PAN-ISLAMISM
Like all great movements, the Mohammedan Revival is highly complex.
Starting with the simple, puritan protest of Wahabism, it has developed
many phases, widely diverse and sometimes almost antithetical. In the
previous chapter we examined the phase looking toward an evolutionary
reformation of Islam and a genuine assimilation of the progressive
spirit as well as the external forms of Western civilization. At the
same time we saw that these liberal reformers are as yet only a
minority, an élite; while the Moslem masses, still plunged in ignorance
and imperfectly awakened from their age-long torpor, are influenced by
other leaders of a very different character--men inclined to militant
rather than pacific courses, and hostile rather than receptive to the
West. These militant forces are, in their turn, complex. They may be
grouped roughly under the general concepts known as "Pan-Islamism" and
"Nationalism." It is to a consideration of the first of these two
concepts, to Pan-Islamism, that this chapter is devoted.
Pan-Islamism, which in its broadest sense is the feeling of solidarity
between all "True Believers," is as old as the Prophet, when Mohammed
and his few followers were bound together by the tie of faith against
their pagan compatriots who sought their destruction. To Mohammed the
principle of fraternal solidarity among Moslems was of transcendent
importance, and he succeeded in implanting this so deeply in Moslem
hearts that thirteen centuries have not sensibly weakened it. The bond
between Moslem and Moslem is to-day much stronger than that between
Christian and Christian. Of course Moslems fight bitterly among
themselves, but these conflicts never quite lose the aspect of family
quarrels and tend to be adjourned in presence of infidel aggression.
Islam's profound sense of solidarity probably explains in large part its
extraordinary hold upon its followers. No other religion has such a grip
on its votaries. Islam has won vast territories from Christianity and
Brahmanism,[25] and has driven Magism from the face of the earth;[26]
yet there has been no single instance where a people, once become
Moslem, has ever abandoned the faith. Extirpated they may have been,
like the Moors of Spain, but extirpation is not apostasy.
Islam's solidarity is powerfully buttressed by two of its fundamental
institutions: the "Hajj," or pilgrimage to Mecca, and the caliphate.
Contrary to the general opinion in the West, it is the Hajj rather than
the caliphate which has exerted the more consistently unifying
influence. Mohammed ordained the Hajj as a supreme act of faith, and
every year fully 100,000 pilgrims arrive, drawn from every quarter of
the Moslem world. There, before the sacred Kaaba of Mecca, men of all
races, tongues, and cultures meet and mingle in an ecstasy of common
devotion, returning to their homes bearing the proud title of "Hajjis,"
or Pilgrims--a title which insures them the reverent homage of their
fellow Moslems for all the rest of their days. The political
implications of the Hajj are obvious. It is in reality a perennial
Pan-Islamic congress, where all the interests of the faith are discussed
by delegates from every part of the Mohammedan world, and where plans
are elaborated for Islam's defence and propagation. Here nearly all the
militant leaders of the Mohammedan Revival (Abd-el-Wahab, Mahommed ben
Sennussi, Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani, and many more) felt the imperious
summons to their task.[27]
As for the caliphate, it has played a great historic rôle, especially in
its early days, and we have already studied its varying fortunes.
Reduced to a mere shadow after the Mongol destruction of Bagdad, it was
revived by the Turkish sultans, who assumed the title and were
recognized as caliphs by the orthodox Moslem world.[28] However, these
sultan-caliphs of Stambul[29] never succeeded in winning the religious
homage accorded their predecessors of Mecca and Bagdad. In Arab eyes,
especially, the spectacle of Turkish caliphs was an anachronism to which
they could never be truly reconciled. Sultan Abdul Hamid, to be sure,
made an ambitious attempt to revive the caliphate's pristine greatness,
but such success as he attained was due more to the general tide of
Pan-Islamic feeling than to the inherent potency of the caliphal name.
The real leaders of modern Pan-Islamism either gave Abdul Hamid a merely
qualified allegiance or were, like El Sennussi, definitely hostile. This
was not realized in Europe, which came to fear Abdul Hamid as a sort of
Mohammedan pope. Even to-day most Western observers seem to think that
Pan-Islamism centres in the caliphate, and we see European publicists
hopefully discussing whether the caliphate's retention by the
discredited Turkish sultans, its transference to the Shereef of Mecca,
or its total suppression, will best clip Pan-Islam's wings. This,
however, is a distinctly short-sighted view. The caliphal institution is
still undoubtedly venerated in Islam. But the shrewd leaders of the
modern Pan-Islamic movement have long been working on a much broader
basis. They realize that Pan-Islamism's real driving-power to-day lies
not in the caliphate but in institutions like the Hajj and the great
Pan-Islamic fraternities such as the Sennussiya, of which I shall
presently speak.[30]
Let us now trace the fortunes of modern Pan-Islamism. Its first stage
was of course the Wahabi movement. The Wahabi state founded by
Abd-el-Wahab in the Nejd was modelled on the theocratic democracy of the
Meccan caliphs, and when Abd-el-Wahab's princely disciple, Saud, loosed
his fanatic hosts upon the holy cities, he dreamed that this was but the
first step in a puritan conquest and consolidation of the whole Moslem
world. Foiled in this grandiose design, Wahabism, nevertheless, soon
produced profound political disturbances in distant regions like
northern India and Afghanistan, as I have already narrated. They were,
however, all integral parts of the Wahabi phase, being essentially
protests against the political decadence of Moslem states and the moral
decadence of Moslem rulers. These outbreaks were not inspired by any
special fear or hatred of the West, since Europe was not yet seriously
assailing Islam except in outlying regions like European Turkey or the
Indies, and the impending peril was consequently not appreciated.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the situation had
radically altered. The French conquest of Algeria, the Russian
acquisition of Transcaucasia, and the English mastery of virtually all
India, convinced thoughtful Moslems everywhere that Islam was in deadly
peril of falling under Western domination. It was at this time that
Pan-Islamism assumed that essentially anti-Western character which it
has ever since retained. At first resistance to Western encroachment was
sporadic and unco-ordinated. Here and there heroic figures like
Abd-el-Kader in Algeria and Shamyl in the Caucasus fought brilliantly
against the European invaders. But though these paladins of the faith
were accorded widespread sympathy from Moslems, they received no
tangible assistance and, unaided, fell.
Fear and hatred of the West, however, steadily grew in intensity, and
the seventies saw the Moslem world swept from end to end by a wave of
militant fanaticism. In Algeria there was the Kabyle insurrection of
1871, while all over North Africa arose fanatical "Holy Men" preaching
holy wars, the greatest of these being the Mahdist insurrection in the
Egyptian Sudan, which maintained itself against England's best efforts
down to Kitchener's capture of Khartum at the very end of the century.
In Afghanistan there was an intense exacerbation of fanaticism awakening
sympathetic echoes among the Indian Moslems, both of which gave the
British much trouble. In Central Asia there was a similar access of
fanaticism, centring in the powerful Nakechabendiya fraternity,
spreading eastward into Chinese territory and culminating in the great
revolts of the Chinese Mohammedans both in Chinese Turkestan and Yunnan.
In the Dutch East Indies there was a whole series of revolts, the most
serious of these being the Atchin War, which dragged on interminably,
not being quite stamped out even to-day.
The salient characteristic of this period of militant unrest is its lack
of co-ordination. These risings were all spontaneous outbursts of local
populations; animated, to be sure, by the same spirit of fear and
hatred, and inflamed by the same fanatical hopes, but with no evidence
of a central authority laying settled plans and moving in accordance
with a definite programme. The risings were inspired largely by the
mystical doctrine known as "Mahdism." Mahdism was unknown to primitive
Islam, no trace of it occurring in the Koran. But in the "traditions,"
or reputed sayings of Mohammed, there occurs the statement that the
Prophet predicted the coming of one bearing the title of "El Mahdi"[31]
who would fill the earth with equity and justice. From this arose the
widespread mystical hope in the appearance of a divinely inspired
personage who would effect the universal triumph of Islam, purge the
world of infidels, and assure the lasting happiness of all Moslems. This
doctrine has profoundly influenced Moslem history. At various times
fanatic leaders have arisen claiming to be El Mahdi, "The Master of the
Hour," and have won the frenzied devotion of the Moslem masses; just as
certain "Messiahs" have similarly excited the Jews. It was thus natural
that, in their growing apprehension and impotent rage at Western
aggression, the Moslem masses should turn to the messianic hope of
Mahdism. Yet Mahdism, by its very nature, could effect nothing
constructive or permanent. It was a mere straw fire; flaring up fiercely
here and there, then dying down, leaving the disillusioned masses more
discouraged and apathetic than before.
Now all this was recognized by the wiser supporters of the Pan-Islamic
idea. The impotence of the wildest outbursts of local fanaticism against
the methodical might of Europe convinced thinking Moslems that long
preparation and complete co-ordination of effort were necessary if Islam
was to have any chance of throwing off the European yoke. Such men also
realized that they must study Western methods and adopt much of the
Western technique of power. Above all, they felt that the political
liberation of Islam from Western domination must be preceded by a
profound spiritual regeneration, thereby engendering the moral forces
necessary both for the war of liberation and for the fruitful
reconstruction which should follow thereafter. At this point the ideals
of Pan-Islamists and liberals approach each other. Both recognize
Islam's present decadence; both desire its spiritual regeneration. It is
on the nature of that regeneration that the two parties are opposed. The
liberals believe that Islam should really assimilate Western ideas. The
Pan-Islamists, on the other hand, believe that primitive Islam contains
all that is necessary for regeneration, and contend that only Western
methods and material achievements should be adopted by the Moslem world.
The beginnings of self-conscious, systematic Pan-Islamism date from
about the middle of the nineteenth century. The movement crystallizes
about two foci: the new-type religious fraternities like the Sennussiya,
and the propaganda of the group of thinkers headed by Djemal-ed-Din. Let
us first consider the fraternities.
Religious fraternities have existed in Islam for centuries. They all
possess the same general type of organization, being divided into lodges
("Zawias") headed by Masters known as "Mokaddem," who exercise a more or
less extensive authority over the "Khouan" or Brethren. Until the
foundation of the new-type organizations like the Sennussi, however, the
fraternities exerted little practical influence upon mundane affairs.
Their interests were almost wholly religious, of a mystical, devotional
nature, often characterized by great austerities or by fanatical
excesses like those practised by the whirling and howling dervishes.
Such political influence as they did exert was casual and local.
Anything like joint action was impossible, owing to their mutual
rivalries and jealousies. These old-type fraternities still exist in
great numbers, but they are without political importance except as they
have been leavened by the new-type fraternities.
The new-type organizations date from about the middle of the nineteenth
century, the most important in every way being the Sennussiya. Its
founder, Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi, was born near Mostaganem, Algeria,
about the year 1800. As his title "Seyid" indicates, he was a descendant
of the Prophet, and was thus born to a position of honour and
importance.[32] He early displayed a strong bent for learning and piety,
studying theology at the Moorish University of Fez and afterwards
travelling widely over North Africa preaching a reform of the prevailing
religious abuses. He then made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and there his
reformist zeal was still further quickened by the Wahabi teachers. It
was at that time that he appears to have definitely formulated his plan
of a great puritan order, and in 1843 he returned to North Africa,
settling in Tripoli, where he built his first Zawia, known as the "Zawia
Baida," or White Monastery, in the mountains near Derna. So impressive
was his personality and so great his organizing ability that converts
flocked to him from all over North Africa. Indeed, his power soon
alarmed the Turkish authorities in Tripoli, and relations became so
strained that Seyid Mahommed presently moved his headquarters to the
oasis of Jarabub, far to the south in the Lybian desert. When he died in
1859, his organization had spread over the greater part of North Africa.
Seyid Mahommed's work was carried on uninterruptedly by his son, usually
known as Sennussi-el-Mahdi. The manner in which this son gained his
succession typifies the Sennussi spirit. Seyid Mahommed had two sons, El
Mahdi being the younger. While they were still mere lads, their father
determined to put them to a test, to discover which of them had the
stronger faith. In presence of the entire Zawia he bade both sons climb
a tall palm-tree, and then adjured them by Allah and his Prophet to leap
to the ground. The younger lad leaped at once and reached the ground
unharmed; the elder boy refused to spring. To El Mahdi, "who feared not
to commit himself to the will of God," passed the right to rule.
Throughout his long life Sennussi-el-Mahdi justified his father's
choice, displaying wisdom and piety of a high order, and further
extending the power of the fraternity. During the latter part of his
reign he removed his headquarters to the oasis of Jowf, still farther
into the Lybian desert, where he died in 1902, and was succeeded by his
nephew, Ahmed-el-Sherif, the present head of the Order, who also appears
to possess marked ability.
With nearly eighty years of successful activity behind it, the Sennussi
Order is to-day one of the vital factors in Islam. It counts its
adherents in every quarter of the Moslem world. In Arabia its followers
are very numerous, and it profoundly influences the spiritual life of
the holy cities, Mecca and Medina. North Africa, however, still remains
the focus of Sennussism. The whole of northern Africa, from Morocco to
Somaliland, is dotted with its Zawias, or lodges, all absolutely
dependent upon the Grand Lodge, headed by The Master, El Sennussi. The
Sennussi stronghold of Jowf lies in the very heart of the Lybian Sahara.
Only one European eye[33] has ever seen this mysterious spot. Surrounded
by absolute desert, with wells many leagues apart, and the routes of
approach known only to experienced Sennussi guides, every one of whom
would suffer a thousand deaths rather than betray him, El Sennussi, The
Master, sits serenely apart, sending his orders throughout North Africa.
The influence exerted by the Sennussiya is profound. The local Zawias
are more than mere "lodges." Besides the Mokaddem, or Master, there is
also a "Wekil," or civil governor, and these officers have discretionary
authority not merely over the Zawia members but also over the community
at large--at least, so great is the awe inspired by the Sennussiya
throughout North Africa, that a word from Wekil or Mokaddem is always
listened to and obeyed. Thus, besides the various European colonial
authorities, British, French, or Italian, as the case may be, there
exists an occult government with which the colonial authorities are
careful not to come into conflict.
On their part, the Sennussi are equally careful to avoid a downright
breach with the European Powers. Their long-headed, cautious policy is
truly astonishing. For more than half a century the order has been a
great force, yet it has never risked the supreme adventure. In many of
the fanatic risings which have occurred in various parts of Africa,
local Sennussi have undoubtedly taken part, and the same was true during
the Italian campaign in Tripoli and in the late war, but the order
itself has never officially entered the lists.
In fact, this attitude of mingled cautious reserve and haughty aloofness
is maintained not only towards Christians but also towards the other
powers that be in Islam. The Sennussiya has always kept its absolute
freedom of action. Its relations with the Turks have never been cordial.
Even the wily Abdul Hamid, at the height of his prestige as the champion
of Pan-Islamism, could never get from El Sennussi more than coldly
platonic expressions of approval, and one of Sennussi-el-Mahdi's
favourite remarks was said to have been: "Turks and Christians: I will
break both of them with one and the same stroke." Equally characteristic
was his attitude toward Mahommed Ahmed, the leader of the "Mahdist"
uprising in the Egyptian Sudan. Flushed with victory, Mahommed Ahmed
sent emissaries to El Sennussi, asking his aid. El Sennussi refused,
remarking haughtily: "What have I to do with this fakir from Dongola? Am
I not myself Mahdi if I choose?"
These Fabian tactics do not mean that the Sennussi are idle. Far from
it. On the contrary, they are ceaselessly at work with the spiritual
arms of teaching, discipline, and conversion. The Sennussi programme is
the welding, first, of Moslem Africa and, later, of the whole Moslem
world into the revived "Imâmât" of Islam's early days; into a great
theocracy, embracing all True Believers--in other words, Pan-Islamism.
But they believe that the political liberation of Islam from Christian
domination must be preceded by a profound spiritual regeneration. Toward
this end they strive ceaselessly to improve the manners and morals of
the populations under their influence, while they also strive to improve
material conditions by encouraging the better cultivation of oases,
digging new wells, building rest-houses along the caravan routes, and
promoting trade. The slaughter and rapine practised by the Sudanese
Mahdists disgusted the Sennussi and drew from their chief words of
scathing condemnation.
All this explains the Order's unprecedented self-restraint. This is the
reason why, year after year and decade after decade, the Sennussi
advance slowly, calmly, coldly; gathering great latent power, but
avoiding the temptation to expend it one instant before the proper time.
Meanwhile they are covering North Africa with their lodges and schools,
disciplining the people to the voice of their Mokaddems and Wekils; and,
to the southward, converting millions of pagan negroes to the faith of
Islam.[34]
Nothing better shows modern Islam's quickened vitality than the revival
of missionary fervour during the past hundred years. Of course Islam has
always displayed strong proselytizing power. Its missionary successes in
its early days were extraordinary, and even in its period of decline it
never wholly lost its propagating vigour. Throughout the Middle Ages
Islam continued to gain ground in India and China; the Turks planted it
firmly in the Balkans; while between the fourteenth and sixteenth
centuries Moslem missionaries won notable triumphs in such distant
regions as West Africa, the Dutch Indies, and the Philippines.
Nevertheless, taking the Moslem world as a whole, religious zeal
undoubtedly declined, reaching low-water mark during the eighteenth
century.
The first breath of the Mohammedan Revival, however, blew the
smouldering embers of proselytism into a new flame, and everywhere
except in Europe Islam began once more advancing portentously along all
its far-flung frontiers. Every Moslem is, to some extent, a born
missionary and instinctively propagates his faith among his non-Moslem
neighbours, so the work was carried on not only by priestly specialists
but also by multitudes of travellers, traders, and humble migratory
workers.[35] Of course numerous zealots consecrated their lives to the
task. This was particularly true of the religious fraternities. The
Sennussi have especially distinguished themselves by their apostolic
fervour, and from those natural monasteries, the oases of the Sahara,
thousands of "Marabouts" have gone forth with flashing eyes and swelling
breasts to preach the marvels of Islam, devoured with a zeal like that
of the Christian mendicant friars of the Middle Ages. Islam's
missionary triumphs among the negroes of West and Central Africa during
the past century have been extraordinary. Every candid European observer
tells the same story. As an Englishman very justly remarked some twenty
years ago: "Mohammedanism is making marvellous progress in the interior
of Africa. It is crushing paganism out. Against it the Christian
propaganda is a myth."[36] And a French Protestant missionary remarks in
similar vein: "We see Islam on its march, sometimes slowed down but
never stopped, towards the heart of Africa. Despite all obstacles
encountered, it tirelessly pursues its way. It fears nothing. Even
Christianity, its most serious rival, Islam regards without hate, so
sure is it of victory. While Christians dream of the conquest of Africa,
the Mohammedans do it."[37]
The way in which Islam is marching southward is dramatically shown by a
recent incident. A few years ago the British authorities suddenly
discovered that Mohammedanism was pervading Nyassaland. An investigation
brought out the fact that it was the work of Zanzibar Arabs. They began
their propaganda about 1900. Ten years later almost every village in
southern Nyassaland had its Moslem teacher and its mosque hut. Although
the movement was frankly anti-European, the British authorities did not
dare to check it for fear of repercussions elsewhere. Many European
observers fear that it is only a question of time when Islam will cross
the Zambezi and enter South Africa.
And these gains are not made solely against paganism. They are being won
at the expense of African Christianity as well. In West Africa the
European missions lose many of their converts to Islam, while across
the continent the ancient Abyssinian Church, so long an outpost against
Islam, seems in danger of submersion by the rising Moslem tide. Not by
warlike incursions, but by peaceful penetration, the Abyssinians are
being Islamized. "Tribes which, fifty or sixty years ago, counted hardly
a Mohammedan among them, to-day live partly or wholly according to the
precepts of Islam."[38]
Islam's triumphs in Africa are perhaps its most noteworthy missionary
victories, but they by no means tell the whole story, as a few instances
drawn from other quarters of the Moslem world will show. In the previous
chapter I mentioned the liberal movement among the Russian Tartars.
That, however, was only one phase of the Mohammedan Revival in that
region, another phase being a marked resurgence of proselyting zeal.
These Tartars had long been under Russian rule, and the Orthodox Church
had made persistent efforts to convert them, in some instances with
apparent success. But when the Mohammedan Revival reached the Tartars
early in the nineteenth century, they immediately began labouring with
their christianized brethren, and in a short time most of these reverted
to Islam despite the best efforts of the Orthodox Church and the
punitive measures of the Russian governmental authorities. Tartar
missionaries also began converting the heathen Turko-Finnish tribes to
the northward, in defiance of every hindrance from their Russian
masters.[39]
In China, likewise, the nineteenth century witnessed an extraordinary
development of Moslem energy. Islam had reached China in very early
times, brought in by Arab traders and bands of Arab mercenary soldiers.
Despite centuries of intermarriage with Chinese women, their descendants
still differ perceptibly from the general Chinese population, and
regard themselves as a separate and superior people. The Chinese
Mohammedans are mainly concentrated in the southern province of Yunnan
and the inland provinces beyond. Besides these racially Chinese Moslems,
another centre of Mohammedan population is found in the Chinese
dependency of Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, inhabited by Turkish stocks
and conquered by the Chinese only in the eighteenth century. Until
comparatively recent times the Chinese Moslems were well treated, but
gradually their proud-spirited attitude alarmed the Chinese Government,
which withdrew their privileges and persecuted them. Early in the
nineteenth century the breath of the Mohammedan Revival reached China,
as it did every other part of the Moslem world, and the Chinese
Mohammedans, inflamed by resurgent fanaticism, began a series of revolts
culminating in the great rebellions which took place about the year
1870, both in Yunnan and in Eastern Turkestan. As usual, these
fanaticized Moslems displayed fierce fighting power. The Turkestan
rebels found an able leader, one Yakub Beg, and for some years both
Turkestan and Yunnan were virtually independent. To many European
observers at that time it looked as though the rebels might join hands,
erect a permanent Mohammedan state in western China, and even overrun
the whole empire. The fame of Yakub Beg spread through the Moslem world,
the Sultan of Turkey honouring him with the high title of Commander of
the Faithful. After years of bitter fighting, accompanied by frightful
massacres, the Chinese Government subdued the rebels. The Chinese
Moslems, greatly reduced in numbers, have not yet recovered their former
strength; but their spirit is still unbroken, and to-day they number
fully 10,000,000. Thus, Chinese Islam, despite its setbacks, is a factor
to be reckoned with in the future.[40]
The above instances do not exhaust the list of Islam's activities during
the past century. In India, for example, Islam has continued to gain
ground rapidly, while in the Dutch Indies it is the same story.[41]
European domination actually favours rather than retards the spread of
Islam, for the Moslem finds in Western improvements, like the railroad,
the post-office, and the printing-press, useful adjuncts to Islamic
propaganda.
Let us now consider the second originating centre of modern
Pan-Islamism--the movement especially associated with the personality of
Djemal-ed-Din.
Seyid Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani was born early in the nineteenth century
at Asadabad, near Hamadan, in Persia, albeit, as his name shows, he was
of Afghan rather than Iranian descent, while his title "Seyid," meaning
descendant of the Prophet, implies a strain of Arab blood. Endowed with
a keen intelligence, great personal magnetism, and abounding vigour,
Djemal-ed-Din had a stormy and chequered career. He was a great
traveller, knowing intimately not only most of the Moslem world but
western Europe as well. From these travels, supplemented by wide
reading, he gained a notable fund of information which he employed
effectively in his manifold activities. A born propagandist,
Djemal-ed-Din attracted wide attention, and wherever he went in Islam
his strong personality started an intellectual ferment. Unlike El
Sennussi, he concerned himself very little with theology, devoting
himself to politics. Djemal-ed-Din was the first Mohammedan who fully
grasped the impending peril of Western domination, and he devoted his
life to warning the Islamic world of the danger and attempting to
elaborate measures of defence. By European colonial authorities he was
soon singled out as a dangerous agitator. The English, in particular,
feared and persecuted him. Imprisoned for a while in India, he went to
Egypt about 1880, and had a hand in the anti-European movement of Arabi
Pasha. When the English occupied Egypt in 1882 they promptly expelled
Djemal, who continued his wanderings, finally reaching Constantinople.
Here he found a generous patron in Abdul-Hamid, then evolving his
Pan-Islamic policy. Naturally, the Sultan was enchanted with Djemal, and
promptly made him the head of his Pan-Islamic propaganda bureau. In
fact, it is probable that the success of the Sultan's Pan-Islamic policy
was largely due to Djemal's ability and zeal. Djemal died in 1896 at an
advanced age, active to the last.
Djemal-ed-Din's teachings may be summarized as follows:
"The Christian world, despite its internal differences of race and
nationality, is, as against the East and especially as against Islam,
united for the destruction of all Mohammedan states.
"The Crusades still subsist, as well as the fanatical spirit of Peter
the Hermit. At heart, Christendom still regards Islam with fanatical
hatred and contempt. This is shown in many ways, as in international
law, before which Moslem nations are not treated as the equals of
Christian nations.
"Christian governments excuse the attacks and humiliations inflicted
upon Moslem states by citing the latter's backward and barbarous
condition; yet these same governments stifle by a thousand means, even
by war, every attempted effort of reform and revival in Moslem lands.
"Hatred of Islam is common to all Christian peoples, not merely to some
of them, and the result of this spirit is a tacit, persistent effort for
Islam's destruction.
"Every Moslem feeling and aspiration is caricatured and calumniated by
Christendom. 'The Europeans call in the Orient "fanaticism" what at home
they call "nationalism" and "patriotism." And what in the West they call
"self-respect," "pride," "national honour," in the East they call
"chauvinism." What in the West they esteem as national sentiment, in the
East they consider xenophobia.'[42]
"From all this, it is plain that the whole Moslem world must unite in a
great defensive alliance, to preserve itself from destruction; and, to
do this, it must acquire the technique of Western progress and learn the
secrets of European power."
Such, in brief, are the teachings of Djemal-ed-Din, propagated with
eloquence and authority for many years. Given the state of mingled fear
and hatred of Western encroachment that was steadily spreading
throughout the Moslem world, it is easy to see how great Djemal's
influence must have been. And of course Djemal was not alone in his
preaching. Other influential Moslems were agitating along much the same
lines as early as the middle of the nineteenth century. One of these
pioneers was the Turkish notable Aali Pasha, who was said to remark:
"What we want is rather an increase of fanaticism than a diminution of
it."[43] Arminius Vambéry, the eminent Hungarian Oriental scholar,
states that shortly after the Crimean War he was present at a militant
Pan-Islamic gathering, attended by emissaries from far parts of the
Moslem world, held at Aali Pasha's palace.[44]
Such were the foundations upon which Sultan Abdul Hamid built his
ambitious Pan-Islamic structure. Abdul Hamid is one of the strangest
personalities of modern times. A man of unusual intelligence, his mind
was yet warped by strange twists which went to the verge of insanity.
Nursing ambitious, grandiose projects, he tried to carry them out by
dark and tortuous methods which, though often cleverly Macchiavellian,
were sometimes absurdly puerile. An autocrat by nature, he strove to
keep the smallest decisions dependent on his arbitrary will, albeit he
was frequently guided by clever sycophants who knew how to play upon his
superstitions and his prejudices.
Abdul Hamid ascended the throne in 1876 under very difficult
circumstances. The country was on the verge of a disastrous Russian war,
while the government was in the hands of statesmen who were endeavouring
to transform Turkey into a modern state and who had introduced all sorts
of Western political innovations, including a parliament. Abdul Hamid,
however, soon changed all this. Taking advantage of the confusion which
marked the close of the Russian war, he abolished parliament and made
himself as absolute a despot as any of his ancestors had ever been.
Secure in his autocratic power, Abdul Hamid now began to evolve his own
peculiar policy, which, from the first, had a distinctly Pan-Islamic
trend[45]. Unlike his immediate predecessors, Abdul Hamid determined to
use his position as caliph for far-reaching political ends. Emphasizing
his spiritual headship of the Mohammedan world rather than his political
headship of the Turkish state, he endeavoured to win the active support
of all Moslems and, by that support, to intimidate European Powers who
might be formulating aggressive measures against the Ottoman Empire.
Before long Abdul Hamid had built up an elaborate Pan-Islamic propaganda
organization, working mainly by secretive, tortuous methods.
Constantinople became the Mecca of all the fanatics and anti-Western
agitators like Djemal-ed-Din. And from Constantinople there went forth
swarms of picked emissaries, bearing to the most distant parts of Islam
the Caliph's message of hope and impending deliverance from the menace
of infidel rule.
Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda went on uninterruptedly for nearly
thirty years. Precisely what this propaganda accomplished is very
difficult to estimate. In the first place, it was cut short, and to some
extent reversed, by the Young-Turk resolution of 1908 which drove Abdul
Hamid from the throne. It certainly was never put to the test of a war
between Turkey and a first-class European Power. This is what renders
any theoretical appraisal so inconclusive. Abdul Hamid did succeed in
gaining the respectful acknowledgment of his spiritual authority by most
Moslem princes and notables, and he certainly won the pious veneration
of the Moslem masses. In the most distant regions men came to regard the
mighty Caliph in Stambul as, in very truth, the Defender of the Faith,
and to consider his empire as the bulwark of Islam. On the other hand,
it is a far cry from pious enthusiasm to practical performance.
Furthermore, Abdul Hamid did not succeed in winning over powerful
Pan-Islamic leaders like El Sennussi, who suspected his motives and
questioned his judgment; while Moslem liberals everywhere disliked him
for his despotic, reactionary, inefficient rule. It is thus a very
debatable question whether, if Abdul Hamid had ever called upon the
Moslem world for armed assistance in a "holy war," he would have been
generally supported.
Yet Abdul Hamid undoubtedly furthered the general spread of Pan-Islamic
sentiment throughout the Moslem world. In this larger sense he
succeeded; albeit not so much from his position as caliph as because he
incarnated the growing fear and hatred of the West. Thus we may conclude
that Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda did produce profound and
lasting effects which will have to be seriously reckoned with.
The Young-Turk revolution of 1908 greatly complicated the situation. It
was soon followed by the Persian revolution and by kindred symptoms in
other parts of the East. These events brought into sudden prominence new
forces, such as constitutionalism, nationalism, and even social unrest,
which had long been obscurely germinating in Islam but which had been
previously denied expression. We shall later consider these new forces
in detail. The point to be here noted is their complicating effect on
the Pan-Islamic movement. Pan-Islamism was, in fact, cross-cut and
deflected from its previous course, and a period of confusion and mental
uncertainty supervened.
This interim period was short. By 1912 Pan-Islamism had recovered its
poise and was moving forward once more. The reason was renewed pressure
from the West. In 1911 came Italy's barefaced raid on Turkey's African
dependency of Tripoli, while in 1912 the allied Christian Balkan states
attacked Turkey in the Balkan War, which sheared away Turkey's European
provinces to the very walls of Constantinople and left her crippled and
discredited. Moreover, in those same fateful years Russia and England
strangled the Persian revolution, while France, as a result of the
Agadir crisis, closed her grip on Morocco. Thus, in a scant two years,
the Moslem world had suffered at European hands assaults not only
unprecedented in gravity but, in Moslem eyes, quite without provocation.
The effect upon Islam was tremendous. A flood of mingled despair and
rage swept the Moslem world from end to end. And, of course, the
Pan-Islamic implication was obvious. This was precisely what Pan-Islam's
agitators had been preaching for fifty years--the Crusade of the West
for Islam's destruction. What could be better confirmation of the
warnings of Djemal-ed-Din?
The results were soon seen. In Tripoli, where Turks and Arabs had been
on the worst of terms, both races clasped hands in a sudden access of
Pan-Islamic fervour, and the Italian invaders were met with a fanatical
fury that roused Islam to wild applause and inspired Western observers
with grave disquietude. "Why has Italy found 'defenceless' Tripoli such
a hornets' nest?" queried Gabriel Hanotaux, a former French minister of
foreign affairs. "It is because she has to do, not merely with Turkey,
but with Islam as well. Italy has set the ball rolling--so much the
worse for her--and for us all."[46] The Anglo-Russian man-handling of
Persia likewise roused much wrathful comment throughout Islam,[47] while
the impending extinction of Moroccan independence at French hands was
discussed with mournful indignation.
But with the coming of the Balkan War the wrath of Islam knew no bounds.
From China to the Congo, pious Moslems watched with bated breath the
swaying battle-lines in the far-off Balkans, and when the news of
Turkish disaster came, Islam's cry of wrathful anguish rose hoarse and
high. A prominent Indian Mohammedan well expressed the feelings of his
co-religionists everywhere when he wrote: "The King of Greece orders a
new Crusade. From the London Chancelleries rise calls to Christian
fanaticism, and Saint Petersburg already speaks of the planting of the
Cross on the dome of Sant' Sophia. To-day they speak thus; to-morrow
they will thus speak of Jerusalem and the Mosque of Omar. Brothers! Be
ye of one mind, that it is the duty of every True Believer to hasten
beneath the Khalifa's banner and to sacrifice his life for the safety of
the faith."[48] And another Indian Moslem leader thus adjured the
British authorities: "I appeal to the present government to change its
anti-Turkish attitude before the fury of millions of Moslem
fellow-subjects is kindled to a blaze and brings disaster."[49]
Most significant of all were the appeals made at this time by Moslems to
non-Mohammedan Asiatics for sympathy and solidarity against the hated
West. This was a development as unprecedented as it was startling.
Mohammed, revering as he did the Old and New Testaments, and regarding
himself as the successor of the divinely inspired prophets Moses and
Jesus, had enjoined upon his followers relative respect for Christians
and Jews ("Peoples of the Book") in contrast with other non-Moslems,
whom he stigmatized as "Idolaters." These injunctions of the Prophet had
always been heeded, and down to our own days the hatred of Moslems for
Christians, however bitter, had been as nothing compared with their
loathing and contempt for "Idolaters" like the Brahmanist Hindus or the
Buddhists and Confucianists of the Far East.
The first symptom of a change in attitude appeared during the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904. So great had Islam's fear and hatred of the
Christian West then become, that the triumph of an Asiatic people over
Europeans was enthusiastically hailed by many Moslems, even though the
victors were "Idolaters." It was quite in keeping with Pan-Islamism's
strong missionary bent that many pious Moslems should have dreamed of
bringing these heroes within the Islamic fold. Efforts to get in touch
with Japan were made. Propagandist papers were founded, missionaries
were selected, and the Sultan sent a warship to Japan with a Pan-Islamic
delegation aboard. Throughout Islam the projected conversion of Japan
was widely discussed. Said an Egyptian journal in the year 1906:
"England, with her sixty million Indian Moslems, dreads this conversion.
With a Mohammedan Japan, Mussulman policy would change entirely."[50]
And, at the other end of the Moslem world, a Chinese Mohammedan sheikh
wrote: "If Japan thinks of becoming some day a very great power and
making Asia the dominator of the other continents, it will be only by
adopting the blessed religion of Islam."[51]
Of course it soon became plain to these enthusiasts that while Japan
received Islam's emissaries with smiling courtesy, she had not the
faintest intention of turning Mohammedan. Nevertheless, the first step
had been taken towards friendly relations with non-Moslem Asia, and the
Balkan War drove Moslems much further in this direction. The change in
Moslem sentiment can be gauged by the numerous appeals made by the
Indian Mohammedans at this time to Hindus, as may be seen from the
following sample entitled significantly "The Message of the East."
"Spirit of the East," reads this noteworthy document, "arise and repel
the swelling flood of Western aggression! Children of Hindustan, aid us
with your wisdom, culture, and wealth; lend us your power, the
birthright and heritage of the Hindu! Let the Spirit Powers hidden in
the Himalayan mountain-peaks arise. Let prayers to the god of battles
float upward; prayers that right may triumph over might; and call to
your myriad gods to annihilate the armies of the foe!"[52]
To any one who realizes the traditional Moslem attitude towards
"Idolaters" such words are simply amazing. They betoken a veritable
revolution in outlook. And such sentiments were not confined to Indian
Moslems; they were equally evident among Chinese Moslems as well. Said a
Mohammedan newspaper of Chinese Turkestan, advocating a fraternal union
of all Chinese against Western aggression: "Europe has grown too
presumptuous. It will deprive us of our liberty; it will destroy us
altogether if we do not bestir ourselves promptly and prepare for a
powerful resistance."[53] During the troublous first stages of the
Chinese revolution, the Mohammedans, emerging from their sulky
aloofness, co-operated so loyally with their Buddhist and Confucian
fellow-patriots that Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, the Republican leader, announced
gratefully: "The Chinese will never forget the assistance which their
Moslem fellow-countrymen have rendered in the interest of order and
liberty."[54]
The Great War thus found Islam everywhere deeply stirred against
European aggression, keenly conscious of its own solidarity, and frankly
reaching out for Asiatic allies in the projected struggle against
European domination.
Under these circumstances it may at first sight appear strange that no
general Islamic explosion occurred when Turkey entered the lists at the
close of 1914 and the Sultan Caliph issued a formal summons to the Holy
War. Of course this summons was not the flat failure which Allied
reports led the West to believe at the time. As a matter of fact, there
was trouble in practically every Mohammedan land under Allied control.
To name only a few of many instances: Egypt broke into a tumult
smothered only by overwhelming British reinforcements, Tripoli burst
into a flame of insurrection that drove the Italians headlong to the
coast, Persia was prevented from joining Turkey only by prompt
Russo-British intervention, while the Indian North-West Frontier was the
scene of fighting that required the presence of a quarter of a million
Anglo-Indian troops. The British Government has officially admitted that
during 1915 the Allies' Asiatic and African possessions stood within a
hand's breadth of a cataclysmic insurrection.
That insurrection would certainly have taken place if Islam's leaders
had everywhere spoken the fateful word. But the word was not spoken.
Instead, influential Moslems outside of Turkey generally condemned the
latter's action and did all in their power to calm the passions of the
fanatic multitude.
The attitude of these leaders does credit to their discernment. They
recognized that this was neither the time nor the occasion for a
decisive struggle with the West. They were not yet materially prepared,
and they had not perfected their understandings either among themselves
or with their prospective non-Moslem allies. Above all, the moral urge
was lacking. They knew that athwart the Khalifa's writ was stencilled
"Made in Germany." They knew that the "Young-Turk" clique which had
engineered the coup was made up of Europeanized renegades, many of them
not even nominal Moslems, but atheistic Jews. Far-sighted Moslems had no
intention of pulling Germany's chestnuts out of the fire, nor did they
wish to further Prussian schemes of world-dominion which for themselves
would have meant a mere change of masters. Far better to let the West
fight out its desperate feud, weaken itself, and reveal fully its future
intentions. Meanwhile Islam could bide its time, grow in strength, and
await the morrow.
The Versailles peace conference was just such a revelation of European
intentions as the Pan-Islamic leaders had been waiting for in order to
perfect their programmes and enlist the moral solidarity of their
followers. At Versailles the European Powers showed unequivocally that
they had no intention of relaxing their hold upon the Near and Middle
East. By a number of secret treaties negotiated during the war, the
Ottoman Empire had been virtually partitioned between the victorious
Allies, and these secret treaties formed the basis of the Versailles
settlement. Furthermore, Egypt had been declared a British protectorate
at the very beginning of the war, while the Versailles conference had
scarcely adjourned before England announced an "agreement" with Persia
which made that country another British protectorate in fact if not in
name. The upshot was, as already stated, that the Near and Middle East
were subjected to European political domination as never before.
But there was another side to the shield. During the war years the
Allied statesmen had officially proclaimed times without number that the
war was being fought to establish a new world-order based on such
principles as the rights of small nations and the liberty of all
peoples. These pronouncements had been treasured and memorized
throughout the East. When, therefore, the East saw a peace settlement
based, not upon these high professions, but upon the imperialistic
secret treaties, it was fired with a moral indignation and sense of
outraged justice never known before. A tide of impassioned determination
began rising which has set already the entire East in tumultuous
ferment, and which seems merely the premonitory ground-swell of a
greater storm. So ominous were the portents that even before the
Versailles conference had adjourned many European students of Eastern
affairs expressed grave alarm. Here, for example, is the judgment of
Leone Caetani, Duke of Sermoneta, an Italian authority on Mohammedan
questions. Speaking in the spring of 1919 on the war's effect on the
East, he said: "The convulsion has shaken Islamic and Oriental
civilization to its foundations. The entire Oriental world, from China
to the Mediterranean, is in ferment. Everywhere the hidden fire of
anti-European hatred is burning. Riots in Morocco, risings in Algiers,
discontent in Tripoli, so-called Nationalist attempts in Egypt, Arabia,
and Lybia are all different manifestations of the same deep sentiment,
and have as their object the rebellion of the Oriental world against
European civilization."[55]
Those words are a prophetic forecast of what has since occurred in the
Moslem world. Because recent events are perhaps even more involved with
the nationalistic aspirations of the Moslem peoples than they are with
the strictly Pan-Islamic movement, I propose to defer their detailed
discussion till the chapter on Nationalism. We should, however, remember
that Moslem nationalism and Pan-Islamism, whatever their internal
differences, tend to unite against the external pressure of European
domination and equally desire Islam's liberation from European
political control. Remembering these facts, let us survey the present
condition of the Pan-Islamic movement.
Pan-Islamism has been tremendously stimulated by Western pressure,
especially by the late war and the recent peace settlements. However,
Pan-Islamism must not be considered as merely a defensive political
reaction against external aggression. It springs primarily from that
deep sentiment of unity which links Moslem to Moslem by bonds much
stronger than those which unite the members of the Christian world.
These bonds are not merely religious, in the technical sense; they are
social and cultural as well. Throughout the Moslem world, despite wide
differences in local customs and regulations, the basic laws of family
and social conduct are everywhere the same. "The truth is that Islam is
more than a creed, it is a complete social system; it is a civilization
with a philosophy, a culture, and an art of its own; in its long
struggle against the rival civilization of Christendom it has become an
organic unit conscious of itself."[56]
To this Islamic civilization all Moslems are deeply attached. In this
larger sense, Pan-Islamism is universal. Even the most liberal-minded
Moslems, however much they may welcome Western ideas, and however
strongly they may condemn the fanatical, reactionary aspects of the
political Pan-Islamic movement, believe fervently in Islam's essential
solidarity. As a leading Indian Moslem liberal, The Aga Khan, remarks:
"There is a right and legitimate Pan-Islamism to which every sincere and
believing Mohammedan belongs--that is, the theory of the spiritual
brotherhood and unity of the children of the Prophet. The real spiritual
and cultural unity of Islam must ever grow, for to the follower of the
Prophet it is the foundation of the life and the soul."[57]
If such is the attitude of Moslem liberals, thoroughly conversant with
Western culture and receptive to Western progress, what must be the
feelings of the Moslem masses, ignorant, reactionary, and fanatical?
Besides perfectly understandable fear and hatred due to Western
aggression, there is, among the Moslem masses, a great deal of genuine
fanaticism caused, not by European political domination, but by
religious bigotry and blind hatred of Western civilization.[58] But this
fanaticism has, of course, been greatly inflamed by the political events
of the past decade, until to-day religious, cultural, and political
hatred of the West have coalesced in a state of mind decidedly ominous
for the peace of the world. We should not delude ourselves into
minimizing the dangerous possibilities of the present situation. Just
because the fake "Holy War" proclaimed by the Young-Turks at German
instigation in 1914 did not come off is no reason for believing that a
real holy war is impossible. As a German staff-officer in Turkish
service during the late struggle very candidly says: "The Holy War was
an absolute fiasco just because it was not a Holy War."[59] I have
already explained how most Moslems saw through the trick and refused to
budge.
However, the long series of European aggressions, culminating in the
recent peace settlements which subjected virtually the entire Moslem
world to European domination, have been steadily rousing in Moslem
hearts a spirit of despairing rage that may have disastrous
consequences. Certainly, the materials for a holy war have long been
heaping high. More than twenty years ago Arminius Vambéry, who knew the
Moslem world as few Europeans have ever known it, warned the West of the
perils engendered by recklessly imperialistic policies. "As time
passes," he wrote in 1898, "the danger of a general war becomes ever
greater. We should not forget that time has considerably augmented the
adversary's force of resistance. I mean by this the sentiment of
solidarity which is becoming livelier of late years among the peoples of
Islam, and which in our age of rapid communication is no longer a
negligible quantity, as it was even ten or twenty years ago.
"It may not be superfluous to draw the attention of our
nineteenth-century Crusaders to the importance of the Moslem press,
whose ramifications extend all over Asia and Africa, and whose
exhortations sink more profoundly than they do with us into the souls of
their readers. In Turkey, India, Persia, Central Asia, Java, Egypt, and
Algeria, native organs, daily and periodical, begin to exert a profound
influence. Everything that Europe thinks, decides, and executes against
Islam spreads through those countries with the rapidity of lightning.
Caravans carry the news to the heart of China and to the equator, where
the tidings are commented upon in very singular fashion. Certain sparks
struck at our meetings and banquets kindle, little by little, menacing
flames. Hence, it would be an unpardonable legerity to close our eyes to
the dangers lurking beneath an apparent passivity. What the _Terdjuman_
of Crimea says between the lines is repeated by the Constantinople
_Ikdam_, and is commented on and exaggerated at Calcutta by _The Moslem
Chronicle_.
"Of course, at present, the bond of Pan-Islamism is composed of tenuous
and dispersed strands. But Western aggression might easily unite those
strands into a solid whole, bringing about a general war".[60]
In the decades which have elapsed since Vambéry wrote those lines the
situation has become much more tense. Moslem resentment at European
dominance has increased, has been reinforced by nationalistic
aspirations almost unknown during the last century, and possesses
methods of highly efficient propaganda. For example, the Pan-Islamic
press, to which Vambéry refers, has developed in truly extraordinary
fashion. In 1900 there were in the whole Islamic world not more than 200
propagandist journals. By 1906 there were 500, while in 1914 there were
well over 1000.[61] Moslems fully appreciate the post-office, the
railroad, and other modern methods of rapidly interchanging ideas.
"Every Moslem country is in communication with every other Moslem
country: directly, by means of special emissaries, pilgrims, travellers,
traders, and postal exchanges; indirectly, by means of Mohammedan
newspapers, books, pamphlets, leaflets, and periodicals. I have met with
Cairo newspapers in Bagdad, Teheran, and Peshawar; Constantinople
newspapers in Basra and Bombay; Calcutta newspapers in Mohammerah,
Kerbela, and Port Said."[62] As for the professional Pan-Islamic
propagandists, more particularly those of the religious fraternities,
they swarm everywhere, rousing the fanaticism of the people: "Travelling
under a thousand disguises--as merchants, preachers, students, doctors,
workmen, beggars, fakirs, mountebanks, pretended fools or rhapsodists,
these emissaries are everywhere well received by the Faithful and are
efficaciously protected against the suspicious investigations of the
European colonial authorities."[63]
Furthermore, there is to-day in the Moslem world a widespread
conviction, held by liberals and chauvinists alike (albeit for very
different reasons), that Islam is entering on a period of Renaissance
and renewed glory. Says Sir Theodore Morison: "No Mohammedan believes
that Islamic civilization is dead or incapable of further development.
They recognize that it has fallen on evil days; that it has suffered
from an excessive veneration of the past, from prejudice and bigotry and
narrow scholasticism not unlike that which obscured European thought in
the Middle Ages; but they believe that Islam too is about to have its
Renaissance, that it is receiving from Western learning a stimulus which
will quicken it into fresh activity, and that the evidences of this new
life are everywhere manifest."[64]
Sir Theodore Morison describes the attitude of Moslem liberals. How
Pan-Islamists with anti-Western sentiments feel is well set forth by an
Egyptian, Yahya Siddyk, in his well-known book, _The Awakening of the
Islamic Peoples in the Fourteenth Century of the Hegira_.[65] The book
is doubly interesting because the author has a thorough Western
education, holding a law degree from the French university of Toulouse,
and is a judge on the Egyptian bench. Although, writing nearly a decade
before the cataclysm, Yahya Siddyk clearly foresaw the imminence of the
European War. "Behold," he writes, "these Great Powers ruining
themselves in terrifying armaments; measuring each other's strength with
defiant glances; menacing each other; contracting alliances which
continually break and which presage those terrible shocks which overturn
the world and cover it with ruins, fire, and blood! The future is God's,
and nothing is lasting save His Will."
Yahya Siddyk considers the Western world degenerate. "Does this mean,"
he asks, "that Europe, our 'enlightened guide,' has already reached the
summit of its evolution? Has it already exhausted its vital force by two
or three centuries of hyperexertion? In other words: is it already
stricken with senility, and will it see itself soon obliged to yield its
civilizing rôle to other peoples less degenerate, less neurasthenic,
that is to say, younger, more robust, more healthy, than itself? In my
opinion, the present marks Europe's apogee, and its immoderate colonial
expansion means, not strength, but weakness. Despite the aureole of so
much grandeur, power, and glory, Europe is to-day more divided and more
fragile than ever, and ill conceals its malaise, its sufferings, and its
anguish. Its destiny is inexorably working out!...
"The contact of Europe on the East has caused us both much good and much
evil: good, in the material and intellectual sense; evil, from the moral
and political point of view. Exhausted by long struggles, enervated by a
brilliant civilization, the Moslem peoples inevitably fell into a
malaise; but they are not stricken, they are not dead! These peoples,
conquered by the force of cannon, have not in the least lost their
unity, even under the oppressive régimes to which the Europeans have
long subjected them....
"I have said that the European contact has been salutary to us from both
the material and intellectual point of view. What reforming Moslem
princes wished to impose by force on their Moslem subjects is to-day
realized a hundredfold. So great has been our progress in the last
twenty-five years in science, letters, and art that we may well hope to
be in all these things the equals of Europe in less than half a
century....
"A new era opens for us with the fourteenth century of the Hegira, and
this happy century will mark our Renaissance and our great future! A new
breath animates the Mohammedan peoples of all races; all Moslems are
penetrated with the necessity of work and instruction! We all wish to
travel, do business, tempt fortune, brave dangers. There is in the East,
among the Mohammedans, a surprising activity, an animation, unknown
twenty-five years ago. There is to-day a real public opinion throughout
the East."
The author concludes: "Let us hold firm, each for all, and let us hope,
hope, hope! We are fairly launched on the path of progress: let us
profit by it! It is Europe's very tyranny which has wrought our
transformation! It is our continued contact with Europe that favours our
evolution and inevitably hastens our revival! It is simply history
repeating itself; the Will of God fulfilling itself despite all
opposition and all resistance.... Europe's tutelage over Asiatics is
becoming more and more nominal--the gates of Asia are closing against
the European! Surely we glimpse before us a revolution without parallel
in the world's annals. A new age is at hand!"
If this was the way Pan-Islamists were thinking in the opening years of
the century, it is clear that their views must have been confirmed and
intensified by the Great War.[66] The material power of the West was
thereby greatly reduced, while its prestige was equally sapped by the
character of the peace settlement and by the attendant disputes which
broke out among the victors. The mutual rivalries and jealousies of
England, France, Italy, and their satellites in the East have given
Moslems much food for hopeful thought, and have caused corresponding
disquietude in European minds. A French publicist recently admonished
his fellow Europeans that "Islam does not recognize our colonial
frontiers," and added warningly, "the great movement of Islamic union
inaugurated by Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani is going on."[67]
The menacing temper of Islam is shown by the furious agitation which has
been going on for the last three years among India's 70,000,000 Moslems
against the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. This agitation is not
confined to India. It is general throughout Islam, and Sir Theodore
Morison does not overstate the case when he says: "It is time the
British public realized the gravity of what is happening in the East.
The Mohammedan world is ablaze with anger from end to end at the
partition of Turkey. The outbreaks of violence in centres so far remote
as Kabul and Cairo are symptoms only of this widespread resentment. I
have been in close touch with Mohammedans of India for close upon thirty
years and I think it is my duty to warn the British public of the
passionate resentment which Moslems feel at the proposed dismemberment
of the Turkish Empire. The diplomats at Versailles apparently thought
that outside the Turkish homelands there is no sympathy for Turkey. This
is a disastrous blunder. You have but to meet the Mohammedan now in
London to realize the white heat to which their anger is rising. In
India itself the whole of the Mohammedan community from Peshawar to
Arcot is seething with passion upon this subject. Women inside the
Zenanas are weeping over it. Merchants who usually take no interest in
public affairs are leaving their shops and counting-houses to organize
remonstrances and petitions; even the mediæval theologians of Deoband
and the Nadwatul-Ulama, whose detachment from the modern world is
proverbial, are coming from their cloisters to protest against the
destruction of Islam."[68]
Possibly the most serious aspect of the situation is that the Moslem
liberals are being driven into the camp of political Pan-Islamism.
Receptive though the liberals are to Western ideas, and averse though
they are to Pan-Islamism's chauvinistic, reactionary tendencies,
Europe's intransigeance is forcing them to make at least a temporary
alliance with the Pan-Islamic and Nationalist groups, even though the
liberals know that anything like a holy war would dig a gulf between
East and West, stop the influx of Western stimuli, favour reactionary
fanaticism, and perhaps postpone for generations a modernist reformation
of Islam.
Perhaps it is symptomatic of a more bellicose temper in Islam that the
last few years have witnessed the rapid spread of two new puritan,
fanatic movements--the Ikhwan and the Salafîya. The Ikhwan movement
began obscurely about ten years ago in inner Arabia--the Nejd. It is a
direct outgrowth of Wahabism, from which it differs in no essential
respect. So rapid has been Ikhwanism's progress that it to-day
absolutely dominates the entire Nejd, and it is headed by desert
Arabia's most powerful chieftain, Bin Saud, a descendant of the Saud who
headed the Wahabi movement a hundred years ago. The fanaticism of the
Ikhwans is said to be extraordinary, while their programme is the old
Wahabi dream of a puritan conversion of the whole Islamic world.[69] As
for the Salafî movement, it started in India even more obscurely than
Ikhwanism did in Arabia, but during the past few years it has spread
widely through Islam. Like Ikhwanism, it is puritanical and fanatical in
spirit, its adherents being found especially among dervish
organizations.[70] Such phenomena, taken with everything else, do not
augur well for the peace of the East.
So much for Pan-Islamism's religious and political sides. Now let us
glance at its commercial and industrial aspects--at what may be called
economic Pan-Islamism.
Economic Pan-Islamism is the direct result of the permeation of Western
ideas. Half a century ago the Moslem world was economically still in the
Middle Ages. The provisions of the sheriat, or Moslem canon law, such as
the prohibition of interest rendered economic life in the modern sense
impossible. What little trade and industry did exist was largely in the
hands of native Christians or Jews. Furthermore, the whole economic life
of the East was being disorganized by the aggressive competition of the
West. Europe's political conquest of the Moslem world was, in fact,
paralleled by an economic conquest even more complete. Everywhere
percolated the flood of cheap, abundant European machine-made goods,
while close behind came European capital, temptingly offering itself in
return for loans and concessions which, once granted, paved the way for
European political domination.
Yet in economics as in politics the very completeness of Europe's
triumph provoked resistance. Angered and alarmed by Western
exploitation, Islam frankly recognized its economic inferiority and
sought to escape from its subjection. Far-sighted Moslems began casting
about for a _modus vivendi_ with modern life that would put Islam
economically abreast of the times. Western methods were studied and
copied. The prohibitions of the sheriat were evaded or quietly ignored.
The upshot has been a marked evolution toward Western economic
standards. This evolution is of course still in its early stages, and is
most noticeable in lands most exposed to Western influences like India,
Egypt, and Algeria. Yet everywhere in the Moslem world the trend is the
same. The details of this economic transformation will be discussed in
the chapter devoted to economic change. What we are here concerned with
is its Pan-Islamic aspect. And that aspect is very strong. Nowhere does
Islam's innate solidarity come out better than in the economic field.
The religious, cultural, and customary ties which bind Moslem to Moslem
enable Mohammedans to feel more or less at home in every part of the
Islamic world, while Western methods of transit and communication enable
Mohammedans to travel and keep in touch as they never could before. New
types of Moslems--wholesale merchants, steamship owners, business men,
bankers, even factory industrialists and brokers--are rapidly evolving;
types which would have been simply unthinkable a century, or even half a
century, ago.
And these new men understand each other perfectly. Bound together both
by the ties of Islamic fraternity and by the pressure of Western
competition, they co-ordinate their efforts much more easily than
politicals have succeeded in doing. Here liberals, Pan-Islamists, and
nationalists can meet on common ground. Here is no question of political
conspiracies, revolts, or holy wars, challenging the armed might of
Europe and risking bloody repression or blind reaction. On the contrary,
here is merely a working together of fellow Moslems for economic ends
by business methods which the West cannot declare unlawful and dare not
repress.
What, then, is the specific programme of economic Pan-Islamism? It is
easily stated: the wealth of Islam for Moslems. The profits of trade and
industry for Moslem instead of Christian hands. The eviction of Western
capital by Moslem capital. Above all, the breaking of Europe's grip on
Islam's natural resources by the termination of concessions in lands,
mines, forests, railways, custom-houses, by which the wealth of Islamic
lands is to-day drained away to foreign shores.
Such are the aspirations of economic Pan-Islamism. They are wholly
modern concepts, the outgrowth of those Western ideas whose influence
upon the Moslem world I shall now discuss.[71]
FOOTNOTES:
[25] Islam has not only won much ground in India, Brahmanism's homeland,
but has also converted virtually the entire populations of the
great islands of Java and Sumatra, where Brahmanism was formerly
ascendant.
[26] The small Parsi communities of India, centring in Bombay, are the
sole surviving representatives of Zoroastrianism. They were founded by
Zoroastrian refugees after the Mohammedan conquest of Persia in the
seventh century A.D.
[27] Though Mecca is forbidden to non-Moslems, a few Europeans have
managed to make the Hajj in disguise, and have written their
impressions. Of these, Snouck Hurgronje's _Mekka_ (2 vols., The Hague,
1888) and _Het Mekkaansche Feest_ (Leiden, 1889) are the most recent
good works. Also see Burton and Burckhardt. A recent account of value
from the pen of a Mohammedan liberal is: Gazanfar Ali Khan, _With the
Pilgrims to Mecca; The Great Pilgrimage of A. H. 1319 (A.D. 1902)_, with
an Introduction by Arminius Vambéry (London, 1905).
[28] The Shiite Persians of course refused to recognize any Sunnite or
orthodox caliphate; while the Moors pay spiritual allegiance to their
own Shereefian sultans.
[29] The Turkish name for Constantinople.
[30] On the caliphate, see Sir W. Muir, _The Caliphate: Its Rise,
Decline, and Fall_ (Edinburgh, 1915); Sir Mark Sykes, _The Caliph's Last
Heritage_ (London, 1915); XX, "L'Islam après la Guerre," _Revue de
Paris_, 15 January, 1916; "The Indian Khilafat Delegation," _Foreign
Affairs_, July, 1920 (Special Supplement).
[31] Literally, "he who is guided aright."
[32] "Seyid" means "Lord." This title is borne only by descendants of
the Prophet.
[33] The explorer Dr. Nachtigal.
[34] On the Islamic fraternities in general and the Sennussiya in
particular see W. S. Blunt, _The Future of Islam_ (London, 1882); O.
Depont and X. Coppolani, _Les Confréries réligieuses musulmanes_ (Paris,
1897); H. Duveyrier, _La Confrérie musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben Ali es
Sénoussi_ (Paris, 1884); A. Le Chatelier, _Les Confréries musulmanes du
Hedjaz_ (Paris, 1887); L. Petit, _Confréries musulmanes_ (Paris, 1899);
L. Rinn, _Marabouts et Khouan_ (Algiers, 1884); A. Servier, _Le
Nationalisme musulman_ (Constantine, Algeria, 1913); Simian, _Les
Confréries islamiques en Algérie_ (Algiers, 1910); Achmed Abdullah
(himself a Sennussi), "The Sennussiyehs," _The Forum_, May, 1914; A. R.
Colquhoun, "Pan-Islam," _North American Review_, June, 1906; T. R.
Threlfall, "Senussi and His Threatened Holy War," _Nineteenth Century_,
March, 1900; Captain H. A. Wilson, "The Moslem Menace," _Nineteenth
Century and After_, September, 1907; ... "La Puissance de l'Islam: Ses
Confréries Réligieuses," _Le Correspondant_, 25 November and 10
December, 1909. The above judgments, particularly regarding the
Sennussiya, vary greatly, some being highly alarmist, others minimizing
its importance. A full balancing of the entire subject is that of
Commandant Binger, "Le Péril de l'Islam," _Bulletin du Comité de
l'Afrique française_, 1902. Personal interviews of educated Moslems with
El Sennussi are Si Mohammed el Hechaish, "Chez les Senoussia et les
Touareg," _L'Expansion Coloniale française_, 1900; Muhammad ibn Utman,
_Voyage au Pays des Sénoussia à travers la Tripolitaine_ (translated
from the Arabic), Paris, 1903.
[35] On Moslem missionary activity in general, see Jansen, _Verbreitung
des Islams_ (Berlin, 1897); M. Townsend, _Asia and Europe_, pp. 46-49,
60-61, 81; A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvième Siècle_ (Paris,
1888); various papers in _The Mohammedan World To-day_ (London, 1906).
[36] T. R. Threlfall, "Senussi and His Threatened Holy War," _Nineteenth
Century_, March, 1900.
[37] D. A. Forget, _L'Islam et le Christianisme dans l'Afrique
centrale_, p. 65 (Paris, 1900). For other statements regarding Moslem
missionary activity in Africa, see G. Bonet-Maury, _L'Islamisme et le
Christianisme en Afrique_ (Paris, 1906); E. W. Blyden, _Christianity,
Islam, and the Negro Race_ (London, 1887); Forget, _op. cit._
[38] A. Guérinot, "L'Islam et l'Abyssinie," _Revue du Monde musulman_,
1918. Also see similar opinion of the Protestant missionary K.
Cederquist, "Islam and Christianity in Abyssinia," _The Moslem World_,
April, 1921.
[39] S. Brobovnikov, "Moslems in Russia," _The Moslem World_, January,
1911.
[40] Broomhall, _Islam in China_ (London, 1910); Nigârèndé, "Notes sur
les Musulmans Chinois," _Revue du Monde musulman_, January, 1907; paper
on Islam in China in _The Mohammedan World To-day_ (London, 1906).
[41] See papers on Islam in Java and Sumatra in _The Mohammedan World
To-day_ (London, 1906); A. Cabaton, _Java, Sumatra, and the Dutch East
Indies_ (translated from the Dutch), New York, 1916.
[42] Quoted from article by "X," "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme,"
_Revue du Monde musulman_, March, 1913. This authoritative article is,
so the editor informs us, from the pen of an eminent Mohammedan--"un
homme d'étât musulman." For other activities of Djemal-ed-Din, see A.
Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, pp. 10-13.
[43] Quoted from W. G. Palgrave, _Essays on Eastern Questions_, p. 111
(London, 1872).
[44] A. Vambéry, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, p. 351 (London,
1906).
[45] Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic schemes were first clearly discerned by
the French publicist Gabriel Charmes as early as 1881, and his warnings
were published in his prophetic book _L'Avenir de la Turquie--Le
Panislamisme_ (Paris, 1883).
[46] Gabriel Hanotaux, "La Crise méditerranéenne et l'Islam," _Revue
Hebdomadaire_, April 13, 1912.
[47] See "X," "La Situation politique de la Perse," _Revue du Monde
musulman_, June, 1914; B. Temple, "The Place of Persia in
World-Politics," _Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_, May 4,
1910; W. M. Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_ (New York, 1912).
[48] Quoted from A. Vambéry, "Die türkische Katastrophe und die
Islamwelt," _Deutsche Revue_, July, 1913.
[49] Shah Mohammed Naimatullah, "Recent Turkish Events and Moslem
India," _Asiatic Review_, October, 1913.
[50] Quoted by F. Farjanel, "Le Japon et l'Islam," _Revue du Monde
musulman_, November, 1906.
[51] Farjanel, _supra_.
[52] Quoted by Vambéry, _supra_.
[53] Vambéry, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists," _Nineteenth
Century and After_, April, 1912.
[54] Vambéry, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists," _Nineteenth
Century and After_, April, 1912.
[55] Special cable to the New York _Times_, dated Rome, May 28, 1919.
[56] Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," _Nineteenth Century and
After_, July, 1919.
[57] H. H. The Aga Khan, _India in Transition_, p. 158 (London, 1918).
[58] This hatred of Western civilization, as such, will be discussed in
the next chapter.
[59] Ernst Paraquin, formerly Ottoman lieutenant-colonel and chief of
general staff, in the _Berliner Tageblatt_, January 24, 1920.
[60] A. Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, pp.
71, 72 (Paris, 1898).
[61] A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, p. 182.
[62] B. Temple, "The Place of Persia in World-Politics," _Proceedings of
the Central Asian Society_, May, 1910.
[63] L. Rinn, _Marabouts et Khouan_, p. vi.
[64] Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," _op. cit._
[65] Yahya Siddyk, _Le Reveil des Peuples islamiques au quatorzième
Siècle de l'Hégire_ (Cairo, 1907). Also published in Arabic.
[66] For a full discussion of the effect of the Great War upon Asiatic
and African peoples, see my book _The Rising Tide of Colour against
White World-Supremacy_ (New York and London, 1920).
[67] L. Massignon, "L'Islam et la Politique des Alliés," _Revue des
Sciences politiques_, June, 1920.
[68] Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," _op. cit._
[69] For the Ikhwan movement, see P. W. Harrison, "The Situation in
Arabia," _Atlantic Monthly_, December, 1920; S. Mylrea, "The
Politico-Religious Situation in Arabia," _The Moslem World_, July, 1919.
[70] For the Salafî movement, see "Wahhabisme--Son Avenir sociale et le
Mouvement salafî," _Revue du Monde musulman_, 1919.
[71] On the general subject of economic Pan-Islamism, see A. Le
Chatelier, "Le Reveil de l'Islam--Sa Situation économique," _Revue
Économique internationale_, July, 1910; also his article "Politique
musulmane," _Revue du Monde musulman_, September, 1910; M. Pickthall,
"La Morale islamique," _Revue Politique internationale_, July, 1916; S.
Khuda Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_ (London, 1912).