matters which it was supposed would become the subject of a

negotiation between that Department and the delegates of the Cherokee

Nation. It was stated by him that the nature and subject of the report,

in the opinion of the President and the Department, rendered its

publication at that time inconsistent with the public interest. The

negotiation referred to subsequently took place, and embraced the

matters upon which Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcock had communicated his

views. That negotiation terminated without the conclusion of any

arrangement. It may, and in all probability will, be renewed. All the

information communicated by Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcock respecting the

Cherokees--their condition as a nation and their relations to other

tribes--is herewith transmitted. But his suggestions and projects

respecting the anticipated propositions of the delegates and his views

of their personal characters can not in any event aid the legislation of

Congress, and in my opinion the promulgation of them would be unfair and

unjust to him and inconsistent with the public interest, and they are

therefore not transmitted.

The Secretary of War further stated in his answer to the resolution that

the other report referred to in it, relating to the alleged frauds which

Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcock was charged to investigate, contained such

information as he (Colonel Hitchcock) was enabled to obtain by _ex

parte_ inquiries of various persons whose statements were necessarily

without the sanction of an oath, and which the persons implicated had

had no opportunity to contradict or explain. He expressed the opinion

that to promulgate those statements at that time would be grossly unjust

to those persons and would be calculated to defeat rather than promote

the objects of the inquiry, and he remarked that sufficient opportunity

had not been given to the Department to pursue the investigation or to

call upon the parties affected for explanations or to determine on the

measures proper to be adopted. And he hoped these reasons would be

satisfactory for not transmitting to the House at that time the reports

referred to in its resolution.

It would appear from the report of the Committee on Indian Affairs, to

whom the communication of the Secretary of War was referred, and which

report has been transmitted to me, together with the resolutions of the

House adopted on the recommendation of the committee, and from those

resolutions, that the reasons given by the Secretary were not deemed

satisfactory and that the House of Representatives claims the right to

demand from the Executive and heads of Departments such information as

maybe in their possession relating to "subjects of the deliberations

of the House and within the sphere of its legitimate powers," and that

in the opinion of the House the reports and facts called for by its

resolution of the 18th of May related to subjects of its deliberations

and were within the sphere of its legitimate powers, and should have

been communicated.

If by the assertion of this claim of right to call upon the Executive

for all the information in its possession relating to any subject of the

deliberation of the House, and within the sphere of its legitimate

powers, it is intended to assert also that the Executive is bound to

comply with such call without the authority to exercise any discretion

on its part in reference to the nature of the information required or to

the interests of the country or of individuals to be affected by such

compliance, then do I feel bound, in the discharge of the high duty

imposed upon me "to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of

the United States," to declare in the most respectful manner my entire

dissent from such a proposition. The instrument from which the several

departments of the Government derive their authority makes each

independent of the other in the discharge of their respective functions.

The injunction of the Constitution that the President "shall take care

that the laws be faithfully executed" necessarily confers an authority

commensurate with the obligation imposed to inquire into the manner in

which all public agents perform the duties assigned to them by law. To

be effective these inquiries must often be confidential. They may result

in the collection of truth or of falsehood, or they may be incomplete

and may require further prosecution. To maintain that the President

can exercise no discretion as to the time in which the matters thus

collected shall be promulgated or in respect to the character of

the information obtained would deprive him at once of the means of

performing one of the most salutary duties of his office. An inquiry

might be arrested at its first stage and the officers whose conduct

demanded investigation may be enabled to elude or defeat it. To require

from the Executive the transfer of this discretion to a coordinate

branch of the Government is equivalent to the denial of its possession

by him and would render him dependent upon that branch in the

performance of a duty purely executive.

Nor can it be a sound position that all papers, documents, and

information of every description which may happen by any means to come

into the possession of the President or of the heads of Departments must

necessarily be subject to the call of the House of Representatives

_merely_ because they relate to a subject of the deliberations of the

House, although that subject may be within the sphere of its legitimate

powers. It can not be that the only test is whether the information

relates to a legitimate subject of deliberation. The Executive

Departments and the citizens of this country have their rights and

duties as well as the House of Representatives, and the maxim that the

rights of one person or body are to be so exercised as not to impair

those of others is applicable in its fullest extent to this question.

Impertinence or malignity may seek to make the Executive Departments the

means of incalculable and irremediable injury to innocent parties by

throwing into them libels most foul and atrocious. Shall there be no

discretionary authority permitted to refuse to become the instruments

of such malevolence?

And although information comes through a proper channel to an executive

officer it may often be of a character to forbid its being made public.

The officer charged with a confidential inquiry, and who reports its

result under the pledge of confidence which his appointment implies,

ought not to be exposed individually to the resentment of those whose

conduct may be impugned by the information he collects. The knowledge

that such is to be the consequence will inevitably prevent the

performance of duties of that character, and thus the Government will

be deprived of an important means of investigating the conduct of its

agents.

It is certainly no new doctrine in the halls of judicature or of

legislation that certain communications and papers are privileged, and

that the general authority to compel testimony must give way in certain

cases to the paramount rights of individuals or of the Government. Thus

no man can be compelled to accuse himself, to answer any question that

tends to render him infamous, or to produce his own private papers

on any occasion. The communications of a client to his counsel and

the admissions made at the confessional in the course of religious

discipline are privileged communications. In the courts of that country

from which we derive our great principles of individual liberty and the

rules of evidence it is well settled--and the doctrine has been fully

recognized in this country--that a minister of the Crown or the head of

a department can not be compelled to produce any papers or disclose any

transactions relating to the executive functions of the Government which

he declares are confidential or such as the public interest requires

should not be divulged; and the persons who have been the channels of

communication to officers of the State are in like manner protected

from the disclosure of their names. Other instances of privileged

communications might be enumerated if it were deemed necessary. These

principles are as applicable to evidence sought by a legislature as

to that required by a court.

The practice of the Government since its foundation has sanctioned the

principle that there must necessarily be a discretionary authority in

reference to the nature of the information called for by either House

of Congress.

The authority was claimed and exercised by General Washington in 1796.

In 1825 President Monroe declined compliance with a resolution of the

House of Representatives calling for the correspondence between the

Executive Departments of this Government and the officers of the United

States Navy and others at or near the ports of South America on the

Pacific Ocean. In a communication made by the Secretary of War in 1832

to the Committee of the House on the Public Lands, by direction of

President Jackson, he denies the obligation of the Executive to furnish

the information called for and maintains the authority of the President

to exercise a sound discretion in complying with calls of that

description by the House of Representatives or its committees. Without

multiplying other instances, it is not deemed improper to refer to the

refusal of the President at the last session of the present Congress to

comply with a resolution of the House of Representatives calling for

the names of the members of Congress who had applied for offices. As no

further notice was taken in any form of this refusal, it would seem to

be a fair inference that the House itself admitted that there were cases

in which the President had a discretionary authority in respect to the

transmission of information in the possession of any of the Executive

Departments.

Apprehensive that silence under the claim supposed to be set up in the

resolutions of the House of Representatives under consideration might be

construed as an acquiescence in its soundness, I have deemed it due to

the great importance of the subject to state my views, that a compliance

in part with the resolution may not be deemed a surrender of a necessary

authority of the Executive.

Many of the reasons which existed at the date of the report of the

Secretary of War of June 1, 1842, for then declining to transmit the

report of Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcock concerning the frauds which he

was charged to investigate have ceased to operate. It has been found

wholly impracticable to pursue the investigation in consequence of the

death and removal out of the country of those who would be called upon

to testify, and in consequence of the want of adequate authority or

means to render it effectual. It could not be conducted without expense.

Congress at its last session prohibited the payment of any account

or charge whatever growing out of or in any way connected with any

commission or inquiry, except military and naval courts-martial and

courts of inquiry, unless special appropriations should be made for the

payment of such accounts and charges. Of the policy of that provision of

law it does not become me to speak, except to say that the institution

of inquiries into the conduct of public agents, however urgent the

necessity for such inquiry may be, is thereby virtually denied to the

Executive, and that if evils of magnitude shall arise in consequence

of the law I take to myself no portion of the responsibility.

In relation to the propriety of directing prosecutions against the

contractors to furnish Indians rations who are charged with improper

conduct, a correspondence has been had between the War Department and

the Solicitor of the Treasury, which is herewith transmitted in a

conviction that such prosecution would be entirely ineffectual.

Under these circumstances I have thought proper to direct that

the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcock concerning the frauds

which he was charged to investigate be transmitted to the House of

Representatives, and it accordingly accompanies this message. At

the same time, I have to request the House to consider it so far

confidential as not to direct its publication until the appropriate

committee shall have examined it and expressed their opinion whether

a just regard to the character and rights of persons apparently

implicated, but who have not had an opportunity to meet the imputations

on them, does not require that portions at least of the report should

not at present be printed.

This course is adopted by me from a desire to render justice to all and

at the same time avoid even the appearance of a desire to screen any,

and also to prevent the exaggerated estimate of the importance of the

information which is likely to be made from the mere fact of its being

withheld.

The resolution of the House also calls for "all facts in the possession

of the Executive, from any source, relating to the subject." There are

two subjects specified in the resolution--one "relative to the affairs

of the Cherokee Indians," and another "concerning the frauds he

[Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcock] was charged to investigate."

All the papers in the War Department or its bureaus relating to the

affairs of the Cherokee Indians, it is believed, have been from time

to time communicated to Congress and are contained in the printed

documents, or are now transmitted, with the exception of those portions

of Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcock's report hereinbefore mentioned, and

excepting the correspondence with the Cherokee delegates in the

negotiations which took place during the last summer, which are not

supposed to be within the intent of the resolution of the House. For

the same reason a memorial from the Old Settlers, or Western Cherokees,

as they term themselves, recently presented, is not transmitted. If

these or any other public documents should be desired by the House,

a specification of them will enable me to cause them to be furnished

if it should be found proper.

All the papers in the War Office or its bureaus known or supposed to

have any relation to the alleged frauds which Lieutenant-Colonel

Hitchcock was charged to investigate are herewith transmitted.

A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Volume 4, part 2: John Tyler · 第 192 / 403 题