CHAPTER I

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:

Inconsistencies in hyphenation and spelling, including inconsistencies

in the spelling of the names of tribes, locations, authors, and

aboriginal terms, have not been corrected. Punctuation has been

silently corrected. A list of other corrections can be found at the end

of the document.

THE FAMILY AMONG THE

AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

MONOGRAPHS ON SOCIOLOGY

EDITED BY

PROF. L. T. HOBHOUSE

AND

PROF. E. A. WESTERMARCK

VOL. II

THE FAMILY AMONG THE

AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES

A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY

BY

B. MALINOWSKI

PH.D. (CRACOW)

London: University of London Press

PUBLISHED FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS, LTD.

BY HODDER & STOUGHTON, WARWICK SQUARE, E. C.

1913

HODDER AND STOUGHTON

PUBLISHERS TO

THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS

FOREWORD

The importance of the subject treated in this study, as well as the

prominent part played by the Australian evidence in the problem of

kinship, will, it is believed, amply justify a detailed inquiry into

the institution of the family in Australia. It is, however, always

desirable for a monograph like the present one, besides being a mere

collection and description of facts, to have a sufficiently wide

theoretical scope. It ought to demonstrate some general principle upon

the particular example treated, and to approach the problem from a new

standpoint.

I wish here shortly to indicate how far a slight and imperfect attempt

in this direction has been made. In describing the facts of family life

in Australia I have tried to show that even if the problems of origins

and development of an institution be put aside and the inquiry be

limited to the actual facts (in this case to the actual working of the

aboriginal kinship organization), there are plenty of subjects of great

theoretical importance, some of which, as yet not fully considered by

sociologists. On the other hand, I have tried to show that in dealing

with purely sociological problems it is necessary, in order to do

justice to the complexity and fulness of social phenomena, to draw into

the field of inquiry a series of facts often hitherto partially or

completely neglected. The facts of daily life, the emotional side of

family relations, the magico-religious ideas of the aborigines about

kinship and sexual relations, customary as well as legal norms--all

these factors must be taken impartially into careful consideration

in order to give the full picture of an institution as it embraces

living man in a living society. In other words each social institution

must be studied in all its complex social functions as well as in its

reflexion in the collective psychology.

As a matter of fact, by a certain tendency to fanciful construction,

natural in all early speculations about a new domain of facts, many

problems in the study of primitive kinship have been artificially

simplified, others unduly complicated and obscured. Thus, for instance,

when in the discussion of primitive forms of marriage the whole problem

of the position of the children and of the emotional attitude of the

parents towards them has been neglected; or when different legal

terms have been applied to undifferentiated societies and legal ideas

attributed to primitive man, without asking how far and under what

conditions this may be done; or, again, when the sexual aspect has

been treated as the only essential feature of marriage. On the other

hand, the concepts of "primitive promiscuity," "descent through females

only," "mother-right" and "father-right" have proved meaningless and

abstruse; the two latter, of course, as far only as they have been used

in the majority of cases without a satisfactory definition.

It is easy to see why such somewhat artificial conceptions have found

their way into the study of primitive marriage and kinship. In the

early days of these studies work had been done not by specialists,

who would try to apply to a new set of problems new methods, but

by men learned in other branches of science, who looked at the

facts, not full in the face, but from a peculiar and often remote

standpoint. The illustrious founder of these studies on the Continent,

the Swiss _savant_ Bachofen, was a student of history of law and

classical culture, and he was chiefly concerned with establishing

the primitive mother-right of the prehistoric Greeks and Romans. The

chief theoretical interest of the eminent ethnographer Morgan was the

unravelling of the riddle of primitive forms of marriage out of the

invaluable material contained in his tables of kinship terms. McLennan

assigns a prominent place in his investigations to factors which had

hardly ever played a very important part in primitive society, as,

for instance, marriage by capture, female infanticide and levirate.

It is evident that in all these and similar speculations the chief

attention was not drawn to the actual working of the social mechanism,

but to survivals, rudiments and fictitious primeval conditions. And

the method of sociological thinking has not been developed upon

living social forms, but upon shadows and petrified remains. Whenever

concrete institutions have been theoretically treated, they were

approached with preconceived ideas, as, for instance, in the well-known

monograph of Fison and Howitt, and in the book of Herr H. Cunow--both

works relating to Australian kinship organization. When reading the

theoretical chapters of the latter, one has the impression that the

Australian tribes were a museum of sociological fossils from various

ancient epochs of which the petrified form has been rigidly preserved,

but into whose inner nature it is quite hopeless to inquire. The

understanding of actual facts is sacrificed to sterile speculation upon

a hypothetical earlier state of things.

Prof. Tylor's well-known article (_Journ. Anthrop. Inst._ xviii.) was,

perhaps, the first protest against this loose and far-fetched treatment

of the subject. He based his method of research on the firm ground

of a statistical survey of facts, and his method of reasoning on the

philosophically sound principle of inquiring into the mutual dependence

of phenomena.

The whole problem has been set on a new basis and its treatment recast

in the fundamental treatise of Prof. Westermarck on the _History of

Human Marriage_. Several of the most important aspects of the question

which had been omitted in the speculations of the previous writers have

received in it their full treatment; in taking into account, in its

manifold aspects, the biological basis of the problem he has shown how

many of the current conceptions about primitive marriage and kinship

could not hold good in the light of a closer criticism. Besides this

merely critical contribution, and besides the biological argument,

the _History of Human Marriage_ constitutes a valuable addition to

the purely sociological treatment of the problem. By resolving the

problem of marriage into that of family, by pointing to the importance

of the relations between parents and children, of the mode of living,

etc., the author has shown that marriage is rooted in a complex of

sociological conditions, and that there are many points to be treated

before we arrive at definite conclusions and broad generalizations.

Another important aspect of the problem has received its full treatment

by Mr. Crawley in his study of primitive marriage (the _Mystic Rose_;

compare the note in the Addenda at the end of this volume). Working out

thoroughly some conceptions suggested already by Prof. Frazer in his

_Golden Bough_, the author has shown the social importance of the ideas

about human relations and in particular about sexual relations as held

by primitive man.

The tendency towards a reform in the method of sociological treatment

of kinship and family has been shown not only from the side of purely

theoretical writers. Some of the modern field workers, who happily for

our science are at the same time distinguished scholars, have achieved

a considerable advance in the method of collecting evidence. This

refers in the first place to the Cambridge School of Ethnology, whose

members under the lead of Dr. Haddon have obtained such remarkable

results from their work in the Torres Straits Islands. Dr. Rivers, who

specially worked out the chapter on kinship in the joint publication of

this Expedition, has, by the introduction of the genealogical method

of inquiry as well as by the systematic study of the functions of kin,

given perhaps the most useful instruments of inquiry into the social

working of family and kinship organization. Thus both our theoretical

conceptions and our methods of getting at the facts are certainly

approaching more and more the first postulate of scientific study:

the possibility of an adequate description of facts and their mutual

dependences as they exist now in living primitive societies. Only on a

basis of such knowledge are further speculations fruitful.

As regards the general principles of sociological method much has been

done in recent times by the French school of sociology, grouped round

the editor of the _Année Sociologique_. The important question, how

methodically to present evidence, has received its full attention in

the excellent works of Dr. Steinmetz and his pupil, Dr. Nieboer, which

are examples of a clear and conclusive way of utilizing ethnological

sources. I am glad to acknowledge my intellectual indebtedness to both

these schools.

I have tried to collect sufficiently complete evidence, and in this

endeavour have used some of the older sources whose trustworthiness

might perhaps be disputed. But many of their observations are highly

valuable if properly interpreted; and moreover it was necessary to

bring their statements into line with the newer evidence for the sake

of critical comparison, as much of what they say has been uncritically

accepted and given without reference by some secondhand compilers (for

instance, Waitz-Gerland, vol. vi.; Cunow) and hence found its way into

the newer sociological literature.

The statements I have taken from the different authors are quoted at

length, and I do not think that I have thus uselessly increased the

bulk of the volume. By an unprejudiced collection of evidence, which

is, moreover, presented in a manner independent of, and accessible

without reference to, the theoretical discussion, I hope to have given

a useful compilation of observations which may serve for further

theoretical purposes other than those of the present writer.

In order to make short and yet clear references possible a list of the

works quoted is given at the end. With its help the short indications

in the footnotes will be perfectly plain.

In this place I wish to express my deep gratitude to Mr. J. Martin

White, whose munificence has made the publication of this book

possible. As a student of sociology at the University of London I am

indebted to Mr. Martin White, who, as it is well known, has founded the

chairs of Sociology at this university, and furthers these studies in

various ways--not the least by his personal contact with and interest

shown in the students and their work.

I had, while working on the present book, the privilege of personal

intercourse with Prof. Westermarck, a privilege I value more than I

can express. I owe much to Dr. Rivers for the constant aid and counsel

generously given me during my studies. Much assistance was given to me

by Mr. Wheeler, who freely put at my disposal his extensive knowledge

of the subject. I have to thank Dr. Tallqvist for several important

remarks upon some pages of my proofs.

But my debt is the greatest to Miss Helena Hadley, without whose kind

help I could not have overcome the difficulties of writing in what is

for me an acquired tongue. Her advice and criticism, both as regards

style and thought, were quite invaluable for me, and this is only a

feeble acknowledgment of my indebtedness and feelings of gratitude.

B. M.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

EXPOSITION OF THE PROBLEM AND METHOD

I. _Exposition of the problem and justification of the task_ (pp. 1

_sqq._).

Some contradictions and obscurities concerning family and kinship

in Australia (pp. 1-6).--Necessity of a careful and detailed

description of all the features of the _individual family_ among

the Australian aborigines (pp. 6-9).--The sense in which the

conception of _law_ and _legal_ should be applied to the Australian

native society indicated (pp. 9-17).

II. _Method of dealing with the evidence_ (pp. 17 _sqq._).

At the outset only a general definition of "family" adopted; on

the other hand raw ethnographical material given. Necessity of

continually checking these two data with each other (p. 17).--In

dealing with the ethnographical evidence _three_ points to be

taken into consideration (pp. 17 _sqq._).--(1) Criticisms of

each statement (pp. 18 _sqq._).--Verbal criticism (hermeneutic)

(pp. 18-19).--Criticism of contents (pp. 19 _sqq._).--Different

elements which might possibly have been the source of errors; and

upon an analysis of which criticism in question may in part be

based; (_a_) Material which the author had under observation

(pp. 20-22).--(_b_) Circumstances and method of obtaining information

(pp. 22, 23).--(_c_) Personal character and profession of the

writer (pp. 23, 24).--(_d_) Purpose for which the book was written

(p. 24).--(_e_) Form and quality of the writer's generalizations

and abstract formulation (pp. 24, 25).--(2) Geographical

localization of statements (pp. 26 sqq.).--Condition under which

local differences may be safely assumed (pp. 26, 27).--(3)

Final inferences from the evidence (pp. 27 _sqq._).--Character

of this operation; analytical division of the information on a

given subject under different headings. Separate discussion of

each point. Contradictions emphasized and not concealed

(pp. 27-29).--Conclusion drawn (pp. 29, 30).--Its confrontation with

kindred facts (pp. 30, 31).--The chief methodological aim: general

and complete clearness of all the operations of inference and

argument (pp. 31-33).

CHAPTER II

MODES OF OBTAINING WIVES

Prof. Westermarck's definition of marriage and family accepted

at the outset as starting-point (pp. 34, 35).--Inquiry first

directed towards the legal aspect of marriage and ideas on

marriage, as expressed and embodied in the aboriginal modes of

obtaining wives (pp. 35, 36).--Statements concerning these facts

(pp. 36-47).--Rough survey (pp. 47, 48).--(1) _Normal forms of

marriage_ (pp. 48 _sqq._).--Chief features and forms of the normal

methods: betrothal in infancy (p. 48);--exchange of sisters or

relatives (pp. 48, 49);--obligations of contracting parties (pp.

49, 50);--some traces of marriage by purchase (pp. 50-52);--public,

tribal character of marriage arrangements (p. 52);--betrothal

and marriage ceremonies (pp. 52-53).--(2) _The violent forms of

marriage_ (pp. 53-55).--Capture (pp. 54, 55).--Elopement (pp.

55, 56).--_Theoretical inferences drawn from these facts_ (pp.

56 _sqq._).--The legal aspect of marriage (pp. 56-58).--The

elements enforcing _ipso facto_ the validity of marriage (pp.

58, 59).--Collective ideas expressed by the facts analyzed (pp.

60-62).--Marital bonds not lax, but on the whole strong and

permanent (pp. 62-66).--Summary (p. 66).

CHAPTER III

HUSBAND AND WIFE

Exposition of the problem (pp. 67, 68).--Statements

(pp. 68-74).--Numerous contradictions extant on this subject. Some

apparently trustworthy statements, affirming a very extensive

authority on the part of the husband, combined with a certain

mutual attachment (pp. 74, 75).--Division of the subject under

three headings for the purpose of securing more definite answers

(pp. 76, 77).--(1) The authority of the husband over his wife

nearly absolute, limited only in cases of wilful murder

(pp. 77-79).--(2) Ill-treatment not the rule; from this, combined

with the foregoing point, follows (pp. 79-82).--(3) Existence of

some affection and attachment between the aboriginal married couples

(pp. 82-84).--On the whole the information in this chapter very

contradictory (p. 84).--Strength of marital bond, as expressed by

mourning and burial ceremonies and customs (pp. 84-88).

CHAPTER IV

SEXUAL ASPECT OF MARRIAGE

General character of the information on this subject indicated,

and some controversy contained in this chapter justified

(pp. 89-91).--Problem set forth (pp. 91, 92).--Statements

(pp. 92-100).--Local differences between different groups of tribes

in sexual matters (pp. 100, 101).--Three points investigated:

(1) The husband's definite sexual over-right and control over

his wife involving his consent in all cases. Otherwise adultery

considered a crime (pp. 101-103).--(2) Chastity in general; its

slight recognition (pp. 104, 105).--(3) Regulated licence

(pp. 105-107).--Its chief form: the Pirrauru practice (pp. 108,

109).--A detailed discussion of the latter showing its lack of the

features of "group marriage" (pp. 109-123).--In general all sexual

licence _regulated_ and devoid of the character of promiscuity and

disorder (pp. 123, 124).--Digression on sexual jealousy among the

Australian aborigines (pp. 124-131).

CHAPTER V

MODE OF LIVING

I. _The relation of the family unit to the tribal and territorial

organization of the aboriginal society_ (pp. 132 _sqq._).

Terminology (pp. 134, 135).--Statements (pp. 136-149).--Rough

survey (pp. 149, 150).--The _territorial_ unit, the _local group_

a body of people possessing in common a tract of country and

inhabiting it to the exclusion of anybody else (pp. 150-152).--Three

different forms of possession of land in Australia (pp. 152,

153).--Idea of rights in a portion of land probably to a great

extent of magico-religious character (p. 153).--The mode of living,

the tribal division varying according to local conditions and with

opportunities of food-supply. In the majority of tribes (especially

those of the arid regions) small groupings of about one to three

families usual (pp. 150-157).

II. _The internal structure of the local group, with reference to

single families_ (pp. 158 _sqq._).

Statements (pp. 158-165).--Disposition of camps, the mode of

occupying the huts and other functions of daily life subject to

strict rules pointing to the isolation of the single families

(pp. 165-167).

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION OF KINSHIP

I. _Theoretical analysis of this concept_ (pp. 168 _sqq._).

Importance of adapting sociological concepts to those social

conditions to which they are applied, exemplified on the concept

of kinship (pp. 168, 169).--Necessity of giving a definition of

kinship for scientific use (pp. 169-171).--The present discussion

specially directed to suit the Australian evidence (pp. 171,

172).--Necessary and sufficient conditions for admitting the

_existence_ of _individual parental kinship_ in any given society

(pp. 172-174).--Further features thereof to be looked for in

the variable social conditions and in the data of "collective

psychology"; "collective ideas" held about kinship and "collective

feelings" referring to it (pp. 174-176).--Preliminary definition of

kinship (p. 176).--_Analysis of the concept of consanguinity_

(pp. 176 _sqq._).--Modern European idea of kinship conceived in terms

of consanguinity (p. 177).--Physiological and social consanguinity

(pp. 178-182).--Exact definition of the latter (p. 182).--Kinship

not always based upon ideas of community of blood. Common features

of the ideas underlying kinship (pp. 182, 183).--Normative ideas

referring to kinship. Descent (pp. 183-185).--_Analysis of the

legal side of kinship_ (pp. 185, _sqq._).--_Legal_ only one of the

aspects of kinship (p. 185).--In primitive societies in particular

kinship not a legal relationship (pp. 185, 186).--Discussion of

some opinions thereon (Mr. Thomas, Prof. Dargun, Prof. Frazer)

(pp. 186-190).--Restricted use of the term _legal_ in the Australian

aboriginal society (pp. 190, 191).--_Justification of the

study of the emotional characteristics of kinship_ (pp. 191

_sqq._).--Importance of feelings in the task of characterizing any

personal relationship. "Collective feelings" (pp. 191, 192).--The

presence in the Australian ethnographic material of objective

facts which express the collective feelings referring to kinship

(pp. 192-194).--Analysis of these facts (pp. 194-197).--Mutual

dependence of collective ideas and collective feelings referring to

kinship (pp. 197, 198).--Summary (pp. 198, 199).--Critical survey

of some definitions of kinship given by other authors (Morgan,

MacLennan, Mr. E. S. Hartland, Dr. Rivers, Fison and Howitt, M. von

Gennep, Prof. Durkheim, Prof. Westermarck, Sir Laurence Gomme)

(pp. 199-206).--Two additional remarks (pp. 206, 207).

II. _Some examples of kinship ideas suggested by the Australian

folklore_ (pp. 207 _sqq._).

Introductory remarks (p. 207).--Belief in totemic conception

existing among the Central tribes (pp. 208, 209).--Absence

of knowledge concerning physiological procreation (pp. 209,

210).--Some important points discussed (pp. 210 _sqq._)--(1)

The ignorance in question complete (pp. 210, 211).--(2) In

particular no idea of _individual paternal_ consanguinity (pp. 211,

212).--(3) Analysis of the aboriginal ideas about reincarnation

(pp. 212-217).--Conclusion: absence of "consanguinity"

(in the social sense) among the Central tribes (pp. 217,

218).--_Beliefs in which some kinship ideas are expressed_

(pp. 218 _sqq._).--Among the Northern tribes special close

tie between spirit-child and father (Gnanji, Umbaia and other

Northern-Central tribes) (pp. 218-220).--Pre-established kinship

involved in the belief concerning reincarnation and return of dead

people (pp. 220-225).--Customs of the _couvade_ type (pp. 225,

226).--Geographical extension of the nescience of physiological

fatherhood (pp. 226, 227).--Two North Queensland beliefs involving

a clear idea of spiritual tie between a father and his child

(pp. 227-229).--Other examples (pp. 229, 230).--Survey of the beliefs

of the South-Eastern tribes possessing the idea of paternal

consanguinity (in the social sense) (pp. 230-232).--Summary

(pp. 232, 233).

CHAPTER VII

PARENTS AND CHILDREN

I. _The first maternal cares and suckling of the infant_ (pp. 234

_sqq._).

Statements (pp. 235, 236).--Close ties between mother and her

offspring during infancy and early childhood (pp. 236, 237).

II. _The relation between parents and children during childhood_

(pp. 238 _sqq._).

Statements (pp. 238-249).--Affirmation of a close tie of

affection and devotion between parents and children (pp. 249,

250).--Illustrations drawn from concrete facts (pp. 250,

251).--Applicable to both the father and mother; to female as well

as to male children (p. 251).--Great leniency of treatment

(pp. 252, 253).--Bearing of the affection of both parents to their

children upon the relation between husband and wife (pp. 253,

254).--No data for assuming the existence in Australia of _patria

potestas_ as a legal form (p. 254).--Lack of information as to

the actual character of the paternal authority in Australia

(pp. 254-256).--Rudiments of education (pp. 256, 257).

III. _Children at puberty removed from their parents' camp, and

consequent weakening of the relationship_ (pp. 257 _sqq._).

Marriage of females at puberty (pp. 257-259).--Great disparity

of age between husband and wife (pp. 259, 260).--Statements

(pp. 260-262).--Boys at puberty and afterwards (pp. 262

_sqq._).--Statements (pp. 262-267).--Boys undergoing initiation;

their life in a special camp ("bachelors' camp") (pp. 267-269).

IV. _The life-long permanence, nevertheless, of the tie between parents and

children_ (pp. 269 _sqq._).

Statements (pp. 269-272).--Lack of information as to the

relationship between sisters and brothers (pp. 272, 273).

CHAPTER VIII

ECONOMICS

The individual family an economic unit (p. 274).--Statements

(pp. 275-281).--Sexual division of labour a marked feature of

Australian marriage (p. 281).--The woman's share of work harder,

more important and indispensable than the man's (pp. 282-283).--The

man's share not devoted to the exclusive benefit of his family

(p. 283). Statements concerning the aboriginal communism in food

(pp. 283-286).--Their bearing upon the economics of the household

(pp. 286, 287).--Sociological features of this sexual division of

labour (pp. 287, 288).--Division of consumption within the family

(pp. 288, 289).--Description of some minor economic features

concerning the household (pp. 289-291).

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS pp. 292-304

ADDENDA " 305-309

BIBLIOGRAPHY " 310-316

INDEX " 317-326

THE FAMILY AMONG THE AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES

CHAPTER I

EXPOSITION OF THE PROBLEM AND METHOD

I

The problem of the social forms of family life still presents some

obscurities. What appears to be most urgently needed is a careful

investigation of facts in all the different ethnographical areas. I

propose in this study to undertake this task for Australia. I shall

avoid making any hypothetical assumptions, or discussing general

problems which refer to the origin or evolution of the family. I wish

only to describe in correct terms and as thoroughly as possible all

that refers to actual family life in Australia. In other words I intend

to give in outline the social morphology of the Australian family.

It may be well to show briefly the necessity for this task, which to

some may appear superfluous, and to indicate the lines on which it will

be attempted. In the first place there are some contradictions with

regard to the problem of relationship or kinship in Australia, which

can be reduced to the question: Is kinship in Australia exclusively

individual; or is it exclusively group kinship (or tribal kinship, as

it often is called); and, further, do these two forms exclude each

other or do they perhaps exist side by side? When Howitt says: "The

social unit is not the individual, but the group; the former merely

takes the relationships of his group, which are of group to group,"[1]

this obviously means that there is no individual relationship,

consequently no individual family in Australia. It is important to note

that the passage just quoted is placed in the chapter on Relationship

in Howitt's chief work on Australia, and that consequently it refers

to all the tribes described by the author, _i. e._ to the majority

of the known Australian tribes. The same opinion that there is only

group relationship and no individual family is supported by another

passage, no less important and general, for it is placed at the

conclusion of Howitt's article on the organization of the Australian

tribes in general: "It has been shown that the fundamental idea in the

conception of an Australian community is its division into two groups.

The relationships which obtain between the members of them are also

those of group to group."[2] And again: "The unit of aboriginal society

is, therefore, not the individual, but the group. It is the group

which marries the group and which begets the group."[3] There are also

a few passages in Spencer and Gillen which deny the existence of the

individual family, at least in some tribes.[4]

[1] _Nat. Tribes_, p. 157. It is hardly necessary to point

out that this phrase is without a precise sense, unless it

be evident in what sense the author uses the conception

"social unit." One looks in vain for such a definition in

Howitt.

[2] Howitt, _Trans. R.S.V._, _l.c._, p. 134.

[3] _Trans. R.S.V._, p. 135.

[4] Compare the passage quoted by A. Lang, just below,

and the passage quoted by us, pp. 108 _sqq._, and p. 243.

How far Spencer and Gillen have the right to deny the

existence of the individual family among the Urabunna will

be discussed in detail below.

Thus the impression drawn from the passages just quoted[5] is that

there is no individual relationship and, what follows as an immediate

consequence, no individual marriage, nor individual family in

Australia. Such a conclusion would be absolutely false. For the same

author (Howitt) writes: "Individual marriage in Australian tribes has

been evident to everyone."[6] Curr speaks in still more positive terms:

"No relationship but that of blood is known amongst Australians."[7]

The social relations which exist amongst the Australian aborigines are

of five sorts; first, those of family; second, those of the tribe;

third, those between associated tribes; fourth, those of neighbours

who belong to different associations; fifth, all other persons.[8]

We see that in Curr's statements there is again no room for any kind

of group relationship. Obviously Curr's information contradicts in

plain terms the foregoing set of statements, and such a contradiction

among our best informants is truly puzzling. There seems to be some

misunderstanding in the present problem.

[5] I have quoted the best first-hand authorities;

instances could easily be multiplied as well from their

works as also from other sources.

[6] _Trans. R.S.V._, p. 115.

[7] Curr, _A.R._, i. p. iii.

[8] Curr, _A.R._, i. p. 60.

This is not only my own opinion. Mr. A. Lang discusses the same

question and finds it necessary to prove in a short article that

individual relationship exists in Australia. He says: "It is certain

that 'blood' or 'own' relations are perfectly recognized. Messrs.

Spencer and Gillen inadvertently deny this, saying: 'The savage

Australian, it may be said with truth, has no idea of relationships

as we understand them.'" This example is not the only one, as has

been shown above, and indeed their number could be easily multiplied.

Mr. Lang proves by several instances that this opinion of Spencer

and Gillen is erroneous, and concludes: "The savage Australian

does discriminate between his actual and his tribal relations. It

was necessary to make this fact clear and certain, as it has been

denied."[9] The same contradiction has also been pointed out by Dr.

Westermarck: "As to the South Australians, Mr. Fison's statements have

caused not a little confusion. On his authority several writers assert

that among the Australian savages groups of males are actually found

united to groups of females."[10] And in a footnote Dr. Westermarck

quotes Lubbock, Morgan, Kohler, Kovalevsky. With such views Dr.

Westermarck contrasts Curr's[11] opinion that strict monogamy obtains,

and that of the Rev. J. Mathew,[12] "who fails to see that group

marriage 'has been proven to exist in the past and certainly does not

occur in Australia now.'"

[9] _Procs. B. Academy_, vol. iii. 1908, May report, p. 4.

[10] Westermarck Ed. _The History of Human Marriage_, p. 56.

[11] Curr, _A.R._, i. p. 126.

[12] Mathew, _J.R.S.N.S.W._, xxiii. p. 404, quoted from

Westermarck, _H.H.M._, p. 57.

Again E. Grosse in his well-known book, speaking of Howitt's work on

the Kurnai says that this author "... hat sich so gründlich in seine

Hypothese einer Gruppenehe ... der prähistorischen Australier vertieft,

dass er darüber ganz vergisst, seine Leser darauf aufmerksam zu machen,

dass die historischen Australier in Einzelnehe leben."[13] This is

quite true, especially the remark that one of the chief sources of

error in sociology is speculating on the origins and prehistory of an

institution before this institution is thoroughly known in the present

state.

[13] E. Grosse, p. 6.

And it seems as if in the present case a good many of the difficulties

may be solved by understanding some of the statements made as referring

to hypothetical earlier stages. As a matter of fact the passage quoted

above, where the existence of group relationship is affirmed, is

continued thus: "The idea of the relation of individual to individual,

and of individual parentage, without reference to the group, is of

later origin, and is the result of a number of social forces acting in

the same general direction and producing change."[14] It is evident

therefore that group relationship is supposed by Howitt to be the

former state, and individual relationship a kind of innovation. But

there is such a lack of clearness, such a confusion of the past and

present tenses, that we are here again at a loss. Take for example

the following passage: "The latest advance which has been made in

the subject of Australian marriage was the conception of marriage in

the group, and of group to group, and of the filial relation of one

group to another."[15] This last phrase should be, in all probability,

understood in the past tense, as referring to prehistoric times. But

the author gives absolutely no hint whether this be so or otherwise.

And when he on the next page refers to Mr. Curr's assertion, that there

is actually no group relationship in Australia, and criticizes this

assertion, a suspicion is aroused that this view of the existence of

marital and filial groups is meant to express the actual status. This

is enough to show how vague and puzzling the question of the individual

family and individual relationship still is.

[14] _Trans. R.S.V._, p. 135.

[15] _Trans. R.S.V._, p. 113.

It is unnecessary to insist on the bewilderment, but the polemical mood

in which our informants always approached the problem of relationship

and family has had its unfortunate consequences. In the first place it

is easy to see that these two groups of facts--individual relationship

and group relationship--are treated by the writers as if they excluded

each other, or at least as if one of them were gradually encroaching

upon the other. Whereas it is quite possible that both individual and

group relationship might exist side by side, originating from different

sources, and expressing two different sets of social relationships.

In the second place, the polemical attitude of our best informants

(Howitt, and Spencer and Gillen) against individual relationship

resulted in their giving very meagre information about the individual

family. As a matter of fact, in all theoretical passages of works

devoted to the social organization of the Australian tribes, the

individual family is passed over in absolute silence.[16] As this

unit obviously plays a foremost part in the social life of Australian

tribes, I submit it is quite justifiable that in these pages some

information about this unit should be gathered and its importance

brought out. Special attention has been devoted to the facts of actual

family life.

[16] As _e. g._ in the general treatises of Spencer and

Gillen, _Nat. Tr., Nor. Tr._, Howitt's _Nat. Tr._, Howitt

and Fison, _K.K. Idem_ in _J.A.J._, xii. p. 33. Howitt in

_Trans. R.S.V._, p. 100, and in _Smithsonian Reports_,

p. 79.

To sum up, it may be said that the defects in our information as to

the individual family, and the contradiction and confusion surrounding

it, do of themselves justify an examination of this institution.

These contradictions are due probably not to any intrinsic reasons,

but to certain theoretical postulates and axioms adopted by some of

our informants. And as the exact description of actual facts seems to

suffer therefrom, a revision of the theoretical side of the problem, as

well as a collection of evidence from a somewhat extensive number of

sources appears advisable.

But over and above clearing up some contradictions, solving some

difficulties, and filling up a gap in the information concerning

Australian kinship organization, there is a much deeper justification

for a detailed collection and classification of facts referring to the

individual family in Australia. I mean, it is only such a proceeding

that can give us a scientific, correct and useful definition of the

Australian individual family (or any other social unit in general). _A

priori_ only a vague meaning can be attached to the term "individual

family," when it refers to a society different from ours. For the

essential features of the individual family, as of all other social

institutions, depend upon the general structure of a given society and

upon the conditions of life therein. A careful and detailed analysis

of the family life and of the different aspects of the family unit in

connection with other social phenomena is therefore necessary. Such an

analysis enables us to describe the said unit in a complete and exact

way.

It is Dr. Rivers to whom we are indebted for emphasizing the

methodological standpoint in this connection. In his article[17] he

points out that we cannot _a priori_ assert the existence of even such

an apparently unquestionable fact as individual motherhood in every

human society whether actual or hypothetical. To affirm that in a given

society motherhood is individual and not communal (group motherhood),

a strict analysis of a whole series of circumstances is necessary.

Applying Dr. Rivers' argument to the other family relationships, we may

say that all the circumstances referring to the relation between man

and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, must be submitted

to a careful and detailed analysis; and that only such an examination

can give us the right idea of what may be called the individual family

in a given society--in this case the Australian individual family.[18]

[17] _Anthrop. Essays_, pp. 309 _sqq._

[18] Comp. below, p. 206, the second paragraph of footnote

1.

As mentioned above, many authors, who have contributed so much in

other respects to our knowledge of Australian kinship organization,

have not entered into details as to the family life, or actual

relationship. Even Mr. Thomas, although he quite acknowledges the

existence of individual relationship, confines himself to the remark

that in Australia exists "the family in the European sense." But this

expression is not adequate. We cannot possibly find in Australia any

social unit that would exactly fit the forms of our individual family;

for this is intimately connected with the structure of our society,

and none of the social conditions it requires are found in Australia.

We can only say a unit which is _analogous_ to our individual family,

and even then we would be more metaphorical than exact. Mr. Lang,

on the other hand, is not exhaustive enough for our purpose--which

is a description of the family unit that will define it fully for

sociological use. Nevertheless as he writes in reply to Dr. Rivers

he has accepted the latter's methodological standpoint, and he gives

a series of apposite remarks and examples. But he concludes: "It is

needless to give more examples; the savage Australian does discriminate

between his actual and his tribal relations." This conclusion is quite

correct, but it is not sufficient. The mere affirmation that the actual

relationship exists and is recognized by the natives is not enough.

This has been obvious to every careful, unprejudiced reader of the

first-hand ethnographical material.

The aim of the present study is to _define what_ this individual

relationship is; to describe its different aspects and features; how

it manifests itself in its different social functions and, as far

as can be ascertained, how it must impress itself upon the native

mind. And here lies the important methodological point on which some

stress must be laid. It is not _the_ actual relationship, or _the_

individual family, or "family in the European sense" which we have

to look for in Australia. It is the aboriginal Australian individual

family, with all its peculiarities and characteristic features, which

must be reconstructed from the evidence. It will be necessary to

describe minutely all the relationships generally embraced by the term

Family,[19] and to describe them in terms taken from the native social

life. In other words we have to look for the connection between the

facts of family life and the general structure of society and forms of

native life; and to take into account all psychological data available,

such as ideas on procreation and reincarnation.

[19] Defining that term only broadly at the outset.

Only by such a description can we reach a correct and scientific

definition of a given institution in a given society. It is essential

that the elements of this definition should be taken from the

conditions of social life in the given society. As an example we may

take the legal side of marriage. Amongst us marriage is a legal act

enforced on the one hand by the authority of the law with all its

complicated social working and the power of the State at its back;

on the other hand by the authority of the Church, which exercises a

profound moral pressure in relation to this institution. These or even

analogous factors will be sought in the Australian tribes in vain.

And yet marriage there is not deprived of its legal validity and of

its social sanction. It is not an act of mere fancy, brutal force or

accident, but the legal factors have there quite a specific character,

and can be found and understood only in connection with the general

tribal structure and government.

Besides all that has been said above against a general offhand

affirmation, that the individual family exists in Australia, it may

be added here that such an assertion is practically quite useless.

No further conclusions or inferences can be drawn from such a vague

statement. Only by knowing exactly and minutely all the features and

characters of the said unit can the different questions attached

to this problem be answered; only so can it be judged whether

the individual family or certain features of it are survivals or

innovations; or whether they are so deeply rooted and connected with

the social life and the whole organization of the tribes, that neither

of these suppositions is justifiable. Such special and concrete

definitions of a given social phenomenon in a given ethnic area, as the

one which it is intended to give here for the Australian individual

family, can serve also as a basis to form by induction a general

conception of the individual family; and only from a rich collection

of such material from different peoples can any sociological laws be

constructed. As said above, a general working definition of the word

individual family may be accepted at the outset of our investigations.

After a careful analysis of all particular relationships concerned; and

further, of the economic unity of the family, division of labour within

it, legal sanction, etc., content can be given to the rough definition

laid down at the beginning, and scientific exactness can be given to

our conception of the individual family in Australia.

It seems desirable in this place to make a digression in order to

consider the problem of law and the legal side of social phenomena in

the Australian aboriginal society, as we shall often have to use these

concepts. A more detailed and exhaustive discussion of it would involve

a treatise on primitive law, but as I am unable to indicate any place

where the concepts in question are defined in a way satisfactory for

the present purpose, I define them here briefly.[20]

[20] In the treatises on primitive law and on family

law such general concepts as "legal" or "law" are never

explicitly defined. Perhaps such a definition is

superfluous for a specialist, but I think that especially

in the ethnology of primitive peoples precise concepts and

explicit definitions are necessary. I may, however, mention

the following places where there are some attempts at

definition--

_Post_, _l.c._, i. sec. 3, pp. 8-10. The author gives a

few remarks about the beginnings of law. He maintains it

existed as _Rechtsgefühl_, feeling of legality, and was

evolved through a system of juridical verdicts, given

according to this sentiment. There were no legal norms

at the beginning.--This passage is unsatisfactory, both

because it does not give any strict definition and because

it does not seem to be in agreement with the facts.

_Kohler_, _l.c._, p. 323. No strict definition given.

Besides the author says that there is no organization

(_staatliche Organisation_), no tribunal, and no executive

among the Australian aborigines. This assertion may be

questioned; compare below.

_Durkheim, D.T.S._, pp. 28 _sqq._ and 108 _sqq._ There are

some interesting remarks bearing upon our subject; but

there are no sufficiently clear definitions, especially

none to suit the laws of quite primitive peoples.

_Lord Avebury_, _l.c._, chap. xi. pp. 464 _sqq._ No

definition of what "law," "legal," should mean in very low

societies, attempted. Law and custom are not discriminated.

Some interesting remarks on punishment (pp. 495 _sqq._) are

not utilized in order to afford strict concepts.

All social organization implies a series of norms, which extend over

the whole social life and regulate more or less strictly all the social

relations. We find such norms and rules in the Australian aboriginal

society, different kinds being enforced by different forms of social

sanction. The validity of some is due to the evil results which are

intrinsically connected with their violation. So _e. g._ we know that

the breaking of certain food taboos has as an inevitable consequence

premature grey hair, eruptions on the skin, or some other mishap. There

are other rules, which are observed because any departure from them

would bring general contempt and ridicule upon the culprit; a form of

chastisement to which the natives are said to be extremely sensitive.

There are still other types of social norms, sanctioned by a more

direct collective action. In some cases the magicians of the tribe will

use the dreaded method of "pointing the bone," thus bringing about the

illness and death of the culprit; or a regulated fight ensues; or a

man has to undergo a definite ordeal. Occasionally a group of people

organize an armed party on their own account, but with the consent of

the community; and so on.

Briefly it may be said that different types of social norms have

different kinds of collective sanction and that we may suitably

classify the norms and regulations according to the kind of sanction

they enjoy. Here seems the proper place to introduce the concept of

Law, Legal. We can agree to call such norms Legal, which enjoy an

organized, more or less regulated and active social sanction. To make

this definition plausible, we may remark that it makes the Australian

legal institutions correspond to what we call law and legal in higher

societies. Further it would be necessary, in order fully to justify our

definition, to show: (1) that among the Australian blacks there exist

such modes of regulated, organized and direct social sanction; (2) that

they differ from other modes of sanction and that the collective mind

is quite aware which norms enjoy just this form of sanction.

In answer to the first problem we may generally point to the existence

of tribal government. That a kind of centralized authority exists in

Australia and that it has well-determined functions has been shown at

full length by Howitt.[21]

[21] _Trans. R.S.V._, pp. 103 _sqq._; _J.A.I._, xii, p. 35;

J.A.I, xiii, p. 282. And especially _Nat. Tr._, chap. vi.

pp. 295-354. The elucidation of the problem of authority

and justice in Australia is one of Howitt's chief merits.

In the passages quoted, there will be found ample material

to exemplify all that is said in the text. I shall give,

however, a few more detailed references on some special

points. Howitt does not classify the facts according

to the principle just enunciated. But all he says fits

perfectly well into our scheme, and he puts stress on some

essential points; viz. that there is a tribal as well as a

supernatural punishment; that there is a central authority,

and that it had means to enforce and execute its decrees.

Curr (_A.R._, vol. i. pp. 53 _sqq._) emphatically denies

the existence of any kind of government; but his polemic

is due to the misunderstanding of the word _government_ as

it should be applied to the Australian aboriginal society.

For general discussion of this problem compare also

G. C. Wheeler, pp. 46-52. Interesting details, corroborating

Howitt's opinion may be found also in the following places:

Spencer and Gillen, _Nat. Tr._, pp. 12 _sqq._, p. 324,

p. 477, pp. 491 _sqq._ _Nor. Tr._, pp. 26 _sqq._ R. Dawson,

pp. 64-65. Hodgson, p. 204. J. D. Lang, p. 331. G. S. Lang,

pp. 9-10. Grey, ii. p. 222. Eyre, ii. pp. 214, 318, 385.

Woods, p. 8. L. Schultze, p. 225. J. B. Gribble, p. 114.

J. Mathew, p. 129. Compare also the following extracts, where

I shortly indicate what is to be found--

Ch. Wilkes, ii. 204. Obedience to elders. _Idem_, i. 222.

Regulated fights. Wilson, 144. Reverence towards old men.

Bennett, pp. 177-178. Chiefs chosen for personal qualities.

Turnbull, p. 91. Ordeals as punishment for crime, p. 101.

Respect for and authority of old men and magicians.

Barrington, 81. Pacific settlement of differences.

Henderson, pp. 107, 158. No chiefs: only "doctors" wield

some authority; p. 160, Duel as redress of injuries.

Macgillivray, i. 151. Power and authority of old and

experienced men; p. 152, Important instances of justice.

_Idem_, ii. p. 27. Authority wielded by some important and

privileged men. G. W. Earl, p. 275. Alleged powerful chiefs

(unreliable). Campbell, 171. Instances of important and

influential men. B. Field, 67. Description of two regulated

fights. Krichauff, p. 77. Old men and doctors in council:

they carry out the resolutions arrived at, or see that

these are carried out; p. 78, Laws, which the warriors or

old men uphold. Penalties: reprimand, exit, and ordeal.

Sutton, p. 18. Hereditary "kingship." Wilhelmi, p. 183.

No chiefs. Respect for old men and their magical powers.

D. Mathews, p. 49. Council of old men. S. Newland. _Proc.

R.G.S.S.A._, iii. p. 40 _sqq._ Examples of important and

powerful men. Mrs. Bates, p. 52. Regulation of offences by

ordeals.

All these references bear indiscriminately on one or the

other of the important features of government and of legal

or other norms discussed in the text.

This government consists roughly speaking of headmen and a tribal

council, composed in the first place of old men of the tribe, skilled

magicians and experienced warriors. This camp council seems as a rule

the more influential factor, and only in few cases are we informed of

chiefs with extensive powers.[22] What is important for us is that

one of the main functions--if not the chief one--of those central

authorities is to decide in case of difficulties in tribal affairs and

to give sentence, a function which is that both of a legislator and of

a judge.[23] The old men are the only depositories of tribal lore; they

also know the rules and norms and how to apply them. We are informed

in many places that they discuss important matters and decide vital

questions; and especially in cases where any law has been transgressed.

They possess also executive power; they can organize an armed party;

they arrange and control the regulated fights; and they have also in

their hands the personal power of punishment by magic.[24] It may

therefore be said in general that the rudimentary form of central

authority, as found in Australia, possesses quite clearly traceable

features of juridical functions and executive power; it forms a kind of

tribunal, and it has its organs to carry out the sentence. It is hardly

necessary to add, that those institutions exist only in a rudimentary

form; but they appear to be quite unmistakable. Besides this central

authority, which sometimes takes the juridical functions upon itself,

there are other forms of organized action, carried out by groups

of individuals, personally interested in the case. Here the legal

character, _i. e._ the feature that distinguishes such action and the

underlying norm from mere violence, fancy or custom--lies in the fact

that such an action is regulated by strict rules and prescriptions. And

it is in just such a mutual connection of a norm and social enforcement

that the fundamental feature of legality may be seen. So _e. g._ in

the Central Tribes a man who has by magic charmed away a woman can

reckon upon the actual support of a definite group of his kindred. The

legality of his act is based upon the existence of a certain norm and

the existence of a form of active and regulated social support which

enforces this norm. Without the norm the social action would be mere

violence. Without the social enforcement the norm would be a moral or

customary rule; so enforced, it may properly be called a law.[25] It is

impossible, for want of space, to deal here more in detail with this

question, which could correctly be answered only by collecting all the

evidence available, and bringing the results into connection with the

general features of Australian society, such as age grades and tribal

secret societies. I only indicate here the point of view, and I shall

in what follows refer to it and exemplify it by concrete instances.

[22] Chiefs are reported by Taplin (Woods, p. 32); J. Dawson,

pp. 5 _sqq._ But these statements, especially the latter,

seem subject to doubt. Compare Curr, _A.R._, i. pp. 55 and

58. Howitt and his correspondents report chiefs among the

Dieri, Tongaranka, Wiimbaio, Theddora, Yuin, Wiradjuri,

Gurnditch Mara, Kulin, etc., _Nat. Tr._, pp. 297-320.

Compare also Waitz Gerland, p. 790. But the term "Chief"

appears somewhat vague; probably it is usually applied to

influential individuals, whose importance is due to their

personal qualities and not to their social position. The

influence of old men, magicians and "doctors," is almost

universally reported, and the council made up of them seems

to wield the real power in the tribe. Compare Howitt, _Nat.

Tr._, pp. 320-326, for some of the above references.

[23] See Wheeler, p. 122, where it is said that offences

like murder by magic, breaches of the marriage regulations,

and the revealing of ceremonial secrets are dealt with by

the elders and headmen. The legislative powers of old and

influential men is mentioned: Howitt, _Nat. Tr._, pp. 89

_sqq._ (new norms introduced by individuals under alleged

supernatural command or vision). Spencer and Gillen,

_Nat. Tr._, pp. 12 _sqq._ (important changes in custom,

law, organization by individual initiative), _idem_,

_Nat. Tr._, p. 324. _Nor. Tr._, pp. 26 _sqq._ (a kind of

tribunal formed by old and influential men). Spencer and

Gillen, _Nat. Tr._, p. 477 (old men in council assembled

decide); p. 490 (Atninga, avenging party, despatched by old

men, whenever vengeance is to be taken); pp. 491 (old men

discuss and settle matters with an Atninga party). Howitt,

_Nat. Tr._, pp. 297, 298 (Council of Pinnaru described);

pp. 320 _sqq._ (deliberating in all important matters).

[24] For the methods of carrying out justice, _i. e._ for

the executive organs, see Wheeler, pp. 131-139, where the

"authorized agents" (avenging parties, etc.), regulated

fights, expiatory ordeals and blood revenge, methods which,

as different forms of carrying out justice, are more or

less executions of a sentence and have the character of

legal proceedings.

See also under the heading "Executive power of tribal

councils of old men," in Howitt's _Nat. Tr._, chap. vi.

pp. 295 _sqq._--The Pinya party of the Dieri tribe. _Ibid._,

pp. 297, 321 and 326.--An atonement of the offence by

barter, p. 329. Direct action of magicians, _ibid._ p. 343.

Compare also the Kurdaitcha, Illapurinja, and Atninga

parties of the Arunta. Spencer and Gillen, _Nat. Tr._,

chap. xiii. p. 475. All these parties are more or less

under the control of the tribal council of old men.

[25] Compare Spencer and Gillen, _Nat. Tr._, p. 554: "...

a man's right to woman secured by means" of magic "is

supported by the men of his own local group." Compare also

the description of this method of charming away a woman in

_Proc. R. Geogr. Soc. S. Australia_, vol. iv. p. 26, by

F. Gillen.

The second problem, viz. whether the distinction between the

customary and religious rules and legal norms may be considered as

well defined in Australia, is still more difficult to answer. The

small differentiation of that society hardly allows any very clear

and definite sociological distinctions. But, broadly speaking, it

seems that the distinction between (1) a trespass, whose punishment

is supernaturally entailed by its very committal; (2) a trespass,

punished by ridicule and public contempt; and (3) a crime, punished by

the decision of the community, acting as a whole, or by its central

organs, or certain groups of it--that this distinction between sin,

improper conduct and crime (as we can call those three categories) is

quite well marked in different features of aboriginal social life. What

might fully elucidate this question, would be a collection of facts,

classified according to these categories.[26]

[26] So _e. g._ there could be placed in the _first

category_ different kinds of food taboos. In the Arunta,

food procured or handled by certain relatives may not

be eaten by a man; nor may be eaten any food in their

immediate presence. Such food would disagree with the man.

Spencer and Gillen, _Nat. Tr._, p. 469.--If certain food

taboos were transgressed during initiation by the boys,

their wounds would inflame. _Ibid._ p. 470.--Certain taboos

must be observed during pregnancy both by the woman and

her husband; if they were transgressed the sickness of

the woman would be worse and the man would lose his skill

in hunting. _Ibid._ p. 471.--Compare also Mitchell, ii.

p. 29, and Wilhelmi, p. 176. If the man should transgress

the mother-in-law taboo, his hair would prematurely grow

grey, or he would soon become bald. This belief is very

widespread. Howitt, _Nat. Tr._, p. 296. D. Mathews, p. 49.

Mrs. Bates, p. 50. Compare also Waitz Gerland, p. 795,

where different norms, enforced by supernatural

punishment, are mentioned, and also MacGillivray, ii. 10,

Eyre ii. 339, Stanbridge, p. 289. Different ceremonies

and ordeals at mourning and burial are regulated by

_custom_; the same thing may probably be said of some of

the initiatory ordeals. Noncompliance would involve the

general ridicule or contempt of the tribesmen: Spencer and

Gillen, _Nat. Tr._, p. 510. As _crimes_ may be mentioned:

transgression of the class rule as well in marriage as in

sexual intercourse. Spencer and Gillen, _Nat. Tr._, p. 495,

say that the usual punishment is death. Killing by magic:

Spencer and Gillen, p. 476; Waitz Gerland, p. 794. In some

cases the transgression of the mother-in-law taboo seems

to be punished by expulsion from the local group: Howitt,

_Nat. Tr._, p. 296.--Salvado says that marriage under

thirty years is punished by death (p. 267). Such examples

could be indefinitely multiplied.

These few remarks are merely made to settle the terminology. By

definition a given norm or rule is Legal if it is enforced by a direct,

organized, and definite social action. And by the word legal will be

designated this side or aspect of a given social relation which is

regulated by laws, as just defined.

Our considerations indicate also in what direction an analysis of the

social conditions in Australia would be interesting from the point of

view of primitive jurisprudence. In the first place, there is a great

variety of modes in which the different legal norms are preserved,

impressed upon the social mind, and taught to different members of

the society. Here the connection of different norms with religion,

myth, totemic cultus, organization of the secret society, etc., might

be discussed. In the second place a careful investigation of the

different forms of social sanction, based partly on belief, partly

on collective ideas and feelings, partly on actual institutions and

direct enforcement, might be carried out. In connection with it there

might be a classification of the norms; and the domain of the purely

legal norms, or rather the properly legal aspect of norms and different

social phenomena could be exactly traced. In other words each norm

should be studied in connection with the way in which it is "codified"

(_i. e._ preserved for and imparted to social knowledge); and in

connection with its sanction. In the case of a legal norm the tribunal

and the executive organs should be indicated as far as possible.

Undoubtedly we find in such a primitive society as the Australian many

institutions still in a state of confusion, which on a higher level

are quite well determined and differentiated. But the more confused

the phenomena, the clearer our conceptions must be in order exactly

to follow the different ways in which the elements are interwoven and

combined. What is an isolated and defined institution in a higher

society, may be merely a side or aspect of social phenomena in a lower

one. But it is highly important to use definite concepts to denote such

aspects or sides in undifferentiated societies, because it often widens

our horizon and puts our ideas to a crucial test.

I wish to add that in the present case it is only the necessity for

clearness and convenience that makes a definition necessary. The domain

of primitive jurisprudence cannot be considered fully explored yet;

the chief aim of a good definition is to state the proper problems and

to show the groups of facts that must be inquired into in order to give

right answers to the problems proposed.

II

Having thus justified the scope of the present book and indicated the

general lines on which its task should be carried out, a few words must

be devoted to the method of dealing with the evidence. We start our

investigations with (1) the Australian first-hand information, and (2)

a general idea of the object of our research, that is a general idea of

the individual family. This implies that during the process of research

these two sets of data must be checked against each other. On the one

hand we must continually extract from the evidence all that corresponds

to our general idea of the individual family; on the other hand this

idea must be specialized and determined according to the evidence.

It is clear enough what, broadly speaking, is meant by the Individual

Family. But what exactly will be the features of this institution in

Australia, that must be extracted from the evidence. This evidence

is, on the other hand, given in the majority of cases in a very crude

state, without reference to any theoretical points of view. The facts

are often given in a purely casual and colloquial way. It is part of

the task to sift out each one of them, and to ask if it can have any

bearing on the present subject. Many facts that seemed not to bear

immediately on it, yet furnished some very useful inferences. In

short, the first duty of such a work as the present is to ask from the

evidence right questions in the right way.

But even if a certain point has been settled upon as essentially

important to be inquired into, and information referring to it has been

gathered, the task is not yet finished. The statements collected on

this point will as a rule present more or less radical discrepancies.

After we have heard twenty opinions on the same subject which by

no means agree with each other, to which shall we adhere? A method

of dealing with evidence must be fixed upon. In the first place the

statements are of the most heterogeneous character and value. They must

be submitted to some criticism before use can be made of them.

After the degree of their reliability has been settled, and after, by

a criticism of each statement, some of the contradictions have been

removed, it must be considered how far the differences between the

statements may be regarded as due to irreducible, local variations of

the given institution; in other words, the problem must be discussed

from the geographical standpoint.

Finally a certain system of weighing the evidence must be chosen, so as

to draw from it the most correct conclusions, and never to prove too

much or too little. So there are three different processes: criticism,

localization of differences, and drawing of conclusions; all of which

must be done according to a careful and conscientious method.

A few remarks about the latter must be given here without any attempt

at completeness. That preliminary criticism is necessary seems hardly

to need justification; to look at the irreducible inconsistencies and

contradictions of a series of statements concerning any given point is

enough. But such criticism must not be arbitrary; it must conform to

strict rules.[27]

[27] The ethnographic sources do not differ essentially

from the historical ones. The purpose of a descriptive

ethnography (such as is adopted in this monograph) is

also nearly identical with the historian's task so far as

positive statement of an actual state of things is the aim

of both. The rules of criticism of sources apply therefore

to our subject as well as to any other historic science.

This will become obvious to every ethnographer who reads

the excellent manual of MM. Langlois et Seignobos. The

proof of the indispensability of such a criticism is to

be found there, too. The method of criticism of sources

adopted in this paper was accepted after a careful study of

this useful book.

The first point to which attention must be paid, is to ascertain the

exact meaning of a given statement. As many of our informants do not

use exact terminology but write in a colloquial language, often spoilt

by literary pretensions, we occasionally run the risk of being misled

by a word or by a turn of expression.[28] In other words, it never

seems advisable to cling blindly to the verbal meaning of a statement

before having put it to the test. So, for instance, in the problem

whether the natives live in families or tribes--the _family_ and

_tribe_ having been exactly defined, a phrase like "the aborigines live

in families" may not be accepted as argument, for by the word "family"

the author may possibly have understood what we have designated by the

word tribe.[29] I shall, as a rule, quote each statement _in extenso_,

and give, if necessary, an interpretation or correction.[30] The sense

in which a word is used may be, in the majority of cases, easily

settled from the context, examples given by the author, and other

instances where he uses the same word. When a phrase is hopelessly

ambiguous, it is wrong to make any use of it.

[28] We obviously do not speak here of such writers as

Howitt, W. E. Roth, Spencer and Gillen, authors who had

a theoretical training. But, as may be pointed out here,

in the present work no writer is excluded, provided that

he has had opportunities of first-hand observation, or

opportunities of private information from first-hand

observers.

[29] See below the discussion of this topic, Chap. V., I.

[30] Much weight has been attached to a very extensive

reproduction of the original text. More important

statements are always adduced verbatim; less important, or

too cumbersome ones, are abridged, but keeping as closely

to the original words as possible.

After the sense of a statement has been settled more or less reliably,

two cases must be discriminated. If the statement is purely a record

of facts, and, still better, if it is exemplified by concrete

instances, there is generally no reason to disbelieve it, especially

if in the general character of the author there is a guarantee of

his trustworthiness; and if he actually has had good opportunities

of observing the natives. But if the statement involves a judgment,

a generalization, or abstraction, we must be much more careful.

Broadly speaking, statements of this latter kind are generally much

more contradictory than mere statements of fact. It will be seen that

the information concerning the treatment of women by their husbands,

concerning sexual matters, and concerning the authority of husbands,

will present many more discrepancies than the information concerning

the modes of obtaining wives, economics, and other concrete questions.

The first category implies much more abstraction and qualifying

judgment than the second. It must be borne in mind that statements of

the first category are the result of a long and complicated series

of mental processes, and that their quality and value is dependent

upon many conditions. All these conditions must be mentally analyzed

and each of them must be taken into account in order to ascertain

its bearing upon the final form in which we find the statement. The

conditions in question may be shortly set forth as follows: Did the

author possess all the qualities necessary for a good ethnographer? Had

he good opportunities to observe the natives and a good method of doing

so? Were the latter still in a primitive condition, or in an advanced

state of decay? A few words may be said in the first place about this

last point.

Only in exceptional cases is it possible to say anything definite

on the state of the natives the author had under observation.[31]

In general, it may be taken as a rule that all writers who were in

any close contact with aborigines, had to do with fairly degenerated

specimens. They were usually squatters or missionaries, and had to do

with blacks hanging round farms or with remnants of tribes gathered in

missions.[32] Their immediate observations, especially in sociological

matters, which are at once affected, when conditions of life change,

and when blacks become degenerate, could be of little value. But there

was still the possibility of gathering information from the natives

themselves, who could, properly questioned, give their recollections of

the bygone times. This was the way in which probably A. W. Howitt got

so much of the most valuable information on the Kurnai tribe, which he

never saw in its primitive state. But only few writers had the mental

training and the opportunities of the writer just mentioned. And the

majority probably communicated to us simply what they saw--not even

considering the problem how far the conditions then present tallied

with the primitive normal state of things in the aboriginal society.

Allowance must therefore be always made for the degeneration of the

blacks as a possible factor affecting ethnographical evidence. In many

cases there will be no room for doubt. For instance, in sexual matters

it is obvious that contact with the white man invariably fosters a

great deal of depravity. An improvement in sexual morality may, on

the other hand, take place if the natives are gathered in a mission

station.[33] But this cannot have any connection with aboriginal custom.

[31] For instance, we can judge this from Curr's

_Recollections_; we know pretty well the state of the

different tribes investigated by Howitt, Spencer and

Gillen, and by Roth. In many other cases a general idea may

be formed from different hints.

[32] The aborigines in their natural uncorrupted state

appear to have been extremely shy, and great difficulties

would undoubtedly have arisen had any one attempted to come

into more intimate contact with them. But in the early days

of the settlement of Australia there was nobody with such

intentions. It is sufficient to read very early accounts,

such as the voyages of Gov. Phillip, Barrington; as also

accounts of explorers like Grey, Eyre, Leichardt, Mitchell,

Sturt, etc., to see how shy and inaccessible were the

blacks in their really savage state.

[33] For examples how natives on mission stations may be

forced into morality, legal and Christian marriages, etc.,

the reader may be referred to the personal diaries of

missionaries. Compare _e. g._ the article by the missionary

D. Mathews, _l.c._ pp. 48 _sqq._

If, therefore, it is found, as is in fact the case, that all writers,

who either inquired into the matter with really scientific precautions,

or had to do with pure, primitive material, inform us that, speaking

broadly, the sexual relations were strictly regulated; and on the

other hand, all settlers, casual observers, and people who obviously

had already corrupted blacks under observation, speak of unrestricted

immorality and even of incest,[34] it may be safely said that the

second type of statements refer to degenerate blacks. Here the general

_a priori_ suppositions quite harmonize with what is to be found

in the evidence; the second type of statements may be therefore

fittingly discarded. In the same way it may be assumed that with a

general dissolution and corruption in the aboriginal society, and with

all kinds of vices engrafted upon it the general level of conjugal

affection and the standard of treatment of the wife by her husband went

down. The contrary cannot possibly be assumed.

[34] See below, the statements, pp. 92 _sqq._

So it appears that, even from the quality of the material the observer

had at his disposal, some useful hints may be obtained as to the

direction in which our statements need correction. Furthermore it

was said above that useful indications can be gathered from the way

in which the observer was in contact with the natives; whether the

observer was a long time in contact with the natives or only a short

time; whether he made his observations with deliberate scientific aim,

or whether they were made casually and recollected afterwards; whether

he had good opportunities for observation, and under what conditions

this was carried on, and so forth.

All these questions may throw much light upon the relation between the

writer's statement in its final form and the actual state of things

to which it refers. These questions are also in close connection with

the point mentioned below, touching the profession of an observer.

For it is usually the privilege of the missionaries to be in a long

and intimate contact with the natives, to have their confidence,

and sometimes to understand even their language, while it is the

ethnographer's privilege to understand the aim of his inquiries. In

some cases there are fairly detailed data about these points, and such

information about the conditions and circumstances under which the

writer got his evidence greatly increases its value. In all cases where

the evidence is contained in memoirs, diaries, descriptions of travels,

expeditions, etc., it is possible to form an idea as to what kind of

relation existed between the respective author and the material of his

observation. So it appears that Curr and Salvado had especially good

opportunities; it is possible to picture the way in which authors like

Collins, Taplin, Grey, Eyre, Lumholtz, Angas, Strehlow and others,

came into contact with the natives. This is much more difficult to

say in the case of writers who wrote only short articles (Oldfield,

Stanbridge, Bonney, Palmer, Cameron and others), which merely give

information without any details as to how it was gathered. In the case

of ethnographers, observing themselves or collecting the observations

of others--like Howitt, Spencer and Gillen, Roth, and some others--we

might expect to be informed minutely about the way in which they

obtained their information. Unfortunately this is only partly the case.

The questions how the condition of the natives, and how the method of

observation can affect the final statements have been discussed at

length. It was done in order to exemplify how from such considerations

may be gathered useful hints, nay even positive indications, as to

the direction along which the given statement may be corrected, if

corrected at all. There are, besides these points, several other

important points referring to the qualifications of the ethnographer

that cannot be omitted when any correction of statement is made.

There is no room to discuss them in detail; they would lead us too

far into the domains of methodology, of ethnographic research. They

must be enumerated briefly. So it is quite clear, that not only the

personal character but also the profession or occupation of the writer

influences very considerably the value and trustworthiness and the

character of the information given. The personal character of the

ethnographer is a rather delicate matter, but nobody could deny that

some authors inspire us with the belief that everything they say is

their real conviction, based on solid foundations of facts, while other

authors fail to produce the same impression on the reader. It is also

clear that a missionary, a police trooper, or an ethnologist, will each

look with different eyes upon the same facts; each of them will group

the essential features and generalize quite differently, and will

express himself in terms which are by no means of the same degree of

exactness and clearness. Ultimately each man will have his professional

bias: the missionary will be influenced by his creeds and his moral

ideas, the ethnologist by his theories, and the squatter or police

trooper will sometimes, where there is room for it, allow play to his

feelings, which usually are not ones of pure sympathy for the natives.

As a matter of fact, it is allowable to speak without exaggeration

of professional types of information. That the utmost caution is

necessary, and that thus only are to be found indications of the

directions in which it is possible to interpret some possible error, is

an almost superfluous statement. Of course a careful and complete study

of the whole work of an author enables one to judge much better how far

his profession or personality may have affected his statements. And

this is also the reason why an ethnologist confining himself to a small

ethnic area is in a better position than the general one. For he is

able to know his sources better, having a much more restricted number

to deal with.

Not less important as regards our attitude towards a given writer's

statements is the purpose with which his book is written. The

greatest confidence of course is inspired by books written with a

purely scientific aim. Even the articles of observers who are not men

of science are apparently much more carefully written if they are

intended for purely scientific use in serious scientific journals (as

some articles in the _Journal of the Ethnological Society_, _Jour.

Anthrop. Inst._, etc.). Memoirs, descriptions of travel, and so on,

give--_ceteris paribus_--less guarantee; often much more room is left

to phantasy, to a tendency to amuse, perhaps puzzle or interest.

Concrete instances of this could be easily adduced.

At the end of all his mental operations, each observer had to

generalize his observations, to express their common features, and

formulate these in abstract and exact language. Here the most important

points are personal intelligence and some mental training. The first

is to be found even among the casual writers; for only people of a

somewhat higher level of mentality would care to observe and write down

their observations. But mental training in a scientific direction is

exclusively to be found among the ethnographers; some of them stand far

above all our other informants in matters of rather theoretical aspect,

especially if social phenomena are concerned. And we may usually, in

case of contradiction, take this information as the firm basis from

which to start the operation of criticism. But on the other hand, there

are reasons to mistrust general opinions laid down by professional

ethnologists, for they are very often not simple generalizations, but

theoretical inferences. Cases will be often met with where a general

remark, which could be taken as a statement of fact--and often is given

in such a form--appears after a more careful analysis to be quite a

conjectural deduction from purely hypothetical premisses, or from

incorrect definition. In all cases--_e. g._ where actual existence

of group marriage is alleged--it will appear that this statement is

a deduction from certain phenomena, which allow of quite a different

interpretation, and that the term "marriage" is defined somewhat

loosely.[35]

[35] Compare also above, pp. 2-5.

To sum up briefly: criticism of statements has in the first place to

ascertain the exact and correct verbal meaning of each of them. In the

second place many general but sure hints are afforded by a detailed

analysis of the conditions under which the evidence was obtained and

set forth by the author. The important points here are: quality of the

material under observation; modes in which evidence was obtained (by

inquiries from natives, by immediate observation, etc.); character,

profession, and training of the informant, including possible bias,

theoretical, moral, and personal. All these points appear at first

sight rather impalpable, but as shown above they may afford good hints,

especially if taken into account simultaneously.

Now we pass to the second point indicated above on page 18, namely, the

discussion of the local differences which may introduce some apparent

contradictions into the statements. Assuming the possession of a series

of statements, the correctness of which we accept within certain

limits, there may still be some contradictions between them, due to the

differences between the tribes, to which these statements refer. The

task will be consequently to indicate these differences and to give

certain reasons why some of the contradictions may be dealt with in

this way and why others cannot be reduced to local differences. In the

first place, in order to facilitate the application of the geographical

point of view, the survey of the statements will always be made in

the same geographical order. I begin with the south-east end of the

continent and proceed then westwards and northwards, enumerating first

the tribes of Victoria, then the tribes of the South territory of South

Australia. I proceed over New South Wales to the Central and Northern

tribes; then to Queensland, ending with West Australia. The order is

kept only roughly without pedantic accuracy, which cannot be achieved,

as many writers do not even trouble to localize their statements with

anything approaching exactitude.

It may now be laid down in which cases it is possible to point with

certainty to local differences between the different tribes and reduce

to these factors the contradictions which are found. If the same

author, who is known to be well-informed concerning the whole area

(either personally or through reliable informants), points expressly

to such differences, there is no reason to disbelieve him. Many such

local differences are indicated in the extensive works of Spencer and

Gillen, and Howitt. As an example may be quoted the differences in

sexual matters, pointed out by Howitt in _Reports of the Smithsonian

Institution_ (compare below, pp. 100 and 101). But even in the case

of such reliable authors as the ones just mentioned it should always

be carefully considered whether they knew with the same degree

of exactness all the tribes they compare. Further, when there is

independent information about geographically-separated tribes from

reliable authors of the same degree of exactness, to whose information

we have reason to ascribe the same weight, we may also safely point,

if there are any contradictions, to local differences. But if quite

contradictory statements about some tribe or tribes living in close

neighbourhood are given, we hardly feel inclined to attribute these

contradictions to local differences. A very important indication of the

advisability of introducing the element of geographical differences

is further the question whether the tribes in question are in general

different from each other, and whether they belong to different types

of culture. Although very little can be said on that point, still on

quite broad lines we must, _e. g._ acknowledge that the Kurnai were a

tribe with many singularities, that the Arunta and other Central tribes

clearly differ from the S.E. tribes, etc. As we shall make very little

use of the geographical factor, what is said above may be considered

sufficient on that point.[36]

[36] As far as I see, in the present state of our

knowledge, it is only admissible to speak with greatest

care and in very broad lines of the Australian types

of culture. Interesting attempts have been made in this

direction by Dr. Graebner, Mr. N. W. Thomas, and Father

Schmidt. The two latter especially base their work

on a profound and extensive knowledge, and formulate

their results with the utmost reserve and carefulness.

Fr. W. Schmidt has at his disposal the powerful instrument

of linguistic knowledge. Mr. W. N. Thomas knows the

Australian facts as nobody else does. Their conclusions are

therefore of much weight. The present investigations afford

little opportunity to point out geographic differences.

Compare Fr. W. Schmidt, "Die Stellung, d. Aranda," etc.,

_Z.f.E._, 1908, pp. 866 _sqq._; F. Graebner, _Ibid._, 1905,

pp. 28 _sqq._; _Globus_, xc. Consult also N. W. Thomas,

_Kinship_, and the same, _Z.f.E._, 1905.

Passing now to the third and perhaps most important methodological

point, we may say a few words as to what method should be adopted

for the drawing of conclusions from evidence considered as reliable.

This is neither a logical proceeding, nor is it a kind of induction.

Properly speaking, a witness's statement may be either accepted or

rejected. But in this book importance has been laid on presenting the

evidence in a quite definite way. Evidence is not used in order to

exemplify or to prove a given assertion on a special point. Such a

proceeding appears to be rather dogmatic, for usually in such cases the

author gives preference to an _a priori_ opinion, and looks afterwards

for its confirmation in the ethnographic first-hand literature. Owing

to the contradictory character of the latter, practically anything can

be proved from it. In the present book the author merely sets forth the

problem; for instance, such quite general questions are asked, as: How

are wives obtained in Australia? What is the treatment of the wife by

her husband? What are the sexual relations in general? and so forth.

On each of those general topics evidence is afterwards collected,

without prejudice or preference given to any type of opinion. There

is, therefore, much less risk of bias or one-sidedness; the whole

care is to make the best of the evidence thus collected; and a series

of statements upon a given subject is presented. Each of them gives

information on several points at once; at any rate each of them may

usually be analyzed into a series of simpler statements. And this

analytical operation will be our first task. There is always one or

more assertion sufficiently general, or simple, which will be contained

in all or in the majority of our statements and will be contradicted by

none. These may be considered as established by our evidence. On other

points there will be contradictions. Often these contradictions will be

only apparent, due to a confusion in terminology, or to the defective

way in which the writers have expressed themselves. Here recourse must

be had to our first form of criticism, to the ascertainment of the

exact meaning of each statement (verbal criticism). If that fails, the

contradictions must be recognized as real ones. In case they cannot be

attributed to any local differences, we must try to eliminate them. And

on this point recourse must be had to the criticism of the statements

from the point of view laid down above (p. 25). Some of the statements

may be discarded as untrustworthy; the correct interpretation of others

may be determined; and thus the contradictions will vanish. Sometimes

this is impossible; the contradictions remain irreducible. Then they

must be simply pointed out, and there is nothing further to be done.

Undoubtedly much greater service is rendered to science by pointing out

really irresolvable contradictions and obscurities than by establishing

fallacious certitude.

Especially if on the part of the field ethnographers there could be

expected some interest in the results of theoretical research, such

indications of contradictions on points, the theoretical importance

of which should be proved, would be of real value.[37] Only such a

co-operation between theoretical writers and observers can give us

satisfactory results. To make indifferent observation is easy. To note

essential things and give useful observations is impossible without

theoretical knowledge and an insight into the laws of sociology. It

would be better if field ethnographers would consider the questions

of theoretical writers, and take into account in their scheme of

investigations the utilization subsequently to be made of their work.

[37] Mr. Thomas in his work on Australian kinship suggests

at every step questions which apparently are quite within

the scope of investigation, and upon which our present

evidence gives no answer. But unhappily I have not been

able to trace any influence of this important work in the

recent ethnographic publications.

Returning, after this digression, to our theme, it may be observed

that the method of dealing with evidence is very simple: there is the

analytical operation, of finding the essential points contained in

a series of statements; in other words, the operation of analyzing

these statements into simple factors and stating which are common to

all the statements and may be accepted as well established. A further

task consists in pointing out the irreducible contradictions. This

operation obviously contains all the others--criticism of the text

and contents of the statement, and reduction of contradictions to

local differences. It is evident also that, although theoretically

the criticism of statements was dealt with first, then the question

of geographical differences, and in the third place the problem of

handling a series of statements, as a matter of fact, the first step

is to make a survey of all our evidence, resolving it into a set of

problems, and then to take each problem separately; in this way we

shall find contradictions and endeavour to eliminate them, and we shall

be compelled to exercise criticism on the statements.

I would like to add here that to help us in the decision between

several contradictory opinions, there is still one criterion beside the

hints enunciated above (which refer to the character of each individual

statement). I mean the criterion whether the final opinion drawn from

the evidence is compatible or not with the other well-established

features of Australian sociology. When deciding to adhere to some view,

which is not established by a unanimous and categoric opinion of all

our informers, it is always necessary to put this view to the test of

other well-established facts. There are some views which are quite

incompatible with the general conditions of life in the Australian

aboriginal society and with the resulting mode of living. As a good

example of such deductive demonstrations we may quote the passage in

Curr, where he arithmetically proves that the statement of Dawson about

the Australian chiefs and their court cannot be true.[38] Another

example is afforded by the interesting passage of Howitt quoted below

_in extenso_ (pp. 113 and 114), which relates how the author thinks

that our ideas on group marriage should be modified by what we know

about the aboriginal mode of living and about the natural character

of men. As a rule it is well always to try to ascertain whether our

conclusion does not stand in contradiction with some part of our

well-founded knowledge. Thus in practice it is always necessary to

start with a crude series of facts, and in any attempt at criticism to

be guided by the contradictions found in them. If then criticism and

corrections, made according to our rules, remove the contradictions, we

have another guarantee that our corrections were good. For if a series

of statements, which at first sight seemed to present irreconcilable

contradictions, do agree after we have applied to such of them as were

either in a minority or appeared vague or came from uncertain sources,

corrections or interpretations (the latter based on principles laid

down quite independently), it may be concluded that our reason for

applying the correction and the way in which we have done it, were

sufficiently correct and justified.

[38] Curr, _A.R._, i. pp. 53 _sqq._

To use a series of statements as they are given would be in the

majority of cases quite impossible. All the contradictions imaginable

would be present, and we should either helplessly drop any attempt at

forming an opinion, or we should get out of the difficulty by a purely

arbitrary act. We could by an act of faith believe in some of our

writers and accept only what they say or what confirms their opinion,

and completely ignore any contradictory information. That would even

enable us to form a much more certain and detailed view on many points.

Our way of proceeding compels us often to relinquish a very precise,

definite opinion, which we could hold if we accepted one statement to

be ultimately true, and neglected the others; but it gives us at least

the conviction that any more precise conclusion would be unfounded.

That all the corrections must be carried out on grounds of ample

justification and in the most discreet way is quite clear. It will be

seen that in the subsequent pages only rarely have statements been

amended, and then the reasons are always given. But it is important

that even these few corrections should be done systematically. The

above indications will, I trust, help to a certain degree to justify

the method adopted in dealing with evidence.

Our methodological considerations were necessarily taken on broad

lines. To give a detailed and precise description of the method of

treating the Australian material would require a whole volume, for

there are in all individual cases so many influences and possibilities

that may be considered as sources of error, and so many elements to

take into consideration, that it would be nearly impossible to trace

all the mental processes that have to be followed here. I found it

also impossible to give explicitly all my reasons in each place where

I ventured to correct a statement. Nevertheless, I have not thought

it superfluous to give in outline the chief points adopted in this

criticism. In the first place even these general hints will be quite

sufficient to indicate the writer's motives to every one who has had to

deal in an analogous way with ethnographical materials. And then they

will serve as a proof that these questions, doubts, and precautions,

were present to his mind while weighing the evidence. In the last

place, as science is essentially based on mutual help and mutual

agreement, if we had a whole series of workers on a given ethnographic

material, a certain general assent, if such could be obtained, would

undoubtedly be the best criterion of reliability of sources. But

matters should be openly and explicitly discussed.

To sum up, the chief methodological principle which we have striven

to keep always before us, is a thorough clearness about every step of

our reasoning. In the first place, therefore, care has been taken to

give an explicit and a perfectly clear survey of the statements; and to

draw conclusions in such a way that all our reasons for drawing them

shall be as clear as possible to the reader, so as to enable every

one to apply his own criticism as easily as possible at any stage of

our reasoning. Necessarily in a study such as the present one, some

allowance must be made for a subjective element in the final judgments

on the value of the evidence. But just as the writer must ask for a

certain amount of trust in his scientific judgment, so he is bound to

give every means to the reader to enable him always fully to judge and

exercise his criticism on the use the author is making of this liberty.

In order to achieve this as far as in us lies, the methodological

principles set forth above have been adopted. They are in short, as

follows: We accept as facts those points in which all statements agree.

On controversial points we try to eliminate the contradictions by

applying textual criticism to the statements, or by pointing out the

possible sources of error, or by showing that these contradictions

must be set down to local differences between the tribes. In drawing

conclusions, we shall point out those facts which are well established,

and also point out those which are more or less uncertain or

contradictory. The sources used are not very numerous, but it is hoped

that they will be found sufficient. They have been impartially chosen

and include each of the various types of Australian evidence.