CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL UNREST AND BOLSHEVISM

Unrest is the natural concomitant of change--particularly of sudden

change. Every break with past, however normal and inevitable, implies a

necessity for readjustment to altered conditions which causes a

temporary sense of restless disharmony until the required adjustment has

been made. Unrest is not an exceptional phenomenon; it is always latent

in every human society which has not fallen into complete stagnation,

and a slight amount of unrest should be considered a sign of healthy

growth rather than a symptom of disease. In fact, the minimum degrees of

unrest are usually not called by that name, but are considered mere

incidents of normal development. Under normal circumstances, indeed, the

social organism functions like the human organism: it is being

incessantly destroyed and as incessantly renewed in conformity with the

changing conditions of life. These changes are sometimes very

considerable, but they are so gradual that they are effected almost

without being perceived. A healthy organism well attuned to its

environment is always plastic. It instinctively senses environmental

changes and adapts itself so rapidly that it escapes the injurious

consequences of disharmony.

Far different is the character of unrest's acuter manifestations. These

are infallible symptoms of sweeping changes, sudden breaks with the

past, and profound maladjustments which are not being rapidly rectified.

In other words, acute unrest denotes social ill-health and portends the

possibility of one of those violent crises known as "revolutions."

The history of the Moslem East well exemplifies the above

generalizations. The formative period of Saracenic civilization was

characterized by rapid change and an intense idealistic ferment. The

great "Motazelite" movement embraced many shades of thought, its radical

wing professing religious, political, and social doctrines of a violent

revolutionary nature. But this changeful period was superficial and

brief. Arab vigour and the Islamic spirit proved unable permanently to

leaven the vast inertia of the ancient East. Soon the old traditions

reasserted themselves--somewhat modified, to be sure, yet basically the

same Saracenic civilization became stereotyped, ossified, and with this

ossification changeful unrest died away. Here and there the radical

tradition was preserved and secretly handed down by a few obscure sects

like the Kharidjites of Inner Arabia and the Bettashi dervishes; but

these were mere cryptic episodes, of no general significance.

With the Mohammedan Revival at the beginning of the nineteenth century,

however, symptoms of social unrest appeared once more. Wahabism aimed

not merely at a reform of religious abuses but was also a general

protest against the contemporary decadence of Moslem society. In many

cases it took the form of a popular revolt against established

governments. The same was true of the correlative Babbist movement in

Persia, which took place about the same time.[284]

And of course these nascent stirrings were greatly stimulated by the

flood of Western ideas and methods which, as the nineteenth century wore

on, increasingly permeated the East. What, indeed, could be more

provocative of unrest of every description than the resulting

transformation of the Orient--a transformation so sudden, so intense,

and necessitating so concentrated a process of adaptation that it was

basically revolutionary rather than evolutionary in its nature? The

details of these profound changes--political, religious, economic,

social--we have already studied, together with the equally profound

disturbance, bewilderment, and suffering afflicting all classes in this

eminently transition period.

The essentially revolutionary nature of this transition period, as

exemplified by India, is well described by a British economist.[285]

What, he asks, could be more anachronistic than the contrast between

rural and urban India? "Rural India is primitive or mediæval; city India

is modern." In city India you will find every symbol of Western life,

from banks and factories down to the very "sandwichmen that you left in

the London gutters." Now all this co-exists beside rural India. "And it

is surely a fact unique in economic history that they should thus exist

side by side. The present condition of India does not correspond with

any period of European economic history." Imagine the effect in Europe

of setting down modern and mediæval men together, with utterly disparate

ideas. That has not happened in Europe because "European progress in the

economic world has been evolutionary"; a process spread over centuries.

In India, on the other hand, this economic transformation has been

"revolutionary" in character.

How unevolutionary is India's economic transformation is seen by the

condition of rural India.

"Rural India, though chiefly characterized by primitive usage, has been

invaded by ideas that are intensely hostile to the old state of things

It is primitive, _but not consistently primitive_. Competitive wages are

paid side by side with customary wages. Prices are sometimes fixed by

custom, but sometimes, too, by free economic causes. From the midst of a

population deeply rooted in the soil, men are being carried away by the

desire of better wages. In short, economic motives have suddenly and

partially intruded themselves in the realm of primitive morality. And,

if we turn to city India, we see a similar, though inverted, state of

things.... In neither case has the mixture been harmonious or the fusion

complete. Indeed, the two orders are too unrelated, too far apart, to

coalesce with ease....

"India, then, is in a state of economic revolution throughout all the

classes of an enormous and complex society. The only period in which

Europe offered even faint analogies to modern India was the Industrial

Revolution, from which even now we have not settled down into

comparative stability. We may reckon it as a fortunate circumstance for

Europe that the intellectual movement which culminated in the French

Revolution did not coincide with the Industrial Revolution. If it had,

it is possible that European society might have been hopelessly wrecked.

But, as it was, even when the French Revolution had spent its force in

the conquests of Napoleon, the Industrial Revolution stirred up enough

social and political discontent. When whole classes of people are

obliged by economic revolution to change their mode of life, it is

inevitable that many should suffer. Discontent is roused. Political and

destructive movements are certain to ensue. Not only the Revolutions of

'48, but also the birth of the Socialist Party sprang from the

Industrial Revolution.

"But that revolution was not nearly so sweeping as that which is now in

operation in India. The invention of machinery and steam-power was, in

Europe, but the crowning event of a long series of years in which

commerce and industry had been constantly expanding, in which capital

had been largely accumulated, in which economic principles had been

gradually spreading.... No, the Indian economic revolution is vastly

greater and more fundamental than our Industrial Revolution, great as

that was. Railways have been built through districts where travel was

almost impossible, and even roads are unknown. Factories have been

built, and filled by men unused to industrial labour. Capital has been

poured into the country, which was unprepared for any such development.

And what are the consequences? India's social organization is being

dissolved. The Brahmins are no longer priests. The ryot is no longer

bound to the soil. The banya is no longer the sole purveyor of capital.

The hand-weaver is threatened with extinction, and the brass-worker can

no longer ply his craft. Think of the dislocation which this sudden

change has brought about, of the many who can no longer follow their

ancestral vocations, of the commotion which a less profound change

produced in Europe, and you will understand what is the chief

motive-power of the political unrest. It is small wonder. The wonder is

that the unrest has been no greater than it is. Had India not been an

Asiatic country, she would have been in fierce revolution long ago."

The above lines were of course written in the opening years of the

twentieth century, before the world had been shattered by Armageddon and

aggressive social revolution had established itself in semi-Asiatic

Russia. But even during those pre-war years, other students of the

Orient were predicting social disturbances of increasing gravity. Said

the Hindu nationalist leader, Bipin Chandra Pal: "This so-called unrest

is not really political. It is essentially an intellectual and spiritual

upheaval, the forerunner of a mighty social revolution, with a new

organon and a new philosophy of life behind it."[286] And the French

publicist Chailley wrote of India: "There will be a series of economic

revolutions, which must necessarily produce suffering and

struggle."[287]

During this pre-war period the increased difficulty of living

conditions, together with the adoption of Western ideas of comfort and

kindred higher standards, seem to have been engendering friction between

the different strata of the Oriental population. In 1911 a British

sanitary expert assigned "wretchedness" as the root-cause of India's

political unrest. After describing the deplorable living conditions of

the Indian masses, he wrote: "It will of course be said at once that

these conditions have existed in India from time immemorial, and are no

more likely to cause unrest now than previously; but in my opinion

unrest has always existed there in a subterranean form. Moreover, in the

old days, the populace could make scarcely any comparison between their

own condition and that of more fortunate people; now they can compare

their own slums and terrible 'native quarters' with the much better

ordered cantonments, stations, and houses of the British officials and

even of their own wealthier brethren. So far as I can see, such misery

is always the fundamental cause of all popular unrest.... Seditious

meetings, political chatter, and 'aspirations' of babus and demagogues

are only the superficial manifestations of the deeper disturbance."[288]

This growing social friction was indubitably heightened by the lack of

interest of Orientals in the sufferings of all persons not bound to them

by family, caste, or customary ties. Throughout the East, "social

service," in the Western sense, is practically unknown. This fact is

noted by a few Orientals themselves. Says an Indian writer, speaking of

Indian town life: "There is no common measure of social conduct....

Hitherto, social reform in India has taken account only of individual or

family life. As applied to mankind in the mass, and especially to those

soulless agglomerations of seething humanity which we call cities, it is

a gospel yet to be preached."[289] As an American sociologist remarked

of the growing slum evil throughout the industrialized Orient: "The

greatest danger is due to the fact that Orientals do not have the high

Western sense of the value of the life of the individual, and are,

comparatively speaking, without any restraining influence similar to our

own enlightened public opinion, which has been roused by the struggles

of a century of industrial strife. Unless these elements can be

supplied, there is danger of suffering and of abuses worse than any the

West has known."[290]

All this diffused social unrest was centring about two recently emerged

elements: the Western-educated _intelligentsia_ and the industrial

proletariat of the factory towns. The revolutionary tendencies of the

_intelligentsia_, particularly of its half-educated failures, have been

already noted, and these latter have undoubtedly played a leading part

in all the revolutionary disturbances of the modern Orient, from North

Africa to China.[291] Regarding the industrial proletariat, some writers

think that there is little immediate likelihood of their becoming a

major revolutionary factor, because of their traditionalism, ignorance,

and apathy, and also because there is no real connection between them

and the _intelligentsia_, the other centre of social discontent.

The French economist Métin states this view-point very well. Speaking

primarily of India, he writes: "The Nationalist movement rises from the

middle classes and manifests no systematic hostility toward the

capitalists and great proprietors; in economic matters it is on their

side."[292] As for the proletariat: "The coolies do not imagine that

their lot can be bettered. Like the ryots and the agricultural

labourers, they do not show the least sign of revolt. To whom should

they turn? The ranks of traditional society are closed to them. People

without caste, the coolies are despised even by the old-style artisan,

proud of his caste-status, humble though that be. To fall to the job of

a coolie is, for the Hindu, the worst declassment. The factory workers

are not yet numerous enough to form a compact and powerful proletariat,

able to exert pressure on the old society. Even if they do occasionally

strike, they are as far from the modern Trade-Union as they are from the

traditional working-caste. Neither can they look for leadership to the

'intellectual proletariat'; for the Nationalist movement has not emerged

from the 'bourgeois' phase, and always leans on the capitalists....

"Thus Indian industry is still in its embryonic stages. In truth, the

material evolution which translates itself by the construction of

factories, and the social evolution which creates a proletariat, have

only begun to emerge; while the intellectual evolution from which arise

the programmes of social demands has not even begun."[293]

Other observers of Indian industrial conditions, however, do not share

M. Métin's opinion. Says the British Labour leader, J. Ramsay Macdonald:

"To imagine the backward Indian labourers becoming a conscious regiment

in the class war, seems to be one of the vainest dreams in which a

Western mind can indulge. But I sometimes wonder if it be so very vain

after all. In the first place, the development of factory industry in

India has created a landless and homeless proletariat unmatched by the

same economic class in any other capitalist community; and to imagine

that this class is to be kept out, or can be kept out, of Indian

politics is far more vain than to dream of its developing a politics on

Western lines. Further than that, the wage-earners have shown a

willingness to respond to Trades-Union methods; they are forming

industrial associations and have engaged in strikes; some of the social

reform movements conducted by Indian intellectuals definitely try to

establish Trades-Unions and preach ideas familiar to us in connection

with Trades-Union propaganda. A capitalist fiscal policy will not only

give this movement a great impetus as it did in Japan, but in India will

not be able to suppress the movement, as was done in Japan, by

legislation. As yet, the true proletarian wage-earner, uprooted from his

native village and broken away from the organization of Indian society,

is but insignificant. It is growing, however, and I believe that it will

organize itself rapidly on the general lines of the proletarian classes

of other capitalist countries. So soon as it becomes politically

conscious, there are no other lines upon which it can organize

itself."[294]

Turning to the Near East--more than a decade ago a French Socialist

writer, observing the hard living conditions of the Egyptian masses,

noted signs of social unrest and predicted grave disturbances. "A

genuine proletariat," he wrote, "has been created by the multiplication

of industries and the sudden, almost abrupt, progress which has

followed. The cost of living has risen to a scale hitherto unknown in

Egypt, while wages have risen but slightly. Poverty and want abound.

Some day suffering will provoke the people to complaints, perhaps to

angry outbursts, throughout this apparently prosperous Delta. It is true

that the influx of foreigners and of money may put off the hour when the

city or country labourer of Egyptian race comes clearly to perceive the

wrongs that are being done to him. He may miss the educational influence

of Socialism. Yet such an awakening may come sooner than people expect.

It is not only among the successful and prosperous Egyptians that

intelligence is to be found. Those whose wages are growing gradually

smaller and smaller have intelligence of equal keenness, and it has

become a real question as to the hour when for the first time in the

land of Islam the flame of Mohammedan Socialism shall burst forth."[295]

In Algeria, likewise, a Belgian traveller noted the dawning of a

proletarian consciousness among the town working-men just before the

Great War. Speaking of the rapid spread of Western ideas, he wrote:

"Islam tears asunder like rotten cloth on the quays of Algiers: the

dockers, coal-passers, and engine-tenders, to whatever race they belong,

leave their Islam and acquire a genuine proletarian morality, that of

the proletarians of Europe, and they make common cause with their

European colleagues on the basis of a strictly economic struggle. If

there were many big factories in Algeria, orthodox Islam would soon

disappear there, as old-fashioned Catholicism has disappeared with us

under the shock of great industry."[296]

Whatever may be the prospects as to the rapid emergence of organized

labour movements in the Orient, one thing seems certain: the unrest

which afflicted so many parts of the East in the years preceding the

Great War, though mainly political, had also its social side. Toward the

end of 1913, a leading Anglo-Indian journal remarked pessimistically:

"We have already gone so far on the downward path that leads to

destruction that there are districts in what were once regarded as the

most settled parts of India which are being abandoned by the rich

because their property is not safe. So great is the contempt for the law

that it is employed by the unscrupulous as a means of offence against

the innocent. Frontier Pathans commit outrages almost unbelievable in

their daring. Mass-meetings are held and agitation spreads in regard to

topics quite outside the business of orderly people. There is no matter

of domestic or foreign politics in which crowds of irresponsible people

do not want to have their passionate way. Great grievances are made of

little, far-off things. What ought to be the ordered, spacious life of

the District Officer is intruded upon and disturbed by a hundred

distracting influences due to the want of discipline of the people. In

the subordinate ranks of the great services themselves, trades-unions

have been formed. Military and police officers have to regret that the

new class of recruits is less subordinate than the old, harder to

discipline, more full of complaints."[297]

The Great War of course enormously aggravated Oriental unrest. In many

parts of the Near East, especially, acute suffering, balked ambitions,

and furious hates combined to reduce society to the verge of chaos. Into

this ominous turmoil there now came the sinister influence of Russian

Bolshevism, marshalling all this diffused unrest by systematic methods

for definite ends. Bolshevism was frankly out for a world-revolution and

the destruction of Western civilization. To attain this objective the

Bolshevist leaders not only launched direct assaults on the West, but

also planned flank attacks in Asia and Africa. They believed that if the

East could be set on fire, not only would Russian Bolshevism gain vast

additional strength but also the economic repercussion on the West,

already shaken by the war, would be so terrific that industrial collapse

would ensue, thereby throwing Europe open to revolution.

Bolshevism's propagandist efforts were nothing short of universal, both

in area and in scope. No part of the world was free from the plottings

of its agents; no possible source of discontent was overlooked. Strictly

"Red" doctrines like the dictatorship of the proletariat were very far

from being the only weapons in Bolshevism's armoury. Since what was

first wanted was the overthrow of the existing world-order, any kind of

opposition to that order, no matter how remote doctrinally from

Bolshevism, was grist to the Bolshevist mill. Accordingly, in every

quarter of the globe, in Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Americas, as

in Europe, Bolshevik agitators whispered in the ears of the discontented

their gospel of hatred and revenge. Every nationalist aspiration, every

political grievance, every social injustice, every racial

discrimination, was fuel for Bolshevism's incitement to violence and

war.[298]

Particularly promising fields for Bolshevist activity were the Near and

Middle East. Besides being a prey to profound disturbances of every

description, those regions as traditional objectives of the old Czarist

imperialism, had long been carefully studied by Russian agents who had

evolved a technique of "pacific penetration" that might be easily

adjusted to Bolshevist ends. To stir up political, religious, and racial

passions in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, especially against

England, required no original planning by Trotzky or Lenin. Czarism had

already done these things for generations, and full information lay both

in the Petrograd archives and in the brains of surviving Czarist agents

ready to turn their hands as easily to the new work as the old.

In all the elaborate network of Bolshevist propaganda which to-day

enmeshes the East we must discriminate between Bolshevism's two

objectives: one immediate--the destruction of Western political and

economic supremacy; the other ultimate--the bolshevizing of the Oriental

masses and the consequent extirpation of the native upper and middle

classes, precisely as has been done in Russia and as is planned for the

countries of the West. In the first stage, Bolshevism is quite ready to

respect Oriental faiths and customs and to back Oriental nationalist

movements. In the second stage, religions like Islam and nationalists

like Mustapha Kemal are to be branded as "bourgeois" and relentlessly

destroyed. How Bolshevik diplomacy endeavours to work these two schemes

in double harness, we shall presently see.

Russian Bolshevism's Oriental policy was formulated soon after its

accession to power at the close of 1917. The year 1918 was a time of

busy preparation. An elaborate propaganda organization was built up from

various sources. A number of old Czarist agents and diplomats versed in

Eastern affairs were cajoled or conscripted into the service. The

Russian Mohammedan populations such as the Tartars of South Russia and

the Turkomans of Central Asia furnished many recruits. Even more

valuable were the exiles who flocked to Russia from Turkey, Persia,

India, and elsewhere at the close of the Great War. Practically all the

leaders of the Turkish war-government--Enver, Djemal, Talaat, and many

more, fled to Russia for refuge from the vengeance of the victorious

Entente Powers. The same was true of the Hindu terrorist leaders who had

been in German pay during the war and who now sought service under

Lenin. By the end of 1918 Bolshevism's Oriental propaganda department

was well organized, divided into three bureaux, for the Islamic

countries, India, and the Far East respectively. With Bolshevism's Far

Eastern activities this book is not concerned, though the reader should

bear them in mind and should remember the important part played by the

Chinese in recent Russian history. As for the Islamic and Indian

bureaux, they displayed great zeal, translating tons of Bolshevik

literature into the various Oriental languages, training numerous secret

agents and propagandists for "field-work," and getting in touch with all

disaffected or revolutionary elements.

With the opening months of 1919 Bolshevist activity throughout the Near

and Middle East became increasingly apparent. The wave of rage and

despair caused by the Entente's denial of Near Eastern nationalist

aspirations[299] played splendidly into the Bolshevists' hands, and we

have already seen how Moscow supported Mustapha Kemal and other

nationalist leaders in Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and elsewhere. In the

Middle East, also, Bolshevism gained important successes. Not merely was

Moscow's hand visible in the epidemic of rioting and seditious violence

which swept northern India in the spring of 1919,[300] but an even

shrewder blow was struck at Britain in Afghanistan. This land of

turbulent mountaineers, which lay like a perpetual thundercloud on

India's north-west frontier, had kept quiet during the Great War, mainly

owing to the Anglophile attitude of its ruler, the Ameer Habibullah

Khan. But early in 1919 Habibullah was murdered. Whether the Bolsheviki

had a hand in the matter is not known, but they certainly reaped the

benefit, for power passed to one of Habibullah's sons, Amanullah Khan,

who was an avowed enemy of England and who had had dealings with

Turco-German agents during the late war. Amanullah at once got in touch

with Moscow, and a little later, just when the Punjab was seething with

unrest, he declared war on England, and his wild tribesmen, pouring

across the border, set the North-West Frontier on fire. After some hard

fighting the British succeeded in repelling the Afghan invasion, and

Amanullah was constrained to make peace. But Britain obviously dared not

press Amanullah too hard, for in the peace treaty the Ameer was released

from his previous obligation not to maintain diplomatic relations with

other nations than British India. Amanullah promptly aired his

independence by maintaining ostentatious relations with Moscow. As a

matter of fact, the Bolsheviki had by this time established an important

propagandist subcentre in Russian Turkestan, not far from the Afghan

border, and this bureau's activities of course envisaged not merely

Afghanistan but the wider field of India as well.[301]

During 1920 Bolshevik activities became still more pronounced throughout

the Near and Middle East. We have already seen how powerfully Bolshevik

Russia supported the Turkish and Persian nationalist movements. In fact,

the reckless short-sightedness of Entente policy was driving into

Lenin's arms multitudes of nationalists to whom the internationalist

theories of Moscow were personally abhorrent. For example, the head of

the Afghan mission to Moscow thus frankly expressed his reasons for

friendship with Soviet Russia, in an interview printed by the official

Soviet organ, _Izvestia_: "I am neither Communist nor Socialist, but my

political programme so far is the expulsion of the English from Asia. I

am an irreconcilable enemy of European capitalism in Asia, the chief

representatives of which are the English. On this point I coincide with

the Communists, and in this respect we are your natural allies....

Afghanistan, like India, does not represent a capitalist state, and it

is very unlikely that even a parliamentary régime will take deep root in

these countries. It is so far difficult to say how subsequent events

will develop. I only know that the renowned address of the Soviet

Government to all nations, with its appeal to them to combat capitalists

(and for us a capitalist is synonymous with the word foreigner, or, to

be more exact, an Englishman), had an enormous effect on us. A still

greater effect was produced by Russia's annulment of all the secret

treaties enforced by the imperialistic governments, and by the

proclaiming of the right of all nations, no matter how small, to

determine their own destiny. This act rallied around Soviet Russia all

the exploited nationalities of Asia, and all parties, even those very

remote from Socialism." Of course, knowing what we do of Bolshevik

propagandist tactics, we cannot be sure that the Afghan diplomat ever

said the things which the _Izvestia_ relates. But, even if the interview

be a fake, the words put into his mouth express the feelings of vast

numbers of Orientals and explain a prime cause of Bolshevik propagandist

successes in Eastern lands.

So successful, indeed, had been the progress of Bolshevik propaganda

that the Soviet leaders now began to work openly for their ultimate

ends. At first Moscow had posed as the champion of Oriental "peoples"

against Western "imperialism"; its appeals had been to "peoples,"

irrespective of class; and it had promised "self-determination," with

full respect for native ideas and institutions. For instance: a

Bolshevist manifesto to the Turks signed by Lenin and issued toward the

close of 1919 read: "Mussulmans of the world, victims of the

capitalists, awake! Russia has abandoned the Czar's pernicious policy

toward you and offers to help you overthrow English tyranny. She will

allow you freedom of religion and self-government. The frontiers

existing before the war will be respected, no Turkish territory will be

given Armenia, the Dardanelles Straits will remain yours, and

Constantinople will remain the capital of the Mussulman world. The

Mussulmans in Russia will be given self-government. All we ask in

exchange is that you fight the reckless capitalists, who would exploit

your country and make it a colony." Even when addressing its own people,

the Soviet Government maintained the same general tone. An "Order of the

Day" to the Russian troops stationed on the borders of India stated:

"Comrades of the Pamir division, you have been given a responsible task.

The Soviet Republic sends you to garrison the posts on the Pamir, on the

frontiers of the friendly countries of Afghanistan and India. The Pamir

tableland divides revolutionary Russia from India, which, with its

300,000,000 inhabitants, is enslaved by a handful of Englishmen. On this

tableland the signallers of revolution must hoist the red flag of the

army of liberation. May the peoples of India, who fight against their

English oppressors, soon know that friendly help is not far off. Make

yourselves at home with the liberty-loving tribes of northern India,

promote by word and deed their revolutionary progress, refute the mass

of calumnies spread about Soviet Russia by agents of the British

princes, lords, and bankers. Long live the alliance of the revolutionary

peoples of Europe and Asia!"

Such was the nature of first-stage Bolshevik propaganda. Presently,

however, propaganda of quite a different character began to appear. This

second-stage propaganda of course continued to assail Western

"capitalist imperialism." But alongside, or rather intermingled with,

these anti-Western, fulminations, there now appeared special appeals to

the Oriental masses, inciting them against all "capitalists" and

"bourgeois," native as well as foreign, and promising the "proletarians"

remedies for all their ills. Here is a Bolshevist manifesto to the

Turkish masses, published in the summer of 1920. It is very different

from the manifestoes of a year before. "The men of toil," says this

interesting document, "are now struggling everywhere against the rich

people. These people, with the assistance of the aristocracy and their

hirelings, are now trying to hold Turkish toilers in their chains. It is

the rich people of Europe who have brought suffering to Turkey.

Comrades, let us make common cause with the world's toilers. If we do

not do so we shall never rise again. Let the heroes of Turkey's

revolution join Bolshevism. Long live the Third International! Praise be

to Allah!"

And in these new efforts Moscow was not content with words; it was

passing to deeds as well. The first application of Bolshevism to an

Eastern people was in Russian Turkestan. When the Bolsheviki first came

to power at the end of 1917 they had granted Turkestan full

"self-determination," and the inhabitants had acclaimed their native

princes and re-established their old state-units, subject to a loose

federative tie with Russia. Early in 1920, however, the Soviet

Government considered Turkestan ripe for the "Social Revolution."

Accordingly, the native princes were deposed, all political power was

transferred to local Soviets (controlled by Russians), the native upper

and middle classes were despoiled of their property, and sporadic

resistance was crushed by mass-executions, torture, and other familiar

forms of Bolshevist terrorism.[302] In the Caucasus, also, the social

revolution had begun with the Sovietization of Azerbaidjan. The Tartar

republic of Azerbaidjan was one of the fragments of the former Russian

province of Transcaucasia which had declared its independence on the

collapse of the Czarist Empire in 1917. Located in eastern

Transcaucasia, about the Caspian Sea, Azerbaidjan's capital was the city

of Baku, famous for its oil-fields. Oil had transformed Baku into an

industrial centre on Western lines, with a large working population of

mixed Asiatic and Russian origin. Playing upon the nascent

class-consciousness of this urban proletariat, the Bolshevik agents made

a _coup d'état_ in the spring of 1920, overthrew the nationalist

government, and, with prompt Russian backing, made Azerbaijan a Soviet

republic. The usual accompaniments of the social revolution followed:

despoiling and massacring of the upper and middle classes, confiscation

of property in favour of the town proletarians and agricultural

labourers, and ruthless terrorism. With the opening months of 1920,

Bolshevism was thus in actual operation in both the Near and Middle

East.[303]

Having acquired strong footholds in the Orient, Bolshevism now felt

strong enough to throw off the mask. In the autumn of 1920, the Soviet

Government of Russia held a "Congress of Eastern Peoples" at Baku, the

aim of which was not merely the liberation of the Orient from Western

control but its Bolshevizing as well. No attempt at concealment of this

larger objective was made, and so striking was the language employed

that it may well merit our close attention.

In the first place, the call to the congress, issued by the Third

(Moscow) International, was addressed to the "peasants and workers" of

the East. The summons read:

"Peasants and workers of Persia! The Teheran Government of the Khadjars

and its retinue of provincial Khans have plundered and exploited you

through many centuries. The land, which, according to the laws of the

Sheriat, was your common property, has been taken possession of more and

more by the lackeys of the Teheran Government; they trade it away at

their pleasure; they lay what taxes please them upon you; and when,

through their mismanagement, they got the country into such a condition

that they were unable to squeeze enough juice out of it themselves, they

sold Persia last year to English capitalists for 2,000,000 pounds, so

that the latter will organize an army in Persia that will oppress you

still more than formerly, and so the latter can collect taxes for the

Khans and the Teheran Government. They have sold the oil-wells in South

Persia and thus helped plunder the country.

"Peasants of Mesopotamia! The English have declared your country to be

independent; but 80,000 English soldiers are stationed in your country,

are robbing and plundering, are killing you and are violating your

women.

"Peasants of Anatolia! The English, French, and Italian Governments hold

Constantinople under the mouths of their cannon. They have made the

Sultan their prisoner, they are obliging him to consent to the

dismemberment of what is purely Turkish territory, they are forcing him

to turn the country's finances over to foreign capitalists in order to

make it possible for them better to exploit the Turkish people, already

reduced to a state of beggary by the six-year war. They have occupied

the coal-mines of Heraclea, they are holding your ports, they are

sending their troops into your country and are trampling down your

fields.

"Peasants and workers of Armenia! Decades ago you became the victims of

the intrigues of foreign capital, which launched heavy verbal attacks

against the massacres of the Armenians by the Kurds and incited you to

fight against the Sultan in order to obtain through your blood new

concessions and fresh profits daily from the bloody Sultan. During the

war they not only promised you independence, but they incited your

merchants, your teachers, and your priests to demand the land of the

Turkish peasants in order to keep up an eternal conflict between the

Armenian and Turkish peoples, so that they could eternally derive

profits out of this conflict, for as long as strife prevails between you

and the Turks, just so long will the English, French, and American

capitalists be able to hold Turkey in check through the menace of an

Armenian uprising and to use the Armenians as cannon-fodder through the

menace of a pogrom by Kurds.

"Peasants of Syria and Arabia! Independence was promised to you by the

English and the French, and now they hold your country occupied by their

armies, now the English and the French dictate your laws, and you, who

have freed yourselves from the Turkish Sultan, from the Constantinople

Government, are now slaves of the Paris and London Governments, which

merely differ from the Sultan's Government in being stronger and better

able to exploit you.

"You all understand this yourselves. The Persian peasants and workers

have risen against their traitorous Teheran Government. The peasants in

Mesopotamia are in revolt against the English troops. You peasants in

Anatolia have rushed to the banner of Kemal Pasha in order to fight

against the foreign invasion, but at the same time we hear that you are

trying to organize your own party, a genuine peasants' party that will

be willing to fight even if the Pashas are to make their peace with the

Entente exploiters. Syria has no peace, and you, Armenian peasants, whom

the Entente, despite its promises, allows to die from hunger in order to

keep you under better control, you are understanding more and more that

it is silly to hope for salvation by the Entente capitalists. Even your

bourgeois Government of the Dashnakists, the lackeys of the Entente, is

compelled to turn to the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia

with an appeal for peace and help.

"Peasants and workers of the Near East! If you organize yourselves, if

you form your own Workers' and Peasants' Government, if you arm

yourselves, if you unite with the Red Russian Workers' and Peasants'

Army, then you will be able to defy the English, French, and American

capitalists, then you will settle accounts with your own native

exploiters, then you will find it possible, in a free alliance with the

workers' republics of the world, to look after your own interests; then

you will know how to exploit the resources of your country in your own

interest and in the interest of the working people of the whole world,

that will honestly exchange the products of their labour and mutually

help each other.

"We want to talk over all these questions with you at the Congress in

Baku. Spare no effort to appear in Baku on September 1 in as large

numbers as possible. You march, year in and year out, through the

deserts to the holy places where you show your respect for your past and

for your God--now march through deserts, over mountains, and across

rivers in order to come together to discuss how you can escape from the

bonds of slavery, how you can unite as brothers so as to live as men,

free and equal."

From this summons the nature of the Baku congress can be imagined. It

was, in fact, a social revolutionist far more than a nationalist

assembly. Of its 1900 delegates, nearly 1300 were professed communists.

Turkey, Persia, Armenia, and the Caucasus countries sent the largest

delegations, though there were also delegations from Arabia, India, and

even the Far East. The Russian Soviet Government was of course in

control and kept a tight hand on the proceedings. The character of these

proceedings were well summarized by the address of the noted Bolshevik

leader Zinoviev, president of the Executive Committee of the Third

(Moscow) International, who presided.

Zinoviev said:

"We believe this Congress to be one of the greatest events in history,

for it proves not only that the progressive workers and working peasants

of Europe and America are awakened, but that we have at last seen the

day of the awakening, not of a few, but of tens of thousands, of

hundreds of thousands, of millions of the labouring class of the peoples

of the East. These peoples form the majority of the world's whole

population, and they alone, therefore, are able to bring the war

between capital and labour to a conclusive decision....

"The Communist International said from the very first day of its

existence: 'There are four times as many people living in Asia as live

in Europe. We will free all peoples, all who labour.'... We know that

the labouring masses of the East are in part retrograde, though not by

their own fault; they cannot read or write, are ignorant, are bound in

superstition, believe in the evil spirit, are unable to read any

newspapers, do not know what is happening in the world, have not the

slightest idea of the most elementary laws of hygiene. Comrades, our

Moscow International discussed the question whether a socialist

revolution could take place in the countries of the East before those

countries had passed through the capitalist stage. You know that the

view which long prevailed was that every country must first go through

the period of capitalism ... before socialism could become a live

question. We now believe that this is no longer true. Russia has done

this, and from that moment we are able to say that China, India, Turkey,

Persia, Armenia also can, and must, make a direct fight to get the

Soviet System. These countries can, and must, prepare themselves to be

Soviet republics.

"I say that we give patient aid to groups of persons who do not believe

in our ideas, who are even opposed to us on some points. In this way,

the Soviet Government supports Kemal in Turkey. Never for one moment do

we forget that the movement headed by Kemal is not a communist movement.

We know it. I have here extracts from the verbatim reports of the first

session of the Turkish people's Government at Angora. Kemal himself says

that 'the Caliph's person is sacred and inviolable.' The movement headed

by Kemal wants to rescue the Caliph's 'sacred' person from the hands of

the foe. That is the Turkish Nationalist's point of view. But is it a

communist point of view? No. We respect the religious convictions of

the masses; we know how to re-educate the masses. It will be the work of

years.

"We use great caution in approaching the religious convictions of the

labouring masses in the East and elsewhere. But at this Congress we are

bound to tell you that you must not do what the Kemal Government is

doing in Turkey; you must not support the power of the Sultan, not even

if religious considerations urge you to do so. You must press on, and

must not allow yourselves to be pulled back. We believe the Sultan's

hour has struck. You must not allow any form of autocratic power to

continue; you must destroy, you must annihilate, faith in the Sultan;

you must struggle to obtain real Soviet organizations. The Russian

peasants also were strong believers in the Czar; but when a true

people's revolution broke out there was practically nothing left of this

faith in the Czar. The same thing will happen in Turkey and all over the

East as soon as a true peasants' revolution shall burst forth over the

surface of the black earth. The people will very soon lose faith in

their Sultan and in their masters. We say once more, the policy pursued

by the present people's Government in Turkey is not the policy of the

Communist International, it is not our policy; nevertheless, we declare

that we are prepared to support any revolutionary fight against the

English Government.

"Yes, we array ourselves against the English bourgeoisie; we seize the

English imperialist by the throat and tread him underfoot. It is against

English capitalism that the worst, the most fatal blow must be dealt.

That is so. But at the same time we must educate the labouring masses of

the East to hatred, to the will to fight the whole of the rich classes

indifferently, whoever they be. The great significance of the revolution

now starting in the East does not consist in begging the English

imperialist to take his feet off the table, for the purpose of then

permitting the wealthy Turk to place his feet on it all the more

comfortably; no, we will very politely ask all the rich to remove their

dirty feet from the table, so that there may be no luxuriousness among

us, no boasting, no contempt of the people, no idleness, but that the

world may be ruled by the worker's horny hand."

The Baku congress was the opening gun in Bolshevism's avowed campaign

for the immediate Bolshevizing of the East. It was followed by increased

Soviet activity and by substantial Soviet successes, especially in the

Caucasus, where both Georgia and Armenia were Bolshevized in the spring

of 1921.

These very successes, however, awakened growing uneasiness among Soviet

Russia's nationalist protégés. The various Oriental nationalist parties,

which had at first welcomed Moscow's aid so enthusiastically against the

Entente Powers, now began to realize that Russian Bolshevism might prove

as great a peril as Western imperialism to their patriotic aspirations.

Of course the nationalist leaders had always realized Moscow's ultimate

goal, but hitherto they had felt themselves strong enough to control the

situation and to take Russian aid without paying Moscow's price. Now

they no longer felt so sure. The numbers of class-conscious

"proletarians" in the East might be very small. The communist philosophy

might be virtually unintelligible to the Oriental masses. Nevertheless,

the very existence of Soviet Russia was a warning not to be disregarded.

In Russia an infinitesimal communist minority, numbering, by its own

admission, not much over 600,000, was maintaining an unlimited despotism

over 170,000,000 people. Western countries might rely on their popular

education and their staunch traditions of ordered liberty; the East

possessed no such bulwarks against Bolshevism. The East was, in fact,

much like Russia. There was the same dense ignorance of the masses; the

same absence of a large and powerful middle class; the same tradition of

despotism; the same popular acquiescence in the rule of ruthless

minorities. Finally, there were the ominous examples of Sovietized

Turkestan and Azerbaidjan. In fine, Oriental nationalists bethought them

of the old adage that he who sups with the devil needs a long spoon.

Everywhere it has been the same story. In Asia Minor, Mustapha Kemal has

arrested Bolshevist propaganda agents, while Turkish and Russian troops

have more than once clashed on the disputed Caucasus frontiers. In Egypt

we have already seen how an amicable arrangement between Lord Milner and

the Egyptian nationalist leaders was facilitated by the latter's fear of

the social revolutionary agitators who were inflaming the fellaheen. In

India, Sir Valentine Chirol noted as far back as the spring of 1918 how

Russia's collapse into Bolshevism had had a "sobering effect" on Indian

public opinion. "The more thoughtful Indians," he wrote, "now see how

helpless even the Russian _intelligentsia_ (relatively far more numerous

and matured than the Indian _intelligentsia_) has proved to control the

great ignorant masses as soon as the whole fabric of government has been

hastily shattered."[304] In Afghanistan, likewise, the Ameer was losing

his love for his Bolshevist allies. The streams of refugees from

Sovietized Turkestan that flowed across his borders for protection,

headed by his kinsman the Ameer of Bokhara, made Amanullah Khan do some

hard thinking, intensified by a serious mutiny of Afghan troops on the

Russian border, the mutineers demanding the right to form Soldiers'

Councils quite on the Russian pattern. Bolshevist agents might tempt him

by the loot of India, but the Ameer could also see that that would do

him little good if he himself were to be looted and killed by his own

rebellious subjects.[305] Thus, as time went on, Oriental nationalists

and conservatives generally tended to close ranks in dislike and

apprehension of Bolshevism. Had there been no other issue involved,

there can be little doubt that Moscow's advances would have been

repelled and Bolshevist agents given short shrift.

Unfortunately, the Eastern nationalists feel themselves between the

Bolshevist devil and the Western imperialist deep sea. The upshot has

been that they have been trying to play off the one against the

other--driven toward Moscow by every Entente aggression; driven toward

the West by every Soviet _coup_ of Lenin. Western statesmen should

realize this, and should remember that Bolshevism's best propagandist

agent is, not Zinoviev orating at Baku, but General Gouraud, with his

Senegalese battalions and "strong-arm" methods in Syria and the Arab

hinterland.

Certainly, any extensive spread of Bolshevism in the East would be a

terrible misfortune both for the Orient and for the world at large. If

the triumph of Bolshevism would mean barbarism in the West, in the East

it would spell downright savagery. The sudden release of the ignorant,

brutal Oriental masses from their traditional restraints of religion and

custom, and the submergence of the relatively small upper and middle

classes by the flood of social revolution would mean the destruction of

all Oriental civilization and culture, and a plunge into an abyss of

anarchy from which the East could emerge only after generations, perhaps

centuries.

FOOTNOTES:

[284] For these early forms of unrest, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au

dix-neuvième Siècle_, pp. 22-44 (Paris, 1888).

[285] D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in India," _Economic Journal_,

December, 1910.

[286] Bipin Chandra Pal, "The Forces Behind the Unrest in India,"

_Contemporary Review_, February, 1910.

[287] J. Chailley, _Administrative Problems of British India_, p. 339

(London, 1910--English translation).

[288] Dr. Ronald Ross, "Wretchedness a Cause of Political Unrest," _The

Survey_, 18 February, 1911.

[289] A. Yusuf Ali, _Life and Labour in India_, pp. 3, 32 (London,

1907).

[290] E. W. Capen, "A Sociological Appraisal of Western Influence on the

Orient," _American Journal of Sociology_, May, 1911.

[291] P. Khorat, "Psychologie de la Révolution chinoise," _Revue des

Deux Mondes_, 15 March, 1912; L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage orientale_, pp.

164-166; J. D. Rees, _The Real India_, pp. 162-163.

[292] Albert Métin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Étude sociale_, p. 276

(Paris, 1918).

[293] Albert Métin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Étude sociale_, pp. 339-345.

[294] J. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_, pp. 133-134

(London, 1920).

[295] Georges Foucart. Quoted in _The Literary Digest_, 17 August, 1907,

pp. 225-226.

[296] A. Van Gennep, _En Algérie_, p. 182 (Paris, 1914).

[297] _The Englishman_ (Calcutta). Quoted in _The Literary Digest_, 21

February, 1914, p. 369.

[298] For these larger world-aspects of Bolshevik propaganda, see Paul

Miliukov, _Bolshevism: An International Danger_ (London, 1920); also, my

_Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy_, pp. 218-221, and

my article, "Bolshevism: The Heresy of the Under-Man," _The Century_,

June, 1919.

[299] See Chapter V.

[300] See Chapter VI.

[301] For events in Afghanistan and Central Asia, see Sir T. H. Holdich,

"The Influence of Bolshevism in Afghanistan," _New Europe_, December 4,

1919; Ikbal Ali Shah, "The Fall of Bokhara," _The Near East_, October

28, 1920, and his "The Central Asian Tangle," _Asiatic Review_, October,

1920. For Bolshevist activity in the Near and Middle East generally, see

Miliukov, _op. cit._, pp. 243-260; 295-297; Major-General Sir George

Aston, "Bolshevik Propaganda in the East," _Fortnightly Review_, August,

1920; W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past and Present," _Quarterly

Review_, October, 1920; Sir Valentine Chirol, "Conflicting Policies in

the Near East," _New Europe_, July 1, 1920; L. Dumont-Wilden, "Awakening

Asia," _The Living Age_, August 7, 1920 (translated from the French);

Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen, "Moslems and the Tangle in the

Middle East," _National Review_, December, 1919; Paxton Hibben, "Russia

at Peace," _The Nation_ (New York), January 26, 1921; H. von Hoff, "Die

nationale Erhebung in der Türkei," _Deutsche Revue_, December, 1919; R.

G. Hunter, "Entente--Oil--Islam," _New Europe_, August 26, 1920;

"Taira," "The Story of the Arab Revolt," _Balkan Review_, August, 1920;

"Voyageur," "Lenin's Attempt to Capture Islam," _New Europe_, June 10,

1920; Hans Wendt, "Ex Oriente Lux," _Nord und Süd_, May, 1920; George

Young, "Russian Foreign Policy," _New Europe_, July 1, 1920.

[302] Ikbal Ali Shah, _op. cit._

[303] For events in the Caucasus, see W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia,

Past and Present," _Quarterly Review_, October, 1920; C. E. Bechhofer,

"The Situation in the Transcaucasus," _New Europe_, September 2, 1920;

"D. Z. T.," "L'Azerbaidjan: La Première République musulmane," _Revue du

Monde musulman_, 1919; Paxton Hibben, "Exit Georgia," _The Nation_ (New

York), March 30, 1921.

[304] Sir V. Chirol, "India in Travail," _Edinburgh Review_, July, 1918.

Also see H. H. The Aga Khan, _India in Transition_, p. 17 (London,

1918).

[305] Ikbal Ali Shah, _op. cit._

CONCLUSION

Our survey of the Near and Middle East is at an end. What is the

outstanding feature of that survey? It is: Change. The "Immovable East"

has been moved at last--moved to its very depths. The Orient is to-day

in full transition, flux, ferment, more sudden and profound than any it

has hitherto known. The world of Islam, mentally and spiritually

quiescent for almost a thousand years, is once more astir, once more on

the march.

Whither? We do not know. Who would be bold enough to prophesy the

outcome of this vast ferment--political, economical, social, religious,

and much more besides? All that we may wisely venture is to observe,

describe, and analyse the various elements in the great transition.

Yet surely this is much. To view, however empirically, the mighty

transformation at work; to group its multitudinous aspects in some sort

of relativity; to follow the red threads of tendency running through the

tangled skein, is to gain at least provisional knowledge and acquire

capacity to grasp the significance of future developments as they shall

successively arise.

"To know is to understand"--and to hope: to hope that this present

travail, vast and ill-understood, may be but the birth-pangs of a truly

renascent East taking its place in a renascent world.

INDEX

Aali Pasha, Pan-Islam agitation of, 54

Abbas Hilmi, Khedive, pro Turkish views of, 155;

deposition of, 156;

Pan-Arabianism supported by, 170

Abd-el-Kader, French resisted by, 41

Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, Pro-Germanism of, 156

Abd-el-Wahab, Mohammedan revival begun by, 21, 40;

birth of, 21;

early life of, 22 _ff._;

influence of, 22;

death of, 22

Abdul Hamid, despotism of, 32;

as caliph, 39;

Sennussi's opposition to, 39, 46;

Djemal-ed-Din protected by, 53 _ff._;

Pan-Islam policy of, 53 _ff._;

character of, 54 _ff._;

government of, 55;

deposition of, 56, 119;

tyrannical policy of, 116;

nationalism opposed by, 139, 165;

Arabs conciliated by, 142 _ff._

Abu Bekr 22;

policy of, 114 _ff._

Abyssinian Church, Mohammedan threat against, 50

Afghanistan, religious uprisings in, 41;

nineteenth-century independence of, 118;

Bolshevism in, 286 _ff._;

rebellion of, 286_ff._

Africa, Mohammedan missionary work in, 49 _ff._

_See_ also North Africa

Agadir crisis, 57

Ahmed Bey Agayeff, Pan-Turanism aided by, 165

Alexandria, massacre of Europeans in, 149

Algeria, French conquest of, 40, 158;

Kabyle insurrection in, 41;

compulsory vaccination in, 95;

liberal political aspirations in, 118 _ff._;

need for European government in, 122

Allenby, General, Egypt in control of, 177

Amanullah Khan, Bolshevism of, 286;

war on England declared by, 286;

present policy of, 298

Anatolia, Bolshevist manifesto to, 292

Anglo-Russian Agreement, terms of, 159 _ff._

Arabi Pasha, Djemal-ed-Din's influence on, 148;

revolution in Egypt headed by, 148

Arabia, description of natives of, 21;

Turks fought by, 23;

defeat of, 23;

political freedom of, 113;

democracy in, 127;

nationalist spirit in, 140 _ff._;

Turkish rulers opposed by, 140 _ff._;

suppression of, 143;

1905 rebellion of, 143;

effect of Young-Turk revolution on, 145 _ff._;

1916 revolt of, 146;

Pan-Arabism in, 145;

religious character of Pan-Arab movement in, 169 _ff._;

effect of Great War on, 170, 183 _ff._;

Allied encouragement of, 184;

peace terms and, 185;

English agreement with, 185 _ff._;

revolt against Turks of, 185;

secret partition of, 185 _ff._;

Colonel Lawrence's influence in, 186;

secret treaties revealed to, 187;

France and England in, 187 _ff._;

Mustapha Kemal aided by 194, _ff._;

English negotiations with, 198;

Bolshevist manifesto to, 292

Arabian National Committee, creation of, 143

Archer William, on over-population in India, 263

Argyll, Duke of, over-population in India, 263

Armenia, Bolshevist manifesto to, 292

Arya Somaj, 208

Atchin War, 41

Azerbaidjan, Bolshevist revolution in, 290 _ff._

Babbist movement in Persia, 274

Baber, Mogul Empire founded by, 204

Baku, Congress of Eastern Peoples at, 291, 297

Balkan War, 57;

Mohammedans roused by, 58

Barbary States, French conquest of, 158

Bérard, Victor, on the enmity of Turks and Arabs, 141 _ff._;

France's Syrian policy criticised by, 199

Bertrand, Louis, anti-Western feeling in Orient described by, 95 _ff._;

on social conditions in the Levant, 269, 271

Bevan, Edwyn, nationalist views of, 125 _ff._

Bin Saud, Ikhwan movement led by, 72

Bolshevism, effects on Orient of, 175;

Mustapha Kemal aided by, 196 _ff._;

the East a field for, 283 _ff._;

propaganda of, 284 _ff._, 288 _ff._;

Oriental policy of, 285;

in Afghanistan, 286 _ff._;

manifesto to Mohammedans issued by, 288 _ff._;

manifesto to Turks issued by, 289 _ff._;

"Congress of Eastern Peoples" held by, 291 _ff._

Bombay, English character of, 100;

social conditions in, 270 _ff._

Bose, Pramatha Nath, on economic conditions in India, 245 _ff._

Brahminism, illiberalism of, 120

Brailsford, H. N., on modern industry in Egypt, 236 _ff._;

on social conditions in Egypt, 269 _ff._

British East India Company, 205

Bukhsh, S. Khuda, reform work of, 31 _ff._;

nationalism in India opposed by, 125 _ff._;

on Indian social conditions, 253 _ff._

Caetani, Leone, 63

Cahun, Léon, Turanism and, 163

Cairo, revolt in, 178;

modern women in, 258

Calcutta, English character of, 100;

social conditions in, 270

Caliphate, Islam strengthened by, 38 _ff._;

history of, 39;

Turkey the head of, 39 _ff._

Chelmsford, Lord, report of, 216 _ff._

China, Mohammedan insurrection in, 41, 51 _ff._;

Mohammedan missionary work in, 50;

number of Mohammedans in, 51;

Mohammedan agitation in, 60

Chirol, Valentine, Western influence in Orient described by, 79 _ff._;

on Egyptian situation, 179 _ff._;

Montagu-Chelmsford Report approved by, 220;

on Egyptian conditions since the war, 271 _ff._;

on Bolshevism in India, 298

Congress of Eastern Peoples, 291 _ff._

Constantine, King, recalled, 194

Constantinople, Allied occupation of, 192 _ff._;

changes since 1896 in, 251 _ff._;

status of women in, 258

Cox, Sir Percy, English-Arabian negotiations made by, 198;

influence of, 200

Cromer, Lord, on Islam, 29, 32;

Western influence in Orient described by, 80;

ethics of imperialism formulated by, 84, 102, 120 _ff._;

Egyptian administration of, 149;

resignation of, 152;

on western-educated Egypt, 257;

on over-population in India, 263

Curtis, Lionel, nationalism in India supported by, 130 _ff._;

Montagu-Chelmsford Report approved by, 220

Curzon-Wyllie, Sir, assassination of, 212

Damascus, French in, 191 _ff._

Dar-ul-Islam, 171 _ff._

Dickinson, G. Lowes, on Eastern economics, 249

Djemal-ed-Din, birth of, 52;

character of, 52;

anti-European work of, 52;

in India, 52;

in Egypt, 53;

Abdul Hamid's protection of, 53 _ff._;

death of, 53;

teachings of, 53 _ff._;

nationalism taught by, 138;

Egypt influenced by, 148;

in Russia, 285

Dutch East Indies, Mohammedan uprisings in, 41;

Mohammedan missionary work in, 52

Egypt, nationalism in, 32, 118 _ff._;

Mahdist insurrection in, 41;

1914 insurrection of, 61;

exiled Arabs in, 143;

characteristics of people of, 147 _ff._;

early European influences in, 147;

nationalist agitation in, 148 _ff._;

influence of Djemal-ed-Din in, 148;

1882 revolution in, 148 _ff._;

Lord Cromer's rule of, 149;

France's influence in, 150 _ff._;

failure of English liberal policy in, 153 _ff._;

Lord Kitchener's rule in, 153 _ff._;

effect of outbreak of World War on, 155 _ff._;

made English protectorate, 156 _ff._;

Pan-Arabism in, 169;

Versailles conference's treatment of, 174;

nationalist demands of, 177;

Allenby in control of, 177;

rebellion of, 178 _ff._;

martial law in, 178;

situation after rebellion in, 179 _ff._;

English commission of inquiry in, 181;

English compromise with, 182;

opposition to compromise in, 182 _ff._;

modern factories in, 234, 236;

industrial conditions in, 236 _ff._;

social conditions in, 269;

social revolution in, 281 _ff._

El-Gharami, 30

El Mahdi, 42

England, Egypt's rebellion against, 175 _ff._;

Commission of Inquiry into Egyptian affairs appointed by, 181;

Egyptian compromise with, 182;

opposition to compromise in, 182;

Arabia and, 184 _ff._;

in Mesopotamia, 185 _ff._;

in Palestine, 186;

French disagreement with, 188 _ff._;

at San Remo conference, 190;

Mesopotamian rebellion against, 192 _ff._;

Sèvres Treaty and, 193;

Greek agreement with, 193;

Arabian negotiation with, 198;

in India, 204 _ff._

Enver Pasha, Pan-Turanism and, 167;

in Russia, 285

Feisal, Prince, at peace conference, 187 _ff._;

peace counsels of, 188;

made king of Syria, 191

Fisher, on social conditions in India, 270 _ff._

France, Morocco seized by, 57;

anti-British propaganda of, 150 _ff._;

Arabia and, 184;

Syrian aspirations of, 185 _ff._;

at San Remo conference, 190;

Syrian rebellion and, 191 _ff._;

Sèvres Treaty and, 193;

Greek agreement with, 193;

present Syrian situation of, 198 _ff._

Gandhi, M. K., boycott of England advocated by, 224

Gorst, Sir Eldon, Lord Cromer succeeded by, 152;

failure of policy of, 153 _ff._

Gouraud, General, Feisal subdued by, 191;

danger in methods of, 299

Greece, anti-Turk campaign of, 193;

Venizelos repudiated by, 194;

Constantine supported by, 194

Habibullah Khan, Ameer, England supported by, 286;

death of, 286

Haifa, to be British, 186

Hajj, Islam strengthened by, 38 _ff._

Halil Pasha, Pan-Turanism and, 168

Hanotaux, Gabriel, 57

Harding, Lord, Indian nationalist movement supported by, 215

Hedjaz, Turkish dominion of, 140

Hindustan, Islam's appeal to 60;

anti-Western feeling in, 99 _ff._;

illiberal tradition of, 120

Hunter, Sir William, on over-population in India, 263 _ff._

Hussein Kamel, made Sultan of Egypt, 156

Ikhwan, beginning of, 71;

progress of, 71

Imam Yahya, 199

India, reform of Islamism in, 30;

English mastery of, 40;

Islam's missionary work in, 52;

1914 insurrection in, 61;

English towns and customs in, 100;

effect of Russo-Japanese War in, 105, 210 _ff._;

liberal political aspirations in, 118 _ff._;

democracy introduced by England in, 122 _ff._;

opposition to nationalism in, 124 _ff._, 218 _ff._;

support of nationalism in, 129 _ff._, 136 _ff._;

history of, 201;

Aryan invasion of, 201 _ff._;

beginning of caste system in, 202 _ff._;

Mohammedan invasion of, 203 _ff._;

Mogul Empire founded in, 204;

British conquest of, 205 _ff._;

beginning of discontent in, 206 _ff._;

Hindu nationalist movement in, 208 _ff._, 212 _ff._;

English liberal policy in, 213 _ff._;

result of outbreak of war in, 214;

Montagu-Chelmsford Report in, 216 _ff._;

militant unrest in, 220 _ff._;

effect of Rowlatt Bill in, 222 _ff._;

English boycotted by, 223 _ff._;

present turmoil in, 224;

industries in, 233 _ff._;

industrial conditions in, 237 _ff._;

industrial future of, 239 _ff._;

agriculture in, 243 _ff._;

Swadeshi movement in, 244 _ff._;

social conditions in, 253 _ff._;

status of women in, 254, 258 _ff._;

education in, 255 _ff._;

over-population in, 262 _ff._;

condition of peasants in, 269;

city and rural life in, 275 _ff._;

economic revolution in, 276 _ff._;

attitude of Bolshevists toward, 289 _ff._

Indian Councils Act, terms of, 213;

effect of 213

Indian National Congress, 206

Islam, eighteenth-century decadence of, 20 _ff._;

revival of, 21;

Christian opinions of, 26 _ff._;

present situation of, 27 _ff._;

agnosticism in, 32 _ff._;

fanatics in, 33 _ff._;

solidarity of, 37 _ff._;

Hajj an aid to, 38 _ff._;

caliphate an aid to, 38 _ff._;

Western successes against, 40;

proselytism of, 48 _ff._;

effect of Balkan War on, 58 _ff._;

effect of Russo-Japanese War on, 59, 105 _ff._;

Western influence on, 75 _ff._;

anti-Western reaction of, 88 _ff._;

race mixture in, 102 _ff._;

tyranny in, 111 _ff._;

early equality in, 113 _ff._;

political reformation in, 115 _ff._;

birth of nationalism in, 137 _ff._;

Bolshevist propaganda in, 284 _ff._

_See_ also Pan-Islam

Ismael, Hamet, on scepticism among Moslems, 32

Ismael, Khedive, tyrannical policy of, 116;

Egypt Europeanized by, 147 _ff._

Italy, Tripoli attacked by, 57;

San Remo Treaty opposed by, 190, 193

Japan, Mohammedan missionary work in, 59 _ff._

Jowf, Sennussi stronghold, 45

Kabyle insurrection, 41

Khadjar dynasty, Persian revolution against, 160

Kharadjites, Islamic spirit preserved by, 274

Khartum, capture of, 41

Kheir-ed-Din, attempt to regenerate Tunis made by, 89

Kitchener, Lord, Mahdist insurrection suppressed by, 41;

anti-nationalist beliefs of, 122;

nationalism in Egypt suppressed by, 153 _ff._

Krishnavarma, S., assassination commended by, 211

Lawrence, Colonel, influence of, 186;

Arab-Turk agreement, views of, 194 _ff._;

Mesopotamia, views of, 197

Lebanon, France's control of, 184

Lenine, manifesto to Mohammedans issued by, 288 _ff._

Low, Sidney, modern imperialism described by, 86 _ff._;

on Egyptian situation, 154

Lyall, Sir Alfred, on Western education in India, 256 _ff._

Lybyer, Professor A. H., democracy in Islam described by, 114, 127

Macdonald, J. Ramsay, on economic conditions in India, 245;

on social revolution in India, 280 _ff._

McIlwraith, Sir M., on Egyptian situation, 180

McMahon, Sir Henry, agreement with Arabs made by, 185 _ff._

Madras, English character of, 100

Mahdism, definition of, 42 _ff._

Mahdist insurrection, 42

Mahmud II, Sultan, liberal policy of, 115

Mahmud of Ghazni, India invaded by, 204

Mecca, decadence of, 21;

Abd-el-Wahab's pilgrimage to, 22;

Saud's subjugation of, 23;

Turkish reconquest of, 23;

aid to strength of Islam, 38 _ff._;

post cards sold at, 251

Medina, decadence of, 21;

Abd-el-Wahab's studies at, 22;

Saud's subjugation of, 23;

Turkish reconquest of, 23;

electricity at, 251

Mehemet Ali, army of, 23;

Turks aided by, 23;

Wahabi defeated by, 23;

liberal policy of, 115;

Egypt Europeanized by, 147

Mesopotamia, Turkish dominion of, 140;

England in, 184 _ff._;

rebellion against England of 192 _ff._;

denunciation of English policy in, 197;

Bolshevists' manifesto issued to, 292

Métin, Albert, on nationalist movement in India, 279 _ff._

Midhat Pasha, liberal movement aided by, 32

Milner, Lord, Egyptian inquiry commission headed by, 181;

character of, 181;

compromise agreed on by, 182 _ff._;

resignation of, 182;

influence of, 200

Mogul Empire, foundation of, 204

Mohammed Abdou, Sheikh, liberal movement aided by, 32;

Djemal-ed-Din's influence on, 148;

conservative teachings of, 150

Mohammed Ahmed, Sennussi's scorn of, 46

Mohammed Farid Bey, anti-English policy of, 152;

mistakes of, 152 _ff._;

pro German policy of, 156

Mohammedan Revival. _See_ Pan-Islam

Mollahs, anti-liberalism of, 30

Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 217 _ff._

Montagu, liberal policy of, 216 _ff._

Morison, Sir Theodore, on Moslem situation, 67, 70 _ff._;

on modern industry in India, 234 _ff._, 245

Morley, John, liberal policy of, 213

Morocco, French seizure of, 57, 158;

in nineteenth century, 118

Motazelism, re-discovery of, 26;

influence of, 30

Moulvie Cheragh Ali, reform work of, 31

Muhammed Ali, Shah, revolt in Persia against, 119

Muir, Ramsay, European imperialism described by, 83

Mustapha Kemal, character of, 150;

beliefs of, 151 _ff._;

death of, 151;

Allies defied by, 191;

Turkish denunciation of, 193;

Greek campaign against, 193 _ff._;

Arab aid given to, 194 _ff._;

policy of, 196;

Bolshevists allied with, 196 _ff._;

French negotiations with, 199;

Bolshevist support of, 286, 295

Mutiny of 1857, 205

Nair, Doctor T. Madavan, anti-nationalist opinions of, 124, 219

Nakechabendiya fraternity, 41

Namasudra, anti-nationalist organization, 124, 219

Nejd, birth of Abd-el-Wahab in, 21 _ff._;

description of, 21 _ff._;

return of Abd-el-Wahab to, 22;

conversion of, 22;

consolidation of, 23

Nitti, Premier, San Remo Treaty opposed by, 190 _ff._

North Africa, "Holy Men" insurrection in, 41;

lack of nationalism in, 157 _ff._;

races in, 158 _ff._

Nyassaland, Mohammedanism in, 49 _ff._

Orient, _See_ Islam

Pal, Bepin Chander, on Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 218;

on social revolution in India, 277

Palestine, Sykes-Picot Agreement and, 185;

England in, 185

Pan-Islam, fanatics' scheme for, 33 _ff._;

definition of, 37 _ff._;

Hajj an aid to, 38 _ff._;

caliphate an aid to, 39 _ff._;

anti-Western character of, 41 _ff._;

fraternities in, 43 _ff._;

Abdul Hamid's support of, 54 _ff._;

Young-Turk interruption of, 56;

renewal of, 57 _ff._;

effect of Balkan War on, 58 _ff._;

Great War and, 61 _ff._;

Versailles Treaty and, 62 _ff._;

press strength of, 67;

propaganda of, 67;

menacing temper of, 70 _ff._;

economic evolution in, 72 _ff._

Pan-Syrian Congress, 191

Pan-Turanism. _See_ Turanians

Pan-Turkism, _See_ Turkey, rise of nationalism in

Persia, 1914 insurrection in, 61;

an English protectorate, 62;

tyranny in, 116;

independence of, 118;

liberal movement in, 118;

1908 revolution in, 119, 159 _ff._;

need for European government in, 122;

nineteenth-century conditions in, 159;

Versailles conference's treatment of, 174 _ff._;

war conditions in, 196;

Bolshevism in, 196 _ff._, 287 _ff._;

Bolshevist manifesto issued to, 291

_Population Problem of India, The_, 264

Ramsay, Sir William, on economic conditions in Asia Minor, 241 _ff._

_Realpolitik_, treatment of Orient by, 86, 106

Reshid Pasha, liberal movement aided by, 32

Roushdi Pasha, nationalist demands of, 177 _ff._

Rowlatt Bill, nationalist opposition to, 222 _ff._

Russia, Turanian antagonism for, 167 _ff._

_See_ also Bolshevism and Soviet Russia

Russo-Japanese War, Islam roused by, 59, 105

Salafî, rise and growth of, 72;

spirit of, 72

San Remo, conference at, 190 _ff._

Saud, Abd-el-Wahab succeeded by, 22;

power and character of, 22;

government of, 22, 40;

holy cities subdued by, 23;

death of, 23

Saud, clan of, converted, 24

Schweinfurth, Georg, Egyptian nationalism described by, 149 _ff._

Sennussi-el-Mahdi, leadership won by, 44;

power of, 45

Sennussiya, foundation of, 43 _ff._;

leadership of, 45;

present power of, 45 _ff._;

government of, 45;

policy of, 46 _ff._;

proselytism of, 48 _ff._

Sèvres Treaty, 193, 199

Seyid Ahmed, state in India founded by, 24;

conquest of, 24

Seyid Ahmed Khan, Sir, reforms of, 30

Seyid Amir Ali, reform work of, 31

Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi, in Mecca, 24, 39;

Abdul Hamid opposed by, 39, 44;

birth of, 44;

education of, 44;

"Zawias" built by, 44;

power of, 44 _ff._

Shamyl, Russia opposed by, 41

Shiah Emir, 199

Shuster, W. Morgan, Persia's political capacity described by, 127 _ff._

South Africa, Mohammedan threat against, 49

Soviet Russia, Afghanistan allied with, 287 _ff._;

Kemal supported by, 295;

success of, 297 _ff._

Sun-Yat-Sen, Doctor, 60

Sydenham, Lord, Montagu-Chelmsford Report criticised by, 219

Swadeshi movement, 244 _ff._

Sykes-Picot Agreement, terms of, 185 _ff._;

French opposition to, 189 _ff._;

fulfilment of, 190

Syria, Turkish dominion of, 140;

nationalist agitation in, 142 _ff._;

France in, 184 _ff._;

declaration of independence of, 191;

French suppression of, 191;

present situation in, 198 _ff._;

Bolshevist manifesto issued to, 293

Tagore, Rabindranath, on economic conditions in India, 248

Talaat, in Russia, 285

Tartars, liberal movement among, 32;

Mohammedan missionary work among, 50 _ff._;

nationalist revival of, 163 _ff._;

Bolshevism among, 285

Tekin Alp, on Pan-Turanism, 167

Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 149

Tewfik Pasha, anti-English feeling of, 92

Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, nationalist work of, 210, 218

Townsend, Meredith, anti-Western feeling in Orient explained by, 102, 104

Transcaucasia, Russian conquest of, 40;

after-the-war situation in, 196;

Mustapha Kemal supported by, 196

Tripoli, Italy's raid on, 57;

Mohammedan resistance in, 57;

1914 insurrection in, 61

Tunis, Kheir-ed-Din's reforms in, 89 _ff._

Turanians, peoples composing, 162 _ff._;

nationalist movement among, 163 _ff._;

effect of Young-Turk Revolution on, 165;

effect of Balkan Wars on, 166 _ff._;

effect of Great War on, 167 _ff._

Turkestan, Bolshevism in, 286;

social revolution in, 290

Turkestan, Chinese, Mohammedans in, 51;

revolt of, 51

Turkey, Islam conquered by, 23;

Arabs war against, 23 _ff._;

Mehemet Ali's aid of, 28;

liberal movement in, 31 _ff._;

1908 revolution in, 32, 119;

Balkan attack on, 57 _ff._;

anti-Western feeling in, 90 _ff._;

effect of Russo-Japanese War in, 106;

independence of, 118;

liberal movement in, 118;

democracy in, 126;

birth of nationalism in, 138;

language of, 138;

Pan-Turanism in, 140 _ff._, 161 _ff._, 183 _ff._;

Arabian rebellion against, 141 _ff._;

Allied treaty with, 193;

Arab aid given to, 194 _ff._;

Western educational methods in, 256;

status of women in, 258;

Bolshevists' manifesto to, 289 _ff._

_Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal, The_, 167

Vambéry, Arminius, warning against Mohammedans uttered by, 65 _ff._, 107;

Moslem politics described by, 114, 126;

Young-Turk party described by, 117;

Turanism and, 63;

on changes at Constantinople, 251 _ff._;

on native officials in East, 257 _ff._;

on status of woman in East, 259;

Venizelos, Allied agreement with, 193;

Greek repudiation of, 194

Versailles Peace, Islam affected by 107 _ff._, 173;

secret treaties revealed by, 174 _ff._

Victoria, Queen, made Empress of India, 205

Wacha, Sir Dinshaw, on Montagu-Chelmsford Report 217 _ff._

Wahabi, formation of state of, 22, 40;

government of, 22, 41;

successful fighting of, 23;

defeat of, 23;

end of political power of, 23;

spiritual power of, 24;

in India, 24;

English conquest of, in India, 24;

influence of, 24;

characteristics of, 25 _ff._

Wattal, P. K., on over-population in India, 264 _ff._

Willcocks, Sir William, on Egyptian situation, 179

Yahya Siddyk, on pro-war Mohammedan situation, 68 _ff._

Yakub Beg, Turkestan insurrection led by, 51

Young Arabia, 143 _ff._

Young-Turk party, rise of, 116 _ff._;

nationalist policy of, 140;

Arabian nationalism and, 145 _ff._

Young-Turk revolution, 56, 119

_Yugantar_, anti-English organ, 211 _ff._

Yunnan, Mohammedan insurrection in, 41, 51 _ff._;

Chinese Mohammedans in, 51

Yusuf Bey Akchura Oglu, Pan-Turanian society founded by, 165

Zagloul Pasha, Milner's discussions with, 181;

Milner's compromise with, 182;

opposition to, 182 _ff._

Zaidite Emir, 199

Zawia Baida, Sennussi's founding of, 44

Zinoviev, on Third International, 294 _ff._

[Illustration: THE WORLD OF ISLAM]

TRANSCRIBERS' NOTES

General: Accents and capitalisation, particularly on cited sources, have

been left as in the original.

Pages 8, 274, 303: Spelling of Kharijites/Kharidjites/Kharadjites left

as in source.

Page 21: Inquity replaced with iniquity.

Page 39: Hyphen added to El-Afghani for consistency.

Page 45: Zawais corrected to Zawias.

Page 49: Hyphen removed from repercussions for consistency.

Page 94: Hyphen removed from easy-going.

Footnote 257: Italicisation removed from March following The Century.

Footnotes 257 and 259 (originally on page 261): Full-stop (period) added

after op (in op. cit.) for consistency.

Page 290: Hyphen added to oil-fields for consistency.

End of Project Gutenberg's The New World of Islam, by Lothrop Stoddard

The New World of Islam · 第 10 / 10 章