CHAPTER III

THE NORTH AMERICAN PERIL

The policy of the United States--The Monroe doctrine: its various

aspects--Greatness and decadence of the United States--The two

Americas, Latin and Anglo-Saxon.

To save themselves from Yankee imperialism the American democracies

would almost accept a German alliance, or the aid of Japanese arms;

everywhere the Americans of the North are feared. In the Antilles

and in Central America hostility against the Anglo-Saxon invaders

assumes the character of a Latin crusade. Do the United States

deserve this hatred? Are they not, as their diplomatists preach, the

elder brothers, generous and protecting? And is not protection their

proper vocation in a continent rent by anarchy?

We must define the different aspects of their activities in South

America; a summary examination of their influence could not fail to

be unjust. They have conquered new territories, but they have upheld

the independence of feeble States; they aspire to the hegemony of the

Latin continent, but this ambition has prevented numerous and

grievous conflicts between South American nations. The moral

pressure of the United States makes itself felt everywhere; the

imperialist and maternal Republic intervenes in all the internal

conflicts of the Spanish-speaking democracies. It excites or

suppresses revolutions; it fulfils a high vocation of culture. It

{299} uses or abuses a privilege which cannot be gainsaid. The

better to protect the Ibero-Americans, it has proudly raised its

Pillars of Hercules against the ambition of the Old World.

Sometimes this influence becomes a monopoly, and the United States

take possession of the markets of the South. They aim at making a

trust of the South American republics, the supreme dream of their

multi-millionaire _conquistadors_. Alberdi has said that there they

are the "Puerto Cabello" of the new America; that is to say, that

they aim, after the Spanish fashion, at isolating the southern

continent and becoming its exclusive purveyors of ideas and

industries.

Their supremacy was excellent when it was a matter of basing the

independence of twenty republics of uncertain future upon a solid

foundation. The neo-Saxons did not then intervene in the wars of the

South; they remained neutral and observed the peace which Washington

had advocated. They proclaimed the autonomy of the continent, and

contributed to conserve the originality of Southern America by

forbidding the formation of colonies in its empty territories, and by

defending the republican and democratic States against reactionary

Europe.

But who will deliver the Ibero-Americans from the excess of this

influence? _Quis custodiet custodem?_ An irresponsible supremacy is

perilous.

Naturally, in the relations of the United States and the nations of

the South actions do not always correspond with words; the art of

oratory is lavish with a fraternal idealism, but strong wills enforce

their imperialistic ambitions. Although fully attentive to the

fair-sounding promises of the North, the statesmen of the South

refuse to believe in the friendship of the Yankees; being perturbed

by the memory of ancient and recent conquests, these peoples perhaps

exaggerate the danger which might come from the {300} North. A blind

confidence and an excessive timidity are equally futile.

In 1906, at the conference of Rio de Janeiro, Secretary Root, in the

presence of assembled America, was the lay prophet of the new gospel.

"We do not wish," he said, "to win victories, we desire no territory

but our own, nor a sovereignty more extensive than that which we

desire to retain over ourselves. We consider that the independence

and the equal rights of the smallest and weakest members of the

family of nations deserve as much respect as those of the great

empires. We pretend to no right, privilege, or power that we do not

freely concede to each one of the American Republics." This was the

solemn declaration of a Puritan politician; Mr. Root continues the

noble tradition of Washington, Jefferson, and Hamilton.

Ten years earlier another secretary, Mr. Olney, declared to Lord

Salisbury that the great Anglo-Saxon Republic was practically

sovereign--paramount was his word--on the American continent, and

that its fiat was law in affairs which called for its intervention.

Which is the truth: the imperialistic declarations of Mr. Olney or

the idealism of Mr. Root?

Against the policy of respect for Latin liberties are ranged the

instincts of a triumphant plutocracy. The centre of North American

life is passing from Boston to Chicago; the citadel of the ideal

gives way to the material progress of the great porcine metropolis.

There is a conflict of dissimilar currents of morality. The Puritan

tradition of New England seems useless in the struggle of the Far

West; the conquest of the desert demands another morality; the

morality of conflict, aggression, and success. The trusts raise

their heads above the impotent clamour of the weak. The conflict

between the new-comers is tumultuous and brutal; as in the time of

imperial {301} Rome, the latter-day republicans are becoming aware of

their defeat by a new caste, animated by an impetuous love of

conflict. It is the struggle between idealism and plutocracy,

between the tradition of the Pilgrim Fathers and the morality of Wall

Street; the patricians of the Senate and the bosses of Tammany Hall.

The great historical parties are divided; while the democrats do not

forget the ideal of Washington and Lincoln, the republicans think

only of imperialism.

Will a generous _élite_ succeed in withstanding this racial tendency?

Perhaps, but nothing can check the onward march of the United States.

Their imperialism is an unavoidable phenomenon.

The nation which was peopled by nine millions of men in 1820 now

numbers eighty millions--an immense demographic power; in the space

of ten years, from 1890 to 1900, this population increased by

one-fifth. By virtue of its iron, wheat, oil, and cotton, and its

victorious industrialism, the democracy aspires to a world-wide

significance of destiny; the consciousness of its powers is creating

fresh international duties. Yankee pride increases with the endless

multiplication of wealth and population, and the patriotic sentiment

has reached such an intensity that it has become transformed into

imperialism.

The United States buy the products they themselves lack from the

tropical nations. To rule in these fertile zones would to them

appear the geographical ideal of a northern people. Do not their

industries demand new outlets in America and Asia? So to the old

mystic ambition are added the necessities of utilitarian progress.

An industrial nation, the States preach a practical Christianity to

the older continents, to Europe, and to lands yet barbarous, as to

South America; they profess a doctrine of aggressive idealism, a

strange fusion of economic tendencies and Puritan fervour. The

Christian Republic imposes {302} its tutelage upon inferior races,

and so prepares them for self-government.

This utilitarian and mystical expansion is opposed to the primitive

simplicity of the Monroe doctrine. In 1823, to counter the political

methods of the Holy Alliance, President Monroe upheld the republican

integrity of the ancient Spanish colonies. The celebrated message

declared that there were no free territories in America, thus

condemning in advance any projected establishment of European

colonies upon the unoccupied continent of America, and that the

United States limited their political action to the New World, and

renounced all intervention in the disputes of Europe.

At the close of the last century the political absolutism of the Holy

Alliance was only a memory; democracy is progressing, even in the

heart of the most despotic of monarchies, and France is republican.

Europe, after the tragic adventure of the Mexican Empire, abandoned

her expeditions of conquest. The United States, forgetting their

initial isolation, intervened in the politics of the world; they

defended the integrity of China, took part in the conference of

Algeciras, and maintained peace in the East. Like the character in

Terence, nothing in the world leaves them unconcerned. The two bases

of the Monroe doctrine, the absolutism of Europe and the isolation of

the United States, exist no longer, but the Monroe doctrine persists

indefinitely. "If," says Mr. Coolidge, professor of political law at

the University of Harvard, "if, by his principles, the American finds

himself drawn to conclusions which do not please him, he ordinarily

revolts, forsakes his promises, and jumps to conclusions that suit

him better." To the logic of the Latins Americans and Englishmen

oppose utility, common sense, instinct.

The Monroe doctrine has undergone an essential transformation; it has

passed successively from the {303} defensive to intervention and

thence to the offensive. From a theory which condemned any change of

political _régime_ among the new democracies under European pressure,

and which forbade all acquisitions of territory, or the transfer of

power from a weak to a strong nation, there arose the Polk doctrine,

which, in 1845, decreed the annexation of Texas for fear of foreign

intervention. In 1870 President Grant demanded the seizure of San

Domingo as a measure of national protection, a new corollary of the

Monroe doctrine. President Johnson was anxious to see his country in

possession of Cuba in the name of the "laws of political gravitation

which throw small States into the gullets of the great powers." In

1895 Secretary of State Olney, at the time of the trouble between

England and Venezuela, declared that the United States were in fact

sovereign in America. From Monroe to Olney the defensive doctrine

has gradually changed to a moral tutelage.

If theories change, frontiers change no less. The northern Republic

has been the beneficiary of an incessant territorial expansion: in

1813 it acquired Louisiana; in 1819, Florida; in 1845 and 1850,

Texas; the Mexican provinces in 1848 and 1852; and Alaska in 1858.

The annexation of Hawaii took place in 1898. In the same year Porto

Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and one of the Marianne Islands, passed,

by the Treaty of Paris, into the hands of the United States. They

obtained the Samoan Islands in 1890, wished to buy the Danish West

Indies in 1902, and planted their imperialistic standard at Panama in

1903.

Interventions have become more frequent with the expansion of

frontiers. The United States have recently intervened in the

territory of Acre, there to found a republic of rubber gatherers; at

Panama, there to develop a province and construct a canal; in Cuba,

under cover of the Platt amendment, to {304} maintain order in the

interior; in San Domingo, to support the civilising revolution and

overthrow the tyrants; in Venezuela, and in Central America, to

enforce upon these nations, torn by intestine disorders, the

political and financial tutelage of the imperial democracy. In

Guatemala and Honduras the loans concluded with the monarchs of North

American finance have reduced the people to a new slavery.

Supervision of the customs and the dispatch of pacificatory squadrons

to defend the interests of the Anglo-Saxon have enforced peace and

tranquillity: such are the means employed. The _New York American_

announces that Mr. Pierpont Morgan proposes to encompass the finances

of Latin America by a vast network of Yankee banks. Chicago

merchants and Wall Street financiers created the Meat Trust in the

Argentine. The United States offer millions for the purpose of

converting into Yankee loans the moneys raised in London during the

last century by the Latin American States; they wish to obtain a

monopoly of credit. It has even been announced, although the news

hardly appears probable, that a North American syndicate wished to

buy enormous belts of land in Guatemala, where the English tongue is

the obligatory language. The fortification of the Panama Canal, and

the possible acquisition of the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific, are

fresh manifestations of imperialistic progress.

The Monroe doctrine takes an aggressive form with Mr. Roosevelt, the

politician of the "big stick," and intervention _à outrance_.

Roosevelt is conscious of his sacred mission; he wants a powerful

army, and a navy majestically sailing the two oceans. His ambitions

find an unlooked-for commentary in a book by Mr. Archibald Coolidge,

the Harvard professor, upon the United States as a world-power. He

therein shows the origin of the disquietude of the South Americans

before the Northern peril: "When two {305} contiguous States," he

writes, "are separated by a long line of frontiers and one of the two

rapidly increases, full of youth and vigour, while the other

possesses, together with a small population, rich and desirable

territories, and is troubled by continual revolutions which exhaust

and weaken it, the first will inevitably encroach upon the second,

just as water will always seek to regain its own level."

He recognises the fact that the progress accomplished by the United

States is not of a nature to tranquillise the South American; "that

the Yankee believes that his southern neighbours are trivial and

childish peoples, and above all incapable of maintaining a proper

self-government." He thinks the example of Cuba, liberated "from the

rule of Spain, but not from internal troubles, will render the

American of the States sceptical as to the aptitude of the

Latin-American populations of mixed blood to govern themselves

without disorder," and recognises that the "pacific penetration" of

Mexico by American capital constitutes a possible menace to the

independence of that Republic, were the death of Diaz to lead to its

original state of anarchy and disturb the peace which the

millionaires of the North desire to see untroubled.

Warnings, advice, distrust, invasion of capital, plans of financial

hegemony--all these justify the anxiety of the southern peoples.

The people of the United States have always desired a _Zollverein_, a

fiscal union of all the Republics; they wish to gather into their

imperial hands the commerce of the South, the produce of the tropics.

The unity of the German Empire was born of a _Zollverein_ or customs

union, and perhaps in the future the same means will create that

eternal empire of which the patriotism of Mr. Chamberlain used to

dream. The United States, according to candid Professor Coolidge,

are, in respect of Latin {306} America, in a position analogous to

that of Russia in respect of the nations of the _Zollverein_: their

population is greater and more imposing. "History shows us," he

writes, "that when feeble states and powerful states are closely

associated the independence of the weak states runs certain

risks."[1] The Yankee ideal, then, is fatally contrary to

Latin-American independence.

For geographical reasons, and on account of its very inferiority,

South America cannot dispense with the influence of the Anglo-Saxon

North, with its exuberant wealth and its industries. South America

has need of capital, of enterprising men, of bold explorers, and

these the United States supply in abundance. The defence of the

South should consist in avoiding the establishment of privileges or

monopolies, whether in favour of North Americans or Europeans.

It is essential to understand not only the foundations of North

American greatness, but also the weaknesses of the Anglo-Saxon

democracy, in order to escape from the dangers of excessive imitation.

The Anglo-Saxons of America have created an admirable democracy upon

a prodigious expanse of territory. A caravan of races has pitched

its tents from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and has watered the

desert with its impetuous blood. Dutch, French, Anglo-Saxons, and

Germans, people of all sects, Quakers, Presbyterians, Catholics,

Puritans, all have mingled their creeds in a single multiform nation.

At the contact of new soil men have felt the pride of creation and of

living. Initiative, self-assertion, self-reliance, audacity, love of

adventure, all the forms of the victorious will are united in this

Republic of energy. A triumphant optimism quickens the rhythm of

life; an immense impulse of creation builds cities in the wilderness,

and founds new {307} plutocracies amidst the whirlpool of the

markets. Workshops, factories, banks; the obscure unrest of Wall

Street; the architectural insolence of the skyscraper; the

many-coloured, material West; all mingle perpetually in the wild,

uncouth hymn which testifies the desperate battle of will and

destiny, of generation against death. Poets have exalted the

greatness of America. Hear Walt Whitman, the bard of this advancing

democracy:--

"Long, too long, America....

For who except myself has yet conceived

What your children _en masse_ really are?

They will make the most splendid race the sun

Ever shone upon,"

he cries, in his free rhythms.

"O mother of a mighty race!"

said Bryant, celebrating the glories of North America, and the

fastidious Whittier would have the United States excel the Old World

on its own ground:

"And cast in some diviner mould

Lest the new cycle shame the old."

They have reconciled equality with liberty, in manners and in law.

Fair play, the identical chances which the Republic offers her

citizens, in creating schools, in fostering the advance of self-made

men in society, constitutes the firmest foundation of the life of a

republic. Equity and equality prevail above the eager onrush of her

citizens; equality in industrial struggles against monopolies;

equality in the churches in place of intolerance; equality in school

instead of the privileges created by wealth. This persistent

exaltation of liberty matches the sentiment of social discipline.

The Germanic sense of {308} organisation is added to the Anglo-Saxon

individualism; associations multiply and become a gigantic network

spread over the entire face of the country; clubs, leagues, societies

of co-operation and production and philanthropic institutions.

But this civilisation, in which men of strong vitality win wealth,

invent machines, create new cities, and profess a Christianity full

of energy and accomplishment, has not the majesty of a harmonious

structure. It is the violent work of a people of various origin,

which has not yet been ennobled by the _patina_ of tradition and

time. In the cities which restless workers hastily raise on barren

soil, one can as yet perceive no definitive unity. Race antagonism

disturbs North America; the negroes swarm in the South; Japanese and

Orientals aspire to the conquest of the West. Neo-Saxon civilisation

is still seeking its final form, and in the meantime it is piling up

wealth amid the prevailing indiscipline. "We find in the United

States," says M. André Chevrillon, "a political system, but not a

social organisation." The admirable traditions of Hamilton and

Jefferson have been subjected to the onslaught of new influences, the

progress of plutocracy, the corruption of the administrative

functions, the dissolution of parties, the abuse of the power of

monopolies. The axis of the great nation is becoming displaced

towards the West, and each step in advance marks the triumph of

vulgarity.

An octopus of a city, New York, might be taken as the symbol of this

extraordinary nation; it displays the vertigo, the audacity, and all

the lack of proportion that characterise American life. Near the

poverty of the Ghetto and the disturbing spectacle of Chinatown you

may admire the wealth of Fifth Avenue and the marble palaces which

plagiarise the architecture of the Tuscan cities. Opposite the

obscure crowds of emigrants herded in the docks you will see the

refined luxury of the plutocratic {309} hotels, and facing the

majestic buildings of Broadway, the houses of the parallel avenues,

which are like the temporary booths of a provincial fair. Confusion,

uproar, instability--these are the striking characteristics of the

North American democracy. Neither irony nor grace nor scepticism,

gifts of the old civilisations, can make way against the plebeian

brutality, the excessive optimism, the violent individualism of the

people.

All these things contribute to the triumph of mediocrity; the

multitude of primary schools, the vices of utilitarianism, the cult

of the average citizen, the transatlantic M. Homais, and the tyranny

of opinion noted by Tocqueville; and in this vulgarity, which is

devoid of traditions and has no leading aristocracy, a return to the

primitive type of the redskin, which has already been noted by close

observers, is threatening the proud democracy. From the excessive

tension of wills, from the elementary state of culture, from the

perpetual unrest of life, from the harshness of the industrial

struggle, anarchy and violence will be born in the future. In a

hundred years men will seek in vain for the "American soul," the

"genius of America," elsewhere than in the indisciplined force or the

violence which ignores moral laws.

Among the Anglo-Saxon nations individualism finds its limits in the

existence of a stable home; it may also struggle against the State,

according to the formula consecrated by Spencer, "the man versus the

State." It defends its jealous autonomy from excessive legislation,

from the intervention of the Government in economic conflicts or the

life of the family. And it is precisely the family spirit which is

becoming enfeebled in North America, under the pressure of new social

conditions. The birth-rate is diminishing, and the homes of foreign

immigrants are contributing busily to the formation of the new

generations; the native stock inheriting good racial {310} traditions

would seem to be submerged more and more by the new human tide. A

North American official writes that "the decrease in the birth-rate

will lead to a complete change in the social system of the

Republic."[2] From this will result the abandonment of the

traditional austerity of the race, and the old notions of sacrifice

and duty. The descendants of alien races will constitute the nation

of the future. The national heritage is threatened by the invasion

of Slavs and Orientals, and the fecundity of the negroes; a painful

anxiety weighs upon the destinies of the race.

The family is unstable, and divorces are increasing at an

extraordinary rate. Between 1870 and 1905 the population doubled;

during the same period the divorces increased sixfold and the

marriages decreased. There is no fixity in the elements of variety,

and the causes of this state of transition will not disappear, as

they are intimately allied with the development of the industrial

civilisation which has brought with it a new ideal of happiness. By

emancipating men and women from the old moral principles it has

modified sexual morality; by accelerating social progress it has

brought an additional bitterness into the social mêlée, a greater

egoism into human conflict.

Excessive and heterogeneous immigration prevents any final

crystallisation; in the last ten years 8,515,000 strangers have

entered into the great hospitable Union. They came from Germany,

Ireland, Russia, or Southern Italy. It is calculated that the United

States are able to assimilate 150,000 to 200,000 immigrants each

year, but they certainly cannot welcome such an overwhelming host

without anxiety.

Criminality increases; the elaboration of a {311} common type among

these men of different origin is proceeding more slowly. Doubtless

beneath the shelter of the political federation of the various States

a confused agglomeration of races is forming itself, and this

justifies the query of Professor Ripley: "The Americans of the

North," he says, "have witnessed the disappearance of the Indians and

the buffalo, but can they be certain to-day that the Anglo-Saxons

will survive them?"

In seeking to imitate the United States we should not forget that the

civilisation of the peoples of the North presents these symptoms of

decadence.

Europe offers the Latin-American democracies what the latter demand

of Anglo-Saxon America, which was formed in the school of Europe. We

find the practical spirit, industrialism, and political liberty in

England; organisation and education in Germany; and in France

inventive genius, culture, wealth, great universities, and democracy.

From these ruling peoples the new Latin world must indirectly receive

the legacy of Western civilisation.

Essential points of difference separate the two Americas.

Differences of language and therefore of spirit; the difference

between Spanish Catholicism and the multiform Protestantism of the

Anglo-Saxons; between the Yankee individualism and the omnipotence of

the State natural to the nations of the South. In their origin, as

in their race, we find fundamental antagonisms; the evolution of the

North is slow and obedient to the lessons of time, to the influences

of custom; the history of the southern peoples is full of

revolutions, rich with dreams of an unattainable perfection.

The people of the United States hate the half-breed, and the impure

marriages of whites and blacks which take place in Southern homes; no

manifestation of Pan-Americanism could suffice to destroy the racial

prejudice as it exists north of Mexico. The {312} half-breeds and

their descendants govern the Ibero-American democracies, and the

Republic of English and German origin entertains for the men of the

tropics the same contempt which they feel for the slaves of Virginia

whom Lincoln liberated.

In its friendship for them there will always be disdain; in their

progress, a conquest; in their policy, a desire of hegemony. It is

the fatality of blood, stronger than political affinities or

geographical alliances.

Instead of dreaming of an impossible fusion the Neo-Latin peoples

should conserve the traditions which are proper to them. The

development of the European influences which enrich and improve them,

the purging of the nation from the stain of miscegenation, and

immigration of a kind calculated to form centres of resistance

against any possibilities of conquest, are the various aspects of

this Latin Americanism.[3]

[1] The United States as World-Power.

[2] _Race Improvement in the United States_. Academy of Political

and Social Science, Philadelphia, 1909, pp. 70-1 _et seq_.

[3] The Mexican sociologist, F. Bulnes, writes in his book, _L'Avenir

des nations Hispano-Americaines_: "It is more than probable that by

1980 the United States will hold a population of 250,000,000

inhabitants. They will then scarcely be sufficient for the needs of

this population, and will no longer be able to supply the world with

the vast quantity of cereals which they supply to-day. They will

therefore have to choose between a recourse to the methods of

intensive culture and the conquest of the extra-tropical lands of

Latin America, which are fitted, by their conditions, to the easy and

inexpensive production of excellent cereals."

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