relics in Normandy, is told by the Norman writers in many different
forms, more or less inconsistent with each other, and some of them
demonstrably incorrect; and it is impossible to discover the truth.
That William accused Harold of perjury all over Europe, and that no
answer was attempted, is evidence that something of the sort had
happened. As Professor Freeman points out, the absolute silence of all
the English chroniclers implies that they did not know how to meet the
accusation. Harold must have taken some such oath, under some form of
coercion, and so have given his enemy an advantage; but obviously it
would have been a greater crime to keep such an oath than to break it.
Obviously too, on any version of the story that is not self-refuted,
William's conduct was far more dishonourable than Harold's.
[3] Professor Freeman's great History of the Norman Conquest contains
a very minute discussion of every point of detail, and a narrative
framed by laboriously piecing together the statements which on careful
comparison he deems most correct. Much of this is very valuable, though
there is at least one important point in which his account cannot be
right. Much of it is more or less wasted labour, because it involves
giving a precise meaning to expressions in the authorities which were
probably used loosely. The main outlines are clear enough, the details
are at least partially conjectural, and inferences based on physical
facts are a safer guide, so far as they go, than interpretations of the
inconsistent and perhaps unmeaning language of monkish writers.
There is also the Bayeux Tapestry, which has been reproduced by Mr.
Collingwood Bruce, and which for costume and arms is invaluable: but
from the nature of the case it is a very poor guide in determining the
tactics of the battle. To rely on it for such purposes, as Professor
Freeman and others do, seems to me as unreasonable as to deduce a
military history of the battle of Agincourt from Shakespeare's _Henry
V._, as put on the stage.
[4] A vehement controversy has raged since Professor Freeman's death
regarding the accuracy of his narrative, the point most strenuously
disputed being his statement that Harold's front was protected by a
solid wooden barrier. It is maintained in opposition that there was
nothing but the wall of interlaced shields familiar to both Saxons and
Danes. Without entering into the controversy, I content myself with
saying that while the weight of testimony seems to be in favour of some
kind of obstacle having been erected, I am satisfied, for the reasons
given in the text, that there cannot have been anything like the
massive structure described by Professor Freeman.
[5] It must have been later in reality; since sunrise, the whole Norman
army had marched seven miles, had halted, and had then been arrayed in
order of battle, and this on October 14. Moreover, such a battle could
not have lasted nine hours, and it certainly ended at dark.
[6] This suggestion is not based on any direct statement, but it seems
to be the only way in which the archers could have aimed effectually.
If they had been behind the horsemen, shooting over their heads, the
arrows would have been as likely to strike Normans as Saxons.
[7] Harold's tomb was shown at Waltham down to the date of the
dissolution of the abbey. There is no positive information on the
point, but there seems no reason for rejecting the explanation that
William afterwards allowed the corpse of Harold to be removed to
Waltham. It is at least much more probable than that a falsehood should
have been allowed to pass unchallenged.
[8] This word, which is of course French but was adopted in English
with the same signification, definitely means a body of men, originally
mailed horsemen, drawn up together; but it implies nothing as to their
formation or strength. The usual practice was to form three; the
vanguard, which became ordinarily the right when in line of battle;
the rearguard, which similarly became the left; and the main battle
or centre. In the Latin chroniclers the equivalent term is generally
_acies_, which occasionally leads to some confusion in interpreting
their statements, as the classical sense of _acies_ is order of battle,
as contrasted with _agmen_, order of march.
[9] It is suggested that this was a waggon, such as was habitually
used in Italy at an earlier date, and occasionally at least in England
(as at the battle of the Standard), to carry to battle the standard of
the town. The earl's standard certainly floated over it, and attracted
prince Edward's attention: and from the account given of the prisoners
being shut up in it, it would seem to have been very substantially
built. Montfort however would hardly have travelled in such a waggon,
and certainly the royalists imagined he was in it. There is no reason
except the silence of the chroniclers why there should not have been
both a _carroccio_, and also Montfort's own carriage.
[10] As he had not been crowned at Rome he had no right to use the
imperial title.
[11] The name itself may very possibly be derived from the event.
[12] There are the remains of an ancient bridge at this spot, where
so many of the fugitives from the battle were cut to pieces that the
meadow bears the name of Dead Man's Eyot: but there is no mention of a
bridge in the authorities, so that probably the bridge was built later.
[13] Here again I have given the account which seems to me most
probable, after study of the ground and of the authorities. Professor
Prothero, in his _Life of Simon de Montfort_ (p. 339 note), gives the
different possibilities, and comes to a conclusion differing from mine
on one point only.
[14] Philip IV. was playing the same game, over-asserting his claims as
feudal suzerain over Guienne.
[15] A map showing all this part of Scotland will be found at p. 147.
[16] The first victory of the pike was gained by the Flemings at
Courtrai, five years later.
[17] All accounts agree in representing the English numbers as more
than double the Scottish, with an enormous superiority in men-at-arms,
the most important item.
[18] The use of the crossbow was solemnly condemned by the Lateran
Council of 1139: no reasons were given, but presumably it was thought
that the cross-bow neutralised the natural, and therefore divinely
intended, advantage of superior strength.
[19] There is a statute of Henry VIII. which forbids practising at any
less distance.
[20] The so-called Salic law had never been heard of till Philip V.
evolved it for his own purposes a few years before: but the principle
of exclusive male succession is a natural one for a feudally organised
nation to adopt.
[21] Louis VII. of France had it is true married the heiress of
Aquitaine and ruled the province for a few years, but only in her name:
and she soon repudiated him, to marry Henry II. of England.
[22] This is said by Froissart to have been done on the advice of
Godfrey of Harcourt, who was certainly one of the king's most trusted
officers during the campaign, habitually leading the advanced guard.
[23] He was in the county of Ponthieu, which had been the portion of
Margaret of France, second wife of Edward I. He was not descended from
her, but from Eleanor of Castile: there does not however seem to have
been any provision for Ponthieu being inherited by Margaret's children.
[24] _Herse_ has another and less familiar meaning, which still better
corresponds to the formation indicated—the stands used in churches for
seven candles, the centre one forming the apex, and those at the sides
gradually lower.
[25] This theory is so far as I know novel, and I put it forward as a
suggestion for what it may be worth. It explains, I venture to think,
the extraordinary success of the English tactics, and it contradicts
no ascertained facts. Every one who knows a little about drill will
see that in this formation the archers would be able to change the
direction of their shooting with perfect ease, and without interfering
with each other. The archers cannot have been on the flanks of the
whole line only, or their arrows, long as the range was, would not have
told across the whole front. They could obviously move with ease and
rapidity, and it is quite possible that they may have formed a line
in front of the dismounted men-at-arms, when no attack was impending,
as for instance to encounter the Genoese, and have fallen back to the
_herse_ when the knights were seen preparing to charge.
[26] There is no need to insist on the picturesque detail of the rain
which fell just before the battle having wetted the strings of the
cross-bows, while the English kept their bows under cover. It may well
have been true: but the range of the long-bow was always greater than
that of the cross-bow.
[27] It is convenient to use this word for those who were fighting in
the English cause: but as a matter of fact two-thirds of the Black
Prince's men-at-arms were from among his Gascon subjects, and the
_servientes_ therefore in about the same proportion. The archers
doubtless were all, or nearly all, English: there is no trace of the
long-bow except in English armies.
[28] I am indebted for these details, except so far as they are from my
own observation, to Colonel Babinet, a retired French officer living
at Poitiers, who has published in the _Bulletin des Antiquaires de
l'Ouest_ a very elaborate memoir on the battle, which he has kindly
supplemented by private letters. His study of the topography has been
most minute, and his conclusions about it, so far as I can judge,
are entirely sound. If there were many investigators as patient and
careful, historians would find many battles less perplexing. Every one
who attempts to understand the battle of Poitiers must feel grateful to
Colonel Babinet, even if he does not accept all that gentleman's views
as to the course of events.
[29] The Chandos Herald was in the service of Sir John Chandos, one
of the Black Prince's best officers. The herald was not apparently
present, but he obviously must have had every means of knowing about
the battle, in which Sir John fought; he did not, however, publish
his rhymed narrative till some thirty years later. Froissart, who
was nineteen years old in 1356, devoted his whole life to the work
of his history; he was familiar with courts, if not with camps,
indefatigable in acquiring information, but not critical. He too had
ample opportunities of learning all about the battle of Poitiers, at
any rate from the English side. The manuscripts of Froissart, however,
vary greatly, which casts a certain doubt over the trustworthiness of
such details as are not given identically in all. Baker was a clerk
of Swinbrook in Oxfordshire: the last words of his chronicle were
written before the peace of Bretigny in 1360, so that he was even more
strictly contemporary than Froissart. Several passages in his history,
in which he makes very definite statements about the tactics of the
long-bow, prove that he, or his informant, understood military matters
well. None of them can have seen the ground, and therefore no stress
need be laid on minor inaccuracies of description. Mistakes about the
names of actors in the drama might easily be made: all that can be said
is that the writer who has made fewest errors has a slightly better
claim to general credibility. None of them can be deemed likely to
have deliberately misrepresented, or to have been totally misinformed
about the ground-work of the whole story. Yet there is the fact, that
their narratives are substantially contradictory. Critical ingenuity
may no doubt patch up some sort of superficial reconciliation between
them, but it can only be superficial. Under these conditions I have
no alternative but to follow the narrative which seems to be most in
accordance with the known facts. I am not ignorant of the difficulties
involved in this course, but my plan does not admit of a full
discussion of every point that might be raised. On the whole I incline
to discard the Chandos Herald, the more so because none of the less
detailed narratives support him, and as between Froissart and Baker,
to prefer the latter. My account of the actual battle will therefore
follow the chronicle of Baker of Swinbrook, in all matters in which he
and Froissart are completely at variance.
[30] According to Baker, the prince began this movement _cum
cariagiis_, to which, however, there is no further reference. It
is obviously possible that the prince may have wished to get the
baggage out of the way, and therefore started it towards the Gué de
l'Homme, and that he shifted his troops in order to cover this from
the French. If so, this would be the element of truth in the Chandos
Herald's narrative; but it does not in any way remove the essential
contradiction between the Chandos Herald and the other authorities.
[31] Froissart calls him Thomas lord of Berkeley, a young man in his
first battle, and says he was son of Sir Maurice Berkeley, who died at
Calais a few years before. Thomas the then lord of Berkeley, and elder
brother of that Sir Maurice, was in the battle, but he was a man of
over fifty, and he had his son Maurice with him for his first campaign.
That Baker should be right, and Froissart wrong, on a point peculiarly
within Froissart's province, is a striking incidental testimony to
Baker's trustworthiness.
[32] The name was derived from Bernard Count of Armagnac, the duke's
father-in-law, who gave the party most of its energy.
[33] _Henry V._ Act iv. Scene 3. Shakespeare has introduced the
incidents told by the English authors with much accuracy, but has gone
quite wrong as to the persons concerned. The wish was expressed by Sir
W. Hungerford, not by the earl of Westmoreland, who was in England.
Henry's chaplain makes the king's words more pious, if less poetical;
and the piety was certainly in keeping with his character.
[34] Comparatively recent plantations slightly obscure the ground,
making minute accuracy impossible: but the general character of the
field, and its main details, are quite clearly to be seen.
[35] The numbers of Henry's original force can be closely computed
from original documents; and there exists also part of a list of the
gentlemen present at Agincourt, with the numbers of their contingents.
Estimating from the latter, the total number of combatants was far
below 10,000.
[36] _Boulevard_ is the technical name for a kind of earthwork used
in the early days of cannon. It was a sort of terrace, protected by
a parapet, on which cannon could be planted as an outer defence to a
fortress, and might be of any shape. The technical name for the small
forts which the English gradually erected round Orleans is _bastide_.
[37] The formation of a fortified post by means of the camp-waggons was
a fundamental part of the tactics of John Zisca, the long successful
leader of the Bohemian insurrection a few years earlier. The _lager_
which is a feature now well known of African warfare, is the same thing
in principle.
[38] This is of course not the first instance of a siege approximating
to the modern type. The siege of Harfleur already mentioned was in fact
more like a modern siege than that of Orleans.
[39] Sir Edward Creasy goes so far as to place the relief of Orleans
among the fifteen _Decisive Battles of the World_.
[40] The Beauforts had been duly legitimated by Parliament, but Henry
IV., in confirming this to his half-brothers, had inserted words in
his charter which barred their succession to the throne. The strict
legality of the latter act can hardly be maintained: but it is plain
that no one dreamed of preferring the Beauforts to the house of York.
[41] In Chapter II. I abstained from giving the numbers at Hastings,
because there seem to me to be no adequate materials for forming a
trustworthy estimate: but it is scarcely possible that the armies which
fought at Hastings can have been within many thousands of the total
given by chroniclers for Towton.
[42] It is possible that the numbers are exaggerated, but there is no
reason for thinking so except the smallness of the battle-field; and
if so the exaggeration was on both sides alike, for it is certain that
the Lancastrian numbers preponderated. The Yorkist force is given at
49,000 by the authorities who put the Lancastrians at 60,000, both
totals being given before any fighting had taken place. What losses had
been incurred at Ferrybridge we are not told, and we can only guess at
the strength of the Yorkist rearguard: but the numbers with which the
battle began cannot have been very far from seven to four.
[43] Sir John Ramsay, in his generally valuable work, _Lancaster and_
_York_, places Warwick's line along the high-road, where there is every
reason to believe that there was no hedge at all in the fifteenth
century, for the amazing reason that "from that position he could take
the king's troops in detail as they came out of the narrow street of
Barnet," which ended in the open heath half-a-mile off. It is true that
he adds, "but Edward always laughed at Warwick's strategy," by which
presumably he means tactics. Since all that Edward knew of Warwick's
tactics was that he had inspired, or at least shared in directing,
the bold and skilful tactics of Towton, he must have been very easily
amused.
[44] This fact alone is sufficient to disprove the Yorkist falsehood
that while Warwick had 30,000 men, Edward had but 9000.
[45] The numbers are not very clearly given, but the accounts seem
to indicate no great disparity, with the advantage, if any, to the
Lancastrians.
[46] Sir John Ramsay must have seen the ground in winter, if he was
able to obtain a view of the whole position. In summer the trees, which
are none of them ancient, intercept a great deal. I should be inclined
to think that the Lancastrian line faced nearly south instead of
parallel to the modern road, as he places it: otherwise he seems to me
to have worked out the topographical details very well.
[47] Curiously enough the earliest cannon seem to have been
breechloading. This mode of construction was however abandoned after
a time, either because the movable pieces did not fit properly, or
because they could not be made strong enough to stand the strain when
gunpowder came to be thoroughly explosive, in favour of muzzle-loading.
In modern warfare, until after the Crimean War, cannon were mere metal
tubes, with a touch-hole by which they were fired. Things have moved
fast since then. Of the millions of men now under military service, how
many have a clear idea of what "spiking a gun" meant?
[48] I use this phrase for convenience' sake, to mean the shot
discharged by every kind of hand firearms until the introduction of the
rifle.
[49] This especially held good of the heavy plate armour which was
introduced in the fourteenth century, and grew heavier and heavier.
There seems to have been hardly any chain mail which a clothyard arrow
could not pierce.
[50] There had been many Scots in the service of Gustavus: and this
fact made the Scottish intervention in the English civil war more
weighty than it would otherwise have been.
[51] It is significant of the superior importance of the cavalry in the
seventeenth century that the lieutenant-general, second in command,
led the cavalry, the infantry being under the major-general, third in
command.
[52] The letter is rather confused, but it can hardly bear this
meaning, though it undoubtedly authorised fighting a battle.
[53] Switzerland need not be forgotten, but Switzerland could under no
circumstances have wielded the European influence exerted by English
ideas, backed by the vast power, military, naval and commercial, of the
England of Marlborough, and Chatham, and Nelson.
[54] Hodgson, an officer who was in the battle, says that Cromwell sent
four regiments to circle round the enclosures of Brocksmouth House and
fall on the enemy's right flank. Such a manœuvre was hard to work
accurately in the dark, but if successful was bound to be decisive.
The evidence is good: but this very decisiveness makes me hesitate to
believe that Cromwell himself, to say nothing of other narrators, could
have described the battle without mentioning so important a fact.
[55] Quoted from Cromwell's despatch to the Speaker.
[56] The Margrave of Baden helped to drive Marlborough to this extreme
haste: he had claimed the chief command on the junction of the armies,
and had with difficulty been induced to agree that it should be
exercised by himself and Marlborough on alternate days. The Margrave
was far too cautious to storm the Schellenberg: Marlborough had
therefore to attack that evening or to wait two days, which would have
been too late.
[57] This devastation is always regarded as a blot on Marlborough's
fame, and is in marked contrast to his usual humanity. The practice was
dying out, in obedience to the dictates of opinion, but it was not yet,
as it would be now, an outrage on international usage.
[58] The village which gives its name to the battle is properly called
Blindheim: but the spelling in the text has been adopted in English
ever since Marlborough's day.
[59] The famous lines of Torres Vedras are the only instance in more
modern times of such a method of defence proving successful, and they
could not, from the nature of the case, be turned, and were never
assailed. The system on which the eastern frontier of France is now
defended is an instance of the same thing on the greatest possible
scale. There the flanks abut on neutral countries, and cannot therefore
be turned without violating the neutrality of either Belgium or
Switzerland. What it would cost to break through such a line cannot
be calculated, for it would depend on the effect, as yet untried, of
modern scientific developments in explosives, electric communication
and the like: but it can hardly be doubted that it could be done, if
the assailant were willing to pay the price.
[60] A map in which Marlborough's Belgian campaigns can be followed,
will be found at p. 234.
[61] The duke of Burgundy was associated with Vendôme, in accordance
with the vicious method which Louis XIV. frequently adopted. It was
assumed that the young and inexperienced prince would be entirely
guided by the veteran general: but it occasionally happened that the
prince developed a will of his own, and then the veteran was helpless.
How far Burgundy interfered before the battle, how far Vendôme's
well-known sluggishness except in action was responsible for the French
being thus surprised, is not quite clear: it will be seen that in the
actual battle Burgundy, by his alternate hesitation and rashness,
largely caused the French defeat.
[62] General Webb, who commanded the escort, beat off with great
skill and courage a very superior force: Marlborough, who disliked
Webb, in his despatches made so very little of this exploit, which in
fact sealed the fate of Lille, that it was even said he had wilfully
given Webb inadequate numbers, in order to expose him to destruction.
Thackeray makes effective use of this in _Esmond_.
[63] This account of Wolfe's death is quoted from Parkman's _Montcalm
and Wolfe_, on which most interesting work the foregoing narrative is
based. There are several versions of Wolfe's dying words, but Parkman,
after comparing the evidence, accepts that given above.
[64] Had Wellington's base of operations been Cadiz instead of Lisbon,
every step in advance would have pushed the French nearer to their
base, and therefore would have rendered the conditions of supply, etc.,
increasingly favourable to them. A successful advance from Portugal on
Madrid cut off the whole south from easy communication with France,
without which they could not long maintain their ground.
[65] He was only created Lord Wellington after the battle of Talavera,
but it is convenient to use the familiar title all through.
[66] All the quotations in this and the following chapter are from
Napier.
[67] This is the battle which, in a school-book I once saw, was
described as a glorious victory won by 29,000 French over 90,000
English and Spaniards.
[68] Maida and Vimiero were real defeats, but the numbers engaged were
insignificant. Aspern was a great and bloody battle, in which the
French on the whole got the worst of it, but it was hardly a distinct
Austrian victory.
[69] The exploits of Craufurd, with the light division, acting as
Wellington's advanced guard, are the subject of some of Napier's best
writing.
[70] The disastrous Walcheren expedition, which started while the
battle of Talavera was being fought, had wasted a large part of the
military strength of England. Sent as it was after Napoleon had
forced Austria again to sue for peace, and badly conducted, it was
an inevitable failure. This being the case, it is of course true
that the men and material would have been more usefully employed in
the Peninsula. But it is by no means equally clear that the original
idea was faulty. Had even a smaller force, energetically led, been
despatched to the same point two months earlier, when Napoleon was
still absorbed in remedying his failure at Aspern, the consequences
might have been enormous. At the very least it could have ruined
Antwerp for purposes of naval construction; and Napoleon deemed
Antwerp, "a pistol pointed at the heart of England," so valuable that
in 1814, when almost at the last gasp, he broke off negotiations for
peace rather than cede Antwerp.
[71] King Joseph was indeed declared commander-in-chief in March 1812,
but the marshals disputed his authority, and denounced his plans as
unwise. Their criticisms were not unreasonable, but "one bad general is
better than two good ones."
[72] Belgium had been for over twenty years annexed to France. Holland
had been entirely under French influence almost as long, and annexed
to France for six years. Hence the people were either partisans of the
French, or in great dread of them.
[73] In fact this proportion is in some sense far too high. Many of
the English had never seen a shot fired, and though they stood on the
defensive with admirable steadiness, it is at least doubtful whether
they would have been effective for manœuvring.
[74] During the interval the duke of Wellington attended the famous
ball at Brussels given by the duchess of Richmond. It is always a pity
to spoil a romantic story; but the idea derived from the beautiful
description in 'Childe Harold,' and probably still believed by the
majority of those who have not studied the history, that the first
intimation of the French advance was given by the sound of distant
cannon heard at the ball, is contrary to all the facts. Wellington,
having given his orders, went to the ball in order to prevent alarm
spreading in Brussels: there was no firing during the night, none in
fact, that could have been heard at that distance, till the following
afternoon.
[75] The duke's father had also been killed in battle against Napoleon,
at Jena. After Quatre-Bras the Brunswick troops wore black uniforms
with skull and crossbone badges, in token of mourning, until their
young duke came of age.
[76] This would doubtless have happened if the whole of Ney's nominal
command had been united. Napoleon however seems to have expected that
Quatre-Bras would not be held by any serious force.
[77] The mention of Liège shows how vague the Emperor's ideas were
at the moment; it is hard to see how Wellington, known to be moving
straight north on Brussels, could take a position to cover Liège.
[78] This regiment was commanded by Marbot, whose memoirs attracted so
much attention when published in 1891.
[79] Those who say that Waterloo was lost by Grouchy's fault have
to get over the fact that Napoleon took no steps, till it was far
too late, to summon him thither. The emperor knew that Wellington
was standing to fight, Grouchy could only guess. Suppose Gneisenau's
suspicions had been realised, and Wellington had retreated, and the
cannon had been Napoleon attacking Blucher _viâ_ St. Lambert, Grouchy
would, by crossing the Dyle, have lost the chance of annihilating the
Prussians.
[80] Wellington is said to have told the story of his midnight
ride about twenty years afterwards, _à propos_ of his famous horse
Copenhagen. He was not the kind of man to invent such a story, and
his well-known reticence about Waterloo would fully account for
the incident remaining unknown. On the other hand its intrinsic
improbability is so great, that it can hardly be accepted without
cogent evidence. The testimony however is altogether at second-hand,
though quite precise enough to warrant belief in an ordinary way; but
it is obviously reasonable to require something more for a story which
would sound scarcely credible if told of any commander-in-chief, and is
specially at variance with Wellington's cool and prudent disposition.
[81] This was entirely untrue in fact, as we have seen, but if the
troops at Hal had been on the field it would have been nearly true.
Napoleon could only have guessed, as the ground concealed a great part
of Wellington's army: this is not one of the deliberate falsehoods of
which he was only too commonly guilty.
[82] It is impossible to conjecture what put this idea into Ney's mind,
as the English army had bivouacked in very nearly the order of battle,
and had therefore not moved in the morning.
[83] It must be remembered that the range of the musket was very short,
so that the bullets could hardly do mischief in neighbouring squares if
they missed the cavalry.
[84] Readers who are curious in mendacity should read in Napoleon's
Correspondence the bulletin dated Lâon, June 20, 1815, in which the
battles of Ligny and Waterloo are reported.
[85] Napoleon's Egyptian expedition is no real exception: it reached
its destination, but the battle of the Nile rendered it a total failure.
[86] It was said that Captain Nolan, the aide-de-camp who bore the
order, and who was well known from his writings to be a firm believer
in the power of cavalry to perform the most impossible feats,
answered Lord Lucan's objections by putting on the written words an
interpretation which Lord Raglan did not intend, and that Lord Lucan
was stung by implied imputation on his courage. Nolan however was shot
dead at the first moment of the charge, and there was consequently no
means of knowing what he could have said in his own defence.
[87] On the other side of the Tchernaya are some conspicuous remains of
ancient walls known as the ruins of Inkerman: from these the allies,
who found it convenient to have names for all portions of the ground
they were concerned with, named the opposite portion of the plateau
Mount Inkerman.
[88] It is not suggested that the French general at the outset, or
later, evaded his due share of the common duty: it is one of the evils
of a divided command that if a mistake is made in such a matter, as
may easily happen from imperfect information, obstacles to remedying
it arise from motives on both sides which are in themselves perfectly
reasonable.
[89] _Decisive Battles of India._
[90] Englishmen in India made many mistakes at one time or another,
but there was always some one at hand to redeem the blunder, or else
they were saved by the reputation for audacity and invincibility due
to previous successes. They were guilty of many wrongful acts, but
the sufferers were the native princes whom they dispossessed: it is
probably no exaggeration to say that the rule of the English at its
worst was better than the best government of any native princes.
[91] Colonel Malleson, in his _Decisive Battles of India_, gives a very
clear account of this remarkable feat, as well as of other similar
battles, which must be here passed over.
[92] In memory of this great victory the 39th bears on its colours the
motto "Primus in Indis."
[93] Sindia, Holkar, Bhonslay, are family appellations, but they
serve to identify three of the chief Mahratta states better than the
individual names of the successive rulers.
[94] It is said that Wellesley had no information that the Kaitna was
fordable there, but that he inferred it from the fact of there being
another village opposite Assye, and no sort of bridge.
[95] The parallel is singularly exact between the conduct of the three
great Mahratta princes in 1803-4 and that of Austria, Russia and
Prussia in 1805-6. The two former made war on Napoleon, trying in vain
to induce Prussia to join them: after they had been decisively defeated
at Austerlitz, Prussia alone attacked the conqueror, with the natural
result of being still worse beaten at Jena.
[96] This method of attack in oblique order, or in échelon, is by some
writers treated as a great discovery, attributed to Frederick the Great
of Prussia. He certainly won by these tactics his most conspicuous
victory, Rossbach: but the method itself is in the nature of things,
as soon as generals begin to use their brains; it is but one way of
bringing superior force to bear on a vital point.
[97] There is a story that Major George Lawrence, then a prisoner,
communicated to his brother, and so to the commander-in-chief, the
surprise which the Sikh officers had expressed to him at the small use
made of the English artillery in previous battles. This may be true,
but there is no need to suppose that this influenced the battle of
Gujerat: any officer of ordinary judgment would have done at all times
what Gough did only in his last battle.
INDEX
Abbeville, ford of Somme at, 60
_Acies_, order of battle, 30
— why necessarily a line, 175
— mediæval use of word, 30
Afghan war, its cause, 305
— failure of, 306
Agincourt, battle of, 5, 87 _sqq._
_Agmen_, order of march, 30, 175
Albuera, battle of, 211
Aliwal, battle of, 310
Alma, battle of, 272
Almanza, battle of, 169
Almaraz, bridge on Tagus, 223
Almeida, fortress on Portuguese frontier, 206, 216
— taken by Massena, 207
— re-taken by Wellington, 211
America, rivalry of England and France in, 179, 183
— War of Independence, 194
Angus, E. of, before Flodden, 120
Arapiles hills at Salamanca, 224
Archers, Norman, at Hastings, 25
— at Falkirk, 44
— at Bannockburn, 48, 49
— formation of, for defence, 62
— at Crecy, 63
— at Poitiers, 76, 77
— at Agincourt, 90
— at Verneuil, 93
— at Towton, 108
— at Flodden, 126
(_See also_ Long-bow.)
Arcot, Clive's defence of, 295
Argaum, battle of, 303
Armagnac faction in France, 81, 92
Armies, standing, begin at end of Middle Ages, 129
— — none in England in Civil War, 129
— — feeling against, in England, 151
— — become necessary, 152
_Arrivall of King Edward_, 113
Artillery, developed before hand firearms, 115
— long of little use save in sieges, 116
— gave supremacy to crown, 116
— at siege of Harfleur, 82
— — Orleans, 97
— — Sebastopol, 286
— at Minden, 185
Artillery at Alma, 272
— at Gujerat, 314
— Sikhs strong in, 307
— earliest was breechloading, 115
Aspern, battle of, 205
Assye, battle of, 302
Atherton Moor, battle of, 132
Auberoche, battle of, 56
Auckland, Lord, Governor-General of India, 306
Audacity often the best policy:
— at Oudenarde, 171
— at Talavera, 203
— at Balaclava, 278
— with Orientals, 290, 302
Axe, main weapon of English at Hastings, 21
Babinet, Col., his memoir on battle of Poitiers, 71_n_
Badajos, position of, 206, 218
— surrendered to French, 210
— sieges of, 211, 218
Baden, Margrave of, in Blenheim campaign, 157
Baillie, Scottish general at Marston Moor, 137
Baker of Swinbrook, 75_n_
— his account of Bannockburn, 47, 49
— — Crecy, 62
— — Poitiers, 76
Balaclava, flank march to, 274
— battle of, 276
Balliol, John, K. of Scotland, 41
Bannockburn, battle of, 4, 48
— consequences of, 50
— compared to Crecy, 67
Barbour, his life of Bruce, 47
Barnard, Gen., at Delhi, 318
Barnet, battle of, 111
_Bastide_, 93_n_
Battle Abbey, 23
Battles, nature of interest in, 1 _sqq._
— locality of, how determined, 4
— mediæval meaning of word, 30_n_
— cannot be understood if isolated, 3
— lessons from, 6
Bavaria, Elector of, in Blenheim campaign, 157
Bayeux tapestry, 20_n_
Bayonet, invention of, 116
Bedford, Regent, 92
Belgian troops in Wellington's army, 240
— at Quatre Bras, 243
— at Waterloo, 254
Bengal, conquest of, 299
Berar, rajah of, 301
Beresford, Gen., at Albuera, 211
Berkeley, Sir M., at Poitiers, 77
Berwick, captured by Edward I., 43
— James duke of, 169
Black Prince at Crecy, 64
— his raid through France, 68
— takes position at Poitiers, 70
— negotiates for peace, 74
— leads final charge in battle, 78
— his death, 79
Blake, Spanish general at Albuera, 211
Blenheim, French position at, 159
— scheme of allies for attacking, 161
— details of battle, 162
— importance of victory, 164
Blucher, marshal, in Waterloo campaign, 239
— co-operation with Wellington, 245, 249, 263
— defeated at Ligny, 246
— retreats on Wavre, 247
— his personal zeal, 259
Bohemia, John K. of, at Crecy, 64
Bosquet, Gen., at Inkerman, 283
_Boulevard_, 91_n_
Bretigny, treaty of, 78
Britons, conquered by Romans, 9
— — by Saxons, 10
Broglie, D. of, at Minden, 184
Bruce, Robt. K. of Scotland, 46
— his tactics at Bannockburn, 47
— his exploit before the battle, 48
Brunswick, D. of, killed at Quatre Bras, 244
Brussels, in Waterloo campaign, 243
Bulow, Gen., in Waterloo campaign, 242, 259, 262
Burgos, siege of, 227
Burgundy, John D. of, murdered, 92
— Philip D. of, sides with English, 92
— — abandons them, 99
— Charles D. of, helps Edward IV., 109
— Louis D. of, at Oudenarde, 170
Busaco, battle of, 208
Cabul, 306
Cadogan, Gen., at Oudenarde, 171
Calais, siege of, 64
— Henry V. marches for, 82
Calcutta, Black Hole of, 296
Cambuskenneth, battle of, 42
Campbell, Sir Colin, at Balaclava, 275
— at Chillianwalla, 313
— at Gujerat, 314
— relieves Lucknow, 316
Cannon. _See_ Artillery
Captal de Buch at Poitiers, 77
Cardigan, E. of, at Balaclava, 277
Cardinerie, La, on field of Poitiers, 70
Cathcart, Gen., killed at Inkerman, 282
Cauveripak, Clive's victory at, 296
Cavalry, mailed. _See_ Men-at-Arms
— cannot stand on defensive, 73
— most important arm in 17th century, 130
— at Edgehill, 131
— at Marston Moor, 138
— at Naseby, 143
— element of weakness in line of battle at Blenheim, 160
— — at Minden, 185
— not properly used after Ligny, 247
— French, at Waterloo, 260
— Russian, in Crimea not used, 274
— English, at Balaclava, 277, 278
— Mahratta, 300
Challenge to single combat sent by William I., 22
— — Henry V., 82
— to fight a battle sent to Henry V., 83
— — to James IV. of Scotland, 120
Chandernagore, 297
Charleroi, 242
Charles VI. of France, 81, 92
Charles I., precipitated civil war, 129
— at Edgehill, 131
— besieges Gloucester, 132
— drives Essex into Cornwall, 140
— mismanages Naseby campaign, 142
— takes refuge with Scots, 144
— executed, 145
Charles II. begins standing army, 151
Cheriton, battle of, 133
Chillianwalla, battle of, 312
Chroniclers, mediæval, their weak points, 16, 19, 20_n_, 32, 47, 72, 113
Church supported William the Conqueror, 14
Churchill, Gen., at Blenheim, 162
Ciudad Rodrigo, position of, 206
— sieges of, 207, 216
Civil War, peculiar character of, 128
— local division of parties in, 130
Clausel, Gen., at Salamanca, 226
Clifford, Ld., at Towton, 104
Clive, Robert, founded English power in India, 295
— sent to recover Calcutta, 296
— allies secretly with Meer Jaffier, 297
— wins Plassy, 299
Cnut divided England into earldoms, 11
Colborne, Col., at Waterloo, 262
Column, definition of, 176
— English, at Fontenoy, 181
— _versus_ line. _See_ Line
Combination of different arms at Hastings, 25
— at Falkirk, 45
— at Crecy, 61, 73
Conquest, when impossible, 46
Contades, marshal, at Minden, 184
Coote, Eyre, at Plassy, 297
Cornwall, Essex driven into, 140
— Rd. Earl of, at Lewes, 31
Corunna, battle of, 198
Courtrai, battle of, 45
Craufurd, Gen. R., marches to Talavera, 202
— on the Coa, 206_n_
— at Busaco, 208
— killed at Ciudad Rodrigo, 217
Crawford, L., parliamentary general, 134
Crecy, battle of, 61 _sqq._
— novelty of tactics, 61
— an epoch in art of war, 67
Cressingham, killed at Cambuskenneth, 42
Crevant, battle of, 92
Crimean war, state of Europe before, 268
— general causes of, 267
— material novelties in, 286
— results of, 287
Cromwell, Oliver, at Edgehill, 130
— forms Ironsides, 133
— at Marston Moor, 138
— urges Self-denying Ordinance, 141
— his raid round Oxford, 142
— at Naseby, 144
— sent to invade Scotland, 145
— held in check by Leslie, 145
— retreats to Dunbar, 146
— wins battle, 149
— at Worcester, 150
Cross-bow, condemned by Lateran Council, 51_n_
— encouraged by Richard I., 51
— no match for long-bow, 63
— -men, Genoese, at Crecy, 63
Cuesta, Gen., at Talavera, 201
Culloden, battle of, 183
Cumberland, D. of, at Fontenoy, 181
— at Culloden, 183
Cutts, Gen., at Blenheim, 162
D'Albret, Constable of France, at Agincourt, 89
Danes, invade England, 10
— mode of fighting of, 10
— conquer England under Cnut, 11
Daventry, Charles I. at, 143
Defences, artificial, at Hastings, 21
— — at Poitiers, 74
Delhi, mutiny centred at, 317
— siege of, formed, 318
— storming of, 320
D'Erlon, Gen., on day of Quatre Bras, 245
— at Waterloo, 258, 261
Dettingen, battle of, 181
Dhuleep Sing, 311
Discipline, definition of, 288
Divided command, evils of, at Marston Moor, 135
— in War of Spanish Succession, 156
— at Oudenarde, 171
— at Fontenoy, 181
— in Peninsula generally, 215
— at Albuera, 211
— in Crimea, 273, 285
Donauwerth, Marlborough crosses Danube at, 158
Dost Mahommed, 306
Douro, Wellington forces passage of, 200
Duguesclin, Constable of France, 79
Dunbar, battle of, 149
Dunois, his testimony as to influence of Jeanne d'Arc, 96
Dupleix, 295
Dutch, troublesome allies to Marlborough, 156, 166
Edgehill, battle of, 131
Edward the Confessor, death of, 11
Edward I. at Lewes, 31
— at Evesham, 34, 38
— develops long-bow, 51
— his relations to Scotland, 40, 41
— at Falkirk, 43
Edward II. at Bannockburn, 48
— defeated by his own fault, 50
Edward III., his claims to crown of France, 55
— invades Normandy, 58
— his haphazard strategy, 59
— his novel tactics at Crecy, 61
— takes Calais, 64
Edward IV. assumes crown, 103
— at Towton, 107
— overthrown by Warwick, 109
— returns from exile, 109
— at Barnet, 111
— at Tewkesbury, 114
Edward, son of Henry VI., his birth, 102
— killed at Tewkesbury, 115
Edwardes, Lieut., at Mooltan, 311
Edwin and Morcar, Earls, 12, 15
Elba, Napoleon's return from, 238
Ellenborough, Ld., Gov.-General of India, 306
Elvas, 206, 218
English, characteristics of, as soldiers, 6, 177
— their military history specially instructive, 7
— a nation earlier than any other people, 7, 55
— learned Danish modes of fighting, 10
— the long-bow theirs exclusively, 53
— had no standing army in Civil War, 129
— military reputation low before Marlborough, 154
— reasons for their fighting in line, 177
— concerned in all European wars of 18th century, 179
— armies lose efficiency after Marlborough, 180
Essex, E. of, at Edgehill, 131
— driven to Cornwall, 140
Eugene of Savoy, Marlborough's colleague, 156
— at Blenheim, 161
— at Oudenarde, 172
Evesham, battle of, 36
Fairfax, Ld., at Marston Moor, 138
Fairfax, Sir T., at Marston Moor, 138
— commands New Model, 141
— at Naseby, 143
Falconbridge, Ld., at Towton, 108
Falkirk, Wallace's battle of, 44
— Jacobite battle of, 183
Fastolfe, Sir J., at battle of the Herrings, 94
Feigned flight of Normans at Hastings, 25
Ferozeshah, battle of, 309
Ferrybridge, 104
Feudal nobles preponderant after Hastings, 27, 45
— their power broken by pike and long-bow, 6
— class pride of, ruinous at Crecy, 63
— — at Agincourt, 89
Flanders, ally of Edward III., 56
Flank march at Busaco, 209
— to Balaclava, 274
Flodden, battle of, 5, 123 _sqq._
— last victory of bow, 127
Fontenoy, battle of, 181
Formigny, battle of, 99
France, contrasted with England in 14th century, 55
— made a nation by Hundred Years' War, 99
— state of, under Charles VI., 81
— her military supremacy broken at Blenheim, 164
— why hostile to England throughout 18th century, 179
— rival of England for domination in India, 295
Freeman, Professor, on Hastings, 20, 21
Froissart as an authority, 75
Fuentes d'Onoro, battle of, 210
Fulford, battle of, 15
Geography, how it influences the course of a war, 4
George II. at Oudenarde, 171
— at Dettingen, 181
Gérard, Gen., in Waterloo campaign, 249
Glansdale, Sir W., at siege of Orleans, 97
Gloucester, siege of, 132
— E. of, at Lewes, 31
— — at Evesham, 36
Gneisenau, Gen., in Waterloo campaign, 249
Golab Sing in Punjab, 310
Goring, royalist general at Marston Moor, 138
Gortschakoff, prince, in Crimea, 280, 287
Gough, Sir H., at Moodkee, 308
— at Ferozeshah, 309
— at Sobraon, 310
— at Ramnugur, 312
— at Chillianwalla, 313
— at Gujerat, 314
Graham, Gen., in Vittoria campaign, 231
Grouchy, marshal, detached to pursue Blucher, 247
— will not "march to the cannon," 249
— could he have saved Waterloo? 250
— retreats successfully into France, 251
Guienne, never French before Edward III., 55
— becomes French in feelings, 79
Gujerat, battle of, 314
Gunpowder came slowly into use, 115
— political effects of, 117
(_See_ Artillery and Musket.)
Gyrth, Harold's brother, killed at Hastings, 24
Halidon Hill, battle of, 118
Hamley, Sir E., on battle of the Alma, 273
— — Balaclava, 279
— — Inkerman, 284
Hanoverian troops at Fontenoy, 181
— at Minden, 185
Hardinge, Sir H., Gov.-Gen. of India, 307
— at Ferozeshah, 308
Harfleur, siege of, 82
Harold Hardrada invades England, 15
— killed at Stamford bridge, 16
Harold, king, election of, 12
— story of his oath, 13_n_
— his measures for defence, 14
— goes north to fight Northmen, 15
— at Stamford bridge, 16
— rapidity of his return, 18
— urged not to face the Normans in person, 19
— chooses position at Hastings, 21
— killed in battle, 26
— his burial, 26
Hastings, battle of, 20 _sqq._
— authorities for, 19, 20
— important consequences of, 27
Havelock, Sir H., relieves Lucknow, 316
Haye Sainte, La, on field of Waterloo, 255, 261
Henry III., un-English, 28
— defeated at Lewes, 32
— in Montfort's hands, 33
— at Evesham, 35
Henry V., his claim to the French crown, 80
— invades France, 81
— besieges Harfleur, 82
— marches for Calais, 83
— intercepted at Agincourt, 86
— his tactics, 90
— recognized as heir of France, 92
— his death, 92
Herat, siege of, 306
Herrings, battle of the, 94
_Herse_, formation of archers, 62
Highlanders at Flodden, 126
— in Jacobite rebellion, 183
(_See_ Regiments.)
Hill, Gen., in Peninsular war, 202, 208, 223, 227
Holkar, 301, 304
Homildon, battle of, 119
Hougomont, on field of Waterloo, 253, 256, 257
Housecarls, 11, 16, 23
Hull, held for Parliament, 132
Hyder Ali, 299
India, conquered largely with native soldiers, 289
— France and England rivals in, 295
— English power becomes supreme in, 304
— — in, shaken by Ferozeshah, 308
— — in, strengthened by mutiny, 321
Inferior races, 288
Information, danger of faulty, at Blenheim, 159
— — at Busaco, 209
— — in Waterloo campaign, 243, 247
Inglis, Col., at Lucknow, 316
Inkerman, battle of, 280
Ironsides, Cromwell's, 153
Jacobite rebellion of 1745, 182
James IV. of Scotland makes war on England unprovoked, 119
— mismanages invasion, 120
— accepts Surrey's challenge, 120
— killed at Flodden, 127
Jeanne d'Arc, her influence and character, 95
— relieves Orleans, 96
— her fate, 98
Jena, battle of, 2
John, K. of France, collects army to fight Black Prince, 68
— movements of, to Poitiers, 69
— wastes his chances of success, 73
— taken prisoner in the battle, 78
Joseph Buonaparte made king of Spain, 197
— at Talavera, 202
— cannot control French marshals, 215_n_
— abandons Madrid, 227
— returns, 227
— finally quits Madrid, 228
— at Vittoria, 231
Jourdan, marshal, at Talavera, 202
— at Vittoria, 231
Kenilworth captured by prince Edward, 34
"King's Cabinet Opened," after Naseby, 144
Knights. _See_ Men-at-arms
Lake, Gen., in Mahratta war, 303
Lambert, Gen., at Dunbar, 146
Lancaster, D. of, in Poitiers campaign, 68
Landen, battle of, 154
Laswaree, battle of, 304
Lawrence, Sir H., Resident in Punjab, 311
— at Lucknow, 316
Lawrence, Sir J., Resident in Punjab, 315
— sends troops to Delhi, 319
Leicester, taken by Charles I., 142
— E. of. _See_ Montfort
Leslie, D., at Marston Moor, 137
— in Dunbar campaign, 145
Leven, E. of, at Marston Moor, 138
Lewes, battle of, 31
Ligny, battle of, 245
Lille, siege of, 172
Line, the natural order of battle, 175
— development of column out of, 176
— superiority of line over column, 176
— depends on troops, 177
— habitually used by English, 178
— its advantage shown at Minden, 185
— — Talavera, 203
— — Busaco, 208
— — Albuera, 212
— — Waterloo, 262
— — Alma, 272
— — Inkerman, 284
Lines, fortified, why of little use, 165
— — in Netherlands 1705, 165
— — at Stollhofen, 169
— — at Torres Vedras, 200
Lisbon, English base in Peninsular war, 199
— panic at, 207
Littler, Sir J., in Sikh war, 308, 309
Locality of battles, how determined, 4
Loire river, Black Prince tried to cross, 69
— boundary of English power after Henry V., 93
Long-bow, development of, obscure, 51
— power and range of, 52
— exclusively English, 53
— compared to musket, 117
— mode of using 52
(_See also_ Archers.)
Louis XIV. provoked England to war, 154
— offers peace 1706, 169
— offers peace 1709, 173
Lucan, E. of, in Crimea, 278
Lucknow, relief of, 316
MacMunn, Lieut., in Burma, 291
Madras attacked by Dupleix, 295
— Clive sent from, to recover Bengal, 296
Madrid occupied by Napoleon, 198
— entered by Wellington, 227
— abandoned again, 227
— evacuated by French, 228
Mahrattas, rise of their power, 300
— make war on British, 301
— their power broken by Assye, 304
Maida, battle of, 205
Maitland, Gen., at Waterloo, 261
Malakoff tower at Sebastopol, 285
Malplaquet, battle of, 174
Manchester, E. of, in Civil War, 133, 141
Marengo, battle of, 3
Margaret of Anjou, soul of Lancastrian party, 101
— at Wakefield, 103
— lands at Weymouth, 112
Marlborough, D. of, real head of coalition against Louis XIV., 154
— his character, 155
— compared to Wellington, 155
— his plan of campaign for 1704, 156
— marches to the Danube, 157
— storms Schellenberg, 158
— ravages Bavaria, 158
— wins Blenheim, 163
— inactive in 1705, 166
— wins Ramillies, 168
— wins Oudenarde, 172
— covers siege of Lille, 172
— wins Malplaquet, 174
_Marmion_, quotations from, 124, 126
Marmont, marshal, supersedes Massena, 210
— retreats behind Douro, 223
— out-manœuvres Wellington, 224
— his false tactics at Salamanca, 225
— wounded, 226
Marsin, marshal, commands French army in Bavaria, 155
— joined by Tallard, 158
— his position at Blenheim, 159
Marston Moor, battle of, 137
— importance of results of, 139
Massena, marshal, given command in Spain, 205
— takes Ciudad Rodrigo, 207
— invades Portugal, 207
— at Busaco, 208
— before Torres Vedras, 209
— retreats, 210
— at Fuentes d'Onoro, 210
Maupertuis, on field of Poitiers, 70
Meer Jaffier at Plassy, 298
Meerut, mutiny began at, 317
Men-at-arms at Hastings, 25
— thenceforward deemed sole strength of armies, 27
— failed to break Scottish spears, 44
— Wallace set example of successfully resisting, 45
— at Bannockburn, 49
— at Crecy, English dismount for defence, 61
— at Crecy, French routed by archers, 64
— at Poitiers, French dismount for attack, 72
— madness of this method, 73
— at Agincourt, 90
— at battle of the Herrings, 94
Menschikoff, prince, commands in Crimea, 270
— his mistake at the Alma, 271
— moves out of Sebastopol, 273
— his faulty scheme for Inkerman, 280
Minden, battle of, 184
Mogul Empire, decaying, 296
— under Sindia's influence, 300
— falls under British control, 304
— restoration proclaimed in Mutiny, 317
Montagu, M. of, killed at Barnet, 112
Montcalm, Gen., at Quebec, 189
his arrangements for defence, 189
— mortally wounded, 193
Montfort, Simon, E. of Leicester, leader in Barons' war, 29
— his carriage, 30
— rules England, 33
— deserted by many of his party, 34
— marches for Kenilworth, 34
— intercepted at Evesham, 36
— his death, 38
Montrose, M. of, his campaigns in Scotland, 142, 144
Moodkee, battle of, 308
Mooltan, siege of, 311
Moore, Sir J., in Peninsular war, 198
Mortimer's Cross, battle of, 103
Moselle, Marlborough's campaign on, 165
Musket, long a clumsy weapon, 116
— compared to long-bow, 117
Mutiny, Indian, general character of, 315
— Delhi head-quarters of, 318
— end of, 321
Napoleon invades Spain, 198
— withdraws troops for Russian war, 214
— defeated in Russia, 228
— overthrown, 234
— returns from Elba, 238
— his plan for Waterloo campaign, 241
— at Ligny, 245
— amount of his success so far, 246
— sends Grouchy after Prussians, 247
— follows Wellington to Waterloo, 247
— Grouchy's absence from Waterloo due to his orders, 146
— never expected Prussians to join Wellington, 251
— delays beginning battle, 257
— his attention diverted to Bulow, 260
Napoleon III., why willing to join in Crimean war, 268
— his views as to siege of Sebastopol overruled, 286
Naseby, battle of, 143
National coherence a great source of military strength, 55
— enmities not necessarily permanent, 2
Nesle, Henry V. crosses Somme at, 83
Nevil's Cross, battle of, 118
New Model army, 141
Newbury, first battle of, 133
— second battle of, 140
Newcastle, M. of, besieged in York, 134
— at Marston Moor, 137
Ney, marshal, at Busaco, 208
— at Quatre Bras, 243
— at Waterloo, 260
Nicholson, Gen., killed at Delhi, 320
Norfolk, D. of, at Towton, 108
Normandy, Wm. D. of. _See_ William I.
— John, D. of, at Poitiers, 76
— Edward III. invades, 59
— Henry V. marches through, 83
— — conquers, 92
Norman conquest, effects of, 27
Northampton, battle of, 103
Northmen, at Stamford bridge, 15
— importance of their defeat, 16
Nottingham, Charles I. raises standard at, 131
Numbers engaged at Agincourt, 88
— Albuera, 211
— Alma, 270
— Barnet, 110
— Blenheim, 163
— Crecy, 61
— Flodden, 120
— Inkerman, 281, 283
— Marston Moor, 137
— Minden, 184
— Naseby, 143
— Plassy, 297
— Poitiers, 75
— Quebec, 192
— Salamanca, 226
— Talavera, 204
— Towton, 107_n_
— in Waterloo campaign, 240
— at Waterloo, 254
Oblique order, 312_n_
Oporto, passage of Douro at, 200
Orleans, "key of the south," 93
— siege of, 94
— D. of, at Poitiers, 77
— D. of, Regent, 180
Oudenarde, battle of, 172
Outram, Gen., relieves Lucknow, 316
Oxford, head-quarters of Charles I., 132
— siege of, 142
— E. of, at Poitiers, 77
— E. of, at Barnet, 111
Pakenham, Gen., at Salamanca, 225
Parkman's _History of Montcalm and Wolfe_, 193
Patay, battle of, 99
Peishwa, the, 301
Pelissier, marshal, at siege of Sebastopol, 286
Peninsular war, general character of, 200
Pennefather, Gen., at Inkerman, 281
Périgord, cardinal of, mediates at Poitiers, 74
Phalanx, Macedonian, 45
Philip VI. of France provokes Edward III. to war, 54
— cannot control nobles at Crecy, 63
— his death, 67
Picton, Gen., at storm of Badajos, 218
— killed at Waterloo, 259
Pikemen developed on continent, 6, 117
— essential support to musketeers, 116
— superseded by invention of bayonet, 116
— used by Wallace, 45
Pirch, Gen., in Waterloo campaign, 242, 261
Planchenoit, on field of Waterloo, 260, 262
Plassy, battle of, 298
Plymouth held for Parliament, 132
Point Levi, opposite Quebec, 190
Poitiers, topography of battle-field, 71
— battle of, 76 _sqq._
Ponsonby, Gen., at Waterloo, 259
Porto Novo, battle of, 297
Portugal, relations of, to England, 199
— topography of, 206
— misconduct of government of, 209, 214
Portuguese troops organized by Wellington, 207
— at Busaco, 209
— at Albuera, 212
Positions of armies described, at Agincourt, 88
— Albuera, 211
— Alma, 271
— Bannockburn, 47
— Blenheim, 159
— Busaco, 208
— Crecy, 61
— Dunbar, 146
— Falkirk, 43
— Ferozeshah, 308
— Flodden, 125
— Hastings, 21
— Ligny, 244
— Minden, 184
— Plassy, 298
— Poitiers, 72
— Ramillies, 167
— Salamanca, 225
— Talavera, 201
— Vittoria, 232
— Waterloo, 253
Preston Pans, battle of, 183
Prussia, hostile to France since Jena, 2
Prussian army in Belgium, 239
— its numbers, 240
— its position on frontier, 240
(_See_ Blucher.)
Pyrenees, battles in, 234
Quatre Bras, battle of, 243
Quebec, siege of, 189
— importance of its capture, 193
Raglan, Ld., at the Alma, 272
— at Balaclava, 277
— death of, 286
Railway made in Crimea, 286
Ramillies, battle of, 168
Ramnugur, battle of, 312
Range of long-bow, 52
— of musket, 117
Redan in siege of Sebastopol, 286
Regiments of English army:
— Coldstream Guards, 152
— under Marlborough, 152
— Guards at Talavera, 203
— — at Waterloo, 261
— cavalry, Union brigade at Waterloo, 259
— cavalry, 23rd light dragoons at Talavera, 203
— — heavy brigade at Balaclava, 277
— — light brigade at Balaclava, 278
— — 19th light dragoons at Assye, 302
— infantry, 12th, 20th, 23rd, 25th, 37th, 51st at Minden, 186
— — 48th at Talavera, 203
— — march of Craufurd's brigade, 204
— — 7th, 23rd at Albuera, 212
— — 43rd, 52nd at Ciudad Rodrigo, 217
— — position of all at Waterloo, 255
— — 52nd deals final blow, 262
— — 93rd at Balaclava, 276
— — 39th at Plassy, 298
— — 74th, 78th at Assye, 302
— — 32nd at Lucknow, 316
Reille, Gen., at Quatre Bras, 243
— at Waterloo, 258
Reserve at Lewes doubtful, 30
— at Crecy not wanted, 64
— at Poitiers, 76
— at Flodden, value of, 126
Richmond, duchess of, her ball at Brussels, 243
Rifle, invention of, 267
— effect at Inkerman, 282
River in rear of defeated troops at Lewes, 32
— Evesham, 38
— Towton, 108
— Tewkesbury, 113
— Blenheim, 163
— Sobraon, 310
— obstacle to counter attack at Dunbar, 149
— — Ramillies, 168
Robin Hood's feats an anachronism, 51
Romans, their conquest of Britain, 9
— defeat phalanx, 45
Romorantin taken by Black Prince, 69
Royalists, their advantages at outset of civil war, 129
— where predominant, 131
Runjeet Sing develops Sikh power, 305
— his death, 307
Rupert, prince, compared to Edward I. at Lewes, 33
— at Edgehill, 131
— relieves York, 134
— at Marston Moor, 137
— at Naseby, 143
Russia, Napoleon's invasion of, 228
— too far off to help in Waterloo campaign, 239
— picks quarrel with Turkey, 268
— exhausted by Crimean war, 287
Sackville, Ld. G., at Minden, 185
S. Albans, battle of, 103
S. Lawrence, river, 189
S. Sebastian, storming of, 234
Salamanca, battle of, 225
Salisbury, E. of, at Poitiers, 76
— E. of, killed at Orleans, 94
— E. of, killed at Wakefield, 103
Sambre, river, 242
Santarem, Massena retreats to, 209
Scarlett, Gen., at Balaclava, 276
Schellenberg, stormed by Marlborough, 158
Schiltrons, 44
Scotland, question of succession to, 40
— its previous relations to England, 40
— won its independence, 50
— permanently hostile to England, 118
— suffers repeated defeats, 118
— helps Parliament in civil war, 133
— takes up cause of Charles II., 145
— subjugated by Cromwell, 151
Sea, value of command of, in war, to Edward III., 59
— to Marlborough, 173
— at Quebec, 190
— in Peninsula, 199, 228
— in Crimea, 269, 288
Sebastopol, siege of, its unique character, 274, 287
Seine, river, Edward III.'s difficulty in crossing, 60
Self-denying Ordinance, 141
Sepoys, of all Indian races, 289
— their belief in English officers, 290
— English won India through, 295
— mutiny of, 315
Shakespeare on Agincourt, 85
Sherbrooke, Gen., at Talavera, 201
Siege, transition from mediæval to modern type of, 97
— of Sebastopol, last of the Vauban period, 274
Sikhs, rise of their power, 305
— virtual anarchy among, 307
— betrayed by own leaders in first war, 309
— provoke second war, 311
— become subjects of the East India Company, 315
Sindia, (1) ambitious schemes of, 300
— (2) provokes war with English in Assye campaign, 301
— (3) stands by English in Mutiny, 315
Smith, Sir H., at Aliwal, 310
Snorro Sturleson, his _saga_ of Stamford bridge, 16
Snow during battle of Towton, 108
Sobraon, battle of, 310
Somerset, D. of, at Towton, 104
— D. of, at Barnet, 111
— D. of, at Tewkesbury, 114
Souham, Gen., 227
Soult, marshal, driven from Oporto, 200
— forces Wellington to retire after Talavera, 205
— takes Badajos, 210
— at Albuera, 211
— evacuates Andalusia, 227
— in command after Vittoria, 234
Spain favourable to French claimant, 155, 173
— invaded by Napoleon, 197
— character of resistance in, 198
— government of, incompetent, 199
— geography of, 199
— French driven out of, 234
Squares, natural formation against cavalry in days of musket, 176
— at Waterloo, 260
— unnecessary with rifle, 276
Stakes as defence for archers first used by Henry V., 87
Stamford bridge, battle of, 16
Standard, Harold's, at Hastings, 23
— Montfort's, at Lewes, 30
Standing armies. _See_ Armies
Stanley, Sir E., at Flodden, 126
Steamers in Crimean war, 270
Steinkirk, battle of, 154
Stirling, importance of its position, 42
— siege by Bruce, 46
Stow-on-the-Wold, battle of, 144
Strategy, definition of, 4
— little understood in middle ages, 69
— of Surrey before Flodden, 124
Suffolk, E. of, at Orleans, 94
Supplies, when regularly furnished to armies, 152
— Marlborough careful about, 158
— to Wellington in Peninsula by sea, 199, 228
— Wellington anxious about, before Waterloo, 241
Surajah Dowlah takes Calcutta, 296
— defeated at Plassy, 299
Surrey, E. of, at Flodden, 120 _sqq._
Sybil's Well, 123
Tactics, bearing on history of changes in, 6
— novel, Wallace's, at Falkirk, 43
— — Edward III.'s at Crecy, 61
— of French at Poitiers disastrous, 73
— — repeated at Agincourt, 88
Tagus, river, 201, 206, 223
Talavera, battle of, 202
Tallard, marshal, enters Bavaria, 158
— faults of his position at Blenheim, 160
— taken prisoner, 163
Tej Sing at Ferozeshah, 309
— at Sobraon, 310
Tewkesbury, battle of, 4, 114
Thermopylæ, battle of, 6
Thielemann, Gen., in Waterloo campaign, 149
Thomière, Gen., at Salamanca, 225
Todleben, Gen., at Sebastopol, 274, 285
Torres Vedras, lines of, 200, 209
Tostig, killed at Stamford bridge, 16
Toulouse, battle of, 234
Tournelles at Orleans, 93
Towton, battle of, 107
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 183
— Bassein, 301
Treaty of Bretigny, 78
— Troyes, 92
— Utrecht, 179
Troyes, treaty of, 92
Turenne, 164
Utrecht, treaty of, 179
Vauban, 164
Vendôme, marshal, at Oudenarde, 170
Verneuil, battle of, 93
Victor, marshal, at Talavera, 202
Villars, marshal, on the Moselle, 165
— at Malplaquet, 173
Villeroi, marshal, Marlborough forces his lines, 165
— at Ramillies, 167
Vimiero, battle of, 198
Vittoria, battle of, 232
Wakefield, battle of, 103
Walcheren expedition, 210_n_
Wallace, Sir W., at Cambuskenneth, 42
— at Falkirk, 43
— novelty of his tactics, 44
Waller, Sir W., in civil war, 133, 140
Walpole, his peace policy, 180
Waterloo, campaign of:
— Napoleon's general plan for, 241
— allies must wait attack, 240
— co-operation of Wellington and Blucher in, 249
— success attained by Napoleon at outset of, 246
Waterloo, battle of:
— topography, 253
— Wellington's position, 254
— tactical errors of French, 258, 260
— Prussian aid essential part of, 257
— completeness of victory, 262