AGINCOURT AND ORLEANS
For nearly forty years after the death of the Black Prince the English
pretensions against France lay dormant. Something like friendly
relations existed from time to time between the two countries: Richard
II. even contracted a marriage with a French princess, though he was
deposed before his child bride was grown up. Cordial peace however
was impossible: the English possessions in Guienne were a standing
temptation to French ambition and patriotism: the English claim to the
French crown was a standing provocation. That claim had by no means
been forgotten: the glories of Crecy and Poitiers had made a deeper
impression than the slow failure of the following years, the burden of
which had fallen much more heavily on Guienne than on England. To the
English mind the pretensions of their kings to the throne of France
had become a national rather than a personal matter. It was England
that considered herself entitled to dominate over France, rather
than an individual claiming an inheritance for himself. Richard II.
had been succeeded by his cousin the duke of Lancaster, who reigned
by a perfectly valid national title, formally voted by Parliament,
and substantially accepted by the country as a whole. He was, as it
happened, the heir male of Edward III., heir according to the theory
embodied in the Salic law which France had made her rule of succession:
but he was not the heir of Edward III. according to the theory which
alone could render valid Edward III.'s claim to France. What is
commonly said in relation to Edward is strictly true of Henry V.: if
his contention was based on a sound theory, it held good in favour of
some one else. There is no trace of this being recognised in England:
Henry V. was the lawful king of England, lawful successor of his
great-grandfather, and might reasonably urge his great-grandfather's
pretensions.
The state of France at the date of the accession of Henry V. was
deplorable. The king, Charles VI., had long been mad; his occasional
lucid intervals, when he was supposed to resume the reins of
government, only served to make confusion worse. The queen was one
of the worst of women, without the great abilities which went some
way towards atoning for the wickedness of Catharine de Medicis or her
namesake of Russia. The Dauphin was a dissolute and reckless boy.
All good government was lost: for power was disputed by two bitterly
hostile factions, each of which used it in turn for its own purposes.
One was headed by the duke of Burgundy, cousin of the king, son of the
boy who was taken prisoner at Poitiers beside his father king John. The
other, which bore the name of Armagnacs,[32] was headed by the young
duke of Orleans, the king's nephew, between whom and John of Burgundy
there was an irreconcilable blood-feud. The statesmanship of France was
not ill-represented by the Dauphin's insult to Henry V., in sending him
a present of balls at his accession, with a message implying that he
deemed the young king, perhaps the ablest man of his age, little better
than a child. Shakespeare makes much of the story that the archbishop
of Canterbury urged Henry to undertake war with France, in order to
divert his attention from ecclesiastical affairs at home. Whatever
weight this may have had, the opportunity was obvious, and Henry was
very well competent to use it.
In August 1415 Henry V. landed at the mouth of the Seine, with a
well-equipped army of about 30,000 men. No better point for an invasion
could be chosen: there was a good harbour for his base, and almost
the shortest distance from the sea-shore to Paris is straight up the
Seine. Before however he could advance Harfleur must be taken, and
this cost an unexpectedly long time. More than a month elapsed before
the town surrendered; and then it is suggested that dysentery, which
was raging alike inside and outside the walls, was largely answerable
for the surrender. The siege was conducted entirely by battering, like
a siege of three or four centuries later: probably the comparative
slowness and inadequacy of the cannonade was more or less balanced by
the inferiority of the defensive works to those of later times. When
the town had fallen (or was on the point of falling, for the date is
not quite certain), Henry sent a message to the Dauphin, offering
to settle the dispute by single combat with him, as his father was
incapacitated. The proposal is altogether in the style of chivalry, and
was doubtless considered the right and proper thing to do: but seeing
that the Dauphin was a weak and debauched lad, and Henry in the very
prime of vigour, there was nothing really high-minded about it. Henry
deemed himself bound to wait for an answer, and during the interval
resolved on his course of action. His army had been frightfully reduced
by illness as well as by the losses in the siege: we are told that 5000
men had to be sent home invalided, besides the large number who died.
A garrison was also wanted for Harfleur; altogether the king could not
move with above a third of his original force. The accounts given from
the English side, which are numerous and unusually circumstantial,
vary only slightly: and one French writer, who expressly says that he
saw the English army, agrees pretty closely with them. French writers
in general had only hearsay to guide them, and had every motive to
exaggerate the English numbers. Of men-at-arms Henry had left from 800
to 1000, of archers five or six thousand, besides other foot-soldiers
who were probably about half as numerous. Whatever the number was, it
had suffered no material change before the battle of Agincourt.
With such an insignificant force, offensive operations were out of
the question. Prudence obviously suggested, while honour forbade, a
direct return to England. Henry determined to march through the coast
districts of Normandy, and so gain Calais. Doubtless he was encouraged
to take this venturous course by his knowledge of the distracted state
of France, and in particular by the fact that, while he had now been
six weeks in the country, no attempt had been made to disturb him,
though there was by this time a hostile army gathering at Rouen. About
October 8 the English army started, carrying with them provisions for
several days, with no waggons to delay their march, and under strict
orders that there should be no plundering. Henry aimed at crossing the
Somme as his great-grandfather had done, by the ford of Blanchetaque
below Abbeville: but on coming within a few miles he was informed
that it was very strongly held by the enemy. One French writer says
that this information was false, and that it was the cause of the
subsequent disaster, as otherwise Henry would have reached Calais
without fighting. True or false, Henry believed it, and marched up the
Somme, finding bridge after bridge broken, and naturally feeling that
the chance of a French army barring the road was hourly increasing.
At length, on October 18, fords were found near Nesle, and the
English made their way safely across. Two days later Henry received
a message from the dukes of Orleans and Bourbon to the effect that
they proposed to fight him before he reached Calais, and asking him to
appoint a meeting-place. Henry's reply was that of a general, not of a
knight-errant: he was marching straight to Calais, and they might meet
him where they pleased.
The proceedings of the French as reported are somewhat difficult to
interpret. We are told, and there is no reason to disbelieve it,
that D'Albret, the Constable of France, had been against attempting
to relieve Harfleur: the tradition of the great defeats at Crecy and
Poitiers, and of the success which had attended the subsequent policy
of not fighting in the open field, might well account for this. For
the same reason, doubtless, the army under his command was withdrawn
behind the Somme on the news of Henry's march having begun, though why
the river was not better guarded it is difficult to imagine. On the
other hand we are told that the king of France came to Rouen with the
Dauphin, after the fall of Harfleur, and that all the chief nobility
of France came thither at his summons. So numerous were their forces,
and so confident were they, that they refused the offer of a contingent
from the city of Paris of 6000 men, one of them saying, "What do we
want of the assistance of these shopkeepers, since we are three times
as many as the English?" Most of these nobles must have marched with
the Constable: it can only have been from his army that the challenge
to Henry, above referred to, can possibly have been sent. Then an
unintelligible story is told, of a royal council having been held at
Rouen on October 20 (this date is clearly impossible), at which it was
decided to fight a battle, and orders were sent accordingly to the
Constable. But the same account goes on to speak of summons for all
who were fit to bear arms to join the Constable's army, which from the
nature of the case would have fought and (as was assumed) destroyed the
English, long before any fresh troops could reinforce what was already
far larger than necessary. Then follows a statement that an invitation
was sent to the duke of Burgundy's son, who was only prevented from
joining by his father's express orders, and that he never to his dying
day forgot the humiliation of being kept away from the battle. Seeing
that the youth in question was afterwards duke Philip called the Good,
whose co-operation with Henry V. put France, officially speaking, into
the hands of the latter, it is scarcely possible to accept this as
true. Equally out of keeping with the prevalent feeling of the French
at the time is the story that the king and the Dauphin wanted to join
the army, and were prevented by the old duke of Berri, the king's
uncle, who said, remembering Poitiers, "Better lose the battle than
the king and the battle too." Why, if there was anything of an army in
Normandy, and the council at Rouen were so bent on a battle, no attempt
was made to harass Henry's march, when the Constable was ready to stop
him in front, does not appear. From the English accounts, one of which
was written by Henry's own attendant chaplain, it is perfectly certain
that their march was nowhere really impeded by encountering enemies.
The whole conduct of the French, alike in strategy and in the tactics
of the actual battle of Agincourt, was ill judged: the explanation
doubtless being that the great nobles could not be controlled
effectually by the Constable.
When Henry crossed the Somme, the French army was apparently at
Bapaume, twenty miles to the northward. Why they made no attempt
to attack the English, who marched past them in a line parallel to
the river, but a few miles to the north-east of it, can hardly be
conjectured. At any moment, during two or three days, the Constable
might have fallen upon them, and the English if defeated must have
been destroyed, for the Somme would have been at their back. Perhaps
the Constable thought it wiser to let Henry go to Calais unimpeded,
and only moved in deference to positive orders from the king. Whatever
the reason, it was not till Henry was passing him that he moved: then
he marched in the same direction, the two routes gradually converging
towards each other. On October 24, just after crossing the little
river Ternoise, called in the English narratives the river of swords,
Henry came almost into collision with the French, whose swarming bands
covered the country on his right, and almost in front. The French
halted, as if to tempt him to attack. Henry knew better than so to
throw away his best chance: having the advantage of the ground, he
halted and formed his line for battle. The general feeling in the
English army, if one may trust Henry's chaplain, was one of deep
despondency. Nor was this unreasonable, seeing that they must cut their
way through an army several times the size of their own, unless the
enemy threw away his advantage. The king alone was cool and confident.
When Sir Walter Hungerford in his hearing uttered a wish for 10,000
more archers, Henry uttered the famous rebuke which Shakespeare[33] has
immortalised.
"If we are marked to die, we are enow
To do our country loss; and if to live,
The fewer men, the greater share of honour.
God's will! I pray thee, wish not one man more.
By Jove, I am not covetous for gold,
Nor care I who doth feed upon my cost;
It yearns me not if men my garments wear;
Such outward things dwell not in my desires:
But if it be a sin to covet honour,
I am the most offending soul alive.
No, faith, my coz, wish not a man from England:
God's peace! I would not lose so great an honour
As one man more, methinks, would share from me
For the best hope I have. O, do not wish one more!
Rather proclaim it, Westmoreland, through my host,
That he which hath no stomach to this fight,
Let him depart; his passport shall be made
And crowns for convoy put into his purse:
We would not die in that man's company
That fears his fellowship to die with us."
[Illustration:
_Map VI._
Battle
of
_Agincourt_
(_25^{th} Oct. 1415_)]
The Constable, seeing that he could not attack the English to
advantage, continued his march for a mile or so, and halted across the
road by which the English must march to Calais, between the little
villages of Agincourt and Tramecourt, the English camping almost where
they had halted to offer battle, in and about Maisoncelles. There was
much rain in the night, to the great discomfort of the English, who had
little shelter, and had had more than a fortnight of continuous and
fairly hard marching, with rather scanty supplies of food. The rain
proved in truth a valuable ally, when the French assailed them next day
over the soft wet ground.
Early on the 25th Henry arrayed his little army in order of battle. In
accordance with custom, the vanguard for marching purposes formed the
right of the line, the rearguard the left: the former was commanded
by the duke of York, the latter by lord Camoys, the king himself
taking charge of the main body in the centre: the total number was
too small to admit of a reserve. Accounts differ as to the exact
formation adopted, though there is perfect unanimity as to the English
men-at-arms having all dismounted, and left their horses in rear
with the baggage, such as there was. Nor is there any doubt that the
archers carried each man a six-foot stake, to plant in the ground in
front of the line, so as to form a sort of palisade. These stakes we
are expressly told had been cut by Henry's order immediately before
crossing the Somme, when he knew that an attack from superior numbers
was at any time possible. It seems to have been his own idea, and
to have become the regular practice after Agincourt. Some writers
state that the archers were entirely on the flanks, so that when the
line had advanced to where it came into collision with the French,
the archers lined the woods on each side of the open ground, which
was crossed by the dismounted men-at-arms. This view however must
be rejected for more reasons than one. The distance from the wood
skirting Tramecourt on the English right to that skirting Agincourt on
the left was over half-a-mile.[34] This is too great a distance to be
covered by arrows from the sides, even with the long-bow at its best,
and it is certain that the arrows did deadly execution all over the
battle-field. Moreover Henry had at the most only 1000 men-at-arms,
probably under 900. This number in single rank would hardly suffice to
cover half-a-mile, and of course they could not be in single rank:
there is no reason to doubt what is stated by every authority who
mentions the point at all, that they were four deep. It is necessary
therefore to adopt the other view, that each of the three divisions
had its separate formation, dismounted men-at-arms in line in the
centre, and the archers on each flank of them. The archers were formed
in wedges (_cuneos_), says Henry's chaplain. The formation already
described in giving account of Crecy was no doubt by this time the
regularly established one for an English line: its merits were obvious,
and well tested. The differences between Crecy and Agincourt were only
that in the latter case the front was in three divisions instead of
two, and the archers were protected by an improvised palisade, besides
being separated by shorter lines of spearmen. These differences would
obviously all tend to make them more destructive.
The numbers of the French army are told so variously that it is
impossible to state them with any confidence. They are usually given by
comparison with the English, and the proportion varies from six times
as great down to three times. Henry had perhaps about 10,000 in all,
as has been stated above; he may well have had less, but cannot have
had more.[35] The French were drawn up in three divisions, one behind
the other, each having a continuous line of dismounted men-at-arms.
One contemporary, who says that the English were four deep, says that
the French were thirty deep, which may possibly have been true of the
men-at-arms, who formed a much larger proportion of the French army
than of the English. The front line, at any rate, cannot have had more
than 600 in front at the outside, for a small body of horsemen was
placed on each flank to charge the English archers, and the whole space
available was but half-a-mile, though it is true that they were much
crowded together. There were archers, or at any rate cross-bowmen, in
the French army: how they were posted does not appear, except that they
were never given a chance of being useful. The knights, we are told,
refused to let them have the post of honour in front, behaving thus
with the usual feudal vaingloriousness, which had cost the French so
dear at Crecy. Similarly we are told that the French had cannon, but
certainly no use was made of them, perhaps for the same reason.
The highest nobility of France was well represented on the
battle-field: in fact there were so many semi-royal personages that it
was a difficult task for the Constable, whose authority they barely
recognised, to distribute the honour of command so as to satisfy them.
Ultimately the first division, which was to have the brunt of the
fighting, and expected to carry off all the glory, comprised (it would
be a farce to say it was commanded by) the Constable, the Marshal, the
dukes of Orleans and Bourbon, the brother of the duke of Brittany,
and the count of Eu. The second division had at its head the dukes of
Alençon and Bar, the count of Nevers, youngest brother of the duke of
Burgundy, and the count of Vaudemont, brother of the duke of Lorraine.
The rear division was under men of less note: some or all of the
men-at-arms belonging to it remained on horseback. The front line of
the French was drawn up a little north of the cross-road which now (and
possibly then) leads from Agincourt to Tramecourt. Here they were on
rising ground, and had a wider space than further to the south, the
woods which bound the ground which was the actual scene of conflict
trending back a little on each side. Consequently when the French
advanced, the men were crowded more together. We cannot be wrong in
assuming that the taking up of this position was the Constable's doing,
as he had throughout been averse to attacking the English in the field:
they had but to hold it, and Henry must attack, with everything against
him. If the French authorities are correct, Henry so fully recognised
this that he tried to negotiate, but the terms offered were such as
he declined to accept. This is not improbable in itself, though the
English writers do not mention it: and it is all the more likely to be
true, as the battle did not begin till some three hours after sunrise.
Less than a mile separated the two armies, over ploughed land, gently
rising towards the French, and soft with the recent rain, the upper
part at least doubtless already trodden into mire by the French, who
had been stationary thereabouts since the previous afternoon. There
was no alternative but to advance, as the French did not: but Henry
possessed in his archers a means of stinging them into action, and the
class pride of the French nobles had led to the adoption of an order of
battle which gave them no means of replying. Towards ten o'clock the
king gave the word, "In the name of Almighty God and of St. George,
advance banners." For a moment, the English line knelt and touched the
earth with their faces: then with a cheer they moved forward. As soon
as they were within bowshot of the enemy the line halted, the archers
fixed their stakes in the soft ground and began to shoot. Obviously the
French could not stand to be riddled with arrows: the horsemen who had
been placed on the flanks of the front line on purpose to "over-ride"
the archers, were ordered to charge, but were unable even to reach the
English and were driven back in confusion. The Constable now led the
men-at-arms forwards, separating them apparently into three masses,
to attack the three lines of English spearmen. Weighted with armour,
they sank to the calf at each step, and the archers took them more and
more in flank as they advanced. Still, they managed to reach and even
to press back the English men-at-arms: but then the archers, taking to
their bills, quitted the protection of the stakes, and closed on to
the flanks of the helpless struggling mass, who were far too closely
wedged together to use their spears. The Constable was killed: all the
other noble personages figure on the list of prisoners: of one of them,
the duke of Orleans, it is expressly said that he was taken out after
the battle from a pile of dead and wounded; and probably the same fate
befell others. Wounded or not, they could not move to escape from the
ghastly heap, sunk deeper and deeper in the struggle into the miry
soil. Pushing a little forward, Henry attacked the second French line,
doubtless in the same manner, and with equally decisive result. The
slaughter of the second division was presumably even greater, for all
its leaders, with the duke of Brabant, who arrived with reinforcements
during the battle, were found among the slain. Most of the third line
fled without resistance; the counts at its head made a last desperate
charge at the head of a few hundred men, and found the death they
expected.
The battle was now won, and the English had time to secure the
prisoners. Suddenly a body of French fugitives who had rallied,
threatened a fresh attack: how many there were is not stated, but the
total number of fugitives was two or three times as great as the whole
English army. It was impossible to guard the prisoners while repelling
the attack, and a slaughter of them had begun, when the enemy withdrew.
Of the total French loss the estimates vary greatly: the names of the
most important nobles who fell have been given already. It is perhaps
worth mention that the grandfathers of two of them perished at Crecy,
the then count of Alençon, and the then duke of Lorraine. Between slain
and prisoners, the French nobility suffered enormously; in fact the
blow to the Armagnac party was for the time crushing, though it may be
doubted whether the loss was not a disguised gain to France, as leaving
room for the far more competent professional soldiers, who conducted
the last stages of the great war.
On the English side king Henry fought like the meanest soldier, with
his own hand saving the life of his young brother Humphrey. His
helmet still hangs in Westminster Abbey, with more than one dent from
a sword-stroke, doubtless received in the great battle. The list of
English slain is preposterously small; just thirteen men-at-arms,
though among them was included the duke of York, last surviving
grandson of Edward III., and about a hundred others. One need realise
very fully the conditions of the battle, the absurd mismanagement
of the French leaders, and the helplessness of their masses, not to
multiply tenfold the numbers given, which nevertheless are authentic.
An illustration of the imminence of the danger from which the English
escaped, is furnished by the fact that during the action the baggage
was plundered by French stragglers. As the army left Harfleur without
a waggon, with nothing but what could be carried on horses or by
the soldiers themselves, there cannot have been much: but the king
lost some articles of plate and jewellery for his own personal use,
including the seals of his chancery, which however were most of them
recovered afterwards through the instrumentality of a French noble who
had been taken prisoner in Harfleur. Henry's crown he wore fixed on his
helmet, and a portion of it was cut away in the battle.
Henry V. was too wise to imagine that his small force, even after
victory, could achieve great things. He returned in triumph to
England, leaving the French factions to tear the country to pieces.
In 1417 he landed again in Normandy, and set to work systematically
to conquer that province, which was left to defend itself, while the
princes pursued the much more interesting employment of quarrelling
with each other. After capturing Rouen, and organising the government
so thoroughly that Normandy remained in English hands for thirty
years, Henry marched on Paris. In face of this pressing danger the
French factions began to negotiate, and an interview was arranged on
the bridge of Montereau: but the Armagnacs seized the opportunity
treacherously to murder the duke of Burgundy in the presence of the
Dauphin. Naturally his son at once went over to Henry's side. The
Dauphin was entirely in the hands of the Armagnacs, who were as
incapable as they were base. In Paris, which was always inclined to the
Burgundian side, the feeling spread that Henry of England, especially
if he married a French princess as he proposed to do, would be better
than the Dauphin. In a few months the treaty of Troyes was agreed to,
by which Henry was to be regent during the lifetime of Charles VI.,
and succeed to the throne on his death, on condition of his marrying
the princess Catharine. Unfortunately Henry died two years later, just
before Charles VI. The infant Henry VI. was proclaimed king of both
countries, and his uncle Bedford ruled vigorously in his name. The
death of Charles VI. however made the Dauphin no longer a quasi-rebel,
but the legitimate king: and the national feeling of France declared
for him. Roughly speaking, the English ruled all north of the Loire,
thanks to the Burgundian alliance; the south more or less ruled itself,
for Charles VII. was indolent and unwarlike. His cause was not without
support in the north, while his Scottish allies were there, but two
bloody defeats at Crevant and Verneuil inflicted enormous loss on the
Scots. In the latter battle the archers played a very conspicuous
part: we find some of the archers, left to guard the horses and baggage
while the men-at-arms fought on foot, beating off unaided the body of
French horse which had been sent round to attack the English rear.
Though no more fighting on a large scale took place, it was not till
1428 that Bedford saw his way to the definite forward step of besieging
Orleans.
This city is usually spoken of as being of paramount importance, the
"key of the south"; it is assumed that its capture would have been
equivalent to the final overthrow of Charles VII. A glance at the map
will show that, although the possession of Orleans would have been an
undoubted advantage to the English, it would have only been one step
towards the conquest of the southern half of France. It might with more
justice be asserted that until Orleans was taken, the English were far
from secure in their hold on the north. However this may be, the siege
of Orleans did in fact witness the first English failure. One of the
most remarkable characters in history appeared quite suddenly on the
scene, and turned the scale against them.
Orleans stands on the north bank of the Loire, with a long bridge
connecting it with the south bank. At the time of the siege the
inhabitants destroyed the suburb on the south bank, retaining only a
fort commanding the bridge-head, called the Tournelles, which they
covered with a _boulevard_.[36] The English under the earl of Salisbury
began the siege on October 12, 1428. Their camp was pitched on the
south of the Loire, and the first operation was to construct a little
fort on the ruins of the Augustin convent, whence their cannon were
directed mainly at the Tournelles. A mine was run from thence under the
_boulevard_ in front of the Tournelles. For some mysterious reason the
English did not wait to fire the mine, but assaulted the _boulevard_,
and were repulsed. This waste of life might well have been spared, for
the French not only abandoned the outwork, but, the Tournelles being
injured by the cannonade, evacuated that also after offering almost
nominal resistance to an assault. The French broke down an arch of
the bridge next to the Tournelles, and proceeded to construct a new
_boulevard_ on a small islet near the south bank of the Loire, over
which the bridge passed. So far the siege had progressed successfully
and rapidly: but on October 27 Salisbury was mortally wounded by a
cannon-shot from the city, while reconnoitring from the top of the
Tournelles. The death of so experienced a soldier was a great blow
to the besiegers: but his successor Suffolk carried on the work with
energy. Bringing the army over to the right bank, he left Sir William
Glansdale in command of the Tournelles and the other forts on the left
bank. His purpose was to complete the investment by a series of small
forts all round the city; but the weather delayed his operations,
and it was not till the end of the year that the city was actually
invested. Even then it was not impossible to run the gauntlet of the
forts, or to steal into the city by the river: scarcity however began
to be severely felt. In February 1429 a relieving force, attempting
to destroy a convoy of provisions on its way to the English camp,
was totally routed on the "Day of the Herrings," so called because
a large part of the provisions consisted of salt herrings (Lent was
just beginning). Sir John Fastolfe, who commanded, and who had a force
partly English, partly French of the Burgundian party, had time to
form his waggons in square,[37] within which extemporised fort his
men stood on the defensive, the English archers guarding one of the
issues, the French spearmen the other. The attack was begun by a body
of picked men who had come out of Orleans, and who had cannon with
them. Obviously Fastolfe's defence could not long have been maintained
against even the inefficient cannonading of that age: but the vanguard
of the relieving army came up in time to save the day to the English.
Throwing themselves from their horses, in obedience to the unreasoning
superstition which had cost the French so dear on greater fields,
they rushed at Fastolfe's _lager_. The Scots were shot down by the
archers, the Gascons impaled themselves on the spears: when the rout
was complete, the little English army issuing from behind their waggons
slaughtered as they pleased. Such a disaster was calculated to drive
the men of Orleans to despair. As a last chance they offered their city
to the duke of Burgundy, who naturally would much have liked such an
addition to his dominions: as naturally, the English would not listen
to the proposal for a moment. One of the regent's council said in the
duke's presence that the English were not made to chew morsels for
the duke of Burgundy to swallow. Bedford himself put the same point
with less vulgarity, but equal force, saying that he was not going to
beat the bushes, for some one else to catch the birds. Burgundy had
no answer to make: he was not yet prepared to break with the English,
though this disappointment helped no doubt to increase the growing
coolness between him and Bedford. Orleans had no prospect before it but
starvation or surrender, when its doom was averted by a miracle.
The deliverer who appeared at this critical moment was Jeanne d'Arc, a
peasant girl from Lorraine. Her imagination had been deeply impressed
by the miseries of the war: for years she had heard voices, as she
called them, telling her that she was to save France, and gradually
becoming more frequent and more specific in their commands. At length
her profound enthusiasm made such an impression on her neighbours that
she was able to make her way to the young king, to whom she announced
herself as sent by God to deliver France, and conduct him to Rheims for
his coronation. Charles was naturally inclined to be incredulous, but
she convinced him of her good faith, and won so great an influence over
courtiers and soldiers alike, as to put down for the time the prevalent
profligacy and irreligion. We are told that the roughest of the French
soldiers of fortune, notorious for bad language, accustomed himself, to
please the Maid, to swearing only _par mon bâton_.
The immediate and pressing business was to save Orleans. Clad in
armour, Jeanne accompanied a force which obeyed her inspiration,
though it could hardly be said to have been under her orders, to
convey provisions from Tours. In her simple faith she wished to attack
the besiegers in the most direct way; but the leaders, thinking it
safer to set about their difficult task in the fashion most likely to
succeed, brought her opposite Orleans on the south side of the Loire.
She was indignant at the deception, but the incident only served to
increase her influence. The intention was to send the provisions
into Orleans by large boats, which were to be sent up the river to a
convenient spot, and run the gauntlet of the besiegers back again,
under cover of an attack from the relieving force. The wind however
blew down stream, and the boats could not move against both wind and
current. Jeanne however confidently declared that the wind would
change, as it in fact did, and she herself entered Orleans. Nothing
was so far gained but the immediate relief of urgent need: but in
this case the first step was emphatically everything. The French
were roused to confident enthusiasm by the belief that the Maid was
their divinely-appointed deliverer, the English were correspondingly
depressed. The consciousness of superiority, that mysterious but very
real feeling which often plays a great part in war, changed sides.
"Before the Maid arrived," said Dunois, one of the bravest of the
French leaders, "200 English would put to flight, in a skirmish, 800
or 1000 of the king's army: after she came, 200 French engaged all
the strength of the English, and forced them to shut themselves up
in their forts." This was an exaggeration, but no more. One by one
the English _bastides_ were assailed, and fell into the hands of the
French. Sometimes the defence was but feeble, sometimes it was for the
time successful. The truth was that the English superiority was due
to their tactics in the field, for which there was obviously no place
in the attack and defence of fortifications, not to greater courage,
except so far as repeated defeats had cowed the French and led them
to expect failure. Jeanne d'Arc had changed all that: her own perfect
courage, and calm conviction that she was under the guidance of Heaven,
roused her excitable countrymen to irresistible enthusiasm. At length
came the turn of the Tournelles: the relieving army, with the Maid at
their head, assaulted the _boulevard_ which protected the little fort
on the south. The English defended themselves desperately, and for
three hours kept the enemy at bay. Jeanne was wounded by an arrow,
and this caused such general discouragement that the leaders of the
French were on the point of retreating. The Maid herself however had
not lost heart; "See," she cried suddenly, "my banner touches the
wall, the place is yours," and returned to the assault. Roused to
madness by her example, the French renewed the conflict, some of them
shouting that they could see St. Michael in the air beckoning them on,
others that they saw the white dove of the Holy Spirit alight on the
Maid's standard. Some of the garrison of Orleans pushed planks across
the broken arch of the bridge, and took the Tournelles in rear. The
_boulevard_ was carried, and as Glansdale the commander was retiring
into the Tournelles, a cannon-ball broke the bridge of communication,
and he was drowned in the ditch. With his death all resistance ceased:
the relics of the garrison of the Tournelles were taken prisoners. The
besiegers, seeing that the game was finally lost, abandoned the siege.
Apart from the personal interest awakened by the first exploits of
Jeanne d'Arc, who is a character unique in history, the siege of
Orleans has some military interest. In it we see the mediæval and the
modern[38] conditions of a siege more or less combined. Cannon are
employed on both sides, and at first with some effect; the English
capture of the Tournelles is due to the damage done by their fire:
Salisbury could have been killed from the town by no other means. The
_bastides_ erected by the besiegers are in mediæval style, belonging to
a state of things when walled towns had to be starved out: it does not
seem to have been regarded as possible to batter Orleans itself. The
_boulevard_ of the Tournelles on the other hand is modern, an outwork
formed expressly for the use of cannon. The hand-to-hand fighting of
the assaults is of all ages, down to very recent times. Whether, in
face of all the engines of destruction that can now be brought into
play, a storm like that of the Tournelles, or even like that of
Badajos, will ever be possible again, is another question.
The failure of the siege of Orleans marks the beginning of the decline
of English power in France. Jeanne d'Arc is reasonably called a saint
and a heroine: her career, brief and ultimately disastrous as it
was, had a great immediate effect in stimulating French patriotism
generally, and especially in rousing Charles VII. to a sense of his
duty. But it is entirely a mistake to rank her first and greatest
exploit as an event of supreme importance.[39] One may see any day on
the sea-shore the tide at its height lapping round the base of a bit of
rock which it never entirely covers: but one does not therefore suppose
that the rock caused the turn of the tide. The nominal submission of
France to Henry V. at the treaty of Troyes had been due to France being
divided against herself, to one party being so bitter against the other
as to be willing to league with the foreigner. The superiority of
Henry, and of his brother the regent Bedford, to any of their immediate
opponents, was most marked; the excellence of the English soldiers and
tactics gave them every advantage. Yet even so they could not conquer
France. Such a state of things could not last; competent soldiers,
rulers who were not slaves of faction, were sure to emerge sooner or
later. The duke of Burgundy had only to change sides, which as a matter
of fact he did out of personal grudge against Bedford, to weight the
scale heavily. The ultimate failure of the English attempt to conquer
France was inevitable: whether the process of expelling them should be
long or short must needs depend on the amount of capacity shown on each
side.
The superstitious awe inspired by Jeanne d'Arc did not last long; in
that age all the world was ready to believe in her having supernatural
powers, but these might as easily be diabolical as divine. Naturally
the French regarded her at first as divinely inspired; and her piety,
honesty, and perfect simplicity, which were conspicuous to them, might
well have roused a more lasting enthusiasm. The English as naturally
regarded her as a witch, and put her to a cruel death as such when she
fell into their hands. The victory of Patay, won by the French during
the period of her influence, was due mainly to the English commander
being attacked before he had time to form his line, though to Jeanne
may doubtless be ascribed the unusual promptness of the French in
attacking. The Maid fulfilled her word, and had Charles VII. crowned in
Rheims: but otherwise the war dragged on indecisively till the regent
Bedford died, just when the duke of Burgundy had found it worth his
while to go over to the French side. Thenceforward the English had no
competent head in France: the government at home was weak and torn by
dissensions, which led to the claims of the duke of York. Nevertheless
the war lasted nearly twenty years longer, steadily tending in one
direction, but marked by only one notable event. This was the battle
of Formigny in 1451, which was the final blow to the English power in
Normandy. Formigny was lost because the English leaders applied the
tactics which had won Crecy and Agincourt under conditions to which
they were not applicable. They took up a defensive position, and stood
to await attack, when their business was to force their way onwards.
The French had a couple of cannon, and the English broke their lines
to try and seize them. They nearly succeeded, but the result was that
the two armies engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict, in which the archers
could not use their bows. Another French force coming up and falling on
the rear of the English completed their destruction: of the 5000 men
engaged, 3700 were counted dead on the field.
That England gained anything by the Hundred Years' War, except military
repute, no one would dream of affirming: even that was evanescent,
for gunpowder presently drove the bow out of use. France gained, at a
frightful cost of suffering, her national coherence, but she gained
it in the disastrous form of a monarchy virtually absolute. The war
almost destroyed the feudal nobility, and left nothing strong but the
crown. What might have been the history of France if she had not gone
through this fiery trial, if the nobles had remained petty princes as
in Germany, can hardly be conjectured; the Hundred Years' War fixed
the destiny of France for her. The political lessons of the war are
glaringly obvious. A nation in the modern sense is indefinitely
stronger than a feudal kingdom: conquest of a people that chooses to
resist persistently and with judgment is impossible. The military
lessons are equally clear: discipline will counterbalance almost
any odds: the chief means of tactical success lies in the skilful
combination of different arms.