and especially the formation of International Unions, show us that we
are on the verge of this third stage. We are shaping our way towards the
real Democracy, with the attainment of which wars--though they will not
cease from the world--will certainly become much rarer. The
international _entente_ already establishing itself among the manual
workers of all the European countries--and which has now become an
accepted principle of the Labour movement--is a guarantee and a promise
of a more peaceful era; and those who know the artisans and peasants of
this and other countries know well how little enmity they harbour in
their breasts against each other. Racial and religious wars will no
doubt for long continue; but wars to satisfy the ambitions of a military
clique or a personal ruler, or the ambitions of a commercial group, or
the schemes of financiers, or the engineering of the Press--wars from
these all too fruitful causes will, under a sensible Democracy, cease.
If Britain, during the last twenty years, had really favoured the cause
of the People and their international understanding, there would have
been no war now, for her espousal of the mass-peoples' cause would have
made her so strong that it would have been too risky for any Government
to attack her. But of course that could not have happened, for the
simple reason that Conservatism and Liberalism are not Democracy.
Conservatism is Feudalism, Liberalism is Commercialism, and Socialism
only is in its essence Democracy. It is no good scolding at Sir Edward
Grey for making friends with the Russian Government; for his only
alternative would have been to join the "International"--which he
certainly could not do, being essentially a creature of the commercial
regime. The "Balance of Power" and the _ententes_ and alliances of
Figure-head Governments _had_ to go on, till the day--which we hope is
at hand--when Figure-heads will be no more needed.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] Reprinted by kind permission from the _English Review_ for December,
1914.
[3] As an example of this belief, read the manifesto of Professor
Eucken, who represents such a large section of German opinion, and note
the absolute sincerity of its tone--as well as its simplicity.
[4] _Wars and Capitalism_, by P. Kropotkin. (Freedom Press.)
[5] See _Nash's Magazine_ for October, 1914, article by "Diplomatist."
[6] Ibid.
[7] In order to realize how easy such a process is, we have only to
remember the steps by which the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899 was
engineered.
[8] Of course we must remember that there has been all along and is now
in Germany a very large party, Socialist and other, which has _not_ been
thus carried away; but for the moment its mouth is closed and it cannot
make itself heard.
[9] See Kropotkin's _War and Capitalism_, p. 12.
[10] See note _infra_ on "Commercial Prosperity," p. 167.
(Chapter XI below)
IV
THE CASE AGAINST GERMANY;
_November_, 1914.
With every wish to do justice to Germany, to whose literature I feel I
owe such a debt, and among whose people I have so many personal friends;
allowing also the utmost for the general causes in Europe which have
been for years leading up towards war--and some of which I have
indicated already in the pages above--I still feel it is impossible not
to throw on her the _immediate_ blame for the present catastrophe.
However we distribute the indictment and the charges among the various
parties concerned, whether we accuse mainly the sway of Prussian
Militarism or the rise of German Commercialism, or the long tradition
and growth of a _Welt-politik_ philosophy, or the general political
ignorance which gave to these influences such rash and uncritical
acceptance; or whether we accuse the somewhat difficult and variable
personal equation of the Kaiser himself--the fact still remains that for
years and years this war has been by the German Government most
deliberately and systematically prepared for. The fact remains that
Britain--though for a long period she had foreseen danger and had on the
naval side slowly braced herself to meet it--was on the military side
caught at the last moment unprepared; that France was so little
intending war that a large portion of the nation was actually still
protesting against an increase in the size of the standing army; and
that Russia--whatever plans she may have had, or not had, in mind--was
confessedly at the same period two years or so behind in the
organization and completion of her military establishment.
Whether right or wrong, it can hardly be denied that the moment of the
precipitation of war was chosen and insisted on by Germany. After
Austria's monstrous and insulting dictation to Servia (23rd July), and
Servia's incredibly humble apology (25th), Austria was still not
allowed to accept the latter, and the conference proposed (26th July) by
Sir E. Grey--though accepted by France, Russia, and Italy--was refused
by Germany (27th). On the 28th Austria declared war on Servia. It was
perfectly clear to every one that Russia--after what had happened before
in 1908-9, with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina--could not possibly
allow this insult to Servia to pass. Germany, therefore, by this move
forced Russia's hand; and at a moment when Russia was known or supposed
to be comparatively unprepared.[11] France had been involved in some
military scandals and was still debating as to the two years' instead of
three years' period for her normal military service. The German
Ambassador at Vienna had openly said that France was not in a condition
for facing a war. England was currently supposed in Germany to be
seriously hampered by domestic troubles at home--chiefly of course
among the Irish, but also amongst the Suffragettes(!) _and_ by
widespread disaffection in India. It was thought, therefore, that
England would certainly remain neutral--and I think we may fairly say
that the extent to which Germany counted on this expected neutrality is
evidenced by her disappointment and public rage when she found that she
was mistaken.
Germany's initiative in the matter is further evidenced by her _instant
readiness_ to attack. She was in Luxemburg within a few hours of the
declaration of war with Russia; and it was clearly her intention to
"rush" Paris and then turn back upon Russia.
It may be said that from her own point of view Germany was quite right
to take the initiative. If she sincerely believed that the _Entente_ was
plotting her downfall, she was justified in attacking instead of waiting
to be attacked. That may be so. It is the line to which General
Bernhardi again returns in his latest book (_Britain as Germany's
Vassal_, translated by J. Ellis Barker). But it does not alter the fact
that this was an immense responsibility to take, and that the immediate
onus of the war rests with Germany. If she under all the above
circumstances precipitated war, she can hardly be surprised if the
judgment of Europe (one may also say the world) is against her. If she
has played her cards so badly as to put herself entirely in the wrong,
she must naturally "dree her weird."
There remains the case of her treatment of Belgium. Britain
certainly--who has only lately assisted at the dismemberment of Persia,
and who is even now allowing Russia (in the face of Persian protests) to
cross neutral territory in the neighbourhood of Tabriz on her way to
attack Turkey, who has uttered, moreover, no word of protest against the
late Ukase (of mid-November) by which the independent rights of Finland
have been finally crushed--Britain, I say, need talk no cant about
Belgian neutrality. Britain, for her own absolute safety, has always
required and still requires Belgian neutrality to be respected. And that
by itself is a sufficient, and the most honest, reason. But in the eyes
of the world at large Germany's deliberate and determined sacrifice of
Belgium, simply because the latter stood in the way of the rapid
accomplishment of her warlike designs against France (and England), can
never be condoned--little Belgium who had never harmed or offended
Germany in any way. Add to this her harsh and brutish ill-treatment of
the Belgian civilian people, her ravage of their ancient buildings and
works of art, and her clearly expressed intention both in word and deed
to annex their territory by force should the fortunes of war favour
her--all these facts, which we may say are proven beyond the shadow of a
doubt, form a most serious indictment. They substantiate the charge that
Germany by acting throughout in this high-handed way has deeply violated
the natural laws of the Comity of Nations, which are the safeguards of
Civilization, and they confirm the rightful claim of Europe to sit in
judgment on her.
I say nothing at the moment about the charges of atrocities committed by
German troops, partly because such charges are always in warfare made by
each side against the other, and partly because their verification
should be the subject of a world-inquiry later on. It may be said,
however, that the Belgian and French Commissions of inquiry have
certainly presented material and evidence which _ought_ to be
investigated later--material which would hardly be credible of so humane
and cultured a people as the Germans, were it not for the fact, alluded
to already, of such severities having been deliberately recommended
beforehand by the philosophical writers, military and political, who
have during the last half-century moulded German public opinion.
England, as I say, is in no position herself to sit in judgment on
Germany and lecture her--much as she undoubtedly enjoys doing so.
England's long-standing policy of commercial greed, leading to political
grab in every part of the world; her infidelity in late years towards
small peoples, like the Boers and the Persians; her neglect of treaty
obligations and silence about them when they do not suit her; her most
dubious alliance with a military despotism like Russia: all render it
impossible for her to accuse Germany. The extraordinary thing is that in
the face of such prevarications as these, which are patent to the whole
world, Britain at any moment of serious crisis always comes forward
with the air of utmost sincerity and in an almost saintly pose as the
champion of political morality! How is it? The world laughs and talks of
_heuchlerei_ and _cant Britannique_. But I almost think (perhaps I
stretch a point in order to save the credit of my country) that the real
cause is not so much British hypocrisy as British _stupidity_--stupidity
which keeps our minds in watertight compartments and prevents us
perceiving how confused and inconsistent our own judgments are and how
insincere they appear to our neighbours. At any rate, whether the cause
is pure hypocrisy or pure stupidity, or whether a Scotch mixture of
these, it cannot be denied that its result is most irritating to
decent-minded people.
It is curious how a certain strain or vein of temperament, like that
just mentioned, will run through a nation's whole life, and colour its
actions in all departments, recognized and commented on by the whole
outside world, and yet remain unobserved by the nation itself.
Every one who has known the Germans at home--even years back--has been
conscious of a certain strain in the Teutonic character which has had a
like bearing in the German national life. How shall I describe it? It is
a certain want of tact, unperceptiveness--a kind of overbearing
simplicity of mind. Whether it be in the train or the hotel or the
private house, the German does not always seem to see the personal
situation. Whether you prefer to talk or remain silent, whether you wish
the window open or shut, whether you desire to partake of such and such
a dish or whether you don't--of such little matters he (or she) seems
unaware. Perhaps it is that the Teutonic mind is so vigorous that it
overrides you without being conscious of doing so, or that it is so
convinced of its own Tightness; or perhaps it is that the scientific
type of mind, depending always on formulae and statistics, necessarily
loses a certain finer quality. Anyhow, the fact remains that sociable,
kindly, _gemüthlich_ and so forth as the Germans are, there is a lack of
delicate touch and perception about them, of gentle manners, and a
certain insensitiveness to the opinion of those with whom they have to
deal. The strain may not be without its useful bearings in the
direction of strength and veracity, but it runs curiously through the
national life, and colours deeply, not only the domestic and social
relations of the people but their foreign politics also, and even their
war tactics and strategy.
I have spoken before of the political ignorance of the German
mass-people, which, dating from years back, caused them to be easily led
by their empire-building philosophers to a certain very dangerous
pinnacle of ambition, and there tempted. The same want of perception of
how their actions would be viewed by the world in general caused the
Government to act in the most egregiously high-handed manner in the
matter of the precipitation and declaration of the war itself, and
subsequently likewise in the ruthless invasion of Belgium and treatment
of her people and her cities. The want of discernment of what was going
on outside the sphere of her own psychology led her into fatal delusions
as to the attitude of England, of Ireland, of Belgium, Italy, India, and
so forth. It caused her generals to miscalculate and seriously
under-estimate the strategic forces opposed to them, both in France and
Russia; and in actual battles it has caused them to adopt, with
disastrous results, tactics which were foolishly inspired by contempt of
the enemy. Without insisting too much on the stories of
atrocities--which are still to a certain extent _sub judice_--it does
rather appear that even those excesses which the Commissions of inquiry
have reported (and which occurred, be it said, chiefly in the early days
of the campaign) were due to an intoxication, not merely of champagne
but of excited self-glorification and blindness to the human rights of
peoples at least as brave as themselves.[12]
However that last point may be, it is certainly curious to think
how--whether it be in the case of the German or the English or any other
people--a vein of temperament or character may decide a nation's fate or
colour its history quite as much as or even more than matters of wealth
and armament.
Personally one feels sorry for the great and admirable German
people--though I do not suppose it will matter to them whether one feels
sorry or not! And I look forward to the day when there will come a
better understanding between them and ourselves--better perhaps than has
ever been before--when we shall forgive them their sins against us, and
they will forgive us our sins against them, one of which certainly is
our meanness and shopkeeperiness in rejoicing in the war as a means of
"collaring their trade." I feel sure that the German mass-people will
wake up one day to the knowledge that they have been grossly betrayed at
home, not only by Prussian militarism but by pan-German commercial
philosophy and bunkum, as well as by their own inattention to, and
consequent ignorance of, political affairs. And I hope they will wake up
to the conviction that Destiny and the gods in this matter are after all
bringing them to a conclusion and a consummation far finer than anything
they have perhaps imagined for themselves. If, indeed, when the war is
over, they are fortunate enough to be compelled by the terms of
settlement to abandon their Army and Navy--or _all_ but the merest
residue of these--the consequences undoubtedly will be that, freed from
the frightful burdens which the upkeep of these entails, they will romp
away over the world through an era of unexampled prosperity and
influence. Their science, liberated, will give them the lead in many
arts and industries; their philosophy and literature, no longer crippled
by national vanities, will rise to the splendid world-level of former
days; their colonizing enterprise, unhindered by conscriptionist vetoes,
will carry them far and wide over the globe; and even their trade will
find that without fortified seaports and tariff walls it will, in these
days of universal movement and intercommunication, do fully as well as,
if not much better than, ever it did before. In that day, however, let
us hope that--the more communal conception of public life having
prevailed and come to its own--the success of Trade, among any nation or
people, will no longer mean the successful manufacture of a dominant and
vulgar class, but the real prosperity and welfare of the whole nation,
including all classes.
And in that day, possibly, the other nations, witnessing the
extraordinary prosperity and success of that one which has abandoned
armaments and Kruppisms, will--if they have a grain of sense left in
them--follow suit and, voluntarily divesting themselves too of their
ancient armour, give up the foolishness of national enmities and
jealousies, and adopt the attitude of humanity and peace, which alone
can be the worthy and sensible attitude for us little mortals, when we
shall have arrived at years of discretion upon the earth.
[Just after writing the above I received the following remarks in a
letter of a friend from South America, which may be worth reprinting. He
says: "In spite of the events of 1815 and 1870, French 'culture' is
supreme to-day over all South America. South America is a suburb of
Paris, and French culture has won its triumphs wholly irrespective of
the defeat of French arms. Therefore I incline to think that true German
culture in science and music will gain rather than lose by the
destruction of German arms. Not only will that nation cease to spend its
time writing dull military books, but other nations will be more likely
to appreciate what there is in German thought and culture when this is
no longer offered us at the point of the bayonet! German commerce in
South America has suffered rather than gained by talk of 'shining
armour.' And the poet, scientist and business man will gain rather than
lose if no longer connected with Potsdam."]
FOOTNOTES:
[11] It is said that Russia took some steps towards mobilization as
early as the 25th. If she did, that would seem quite natural under the
circumstances.
[12] There may possibly be found another explanation of these
excesses--namely, in the galling strictness of the Prussian military
regime. After years and years of monotonously regulated and official
lives, it may be that to both officers and men, in their different ways,
orgies of one kind or another came as an almost inevitable reaction.
V.
THE CASE FOR GERMANY
Having put in the last chapter some of the points which seem to throw
the immediate blame of the war on Germany, it would be only fair in the
present chapter to show how in the long run and looking to the general
European situation to-day as well as to the history of Germany in the
past, the war had become inevitable, and in a sense necessary, as a
stage in the evolution of European politics.
After the frightful devastation of Germany by the religious dissensions
of the early part of the seventeenth century and the Thirty Years War,
it fell to Frederick the Great, not only to lay a firm foundation for
the Prussian State but to elevate it definitely as a rival to Austria in
the leadership of Germany. Thenceforth Prussia grew in power and
influence, and became the nucleus of a new Germany. It would almost seem
that things could not well have been otherwise. Germany was seeking for
a new root from which to grow. Clerical and ultra-Catholic Austria was
of no use for this purpose. Bavaria was under the influence of France.
Lutheran Prussia attracted the best elements of the Teutonic mind. It
seems strange, perhaps, that the sandy wastes of the North-East, and its
rather arid, dour population, _should_ have become the centre of growth
for the new German nation, considering the latter's possession of its
own rich and vital characteristics, and its own fertile and beautiful
lands; but so it was. Perhaps the general German folk, with their
speculative, easygoing, almost sentimental tendencies, _needed_ this
hard nucleus of Prussianism--and its matter-of-fact, organizing type of
ability--to crystallize round.
The Napoleonic wars shattered the old order of society, and spread over
Europe the seeds of all sorts of new ideas, in the direction of
nationality, republicanism, and so forth. Fichte, stirred by Napoleon's
victory at Jena (Fichte's birthplace) and the consequent disaster to
his own people, wrote his _Addresses to the German Nation_, pleading
eloquently for a "national regeneration." He, like Vom Stein,
Treitschke, and many others in their time, came to Berlin and
established himself there as in the centre of a new national activity.
Vom Stein, about the same time, carried out the magnificent and
democratic work by which he established on Napoleonic lines (and much to
Napoleon's own chagrin) the outlines of a great and free and federated
Germany. Carl von Clausewitz did in the military world much what Stein
did in the civil world. He formulated the strategical methods and
teachings of Napoleon, and in his book _Vom Krieg_ (published 1832) not
only outlined a greater military Germany, but laid the basis, it has
been said, of all serious study in the art of war. Vom Stein and
Clausewitz died in the same year, 1831. In 1834 Heinrich von Treitschke
was born.
The three Hohenzollern kings, all named Frederick William, who reigned
from the death of Frederick the Great (1786) to the accession of William
I (1861) did not count much personally. The first and third of those
mentioned were decidedly weakminded, and the third towards the close of
his reign became insane. But the ideas already initiated in Germany
continued to expand. The Zollverein was established, the Teutonic
Federation became closer, and the lead of Prussia more decided. With the
joint efforts of William I and Bismarck the policy became more
governmental, more positive, and more deliberate--the policy of
consolidation and of aggrandisement; and with this definite programme in
view, Bismarck engineered the three wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870,
against Denmark, Austria, and France. They all three had the effect of
confirming the military power of Prussia. The first war gave her a much
desired increase of access to the North Sea; the second led to the
treaty with Austria, and ultimately to the formation of the Triple
Alliance; the third ended in the definite establishment of the Prussian
hegemony, the crowning of William I as Emperor, and the union and
consolidation of all the German States under him; but alas! it left a
seed of evil in the wresting of Alsace-Lorraine from France. For
France never forgave this. Bismarck and Moltke knew she would not
forgive, and were sorely tempted to engineer a _second_ war which should
utterly disable her; but this war never came off. The seed of Revenge,
however, remained with France, and the seed of Fear with Germany; and
these two things were destined to lead to a harvest of disaster.
In 1866 Treitschke came to Berlin. Though Saxon by birth, he became
ultra-Prussian in sympathy and temperament. Somewhat deaf, and by no
means yielding or facile in temper, he was not cut out for a political
career. But politics were his interest; his lectures on history were
successful at Leipzig and had still more scope at Berlin. He became the
strongest of German Unionists, and with a keen but somewhat narrow mind
took an absolute pleasure in attacking every movement or body of people
that seemed to him in any way to stand in the path of Germany's
advancement, or not to assist in her consolidation. Thus he poured out
his wrath in turn on Saxony (his own land) and on Hanover, on the Poles,
the Socialists, and the Catholics, and ultimately in his later years on
Britain.[13]