Section II.

Place.

The trite maxim, *A place for everything, and everything in its place*, so

commends itself to the sense of fitness, as hardly to need exposition or

enforcement; yet while no maxim is more generally admitted, scarce any is

so frequently violated in practice. In duty, the elements of time and

place are intimately blended. Disorder in place generates derangement in

time. The object which is out of place can be found only by the waste of

time; and the most faithful industry loses a large part of its value when

its materials are wanting where they ought to be, and must be sought where

they ought not to be.

Apart from considerations of utility, order is an æsthetic duty. It is

needed to satisfy the sense of beauty. Its violation offends the eye,

insults the taste. The æsthetic nature craves and claims culture. It has

abundant provision made for it in external nature; but so large a part of

life must be passed within doors, at least in a climate like ours, that it

is starved and dwarfed, if there be not in interior arrangements some

faint semblance of the symmetry and harmony of the universe. To effect

this needs neither abundance nor costliness of material. A French man or

woman will charm the eye at a cost which in England would be represented

by bare and squalid poverty. A Parisian shop-window will make with a few

francs’ worth of goods an exhibition of artistical beauty which might

challenge the most fastidious criticism. These effects are produced solely

by prime reference to fitness of place,—to orderly arrangement,—to a

symmetry which all can understand, and which any one might copy. Our very

capacity of receiving gratification from this source is the measure of our

duty in this regard. If with the simplest materials we can give pleasure

to the soul through the eye by merely assigning its fit place to every

object, order is among the plainest dictates of beneficence.

*Order is essential to domestic comfort and well-being*, and thus to all

the virtues which have their earliest and surest nurture in domestic life.

There are homes at once affluent and joyless, groaning with needless waste

and barren of needed comfort, in which the idea of repose seems as

irrelevant as Solomon’s figure of lying down on the top of a mast, and all

from a pervading spirit of disorder. In such dwellings there is no love of

home. The common house is a mere lodging and feeding place. Society is

sought elsewhere, pleasure elsewhere; and for the young and easily

impressible there is the strongest inducement to those modes of

dissipation in which vice conceals its grossness behind fair exteriors and

under attractive forms. On the other hand, the well-ordered house affords

to its inmates the repose, comfort, and enjoyment which they crave and

need, and for those whose characters are in the process of formation may

neutralize allurements to evil which might else be irresistible.

A Manual of Moral Philosophy · 第 2 / 8 章